伦理学：英汉对照典藏版

（荷）斯宾诺莎

　　©北京中文在线数字出版股份有限公司，2013-2014

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　　伦理学：英汉对照典藏版/（荷）斯宾诺莎著.北京：北京中文在线数字出版股份有限公司，2009.10

　　CAEBN：7-001-000-00196785-0

　　分类号：英语—汉语—对照读物；伦理学—研究　H319.4:B82

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　　伦理学：英汉对照典藏版

　　（荷）斯宾诺莎　著

　　出 品 人：童之磊

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　　首次发布：2009.10.26

　　更新时间：2014.9.25

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　　出 版 社：陕西人民出版社

　　ISBN：978-7-224-08011-7

　　出版时间：2007.01.01

编者的话

在帝国主义国家以坚船利炮轰开中国大门之前，我们几乎还不知道有这样一种与我们迥异的人存在。他们与我们外貌不同，这让我们产生了种种仇恨的联想。我们视其为妖魔，用古老相传抵御妖魔的手段与之对抗。今日，我们难免会想，在当日的侵略者眼中，我们所采用的是否是一种巫术？以巫术对抗现代文明，难怪我们会一败涂地，只是当年，有多少志士空耗了血泪？

痛定思痛，有识之士开始思考，使东西方的发展差距如此之大，其根本原因何在？答案就是理性精神。

西方的理性精神源自古希腊，古希腊哲学中所谓的“爱智慧”，即体现了对理性的推崇。理性精神在西方持续发展，虽有中世纪的低迷，但在文艺复兴和启蒙时代后冲破了种种精神钳制，使西方爆发了真正意义上的思想革命。自此，人类对自身的理性产生了极大的信赖，人类理性代替上帝的意志成为“万物的尺度”。理性意识的高涨使人们重视现世人生价值，造就了自由进行创造的进取精神，使得西方无论在理论还是在实践上，都踏上了健康蓬勃的发展道路。

与西方重视个人价值与实践的理性精神相比，中国的传统思想太过于“内求于心”。我们所强调的个人体验与涵养缺乏思辨、超越、分析、实证，除了提升个人修养，为社会定制道德规范外，对社会实践并不具有指导意义。

这种东方式的精神，使得17、18世纪，当西方世界在理性精神指导下蒸蒸日上时，中国却陷入了柏杨先生所谓的“文化酱缸”之中，思想界是“一塌糊涂的污泥”，看不到些微的光芒。而相应的，科学与文化也只有承袭，难得创新。毋庸讳言，若无外力介入，强迫国人“睁眼看世界”，或许今日的中国，仍然以为自己处于不与外界通人烟的“桃花源”中呢！

回顾来路，感喟再三。为此，在《文思博要》首批十种获得良好的反响之后，我们又择取十种图书：《理想国》《乌托邦》《人性论》《权利意志》《菊花与刀》《人口原理》《艺术哲学》《宽容》《人类理解论》《伦理学》，汇为《文思博要》第二批，以馈读者。这十种图书为不同时代、不同文化领域的杰作，但都闪耀着西方理性精神的光芒。相信阅读之后，读者非但能在语言学习上更进一步，其思维的宽度与广度也将会得到极大的拓展。

本尼迪克特·德·斯宾诺莎（Benedict de Spinoza），1632年11月24日生于阿姆斯特丹一个普通的犹太商人家庭，卒于1677年2月20日。斯宾诺莎青少年时期接受犹太教育，曾在犹太教会学校学习希伯来文、旧约和犹太典籍。毕业后受到人文主义思想的影响，开始研究布鲁诺和笛卡尔的哲学，并逐渐怀疑和批评犹太教义。最终，犹太教会以思想异端的罪名革除了他的教籍。此后，他一直以磨制光学镜片维持生计，使得自己的身体受到严重损害。但是，即使在如此艰难的生活条件下，他仍然坚持哲学研究，追求真理，他的思想也以通信的方式传播到欧洲各地。正如德国哲学家文德尔班在纪念斯宾诺莎时曾经评价的那样：“为真理而死难，为真理而生更难。”斯宾诺莎就是在不懈地追求真理的过程中，走完了虽然贫困却极其丰富的一生的。

斯宾诺莎生前仅出版过两部著作，一部是以他的真实姓名发表的《笛卡尔哲学原理》，另外一部则是匿名出版的《神学政治论》。在斯宾诺莎死后不久，他的友人以《遗著》为名发表了他的著作集。他的主要著作除以上所述之外，还包括《神、人及其幸福简论》、《希伯来语法》、《政治论》等。就其基本思想而言，斯宾诺莎详尽地探讨了其时代哲学所关注的各种问题，其中包括实体、属性和样式的学说，唯理论的认识论和方法论，无神论，政治学说和伦理学等。在所有这些方面，他都为人类认识的发展和社会的进步作出了积极的贡献。

尽管在斯宾诺莎逝世后的相当长一个时期内，其著作继续受到不同宗教派别的谴责，根本没有得到哲学家和进步思想家的足够重视，但是随着时间的推移，斯宾诺莎的哲学越来越受到应有的重视。他的无神论直接影响了18世纪法国的战斗无神论者；而他的唯物主义也被包括狄德罗、霍尔巴赫、爱尔维修等在内的法国唯物主义者所继承和发展。在德国，斯宾诺莎的哲学经过莱辛、赫尔德等人的极力宣扬，也深深地影响了德国的启蒙思想家。黑格尔就将其哲学看成是自己客观唯心论的先驱，费尔巴哈更是称“斯宾诺莎是现代无神论者和唯物主义者的摩西”。马克思也十分重视斯宾诺莎的唯物主义哲学，把他坚持从世界本身说明世界称为近代哲学的最高荣誉，并把他视为17世纪辩证法的卓越代表之一。

这一切都反映出斯宾诺莎在西方思想史中不可或缺的崇高地位。而对于斯宾诺莎而言，最能体现他这一地位的著作无疑就是他耗费十年工夫完成的《伦理学》。这本书不但系统地表达了斯宾诺莎的哲学世界观以及认识论和伦理观，而且斯宾诺莎其他著作中所提出的许多观点，也都在这本著作中得到了详尽和确切的解释。可以说，《伦理学》一书作为斯宾诺莎一生哲学思想的结晶，是17世纪西欧唯物主义思想发展的总结，该书中体现的辩证法思想和唯理论倾向在西方哲学思想发展史上起到了承前启后的重要作用。

《伦理学》一书的全名是《用几何学予以证明的伦理学》，分为“论神”、“论心灵的性质和起源”、“论情感的起源和性质”、“论人的奴役或情感的力量”和“论理智的力量或人的自由”五个部分，分别论述了神、心灵、情感、自由和幸福，从而构成了一个完整的哲学体系。就结构而言，本书最大的特征就在于它是根据几何学方法完成的。其基本结构是首先提出定义，其次提出公理，然后再对公理进行证明，并常常从公理中延伸出推论以及注释。其中，第一部分讨论本体论；第二部分讨论认识论；最后三个部分则具体讨论伦理学问题。在这里，斯宾诺莎运用辩证的逻辑力量，探讨了人生理想、善与恶、行为规范、原则和道德现象等等伦理学研究的对象。最终指出：追求个人利益作为人的最高自然权利，是人性的普遍规律和道德的唯一基础。善与恶都以是否有利于人的自我保存为标准的。但是，人在认识到个人利益的同时，必须为公共利益而努力，关心他人和人类的利益，只有利他才能利己。可以说，斯宾诺莎为我们理解人类自身、理解人与人之间的关系，并最终选择一种理性的生活方式，提供了最有说服力的分析文本。诚然，如黑格尔所言：要达到斯宾诺莎的成就是不容易的，要达到斯宾诺莎的人格则是不可能的。但是尽管如此，对于我们这样的芸芸众生而言，通过阅读斯宾诺莎，在他的《伦理学》中寻找到完善自身人格的力量还是非常可能的。

Part Ⅰ　On God

Definitions

1.By that which is self-caused,I mean that of which the essence involves exist-ence,or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.

2.A thing is called finite after its kind,when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature.

For instance,a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body.So,also,a thought is limited by another thought,but a body is not limited by thought,nor a thought by body.

3.By substance,I mean that which is in itself,and is conceived through itself；in other words,that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other con-ception.

4.By attribute,I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the es-sence of substance.

5.By mode,I mean the modifications of substance,or that which is in another through which it is also conceived.

6.By God,I mean a being absolutely infinite-that is,a substance consisting of infinite attributes,of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

Explanation.-I say absolutely infinite,not infinite after its kind；for,of a thing infinite only after its kind,infinite attributes may be denied；but if something is abso-lutely infinite,whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its es-sence.

7.That thing is called free,which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature,and of which the action is determined by itself alone.On the other hand,that thing is necessary,or rather constrained,which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.

8.By eternity,I mean existence itself,in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.

Explanation.-Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth,like the es-sence of a thing,and,therefore,cannot be explained by means of continuance or time,though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.

Axioms

1.Everything which exists,exists either in itself or in something else.

2.That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself.

3.From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows；and,on the other hand,if no definite cause be granted,it is impossible that an effect can follow.

4.The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.

5.Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood,the one by means of the other；the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

6.A true idea must agree with its object.

7.If a thing can be conceived as non-existing,its essence does not involve exist-ence.

Propositions

PROP.1.Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

Proof.-This is clear from Def.3.and 5.

PROP.2.Two substances whose attributes are different have nothing in common.

Proof.-Also evident from Def.3.For each must exist in itself,and be conceived through itself；in other words,the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

PROP.3.Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.

Proof.-If they have nothing in common,it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other,and,therefore,one cannot be the cause of the other.

PROP.4.Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances,or by the difference of their modifications.

Proof.-Everything which exists,exists either in itself or in something else，-that is,outside the understanding there is nothing except substance and its modifications.Nothing is,therefore,given besides the understanding,by which several things may be distinguished one from the other,except the substances,or,in other words,their attrib-utes and modifications.

PROP.5.In nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.

Proof.-If several distinct substances be granted,they must be distinguished one from the other,either by the difference of their attributes,or by the difference of their modifications.If only by the difference of their attributes,it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute.But if by the difference of their modifications-as substance is naturally prior to its modifications，-it follows that set-ting the modifications aside,and considering substance in itself,that is truly,there can-not be conceived one substance different from another，-that is,there cannot be granted several substances,but one substance only.

PROP.6.One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Proof.-In nature there cannot be two substances of the same attribute,i.e.，which have anything common to them both,and,therefore,one cannot be the cause of another,neither can one be produced by the other.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything ex-ternal to itself.For in nature there is nothing except substances and their modifications.Now substance cannot be produced by another substance,therefore it cannot be pro-duced by anything external itself.This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory.For,if substance be produced by an external cause,the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause,and it would itself not be substance.

PROP.7.Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

Proof.-Substance cannot be produced by anything external,it must,therefore,be its own cause-that is,its essence necessarily involves existence,or existence be-longs to its nature.

PROP.8.Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Proof.-There can be only one substance with an identical attribute,and existence follows from its nature.Its nature,therefore,involves existence,either as finite or infi-nite.It does not exist as finite,for it would then be limited by something else of the same kind,which would also necessarily exist；and there would be two substances with an identical attribute,which is absurd.It therefore exists as infinite.

PROP.9.The more reality or being a thing has the greater the number of its attrib-utes.

PROP.10.Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

Proof.-An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance,as constitu-ting its essence,and,therefore,must be conceived through itself.

PROP.11.God,or substance,consisting of infinite attributes,of which each ex-presses eternal and infinite essentiality,necessarily exists.

Proof.-If this be denied,conceive,if possible,that God does not exist；then his essence does not involve existence.But this is absurd.Therefore God necessarily exists.

Another proof.-Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned,ei-ther for its existence,or for its non-existence-e.g.，if a triangle exist,a reason or cause must be granted for its existence；if,on the contrary,it does not exist,a cause must also be granted,which prevents it from existing,or annuls its existence.This rea-son or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing,or be external to it.For instance,the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature,namely,because it would involve a contradiction.On the other hand,the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature,inasmuch as its nature involves existence.

But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not follow from the nature of those figures,but from the order of the whole of corporeal Nature.From the latter it must follow,either that a triangle necessarily exists,or that it is impossible that it should exist.So much is self-evident.It follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists,if no cause or reason be granted which prevents its existence.If,then,no cause or reason can be given,which prevents the existence of God,or which destroys his existence,we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist.If there were such a reason,or cause,it would have to be either in God s very nature or outside it,that is,in another substance of another nature.For if it were of the same nature,God,by that very fact,would be admitted to exist.But substance of another nature could have noth-ing in common with God,and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence.

As,then,a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature,such cause must,perforce,if God does not exist,be drawn from God s own nature,which would involve a contradiction.To make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect,is absurd；therefore,neither in the nature of God；nor externally to his nature,can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence.Therefore,God necessari-ly exists.

PROP.12.No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

Proof.-The parts into which substance as thus conceived would be divided,either will retain the nature of substance,or they will not.If the former,then each part will necessarily be infinite,and self-caused,and will perforce consist of a different attrib-ute,so that,in that case,several substances could be formed out of one substance,which is absurd.Moreover,the parts would have nothing in common with their whole,and the whole could both exist and be conceived without its parts,which is absurd,as no one will be able to doubt.If we adopt the second alternative-namely,that the parts will not retain the nature of substance-then,if the whole substance were divided into e-qual parts,it would lose the nature of substance,and would cease to exist,which is ab-surd.

PROP.13.Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Proof.-If it could be divided,the parts into which it was divided would either re-tain the nature of absolutely infinite substance,or they would not.If the former,we should have several substances of the same nature,which is absurd.If the latter,then substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist,which is also absurd.

Corollary.-It follows that no substance,and consequently no corporeal substance，in so far as it is substance,is divisible.

PROP.14.Except God,no substance can be or be conceived.

Proof.-As God is a being absolutely infinite,of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied,and he necessarily exists,if any substance be-sides God were granted it would have to be explained by some attribute of God,and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist,which is absurd.Therefore,besides God no substance can be granted,or consequently,be conceived.If it could be con-ceived,it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent；but this is absurd.There-fore,besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

Corollary 1.-Clearly,therefore：1.God is one,that is only one substance can be granted in the universe,and that substance is absolutely infinite.

Corollary 2.-It follows：2.That extension and thought are either attributes of God or modifications of the attributes of God.

PROP.15.Whatsoever is,is in God,and without God nothing can be,or be con-ceived.

Proof.-Besides God,no substance is granted or can be conceived,that is nothing which is in itself and is conceived through itself.But modes can neither be,nor be con-ceived without substance；wherefore they can only be in the divine nature,and can only through it be conceived.But except for substances and modes there is nothing,there-fore,without God nothing can be,or be conceived.

PROP.16.From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways-that is,all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Proof.-This Proposition will be clear to everyone,who remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers several Properties,which really necessa-rily follow therefrom（that is,from the actual essence of the thing）；and that it infers more Properties the more the definition of the thing expresses reality,that is,the more reality the essence of the defined thing involves.Now,as the divine nature has absolute-ly infinite attributes,of which each expresses infinite essence after its kind,it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things（that is,everything which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect）must necessarily follow.

Corollary 1.-Hence it follows,that God is the efficient cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect.

Corollary 2.-It also follows that God is a cause through himself and not an acci-dental cause.

Corollary 3.-It follows,thirdly,that God is the absolutely first cause.

PROP.17.God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,and is not constrained by any one.

Proof.-We have just shown,that from the necessity of the divine nature alone,or（what is the same thing）from the laws of his nature alone,absolutely infinite things fol-low；and we proved,that without God nothing can be,nor be conceived；but that all things are in God.So there can be nothing outside him by which he is determined or compelled to act.Therefore,God acts from the laws of his nature alone,and is com-pelled by no one.

Corollary 1.-It follows：I.That there can be no cause which,either extrinsically or intrinsically,besides the perfection of his own nature,moves God to act.

Corollary 2.-It follows：2.That God is the sole free cause.For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature,and acts by the sole necessity of his nature,where-fore God is the sole free cause.

PROP.18.God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

Proof.-All things which are,are in God,and must be conceived through God,therefore God is the cause of things which are in him.This is the first.Further,besides God there can be no substance,that is nothing in itself external to God.This is the sec-ond.God,therefore,is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

PROP.19.God,and all the attributes of God,are eternal.

Proof.-God is substance,which necessarily exists,that is existence appertains to its nature,or（what is the same thing）follows from its definition；therefore,God is e-ternal.Further,by the attributes of God we must understand that which expresses the essence of the divine substance,in other words,that which appertains to substance；that,I say,should be involved in the attributes of substance.Now eternity appertains to the nature of substance；therefore,eternity must appertain to each of the attributes,and thus all are eternal.

Note.-This Proposition is also evident from the manner in which I demonstrated the existence of God；it is evident,I repeat,from that proof,that the existence of God,like his essence,is an eternal truth Further,I have proved the eternity of God,in an-other manner,which I need not here repeat.

PROP.20.The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.

Proof.-God and all his attributes are eternal,that is each of his attributes expres-ses existence.Therefore the same attributes of God which explain his eternal essence,explain at the same time his eternal existence,in other words,that which constitutes God s essence constitutes at the same time his existence.Wherefore God s existence and God s essence are one and the same.

CorollaryⅠ.-Hence it follows that God s existence,like his essence,is an eter-nal truth.

Corollary　Ⅱ.-Secondly,it follows that God,and all the attributes of God,are unchangeable.For if they changed as to their existence,they would also change as to their essence；that is,obviously,be changed from true to false,which is absurd.

PROP.21.All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite,or,in other words,are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

Proof.-If you deny this,then conceive（if you can）that in some attribute of God there follows from its absolute nature something that is finite and has a determinate exist-ence,or duration,for instance,the God s idea in thought.Now thought,in so far as it is supposed to be an attribute of God,is necessarily in its nature infinite.But,in so far as it possesses God s idea,it is supposed finite.It cannot,however,be conceived as fi-nite,unless it be limited by thought；but it is not limited by thought itself,in so far as it has constituted God s idea（for so far it is supposed to be finite）；therefore,it is lim-ited by thought,in so far as it has not constituted God s idea,which nevertheless must necessarily exist.Therefore,there is thought which does not constitute God s idea,and,accordingly,God s idea does not naturally follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought（for it is conceived as constituting,and also as not constituting,God s idea），which is against our hypothesis.Wherefore,if God s idea in thought,or anything else in any attribute of God（for we may take any example,as the proof is of universal applica-tion）follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute,the said thing must necessarily be infinite.This was the first thing to be proven.

Next,a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration.For if you deny this,then suppose there is a thing,in some attribute of God,a thing which follows from the necessity of the nature of that at-tribute-for instance,God s idea in thought-and suppose at some time not to have existed,or to be about not to exist.Now thought being an attribute of God,must neces-sarily exist unchanged；and beyond the limits of the duration of God s idea（supposing the latter at some time not to have existed,or not to be going to exist），thought would perforce have existed without God s idea.But this is contrary to the hypothesis,for it is supposed that God s idea follows necessarily from the given thought.Therefore God s i-dea in thought,or anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God,cannot have a limited duration,but through the said attribute is eter-nal.This was the second thing to be proven.Bear in mind that the same Proposition may be affirmed of anything,which in any attribute necessarily follows from God s abso-lute nature.

PROP.22.Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God,in so far as it is modified by a modification,which exists necessarily and as infinite,through the said attribute,must also exist necessarily and as infinite.

Proof.-The proof of this Proposition is similar to that of the preceding one.

PROP.23.Every mode,which exists both necessarily and as infinite,must neces-sarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God,or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily,and as infinite.

Proof.-A mode exists in something else,through which it must be conceived,that is,it exists solely in God,and solely through God can be conceived.If,therefore,a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite,it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of God,in so far as such attribute is conceived as ex-pressing the infinity and necessity of existence,in other words eternity；that is,in so far as it is considered absolutely.A mode,therefore,which necessarily exists as infinite，must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God,either immediately or through the means of some modification,which follows from the absolute nature of the said attribute；that is,which exists necessarily and as infinite.

PROP.24.The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

Proof.-This Proposition is evident from Def.1.For that of which the nature in-volves existence is self-caused,and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of things coming into existence,but also of their continuing in existence,that is,in scholastic phraseology,God is cause of the being of things.For whether things exist,or do not exist,whenever we contemplate their essence,we see that it involves neither existence nor duration.So their essence can be the cause neither of their existence nor of their duration,but only God,to whose nature alone it pertains to exist,can be the cause.

PROP.25.God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things,but also of their essence.

Proof.-If this be denied,then God is not the cause of the essence of things；and therefore the essence of things can be conceived without God.This is absurd.There-fore,God is the cause of the essence of things.

Corollary.-Particular things are nothing but modifications of God s attributes,or modes by which God s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.The demonstration is evident from P15 and D5.

PROP.26.A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner,has neces-sarily been thus conditioned by God；and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act.

Proof.-That by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a particular man-ner is necessarily something positive；therefore both of its essence and of its existence God by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause；this is our first point.And from it the second thing asserted also follows very clearly.For if a thing,which has not been conditioned by God,could condition itself,the first part of our proof would be false,and this,as we have shown,is absurd.

PROP.27.A thing,which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular manner,cannot render itself unconditioned.

Proof.-This Proposition is evident from the third axiom.

PROP.28.Every individual thing,or everything which is finite and has a condi-tioned existence,cannot exist or be conditioned to act,unless it be conditioned for ex-istence and action by a cause other than itself,which also is finite,and has a condi-tioned existence；and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist,or be conditioned to act,unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause,which also is fi-nite,and has a conditioned existence,and so on to infinity.

Proof.-Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act,has been thus conditioned by God.But that which is finite and has a conditioned existence,cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God；for whatsoever follows from the absolute na-ture of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal.It must,therefore,follow from some attribute of God,in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way modified.For there is nothing except substance and its modes,and modes are merely modifications of the attributes of God.But from God,or from any of his attributes,in so far as the lat-ter is modified by a modification infinite and eternal,a conditioned thing cannot follow.It had,therefore,to follow from,or be conditioned to exist and act by God or an attrib-ute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determi-nate existence.This is our first point.Again,this cause or this modification must in its turn be conditioned by another cause,which also is finite,and has a conditioned exist-ence,and again,this last by another；and so on to infinity.

PROP.29.Nothing in the universe is contingent,but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

Proof.-Whatsoever is,is in God.But God cannot be called a thing contingent.For he exists necessarily,and not contingently.Further,the modes of the divine nature follow therefrom necessarily,and not contingently-either in so far as the divine nature is considered absolutely,or in so far as it is considered to be determined to act in a cer-tain way.Further,God is not only the cause of these modes,in so far as they simply ex-ist,but also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular manner.If they be not conditioned by God,it is impossible,and not contingent,that they should condition themselves；contrariwise,if they be conditioned by God,it is im-possible,and not contingent that they should render themselves unconditioned.Where-fore all things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature,not only to exist,but also to exist and operate in a particular manner,and there is nothing that is contin-gent.

PROP.30.Intellect,in function finite,or in function infinite,must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,and nothing else.

Proof.-A true idea must agree with its object,in other words,that which is con-tained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be granted in nature.But in na-ture there is no substance save God,nor any modifications save those which are in God,and cannot without God either be or be conceived.Therefore the intellect,in function finite,or in function infinite,must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifica-tions of God,and nothing else.

PROP.31.The intellect in function,whether finite or infinite,as will,desire,love,etc.，should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature.

Proof.-By the intellect we do not mean absolute thought,but only a certain mode of thinking,differing from other modes,such as love,desire,etc.，and therefore requi-ring to be conceived through absolute thought.It must be so conceived through some at-tribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought,that without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived.It must therefore be referred to na-ture passive rather than to nature active,as must also the other modes of thinking.

PROP.32.Will cannot be called a free cause,but only a necessary cause.

Proof.-Will is only a particular mode of thinking,like intellect；therefore no voli-tion can exist,nor be conditioned to act,unless it be conditioned by some cause other than itself,which cause is conditioned by a third cause,and so on to infinity.But if will be supposed infinite,it must also be conditioned to exist and act by God,not by virtue of his being substance absolutely infinite,but by virtue of his possessing an attrib-ute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought.Thus,however it be conceived,whether as finite or infinite,it requires a cause by which it should be condi-tioned to exist and act.Thus it cannot be called a free cause,but only a necessary or constrained cause.

Corollary 1.-Hence it follows,first,that God does not act according to freedom of the will.

Corollary 2.-It follows secondly,that will and intellect stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion,and rest,and absolutely all natural phenomena,which must be conditioned by God to exist and act in a particular manner.For will,like the rest,stands in need of a cause,by which it is conditioned to exist and act in a parti-cular manner.And although,when will or intellect be granted,an infinite number of re-sults may follow,yet God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will,any more than he can be said to act from freedom of motion and rest on account of those things that follow from motion and rest（for infinitely many things also follow from motion and rest）.Wherefore will no more appertains to God s nature than does anything else in nature,but stands in the same relation to him as motion,rest,and the like,which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner.

PROP.33.Things could have been produced by God in no other way,and in no other order than they have been produced.

Proof.-All things necessarily follow from the nature of God,and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist and act in a particular way.If things,therefore,could have been of a different nature,or have been conditioned to act in a different way,so that the order of nature would have been different,God s nature would also have been able to be different from what it now is；and therefore that different nature also would have perforce existed,and consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.This is absurd.Therefore things could not have been brought into being by God in any other manner,etc.

PROP.34.God s power is identical with his essence.

Proof.-From the sole necessity of the essence of God it follows that God is the cause of himself and of all things.Wherefore the power of God,by which he and all things are and act,is identical with his essence.

PROP.35.Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,necessarily exists.

Proof.-Whatsoever is in God s power must be so comprehended by his essence that it necessarily follows therefrom,and therefore necessarily exists.

PROP.36.Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.

Proof.-Whatsoever exists expresses God s nature or essence in a given conditioned manner；that is,whatsoever exists,expresses in a given conditioned manner God s pow-er,which is the cause of all things,therefore an effect must necessarily follow.

Appendix

In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God.I have shown that he necessarily exists,that he is one；that he is,and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature；that he is the free cause of all things,and how he is so；that all things are in God,and so depend on him,that without him they could neither exist nor be con-ceived；lastly,that all things are pre-determined by God,not through his free will or absolute fiat,but from the very nature of God or infinite power.I have further,where occasion offered,taken care to remove the prejudices,which might impede the compre-hension of my demonstrations.Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things,as I have explained it above.I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.

All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one：that men com-monly suppose that all natural things act,as men do,on account of an end；indeed,they maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end,for they say that God has made all things for man,and man that he might worship God.I will,therefore,consider this opinion,asking first why it obtains general credence,and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it？secondly,I will point out its falsity；and,lastly,I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad,right and wrong,praise and blame,order and confusion,beauty and ugliness,and the like.However,this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the hu-man mind；it will be sufficient here,if I assume as a starting point,what ought to be u-niversally admitted,namely,that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things,that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them,and that they are conscious of such desire.Herefrom it follows first,that men think themselves free,inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires,and never even dream,in their ignorance,of the causes which have disposed them to wish and desire.Secondly,that men do all things for an end,namely,for that which is useful to them,and which they seek.Hence they seek to know only the final causes of what has been done,and when they have heard them,they are satisfied,because they have no reason to doubt further.But if they cannot hear them from another,nothing remains for them but to turn toward themselves,and reflect on the ends by which they are usually determined to do such things；so they necessarily judge the temperament of other men from their own tempera-ment.Furthermore,they find-both in themselves and outside themselves-many means that are very helpful in seeking their own advantage,for instance,eyes for see-ing,teeth for chewing,herbs and animals for yielding food,the sun for giving light,the sea for breeding fish,etc.，they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for ob-taining such conveniences.And knowing that they had found these means,not provided them for themselves,they had reason to believe that there was someone else who had prepared those means for their use.As they look upon things as means,they cannot be-lieve them to be self-created；but,judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves,they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom,who have arranged and adapted everything for human use.They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers（having no information on the subject）in accordance with their own nature,and therefore they assert that the gods or-dained everything for the use of man,in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honors.Hence also it follows,that everyone thought out for him-self,according to his abilities,a different way of worshipping God,so that God might love him more than his fellows,and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice.Thus the prejudice developed into supersti-tion,and took deep root in the human mind；and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things；but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain,i.e.，nothing which is useless to man,they only seem to have demonstrated that nature,the gods,and men are all mad together.Con-sider,I pray you,the result：among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances,such as storms,earthquakes,diseases,etc.，so they declared that such things happen,because the gods are angry at some wrong done them by men,or at some fault committed in their worship.Experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples,that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike；still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice,for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant,and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance,than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh.They therefore laid down as an axiom,that God s judgments far transcend human understanding.Such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity,if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and proper-ties of figures without regard to their final causes.There are other reasons（which I need not mention here）besides mathematics,which were able to bring it about that man would notice these common prejudices and be led to the true knowledge of things.

I have now sufficiently explained my first point.There is no need to show at length,that nature has no particular goal in view,and that final causes are mere human figments.This,I think,is already evident enough,both from the causes and founda-tions on which I have shown such prejudice to be based,and also from Prop.16.，and the Corollaries of Prop.32.，and,in fact,all those propositions in which I have shown,that everything proceeds by a certain eternal necessity of nature,and with the utmost perfection.However,I will add a few remarks：this doctrine concerning the end turns nature completely upside down.For what is really a cause,it considers as an effect,and conversely.What is by nature prior,it makes posterior.And finally,what is supreme and most perfect,it makes imperfect.Passing over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident,it is plain from Props.21.，22.，23.，that effect,is most perfect which is produced immediately by God；the effect which requires for its production sev-eral intermediate causes is,in that respect,more imperfect.But if those things which were made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his end,then the things which come after,for the sake of which the first were made,are necessarily the most excellent of all.Further,this doctrine does away with the perfection of God；for,if God acts for an object,he necessarily desires something which he lacks.Certainly,the-ologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction between the object of want and the object of assimilation；still they confess that God made all things for the sake of himself,not for the sake of creation.They are unable to point to anything prior to creation,except God himself,as an object for which God should act.And so they are necessarily com-pelled to confess that God lacked those things for the sake of which he willed to prepare means,and that he desired them.This is clear through itself.

We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine,anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes,have imported a new method of argument in proof of their theory-namely,a reduction,not to the impossible,but to ignorance；thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting their doctrine.For example,if a stone falls from a roof on to some one s head and kills him,they will demonstrate by their new method,that the stone fell in order to kill the man；for,if it had not by God s will fallen with that object,how could so many circumstances（and there are often many concurrent circumstances）have all happened together by chance？Perhaps you will an-swer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing,and the man was walk-ing that way.“But why，”they will insist，“was the wind blowing,and why was the man at that very time walking that way？”If you again answer,that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before,the weather being previously calm,and that the man had been invited by a friend,they will again insist：“But why was the sea agitated,and why was the man invited at that time？”So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause,till at last you take refuge in the will of God-in other words,the sanctuary of ignorance.So,again,when they survey the frame of the human body,they are amazed；and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art conclude that it has been fashioned,not mechanically,but by divine and supernatu-ral skill,and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt another.

Hence any one who seeks for the true causes of miracles,and strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,and not to gaze at them like a fool,is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those,whom the masses adore as the in-terpreters of nature and the gods.Such persons know that,with the removal of igno-rance,the wonder which forms their only available means for proving and preserving their authority would vanish also.But I now quit this subject,and pass on to my third point.

After men persuaded themselves,that everything which is created is created for their sake,they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves,and to account those things the best of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind.Further,they were bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things,such as goodness,badness,order,confusion,warmth,cold,beauty,deformity,and so on；and from the belief that they are free agents arose the further notions praise and blame,sin and merit.

I will speak of these latter hereafter,when I treat of human nature；the former I will briefly explain here.

Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God they have called good,everything which hinders these objects they have styled bad；and inasmuch as those who do not understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way,but merely imagine them after a fashion,and mistake their imagination for understanding,such per-sons firmly believe that there is an order in things,being really ignorant both of things and their own nature.For when things are so disposed that,when they are presented to us through the senses,we can easily imagine them,and so can easily remember them,we say that they are well-ordered；if the contrary,that they are ill-ordered or confused.Further,as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to us,men prefer order to confusion-as though there were any order in nature,except in relation to our imagi-nation-and say that God has created all things in order；thus,without knowing it,at-tributing imagination to God,unless,indeed,they would have it that God foresaw hu-man imagination,and arranged everything,so that it should be most easily imagined.Nor will it,perhaps,give them pause that infinitely many things are found which far surpass our imagination,and a great many which confuse it on account of its weakness.But enough has been said on this subject.The other abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining,in which the imagination is differently affected,though they are considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes of things,inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for the sake of themselves；and,according as they are affected by it,style it good or bad,healthy or rotten and corrupt.For instance,if the motion whose objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,the objects causing it are styled beautiful；if a contrary motion be excited,they are styled ugly.Those which move the sense through the nose,they call pleasant-smelling or stinking；through the tongue,sweet or bitter,tasty or tasteless；through touch,hard or soft,rough or smooth,etc.；and finally,those which move the ears are said to produce noise,sound or harmony.Men have been so mad as to believe that God is pleased by harmony.Indeed there are philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the motions of the heavens produce a harmony.All of these things instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the disposition of his brain,or rather mistakes for things the forms of his imagination.We need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed and finally skepticism；for although human bodies in many respects agree,yet in very many others they differ；so that what seems good to one seems bad to another；what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another；what is pleasing to one displeases another,and so on.I need not further enumerate,because this is not the place to treat the subject at length,and also because the fact is sufficient-ly well known.It is commonly said：“So many men,so many minds；everyone is wise in his own way；brains differ as completely as palates.”All of which proverbs show,that men judge of things according to their mental disposition,and rather imagine than understand；for,if they understood phenomena,they would,as mathematics attest,be convinced,if not attracted,by what I have urged.

We have now perceived,that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining,and do not indicate the true nature of anything,but only the constitution of the imagination；and,although they have names,as though they were en-tities,existing externally to the imagination,I call them entities imaginary rather than real；and,therefore,all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted.

Many argue in this way.If all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely per-fect nature of God,why are there so many imperfections in nature？such,for instance,as things corrupt to the point of putridity,loathsome deformity,confusion,evil,sin,etc.But these reasoners are,as I have said,easily confuted,for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power；things are not more or less per-fect,according as they delight or offend human senses,or according as they are service-able or repugnant to mankind.To those who ask why God did not so create all men,that they should be governed only by reason,I give no answer but this；because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest；or,more strictly,because the laws of his nature are so vast,as to suffice for the produc-tion of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence,as I have shown in Prop.16.

Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note；if there are any more of the same sort,everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflec-tion.

第一部分　论神

定义

一、所谓自因，我理解为其本质即包含存在，或者其本性只能被想象为存在物。

二、当一个事物可以被同种类的另一事物所限制，它就被认为按其本性是有限的。

比如，一个物体之所以被称为有限的，就是因为我们总是可以设想另外一个更大的物体。因此，同样，一个思想可以被另外一个思想所限制，但是一个物体不能被思想所限制，一个思想也不能被物体所限制。

三、所谓实体，我理解为在其自身内并通过自身被认识的东西。换句话说，实体概念可以不依赖任何其他概念而独立地形成。

四、所谓属性，我理解为这样的东西，即由理智来观察，是构成实体本质的东西。

五、所谓样式，我理解为实体的分殊，或在他物中通过他物同样被认识到的东西。

六、所谓神，我理解为一种绝对无限的存在，也就是，一个由无穷尽的属性所组成的实体，每一个属性都表示永恒无限的本质。

说明我说神是绝对无限的，而不说按其本性它是无限的。因为仅仅按其本性是无限的东西，其无穷尽的属性就会被否认。但如果事物是绝对无限的话，那么凡是表现其本质并且不包含否定词的，都属于其本质。

七、凡是由其自身本性的必然性而独自存在，其行为由其自身单独决定的东西叫做自由。反之，一个事物的存在或行为由外在于它的事物依据一定的方式所决定，便是必然的或者毋宁说是受束缚的。

八、所谓永恒，我理解为存在本身——就存在被理解为独自从永恒事物的定义中必然推导出而言。

说明这样的存在就像事物的本质一样，可以被理解为一种永恒的真理。因此，我们不能用绵延或时间去解释它，尽管绵延可以被设想为无始无终。

公理

一、一切事物不是存在于自身之中，就一定是存在于他物之中。

二、一切事物，如果不能通过他物而被认识，就一定能通过自身而被认识。

三、有明确的原因，就一定会有随之而来的结果；反之，没有明确的原因，就一定不可能会有相应的结果产生。

四、对结果的认识依赖并且包含了对原因的认识。

五、如果两个事物之间没有共同的地方，那么这个事物不能借助另一个事物而被理解，因为，这个事物的概念不包含另一个事物的概念。

六、真观念必然符合它的对象。

七、如果一个事物可以设想为不存在的东西，那么它的本质就不包含存在。

命题

命题一：实体按其本性先于它的分殊。

证明由定义三与定义五可证。

命题二：具有不同属性的两个实体之间没有共同点。

证明也由定义三可证。因为每一个实体都必定存在于各自的自身中并通过其自身而被认识，换句话说，这一实体的概念不包含另一个实体的概念。

命题三：彼此之间没有共同点的事物，一个物不能成为另一个物的原因。

证明如果两物之间没有共同点，那么一个事物不能借助另一事物而被理解，所以这个事物不能成为另一个事物的原因。

命题四：两个或更多不同的事物，其区别不是在于各自实体的属性不同，就一定是由于它们实体的分殊各有不同。

证明一切存在的事物不是存在于自身之中就一定存在于他物之中，也就是说在知性外面，除了实体及其分殊之外，没有其他东西。因此，在知性外面除了实体之外，或者换句话说，除了实体的属性和分殊之外，没有任何东西可以用来区别数个事物之间的异同。

命题五：就其本性而言，不存在两个或数个具有相同性质或属性的实体。

证明倘若有数个不同的实体，它们之间的区别必定不是由于属性的差异，就是由于分殊的不同。如果其区别仅仅是因为属性的差异，就必须承认具有相同属性的实体只能有一个。但是如果区别是由于分殊的不同，因为实体必然先于分殊，所以应当把分殊放在一边，而考察实体自身。确切地说，我们不能设想数个实体之间有什么区别，也就是说不能有数个实体，而只有唯一的实体。

命题六：一个实体不能由另外一个实体产生出来。

证明就其本质，不可能有两个具有相同属性的实体。也就是说，两个实体之间没有任何共同之处。因此，一个实体不能成为另一个实体的原因，一个实体也不能由另一个实体产生出来。

推论由此推知，一个实体不可能由任何其自身之外的东西产生。因为就其本性而言，除实体及其分殊之外，没有其他东西。既然一个实体不能产生另外一个实体，因此实体是不可能由任何外在于它的东西产生的。通过其反命题的荒谬性，这个命题可以更容易地得到证明。因为，如果一个实体是由一个外在于它的原因产生出来的，那么对这个实体的认识，就必须依靠对这一原因的认识，这样它本身也就不是实体了。

命题七：存在属于实体的本性。

证明实体不可能由任何外部的东西所产生。因此，它必定是自因，就是说它的本质必然包含存在，或者说存在属于它的本性。

命题八：每一个实体必然是无限的。

证明具有同一个属性的实体，只能是唯一的实体，而它的本性就是存在。因此，其存在的本性要么是有限的，要么是无限的。但实体不能是有限的存在，因为这样它必然会受到另一个具有同类性质实体的限制。这另外一个实体，同样是必然存在的。这样就会有两个具有相同属性的实体，而这是荒谬的。因此实体必然是无限的存在。

命题九：一个事物所具有的实在性或者存在越多，它所具有的属性也就越多。

命题十：一个实体的每个特殊的属性必然是通过自身而被理解的。

证明由理智来观察，一种属性是构成实体本质的东西，因此，它必然是通过自身而被认识的。

命题十一：神，或实体，包括无穷尽的属性。其每一个属性都表示永恒无限的本质，必然存在。

证明如果这一点被否认，设想一下，神是否可能不存在；这样其本质便不包含存在。但这是荒谬的。因此神必然存在。

另证任何事物的存在或不存在，都必然有相应的原因或理由。比如，假设一个三角形存在，就一定有它存在的原因或理由；相反，如果这个三角形不存在，也一定有阻止或取消它存在的原因或理由。这个原因或理由，要么包含在那个事物的本性之中，要么就一定是存在于那个事物的本性之外。比如，不存在正方的圆形的理由就暗含在圆形的本性之中。也就是，正方的圆形会包含一个矛盾。反之，实体之所以存在的理由也只是由实体的本性而得来的，因为实体的本性就包含着存在。

但是，圆形或三角形之所以存在或不存在的理由，却并不是由于这些形状的本性，而是由于有形的自然界的整体秩序。从这个秩序可以推知一个三角形一定存在，或者不可能存在。这一点是自明的。由此可知，如果没有任何原因或理由阻止一个事物的存在，那么这一事物必然存在。因而，如果没有任何原因或理由能阻止或破坏神的存在，我们就理所当然地得出结论，认为神必然存在。神之所以存在的原因或理由，如果不在神的绝对本性之中，就必定在神的本性之外，也即必定存在于具有另一种本性的其他实体之中。因为，如果承认神的存在理由就在和它具有同一本性的实体之中，那么神的存在也就是确切无疑的。但是，如果神的存在理由在于具有另一种本性的其他实体之中，那么这个实体和神就会毫无共同之处，因此它就既不能导致神的存在，也不能破坏神的存在。

由此，神不存在的原因或理由，不可能由任何神的本性之外的东西而来，那么如果神确实不存在，这一原因或理由就必然是从神的本性自身得出来的，而这是自相矛盾的。断言一个绝对无限、无上完满的存在物具有否定自身存在的理由，是荒谬的。因此，无论在神的本性之中，或在其本性之外，都不可能有任何原因或理由可以取消神的存在。所以，神必然存在。

命题十二：由实体的属性推知实体是可以被分开的，是对实体的属性不正确的认识。

证明假设实体是可以被分开的，那么从实体中分出来的各个部分要么仍然将保留实体的本性，要么将不会保留实体的本性。如果是前者，那么每个部分必然都是无限的，都是自因，并且都具有区别于其他部分的属性。如果是这样的话，则由一个实体可以形成多数实体，这是荒谬的。而且，这些部分就与其整体毫无共同之处，整体也可以在没有部分的情况下存在并被认识。毫无疑问，这也是荒谬的。如果接受第二种情况，也即，部分并不保留实体的本性，那么当整个实体被分为相等的部分时，它就会丧失实体的本性，不复存在，这是荒谬的。

命题十三：绝对无限的实体是不可分的。

证明如果它可以被分开，其分开的各个部分要么保留绝对无限实体的本性，或者无法保留其本性。如果是前者，就会存在数个具有相同本性的实体，这是荒谬的。如果是后者，那么绝对无限的实体将不会存在，这也是荒谬的。

推论由此可以推知，实体是不可分的，因此即使是有形体的实体，就其实体而言，也是不可分的。

命题十四：除了神之外，不可能存在任何实体，也不能认识任何实体。

证明既然神是绝对无限的存在物，凡是表示实体本质的属性都不可否认地归结于神，并且神是必然存在的，如果神之外还存在其他实体，就必须依据神的某种属性来说明这一实体，由此就会存在两个具有相同属性的实体，这是荒谬的。因此，除了神之外不可能存在任何实体，从而也不能设想任何实体。如果可以设想其他实体，它就必须被设想为存在的事物，但是这是荒谬的。所以，除了神之外，不可能存在任何实体，也不能认识任何实体。

推论一因此可以明确地推知：第一，神是唯一的，这即世界上仅仅存在一个实体，而且这个实体是绝对无限的。

推论二由此推知：第二，广延与思想要么是神的属性，要么是神的属性的分殊。

命题十五：一切存在物，都存在于神之中，没有神就不可能存在任何事物，也不可能认识任何事物。

证明除了神之外，不可能存在任何实体，也不可能认识任何实体，这就是说，除了神之外没有任何在自身内并通过自身而被认识的事物。但是如果没有实体，样式就既不可能存在，也不可能被认识。因此，样式只能存在于神的本性之中，只能通过神而被认识。但是除实体和样式之外什么也不存在，所以没有神就不可能存在任何事物，也不可能认识任何事物。

命题十六：从神的本性的必然性，必定推导出以无限多的方式表现出来的无限多的事物——也就是所有能够属于无限理智领域的事物。

证明每个人都会理解这个命题，只要他记得：从任何事物的定义中，理智都可以推知其若干特性，这些特性事实上是从事物的定义（也即从事物的本质）必然推知的。而且事物的定义表示的实在越多，就是说被定义的事物的本质所包含的实在越多，则理智所推知的特性也越多。既然神的本性具有绝对无限的属性，而其每个属性又按其本性表示无限的本质，那么从神的本性的必然性，必定推导出无限多的事物（也就是所有能够属于无限理智领域的事物）。

推论一由此推知，神是所有能够属于无限理智领域的事物的动力因。

推论二由此又推知，神是一个凭借自身的原因而不是偶然的原因。

推论三第三，还可推知，神是绝对的原动因。

命题十七：神仅仅依据其本性的法则而行动，不受任何其他东西的强迫。

证明我们已经指出，绝对无限的事物仅仅从神的本性的必然性推导出来，或者（这是同一回事）仅仅从神的本性的法则推导出来。我们也已经证明，一切存在都在神之中，没有神就不可能存在任何事物，也不可能认识任何事物。因此，在神之外不可能有其他事物可以决定神或强迫神去行动。因此，神仅仅依据其本性的法则而行动，而不受任何其他事物的强迫。

推论一由此推知：第一，除了神自身本性的完满之外，不可能有任何本质或非本质的原因促使神行动。

推论二由此推知：第二，只有神才是自由因。因为只有神依据其本性的必然性而存在，只有神依据其本性的必然性而行动，因此，只有神才是自由因。

命题十八：神是一切事物的内因，而不是外因。

证明一切事物都存在于神之中，都必须通过神而被认识，所以神是在它之中的一切事物的原因。这是第一点。其次，除了神之外不可能有任何实体，就是说在神之外不存在任何自在之物。这是第二点。因此，神是一切事物的内因，而不是外因。

命题十九：神，并且神的一切属性都是永恒的。

证明神是实体，实体必然存在，就是说存在属于其本性，或者（这是同一回事）从其定义可推知其存在。因此，神是永恒的。此外，神的属性应当理解为表示神圣实体之本质的东西，换句话说，是属于实体的东西；这个东西，我说，应当是实体的属性所包含的。既然永恒属于实体的本性，所以每一个属性都应当包含永恒，从而一切属性都是永恒的。

推论：用我证明神的存在的方式来证明这一命题，结果是显而易见的；我重写一下，在那个证明里，显然神的存在和神的本性一样，都是一个永恒的真理，在其他的命题里，我也证明过了神的永恒性，这里不再一一赘述。

命题二十：神的存在与神的本质是同一的。

证明神和神的一切属性都是永恒的，就是说神的每一个属性都表示存在。因此，凡是说明神的永恒本质的属性，同时也说明神的永恒存在。换句话说，构成神的本质的属性同时也构成神的存在，因此，神的存在与神的本质是同一的。

推论一如同神的本质一样，神的存在是一个永恒的真理。

推论二神和神的一切属性都是不能改变的。因为如果它们的存在发生了改变，那么其本质也将随之而发生改变。很明显，这就是说真的可以变成假的，这是荒谬的。

命题二十一：一切从神的任何属性的绝对本性推导出来的事物必定始终存在并且是无限的，或者换句话说，是凭借上述属性而永恒和无限的。

证明如果否认这一点，然后设想（如果可以的话），从神的任何属性的绝对本性推导出来的东西是有限的，并且具有一定的存在或绵延——比如，思想中的神的观念。就思想被设定为神的属性而言，其本性必然是无限的。但是就思想具有神的观念而言，它却被设定为有限的。然而，思想不能被设想为有限的，除非它是通过思想自身而被限制的。但是，就思想构成神的观念而言，它不能通过自身而被限制（因为现在思想已经被设定为是有限的）。所以，就思想不构成神的观念而言，它通过思想而被限制，然而思想仍然是必然存在的。因此，存在着不构成神的观念的思想，由此，就神是绝对的思想而言，神的观念并不必然从其本性而推导出来（因为思想被设定为既构成神的观念，又不构成这一观念）。这是违反我们的假定的。所以，如果思想中的神的观念，或任何其他在神的任何属性中的东西（因为这是具有普遍效用的证明，所以采取任何例子都是可以的）是从上述属性的绝对本性的必然性中推导出来的，那么上述事物必然是无限的。这是需要证明的第一点。

其次，凡是从神的任何属性的必然性推导出来的东西，不可能存在一个有限的绵延。因为如果否认这一点，则要假定在神的属性中有依据其必然性推导出来的东西——比如思想中的神的观念，还要假定这样的东西有时并未曾存在，或者将来不会存在。既然思想作为神的一种属性，一定必然而无变化地存在着；而且在神的观念的有限绵延之外（假定神的观念有时未曾存在，或者将来不会存在），这样思想可以必然地脱离神的观念而存在。然而这又违反了我们的假定，因为我们的假定是，神的观念必然由思想推导出来。因此，思想中的神的观念，或者从神的某些属性的绝对本性所必然推导出来的任何东西，都不可能有一个有限的绵延，而是依据上述属性而成为永恒的。这是需要证明的第二点。要记住，凡是在神的任何属性内从神的绝对本性所必然推导出来的任何东西，都可以得出同样的命题。

命题二十二：凡是从神的任何属性推导出来的东西，就其是处于一个依据上述属性而必然无限地存在着的分殊状态之中而言，这个东西也一定必然而无限地存在着。

证明本命题的证明步骤与前命题一致。

命题二十三：一切必然而无限地存在着的样式，要么必然是从神的某种属性的绝对本性中推导出来，要么是从某种属性的必然而无限地存在着的分殊状态中推导出来的。

证明一个样式是在他物之中，通过他物而必定被认识的东西。换句话说，样式仅仅在神之中，并且只能通过神而被认识。因此，如果一个样式被理解为必然无限的存在，那么它的必然无限的存在一定是通过神的某一属性推论或者感知的，只要这一属性表示存在的必然性与无限性，换句话说，表示其永恒性，也就是只要把它看作是绝对的。因此，一个必然无限地存在着的样式必定是从神的某一属性的绝对本性中推导出来的。它要么是直接从上述属性中推导出来的，要么是间接地从依据上述属性的绝对本性而存在的分殊中推导出来的，就是说间接从必然而无限地存在着的分殊中推导出来的。

命题二十四：由神产生的事物，其本质不包含存在。

证明根据定义一，这个命题是显而易见的。因为事物如果本性就包含存在，就是自因，而它就只依据其自身本性的必然性而存在。

推论由此推知，神不仅仅是使事物开始存在的原因，而且是使事物继续存在的原因。用经院哲学的术语来说就是，神是事物的存在因。因为无论事物存在与否，只要我们沉思它们的本性，就会看到，事物的本质既不包含存在，也不包含绵延。因此，事物的本质既不能是它们存在的原因，也不是它们存在时间的原因，而只有神的本性才属于存在，能够成为原因。

命题二十五：神不仅仅是事物存在的动力因，而且是其本质的动力因。

证明如果否认这个命题，那么神就不是事物本质的原因。由此，如果没有神，万物的本质仍然可以被认识。这是荒谬的。所以神是事物本质的原因。

推论特殊的事物仅仅是神的属性的分殊，或是以某种确定的方式表示神的属性的样式。根据命题十五与定义五，这是很清楚的。

命题二十六：一个事物被决定以某种方式行动，必然是由神决定的。而没有由神决定的东西，是不可能自己决定自己的行动的。

证明决定事物以一种特定方式行动的，必然是能动的东西。因此，由于其本性上的必然性，神成为事物的本性与存在的动力因。这是第一点。由此本命题的第二点也可以非常清楚地推导出来。因为如果存在一个不为神所决定，而能自我决定的东西，本命题的第一点就不能成立了。正如我们上面所说明的那样，这是荒谬的。

命题二十七：一个被神决定以一种特定的方式行动的事物，不能使其自身不被决定。

证明根据公理三，这个命题是很清楚的。

命题二十八：每一个个别事物，或者任何有限的、受制的存在的事物，除非经由另一个同样有限、受制的存在的原因决定它的存在和行动，否则就不可能存在，也不可能有所行动。同样，这一个原因也只能经由另一个有限、受制之存在的原因决定它的存在和行动，才能存在，才能有所行动。以此类推，直至无穷。

证明任何被决定而存在和行动的东西，都是由神所决定而如此的。但是有限、受制之存在的东西，不能由神的任何属性的绝对本性产生出来。因为任何从神的任何属性的绝对本性推导出来的东西，都是无限和永恒的。因此，任何有限的事物，必然是从神的某种属性中推导出来的，就上述属性被当作处于某种样式的状态而言。因为除了实体与样式之外，别无他物，而样式只是神的属性的分殊。但是一个被决定的事物不可能从神或神的任何属性的一个永恒、无限的分殊推导出来。因此，受制的事物能够存在和行动，必定是由于神或神的属性的有限、受制之存在的分殊所推知、所决定的。这是第一点。此外，这一原因或这一分殊本身又必定由其他有限、受制之存在的原因所决定，而后面的那个原因又必定由另一原因所决定，以此类推，直至无穷。

命题二十九：宇宙间没有任何事物是偶然存在的，一切事物都由神的本性的必然性所决定，以某种方式存在和运转的。

证明一切存在都在神之中。但是不能认为神是偶然存在的东西。因为神是必然地而非偶然地存在着。进一步说，神的样式也是必然而非偶然地从神的本性中推导出来的——无论就神的本性被认为是绝对的而言，还是被理解为以某种方式表现出来的行动而言。更进一步说，神作为这些样式的原因，不仅是就样式单纯地存在而言，而且是就它们被决定以某种方式运转而言。如果样式不由神所决定，那么它们自己决定自己，既是不可能的也不是偶然的。反之，如果样式由神所决定，那么，它们要使自己不被决定，这又既是不可能的也不是偶然的。所以一切事物都由神的本性的必然性所决定，不仅仅存在，而且以某种方式存在和运转，偶然的东西是不存在的。

命题三十：理智，无论其效用是有限的还是无限的，必定理解神的属性与神的分殊，再没有其他东西可以理解。

证明真观念必定适合它的对象，换句话说，凡是客观地包含在理智中的东西，一定必然地存在于自然之中。但是自然中只有神是唯一的实体，并且除了在神之中，以及没有神就不可能存在也无法被认识的分殊之外，再不会有任何其他的分殊。因此，理智无论其效用是有限的还是无限的，必定理解神的属性与神的分殊，不能理解其他东西。

命题三十一：理智，无论其效用是有限的还是无限的，也和意志、欲望、爱情等等一样，必须归诸于被自然产生的自然，而不是产生自然的自然。

证明所谓理智，我们并不是指绝对的思想，而只是指思想的某种样式，用以区别于其他各种样式，如欲望、爱情等，所以需要依据绝对的思想才能得到理解。就是说理智必须依据神的一种属性——这种属性表示思想的永恒无限本质，才能得到理解。没有这样的属性，理智将既不能存在，也不能被认识。因此，理智必须归诸于被自然产生的自然，思想的其他样式，也必定如此。

命题三十二：意志不能说是一个自由因，而只能说是一个必然因。

证明像理智一样，意志只是思想的一种样式。所以意愿只有被另外一个原因所决定，才可能存在，才可能行动。而这另外一个原因又由第三个原因所决定，以此递推，直至无穷。而如果假定意志是无限的，那么其存在与行动也必定由神所决定。这并不是因为神是绝对无限的实体，而是由于神具有表示思想的永恒无限的本质属性。因此，无论怎样理解意志，无论它是有限的或者无限的，都需要一个决定其存在与行动的原因。所以，意志不能被称为一个自由因，而只能说是一个必然的或被强迫的原因。

推论一由此推知，第一，神并不依据意志的自由而行动。

推论二由此推知，第二，意志和理智与神的关系，正如运动和静止以及一切自然现象与神的关系一样，都由神所决定，以某种方式存在和行动。因为像其他事物一样，意志也需要一个决定其以某种方式存在和行动的原因。尽管无数事物是意志或理智的结果，但决不能据此认为神是依据自由意志而行动的。这正如从运动和静止中推导出来的事物虽然很多（因为有无数事物是由运动和静止得出的），我们却决不能就此认为神依据运动和静止的自由而行动一样。因此，意志并不属于神的本性，正如其他自然物不属于神的本性一样。而意志与神的关系也正如运动和静止以及其他一切事物与神的关系一样，我们已经指出，这一切都由神的本性的必然性推导出来，由神所决定，以某种方式存在和行动。

命题三十三：事物除了在已经被产生的情形或秩序中之外，不可能在其他情形或秩序中由神所产生。

证明一切事物都是必然地由神的本性推导出来，并且其存在与行动都在某种方式下由神的本性所决定。因此，如果事物能够具有另外一种不同的本性，或者在另外一种不同的方式下被决定而行动，自然的秩序将会变得不同，那么神的本性也将会是与现在不同的另外一种情况。由此，这另外一种神的本性也必然会存在，从而也就会存在两个或更多的神。这是荒谬的。所以，事物除了在已经被产生的情形或秩序中之外，不可能在其他情形或秩序中由神所产生。

命题三十四：神的力量与神的本质是同一的。

证明仅仅由神的本质的必然性就可以推导出，神是自因，也是一切事物的原因。因此神的力量——即神与一切事物得以存在和行动的力量，与神的本质是同一的。

命题三十五：我们所理解的一切在神的力量之中的东西，都是必然存在的。

证明凡是在神的力量之中的东西，都必定包括在神的本质之中，因而必然由神的本质推导出来，所以必然存在。

命题三十六：任何一个存在的事物都会由其本性产生某种结果。

证明一切存在的事物都以某种给定的方式表示神的本性或本质。就是说，一切存在的事物都以某种给定的方式表示神的力量，这种力量是一切事物的原因，所以任何存在的事物都必然会产生某种结果。

附录

以上我已经说明了神的本性和神的特质。我已经指出：神必然存在，神是唯一的，神只凭借其自身本性的必然性而存在和行动；神是万物的自由因，以及神如何是万物的自由因；万物都在神之中，都依靠神，没有神就既不可能存在，也不可能被认识；最后，万物都预先由神所决定，不是由神的自由意志或绝对命令所决定，而是由神的绝对本性或无限力量所决定的。并且只要有机会，我还尽力消除那些可能会妨碍人们理解我的证明的成见。然而现在这种成见仍然有不少。这些成见过去和现在都非常严重地妨碍人们像我以上所说明过的方式那样去理解事物的联系。因此，我认为值得把这些误解提出来用理性加以检验。

我在此想要揭示的所有成见，都基于这一点：人们一般认定一切自然事物都与人一样，是为了达到某个目的而行动的。确实，他们确信神本身指引一切事物走向一定的目的，因为他们假定神造万物是为了人，而神造人又是为了要人敬奉神。因此，我要考察的就是这一观念，首先探究为什么这种成见得到了普遍的认可，以及为什么所有人都有抱这种成见的天然倾向。其次，我将指出这种成见的虚假性。最后我将指出，由此是如何产生出关于善与恶、对与错、赏与罚、秩序和混乱、美和丑等等方面的成见的。不过，我们在这里无须从人心的本性去推敲这些误解产生的原因，而只需要根据一个得到普遍认可的事实作为出发点就足够了，也就是：所有人生来对事物的原因是无知的，他们都有追求有利于自己的东西的欲望，并且他们对这种欲望是有意识的。由此可推知：第一，人们因为意识到自己有意志和欲望，就以为自己是自由的，而对于那些引起意志与欲望的原因却茫然不知，也从来没有梦想过这些。第二，人们做所有事情都是为了某个目的，也就是，以追求有利于自己的东西为目的。因此，对于所发生的任何事情，他们只求知道它们的目的因。只要他们得知这些事情的目的，就心满意足了，因为他们再也没有疑惑的理由了。但是如果他们不能从外界得知这样的原因，他们就被迫转向自身，以自己平常的行动来考虑自然事物的目的。这样他们必然以己度人。此外，他们还在自己身上和外界发现很多非常有助于寻找他们自己利益的工具。比如，眼睛可以观看，牙齿可以咀嚼，动植物可以提供食品，太阳可以提供光明，大海可以养鱼等等。他们就将自然的一切都视为获得便利的工具。他们也知道，这些只是他们现成地得到的工具，而不是他们自己制造出来的。他们便有理由相信，是另外有人准备了这些工具，供人们使用。既然他们将自然事物视为工具，就不会相信它们是自己创造出来的。而且，从这些为他们自己准备的工具来推测，他们必定相信世界上存在一个或多个主宰者，赐予人自由，安排一切，调整一切，供他们使用。他们必定要根据自己的本性来推测这样的主宰者的本性（因为他们对这一对象一无所知）。因此，他们断言这些主宰者规定世间万物供人类使用，是为了支配人类，为了获得人类对它们的至高敬意。由此还可推知，人们会竭尽心力，尽其所能，各显神通地敬奉上帝，以便上帝能够更加厚爱他，并指引整个自然界来满足他那盲目的欲望与无厌的贪婪。因而，这种成见就逐渐发展为迷信，并且深入人心。也就是因为这个原因，人人都竭尽全力去了解和说明事物的终极原因。但是，像他们这样认为大自然无一物不是有目的的，也就是说无一物不是有益于人的，这只不过是要证明自然、诸神与人一同发疯了。请考虑一下这一观点的结果吧：自然事物中有助于人的东西虽然很多，但对人有害的也一定会存在，比如暴风雨、地震、疾病等等。由此他们又宣称，这些事情的发生，要么是因为人们犯了渎神的罪过，惹怒天神造成的；要么就是因为人们敬奉天神时有失礼数造成的。尽管日常经验为我们展示了无数相反的事例，证明祸福降临并不依据虔诚和不虔诚，但人们依然不会就此放弃这种根深蒂固的成见。因为人们将这样的矛盾，与其他不知道有何用处的未知事物放在一起，从而保持自己现有的和天生的无知状态，这要比打破这一整套论证体系并重新开始容易得多。所以，他们认定这是一个公理，即神的判断远远超出人的理解。如果没有数学为我们提供另外一种真理的标准，这样一个教条足以让人类陷入永远无法认清真理的境遇中，这是因为数学不研究目的，仅仅研究图形的本质和特性。除了数学之外，还有其他原因（此处无须赘述）可以让人警惕这些普遍的成见，并被引向对事物的正确认识。

这样，我就将我的第一个观点充分解释清楚了。现在也就没有必要多费唇舌去说明自然本身没有特定的目的，而所谓目的因仅仅是人虚构出来的了。我认为，我既然已经指出了形成这种成见的原因和根源所在，以及命题十六与命题三十二的推论，实际上还有我所说明的万物皆遵循自然的永恒必然性和至高完满性的那些命题，那么这个道理已经得到充分的说明了。然而，我还是要补充一点：这种目的论完全将自然颠倒了。因为这种观点实际上将原因和结果相互颠倒了。它还将本性上在前的东西，当成在后的东西。最后，则将那最高的、最完满的东西当作是不完满的东西了。忽略因果倒置、先后易位这前两点不论（这两点是自明的），根据命题二十一、二十二与二十三，就会明白：只有直接从神产生出来的结果才是最完满的；而需要经过数个间接原因才能产生出来的东西都是更不完满的。但是，如果直接由神产生出来的东西只不过是为了达到神的某种目的的工具，那么最先产生的东西既然是为了随之而来的东西而存在，则随之而来的东西就必然会成为最完满的东西了。其次，这种观念也足以废止神的完满性：因为，如果神是为了某种目标而行动，那么神必然是因为需求自己所缺乏的某种东西。的确，神学家与形而上学者对需要的目的与同化的目的作了区别，但他们依然承认神创造万物是为了自己的目的，而不是为了所创造的事物。除了神之外，在创世之前不可能有任何其他事物，可以成为神行动的目的。由此，他们不得不承认，既然神还需要创造工具以达到某种目的，那么神必然有所需求。这一点是自明的。

此外，我们不能忽视的还有，遵循这一观念，那些竭力想说明其禀赋就在于确定目的因的人还发明了一种新的辩论方法来证明他们的理论，也就是，不用穷尽到不可能的辩论方法，而用穷尽到不知道的辩论方法。这说明他们再也找不到其他方法来为自己的观念辩护了。比如，如果有一块石头从高处掉下来，刚好砸在某个人的头上，并把这个人砸死了，他们就会用这种新方法来证明：这块石头掉下来的目的就是要砸死那个人。因为，如果神没有意旨要达到这样一个目的，又怎么会有这样机缘巧合的事情发生呢（因为常常会有很多同时凑巧发生的事情）？或许可以这样回答：这件事情的发生是由于刮大风，而那个人刚好当时经过那里。他们就会坚持说：“但是为什么那个时候会刮大风呢，那个人又为什么偏偏那个时候经过那里呢？”如果我们再回应说：那天刮大风，是因为海上起了大风浪，此前天气很晴朗，而那个人经过那里则是因为朋友邀请他去。但他们还会坚持说：“为什么那天海上会起风浪呢？为什么刚好在那个时候他受到邀请呢？”因此他们会从一个原因再追问到另一个原因，直到将你追问到神的意愿这个避难所为止，换句话说，所谓神的意愿不过是无知的避难所。再比如，当他们观察到人体的构造时，会感到惊奇。因为他们对这样一个杰作产生的原因一无所知，就断定人体的构造不是机械地构成，而是由一种神圣的或超自然的匠心创造出来的，所以能够使各个部分协调相处，互不妨碍。

因此，任何想寻求奇迹的真正原因，努力以理智的态度去了解自然现象而不是像白痴一样呆看它们的人，就会被那些后者所尊奉的自然和神的阐释者们公然指责为亵渎神灵的异教徒了。因为这些人知道，愚昧一旦消除，他们用来证明和维护其权威的唯一有效的手段也就会同时消失。不过这一问题先到此为止，下面要讨论的是我的第三个观点。

当人们使自己相信一切事物创造出来都是为了人的需要时，他们必定会认为，事物中对人最有用的部分也就是最有价值的部分，并对那些最能对人类产生有益影响的东西最为重视。由此人们必定会以诸如善恶、条理紊乱、冷热、美丑等抽象观念来解释事物的本性。从人是自由的行为者这一信仰出发，又产生出诸如褒贬、功罪等观念。

关于后者我将在以后谈到人的本性时再来讨论，关于前者，我将在这里加以简要说明。

人们曾经将有利于促进健康和对神崇拜的东西叫做善，反之则称之为恶。而那些不了解事物本性的人，由于无法以任何方式检验事物的现象，只是勉强能想象它们，并错误地以想象代替理解。这样的人坚信事物之中都有所谓秩序，却对事物及其本性一无所知。因为，当事物如此这般地陈列着，经过感官而呈现在我们面前时，只要它们便于我们想象，又易于记忆，我们便称之为有秩序；反之则是无秩序或紊乱的。更进一步说，最容易想象的事物常常又是更能取悦我们的事物，因此人们更喜欢秩序而讨厌混乱——好像秩序是与生俱来的，和我们的想象毫无关系似的。他们还认为，是神创造了万物，使之井然有序。由此，他们不假思索地将想象作为一种属性归之于神。他们的意思确乎是说，神对人的想象有先见之明，安排好了世间万物，以便它们能够被人们最容易地加以想象。但是他们却没有意识到，世间有太多远远超出我们想象之外的东西，而足以让我们脆弱的想象发生混乱的东西也不可胜数。关于这一点，我到此也就说够了。至于其他抽象观念，也仅仅是想象得以表现出来的不同方式而已。可是无知者却将这些观念当作事物的主要属性。因为他们相信万物都是为人自身而创造的，所以他们评判事物的善恶好坏也是以事物对于他们的影响为标准的。比如，我们眼前的事物触动我们的神经，如果有益于我们的健康，我们称该事物是美的；如果引起的是相反的结果，我们则称该事物是丑的。此外，那些刺激我们嗅觉的事物，是有香臭之分的；刺激我们味觉的，是有甘苦之分的；刺激我们触觉的，是有坚硬和柔软、粗糙和平滑之分的。最后，刺激我们听觉的，是有噪音、声音或和声之分的。曾有人居然愚蠢到相信上帝也喜欢欣赏和声。甚至有些哲学家还确信天体的运行也构成了一种和声。这一切都充分表明，每个人对事物所作的判断，都根据其心理状态，或毋宁说是将经过想象改造过的东西误当成事物本身。我们的确不用奇怪为什么人们争论不断，莫衷一是，并最终陷于怀疑论之中：因为，尽管人们的身体相同之处很多，然而不同之处更多。因此，这个人以为是善的，另一个人或许会以为是恶的；这个人认为是井然有序的，另一个人或许以为是杂乱无章的；这个人感到愉快的，那个人或许会反感。等等。我没有必要继续列举下去，因为这里不是详细探讨这一主题的地方，也因为这一事实是我们充分认识到的。俗话说得好：“人有多少，心有多杂”；“人人都有小九九”；“智力不同，趣味不同”。诸如此类的谚语说明，人们对事物所作的判断，只以其心理状态为标准，他们宁愿想象而不是理解。因为，如果人们理解了这些现象，那么他们对于我所作的论证，就应该当作数学证明，即使没有被吸引，也应当认为是令人信服的。

现在我们认识到，所有那些对于自然所作的一般性的解释，都只是想象的方式而已。它们除了说明想象的机制之外，说明不了任何事物的真正本性。而且，尽管这些观念有名称，好像是离开想象而独立存在的存在，我将它们称为想象的存在，而不是真实的存在。因此，根据类似这种想象的观念来反对我们的一切论证，都可以毫不费力地加以反驳了。

有许多人以这种方式辩论：如果万物都是从神的绝对完满本性的必然性中推导出来的，那么自然界为什么会有那样多的缺陷存在呢？比如腐烂到发臭的东西，丑陋到令人厌恶的东西，以及混乱、罪恶等等。但正如我已经说过的，这些理由都是很容易驳斥的。因为要判断事物是否完满，只需要从事物的本性及力量中就可以得知。所以事物是不是完满，和它是否愉悦人的感官，是否对人有益是无关的。至于有些人问，上帝创造人，为什么不让人只服从理性的指导呢？我只有这样回答他们：因为上帝决不缺乏用来创造从最高级到最低级完满性的一切事物的材料。或者更严格地说，因为神之本性的法则如此巨大，凡是神的无限智能所能想象的一切，都可以创造出来，这正如我在命题十六所证明的那样。

以上这些都是我所要澄清的误解。无论什么人，如果还存有相同性质的成见，只要他稍加思索，就很容易予以纠正。

Part Ⅱ　On the Nature and Origin of the Mind

Preface

I now pass on to explaining the results,which must necessarily follow from the es-sence of God,or of the eternal and infinite being；not,indeed,all of them（for we proved in Part.1，Prop.16.，that an infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways），but only those which are able to lead us,as it were by the hand,to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.

Definitions

1.By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner the es-sence of God,in so far as he is considered as an extended thing.

2.I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that,which being given,the thing is necessarily given also,and,which being removed,the thing is necessarily re-moved also；in other words,that without which the thing,and which itself without the thing,can neither be nor be conceived.

3.By idea,I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a think-ing thing.

Explanation.-I say conception rather than perception,because the word percep-tion seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object；whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.

4.By an adequate idea,I mean an idea which,in so far as it is considered in itself,without relation to the object,has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

Explanation.-I say intrinsic,in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic,namely,the agreement between the idea and its object.

5.Duration is the indefinite continuance of existing.

Explanation.-I say indefinite,because it cannot be determined through the exist-ence itself of the existing thing,or by its efficient cause,which necessarily gives the ex-istence of the thing,but does not take it away.

6.Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.

7.By particular things,I mean things which are finite and have a conditioned ex-istence；and if several individual things concur in one action,so as to be all simultane-ously the effect of one cause,I consider them all,to that extent,as one particular thing.

Axioms

1.The essence of man does not involve necessary existence,that is,it may,in the order of nature,come to pass that this or that man does or does not exist.

2.Man thinks.

3.Modes of thinking,such as love,desire,or any other of the passions,do not take place,unless there be in the same individual an idea of the thing loved,desired.But the idea can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.

4.We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.

5.We feel and perceive no particular things,save bodies and modes of thought.

Propositions

PROP.1.Thought is an attribute of God,or God is a thinking thing.

Proof.-Particular thoughts,or this or that thought,are modes which,in a certain conditioned manner,express the nature of God.God therefore possesses the attribute of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts,which latter are conceived thereby.Thought,therefore,is one of the infinite attributes of God,which express God s eternal and infinite essence.In other words,God is a thinking thing.

PROP.2.Extension is an attribute of God,or God is an extended thing.

Proof.-The proof of this Proposition is similar to that of the last.

PROP.3.In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence,but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.

Proof.-God can think an infinite number of things in infinite ways,or can form the idea of his essence,and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.But what-ever is in God s power necessarily exists；therefore,there is necessarily such an idea,and it is only in God.

PROP.4.God s idea,from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways,can only be one.

Proof.-Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes of God and his modifications.Now God is one.Therefore God s idea,wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways,can only,be one.

PROP.5.The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause,only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing,not insofar as he is unfolded in any other attribute；that is,the ideas both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their ef-ficient cause their objects or the things perceived,but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

Proof.-This Proposition is evident from Prop.3.of this Part.We there drew the conclusion,that God can form the idea of his essence,and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom,solely,because he is a thinking thing,and not because he is the object of his own idea.Wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause God,in so far as he is a thinking thing.It may,be differently proved as follows：the actual being of ideas is（obviously，）a mode of thought,that is a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of God,in so far as he is a thinking thing,and therefore involves the conception of no other attribute of God,and consequently is not the effect of any attrib-ute save thought.Therefore the actual being of ideas owns God as its cause,in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing.

PROP.6.The modes of any given attribute are caused by God,in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes,and not in so far as he is con-sidered through any other attribute.

Proof.-Each attribute is conceived through itself,without any other；wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of that attribute,but not of any other.Thus they are caused by God,only in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes they,are,and not in so far as he is considered through any other.

Corollary.-Hence the actual being of things,which are not modes of thought,does not follow from the divine nature,because that nature has prior knowledge of the things.Things represented in ideas follow,and are derived from their particular attrib-ute,in the same manner,and with the same necessity as ideas follow（according to what we have shown）from the attribute of thought.

PROP.7.The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connec-tion of things.

Proof.-This Proposition is evident from Part 1，Ax.4.For the idea of each thing caused depends on the knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect.

Corollary.-Hence God s power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action,that is,whatever follows formally from God s infinite nature follows objectively in God from his idea in the same order and with the same connection.

PROP.8.The ideas of particular things,or of modes,that do not exist,must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God,in the same way as the formal essences of par-ticular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

Proof.-This Proposition is evident from the last.

Corollary.-Hence,so long as particular things do not exist,except in so far as they,are comprehended in the attributes of God,their objective being,or ideas,do not exist,except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists；and when particular things are said to exist,not only in so far as they,are involved in the attributes of God,but also in so far as they are said to have duration,their ideas will also involve existence,through which they are said to have duration.

PROP.9.The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by God,not in so far as he is infinite,but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing if actually existing,of which he is the cause,in so far as he is affected by a third idea,and so on to infinity.

Proof.-The idea of an individual thing actually existing is an individual mode of thinking,and is distinct from other modes；thus it is caused by God,in so far only as he is a thinking thing.But not in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely,only in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking；and he is the cause of this latter,as being affected by a third,and so on to infinity.But the order and connec-tion of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes.Therefore,the cause of one individual idea is another individual idea,or God,in so far as he is considered as modified by that idea,is the cause；and of this second idea God is the cause,in so far as he is affected by another idea,and so on to infinity.

Corollary.-Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of any idea,the knowledge thereof is in God,in so far only as he has the idea of the object.

PROP.10.The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man,in other words,substance does not constitute the actual being of man.

Proof.-The being of substance involves necessary existence.If,therefore,the be-ing of substance appertains to the essence of man,substance being granted,man would necessarily be granted also,and,consequently,man would necessarily exist,which is absurd.Therefore,the being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man.

Corollary.-Hence it follows,that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.For the being of substance does not belong to the essence of man.That essence therefore is something which is in God,and which without God can neither be nor be conceived,whether it be a modification,or a mode which ex-presses God s nature in a certain conditioned manner.

PROP.11.The first element,which constitutes the actual being of the human mind,is the idea of some particular thing actually existing.

Proof.-The essence of man is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God,namely,by the modes of thinking,of all which the idea is prior in nature,and,when the idea is given,the other modes（namely,those of which the idea is prior in na-ture）must be in the same individual.Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human mind.But not the idea of a non-existent thing,for then the idea itself cannot be said to exist；it must therefore be the idea of something actually existing.But not of an infinite thing.For an infinite thing,must always necessarily exist；this would involve an absurdity.Therefore the first element,which constitutes the actual being of the hu-man mind,is the idea of something actually existing.

Corollary.-Hence it follows,that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God；thus when we say,that the human mind perceives this or that,we make the asser-tion,that God has this or that idea,not in so far as he is infinite,but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind,or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind；and when we say that God has this or that idea,not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind,but also in so far as he,simultaneously with the human mind,has the further idea of another thing,we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately.

PROP.12.Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,which constitutes the human mind,must be perceived by the human mind,or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence.That is,if the object of the idea consti-tuting the human mind be a body,nothing can take place in that body without being per-ceived by the mind.

Proof.-Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God,in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said ob-ject,that is,in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything.Therefore,whatsoever takes place in the object constituting the idea of the human mind,the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God,in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind；that is the knowledge of the said thing will necessarily be in the mind,in other words the mind perceives it.

PROP.13.The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body,in oth-er words a certain mode of extension which actually exists,and nothing else.

Proof.-If indeed the body were not the object of the human mind,the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in God in virtue of his constituting our mind,but in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else；that is the ideas of the modifica-tions of the body would not be in our mind；but we do possess the ideas of the modifica-tions of the body.Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body,and the body as it actually exists.Further,if there were any other object of the i-dea constituting the mind besides body,then,as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,which would be the effect of that other object；but there is no such idea.Wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists,and nothing else.

Corollary.-From this it follows that man consists of a mind and a body,and that the human body exists,as we are aware of it.

Axiom 1.All bodies are either in motion or at rest.

Axiom 2.Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,sometimes more quickly.

Lemma 1.Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion and rest,quickness and slowness,and not in respect of substance.

Lemma 2.All bodies agree in certain respects.

Proof.-All bodies agree in that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute.Further,in that they may be moved less or more quickly,and may be abso-lutely in motion or at rest.

Lemma 3.A body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion or rest by an-other body,which other body has been determined to motion or rest by a third body,and that third again by a fourth,and so on to infinity.

Proof.-Bodies are individual things,which are distinguished one from the other in respect to motion and rest；thus each must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another individual thing,namely,by another body,which other body is also in mo-tion or at rest.And this body again can only have been set in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to motion or rest.This third body again by a fourth,and so on to infinity.

Corollary.-Hence it follows,that a body in motion keeps in motion,until it is de-termined to a state of rest by some other body；and a body at rest remains so,until it is determined to a state of motion by some other body.This is indeed self-evident.For when I suppose,for instance,that a given body,A，is at rest,and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A,except that it is at rest.If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest,for no other consequence could have been in-volved than its remaining at rest.If,on the other hand,A be given in motion,we shall,so long as we only consider A,be unable to affirm anything concerning it,except that it is in motion.If A is subsequently found to be at rest,this rest cannot be the re-sult of A s previous motion,for such motion can only have led to continued motion；the state of rest therefore must have resulted from something,which was not in A,namely,from an external cause determining A to a state of rest.

Axiom 1.All modes,wherein one body is affected by another body,follow simulta-neously from the nature of the body affected and the body affecting；so that one and the same body may be moved in different modes,according to the difference in the nature of the bodies moving it；on the other hand,different bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.

Axiom 2.When a body in motion impinges on another body at rest,which it is un-able to move,it recoils,in order to continue its motion,and the angle made by the line of motion in the recoil and the plane of the body at rest,whereon the moving body has impinged,will be equal to the angle formed by the line of motion of incidence and the same plane.

So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,which are only distin-guished one from the other by motion and rest,quickness and slowness.We now pass on to compound bodies.

Definition.When a number of bodies,whether of the same or of different size,are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another,or if they so move,wheth-er with the same degree or different degrees of speed,that they communicate their mo-tions to each other in a certain fixed manner,we shall say that those bodies are united with one another and that they all together compose one body or individual,which is dis-tinguished from the others by this union of bodies.

Axiom 3.In proportion as the parts of an individual,or a compound body,are in contact over a greater or less superficies,they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved from their position；consequently the individual will,with greater or less difficulty,be brought to assume another form.Those bodies,whose parts are in contact over large superficies,are called hard；those,whose parts are in contact over small su-perficies,are called soft；those,whose parts are in motion among,one another,are called fluid.

Lemma 4.If from a body or individual,compounded of several bodies,certain bodies be separated,and if,at the same time,an equal number of other bodies or the same nature take,take their place,the individual will preserve its nature as before,without any change in its actuality.

Proof.-For bodies are not distinguished in respect to substance；what consti-tutes the form of the Individual consists in the union of the bodies.But this（by hy-pothesis）is retained even if a continual change of bodies occurs.Therefore,the Indi-vidual will retain its nature,as before,both in respect to substance,and in respect to mode.

Lemma 5.If the parts composing an individual become greater or less,but in such proportion,that they all preserve the same mutual relations of motion and rest,the indi-vidual will still preserve its original nature,and its actuality will not be changed.

Proof.-The same as for the last Lemma.

Lemma 6.If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled to change the motion,which they have in one direction,for motion in another direction,but in such a manner,that they be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication in the same relations as before,the individual will retain its own nature without any change of its actuality.

Proof.-This Proposition is self-evident,for the individual is supposed to retain all that,which,in its definition,we spoke of as its actual being.

Lemma 7.Furthermore,the individual thus composed preserves its nature,wheth-er it be,as a whole,in motion or at rest,whether it be moved in this or that direction；so long as each part retains its motion,and preserves its communication with other parts as before.

Proof.-This Proposition is evident from the definition of an individual prefixed to Lemma 4.

Postulates

1.The human body is composed of a number of individual parts,of diverse nature,each one of which is in itself extremely complex.

2.Of the individual parts composing the human body some are fluid,some soft,some hard.

3.The individual parts composing the human body,and consequently the human body itself,are affected in a variety of ways by external bodies.

4.The human body stands in need for its preservation of a number of other bodies,by which it is continually,so to speak,regenerated.

5.When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body to im-pinge often on another soft part,it changes the surface of the latter,and,as it were,impresses on the soft part certain traces of the external body striking against the fluid part.

6.The human body can move external bodies,and arrange them in a variety of ways.

Propositions

PROP.14.The human Mind is capable of perceiving a great many things,and is the more capable,the more its body can be disposed in a great many ways.

Proof.-The human body is affected in very many ways by external bodies,and is capable in very many ways of affecting external bodies.But the human mind must per-ceive all that takes place in the human body.Therefore,the human Mind is capable of perceiving a great many things,and is the more capable as the human Body is more ca-pable.

PROP.15.The idea,which constitutes the actual being of the human mind,is not simple,but compounded of a great number of ideas.

Proof.-The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body,which is composed of a great number of complex individual parts.But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed；there-fore,the idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts.

PROP.16.The idea of every mode,in which the human body is affected by exter-nal bodies,must involve the nature of the human body,and also the nature of the exter-nal body.

Proof.-All the modes,in which any given body is affected,follow from the nature of the body affected,and also from the nature of the affecting body,wherefore their idea also necessarily involves the nature of both bodies；therefore,the idea of every mode,in which the human body is affected by external bodies,involves the nature of the human body and of the external body.

Corollary 1.-Hence it follows,first,that the human mind perceives the nature of a variety of bodies,together with the nature of its own.

Corollary 2.-It follows,secondly,that the ideas,which we have of external bodies,indicate rather the condition of our own body than the nature of external bodies.I have amply illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.

PROP.17.If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body,the human mind will regard the said external body as actually exist-ing,or as present to itself,until the human body be affected in such a way,as to ex-clude the existence or the presence of the said external body.

Proof.-This Proposition is self-evident,for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected,so long will the human mind regard this modification of the body-that is,it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing,and this idea involves the nature of the external body.In other words,it will have the idea which does not ex-clude,but postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the external body；there-fore the mind will regard the external body as actually existing,until it is affected，＆c.

Corollary.-The mind is able to regard as present external bodies,by which the human body has once been affected,even though they be no longer in existence or pres-ent.

PROP.18.If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time,when the mind afterwards imagines any of them,it will straightway remem-ber the others also.

Proof.-The mind imagines any given body,because the human body is affected and disposed by the impressions from an external body,in the same manner as it is af-fected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said external body；but the body was then so disposed,that the mind imagined two bodies at once；therefore,it will now also imagine two bodies at once,and when the mind imagines one,it will straightway re-member the other.

PROP.19.The human mind has no knowledge of the body,and does not know it to exist,save through the ideas of the modifications by which the body is affected.

Proof.-The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body,which is in God,in so far as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing ac-tually existing；or,inasmuch as the human body stands in need of very many bodies whereby,it is,as it were,continually regenerated；and the order and connection of ide-as is the same as the order and connection of causes；this idea will therefore be in God,in so far as he is regarded as affected by the ideas of very many particular things.Thus God has the idea of the human body,or knows the human body,in so far as he is affect-ed by very many other ideas,and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind；that is,the human mind does not know the human body.But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God,in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind,or the human mind perceives those modifications,and consequently the human body itself,and as actually existing；therefore the mind perceives thus far only the hu-man body.

PROP.20.The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God,following in God in the same manner,and being referred to God in the same manner,as the idea or knowledge of the human body.

Proof.-Thought is an attribute of God；therefore there must necessarily be in God the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications,consequently also of the hu-man mind.Further,this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from God,in so far as he is infinite,but in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing.But the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes；therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is referred to God,in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body.

PROP.21.This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body.

Proof.-That the mind is united to the body we have shown from the fact,that the body is the object of the mind；and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be united with its object,that is,with the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body.

PROP.22.The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body,but also the ideas of such modification.

Proof.-The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God in the same manner,and are referred to God in the same manner,as the ideas of the said modifications.This is proved in the same way as II.20.But the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the human mind,that is,in God,in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind；therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God,in so far as he has the knowl-edge or idea of the human mind,that is,they will be in the human mind itself,which therefore perceives not only the modifications of the body,but also the ideas of such modifications.

PROP.23.The mind does not know itself,except in so far as it perceives the ide-as of the modifications of the body.

Proof.-The idea or knowledge of the mind follows in God in the same manner,and is referred to God in the same manner,as the idea or knowledge of the body.But since the human mind does not know the human body itself,that is,since the knowl-edge of the human body is not referred to God,in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind；therefore,neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to God,in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind；therefore,the human mind thus far has no knowledge of itself.Further the ideas of the modifications,whereby the body is affected,involve the nature of the human body itself,that is,they agree with the nature of the mind；wherefore the knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind；but the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself；wherefore the human mind thus far only has knowledge of itself.

PROP.24.The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.

Proof.-The parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body,except in so far as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation,not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body.The parts of the human body are highly complex individuals,whose parts can be separated from the human body without in any way destroying the nature and dis-tinctive quality,of the latter,and they can communicate their motions to other bodies in another relation；therefore the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,inasmuch as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing,which particular thing is prior in the order of nature to the aforesaid part.We may,affirm the same thing of each part of each individual composing the human body；therefore,the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in God,in so far as he is affected by very many ideas of things,and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only,in other words,the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind；therefore,the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body.

PROP.25.The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

Proof.-We have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body,in-volves the nature of an external body,in so far as that external body conditions the hu-man body in a given manner.But,in so far as the external body is an individual,which has no reference to the human body,the knowledge or idea thereof is in God,in so far as God is regarded as affected by the idea of a further thing,which is naturally prior to the said external body.Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God,in so far as he has the idea of the modification of the human body；in other words,the idea of the modification of the human body,does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

PROP.26.The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually exist-ing,except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body.

Proof.-If the human body is in no way affected by a given external body,then neither is the idea of the human body,in other words,the human mind,affected in any way by the idea of the existence of the said external body,nor does it any manner per-ceive its existence.But,in so far as the human body is affected in any way by a given external body,thus far the mind perceives that external body.

Corollary.-In so far as the human mind imagines an external body,it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.

Proof.-When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body,we say that it imagines；now the mind can only imagine external bodies as actually existing.Therefore,in so far as the mind imagines external bodies,it has not an adequate knowledge of them.

PROP.27.The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Proof.-Every idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of the human body,in so far as the human body is regarded as affected in a given manner.But,inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways,the idea of the said modification，＆c.

PROP.28.The idea of the modifications of the human body,in so far as they have reference only to the human mind,are not clear and distinct,but confused.

Proof.-The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature of ex-ternal bodies as much as that of the human Body,and must involve the nature not only of the human body as a whole,but also of its parts；for the modifications are modes with which the parts of the human body,and consequently the whole body,are affected.But adequate knowledge of external bodies and of the parts composing the human body is in God,not insofar as he is considered to be affected with the human mind,but insofar as he is considered to be affected with other ideas.Therefore,these ideas of the modifica-tions,insofar as they are related only to the human mind,are like conclusions without premises,that is,they are confused ideas.

PROP.29.The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.

Proof.-The idea of a modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,in other words,does not adequately express its nature；that is it does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately；therefore the idea of this ide-a does not adequately express the nature of the human mind,or does not involve an ade-quate knowledge thereof.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that the human mind,when it perceives things after the common order of nature,has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,of its own body,and of external bodies.For the mind does not know itself,except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of body.It only perceives its own body through the ideas of the modifications,and only perceives external bodies through the same means；thus,in so far as it has such ideas of modifica-tion,it has not an adequate knowledge of itself,nor of its own body,nor of external bodies,but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof.

PROP.30.We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.

Proof.-The duration of our body does not depend on its essence,nor on the abso-lute nature of God.But it is conditioned to exist and operate by causes,which in their turn are conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes,these last again being conditioned by others,and so on to infinity.The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of nature,or the constitution of things.Now,however a thing may be constituted,the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,in so far as he has the ideas of all things,and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only.Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God very inadequate,in so far as he is only regarded as constituting the nature of the human mind；that is,this knowledge is very inadequate in our mind.

PROP.31.We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of parti-cular things external to ourselves.

Proof.-Every particular thing,like the human body,must be conditioned by an-other particular thing to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation；this other par-ticular thing must likewise be conditioned by a third,and so on to infinity.As we have shown in the foregoing proposition,from this common property of particular things,we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body；we must draw a sim-ilar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular things,namely,that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration thereof.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that all particular things are contingent and corrupti-ble.For we can have no adequate idea of their duration,and this is what we must un-derst and by the contingency of things and possibility of their corruption.For,except in this sense,nothing is contingent.

PROP.32.All ideas,in so far as they are referred to God,are true.

Proof.-All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with their objects,there-fore they are all true.

PROP.33.There is nothing positive in ideas,which causes them to be called false.

Proof.-If this be denied,conceive,if possible,a positive mode of thinking which constitutes the form of error,or falsity.Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God；ex-ternal to God it cannot be or be conceived.Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false.

PROP.34.Every idea,which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect,is true.

Proof.-When we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect,we say,in other words,that the idea is adequate and perfect in God,in so far as he constitutes the es-sence of our mind；consequently,we say,that such an idea is true.

PROP.35.Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,which inadequate,frag-mentary,or confused ideas involve.

Proof.-There is nothing positive in ideas,which causes them to be called false；but falsity cannot consist in simple privation（for minds,not bodies,are said to err and to be mistaken），neither can it consist in absolute ignorance,for ignorance and error are not identical；wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge,which inadequate,fragmentary,or confused ideas involve.

PROP.36.Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity,as ade-quate or clear and distinct ideas.

Proof.-All ideas are in God,and in so far as they are referred to God are true and adequate；therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,except in respect to a particular mind；therefore all ideas,whether adequate or inadequate,follow by the same necessity.

PROP.37.That which is common to all,and which is equally in a part and in the whole,does not constitute the essence of any particular thing.

Proof.-If this be denied,conceive,if possible,that it constitutes the essence of some particular thing；for instance,the essence of B.Then it cannot without B either exist or be conceived；but this is against our hypothesis.Therefore it does not appertain to B s essence,nor does it constitute the essence of any particular thing.

PROP.38.Those things,which are common to all,and which are equally in a part and in the whole,cannot be conceived except adequately.

Proof.-Let A be something,which is common to all bodies,and which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the whole.I say A cannot be conceived ex-cept adequately.For the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate,both in so far as God has the idea of the human body,and also in so far as he has the idea of the mod-ifications of the human body,which involve in part the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies；that is,the idea in God will necessarily be adequate,both in so far as he constitutes the human mind,and in so far as he has the ideas,which are in the human mind.Therefore the mind necessarily perceives A adequately,and has this adequate perception,both in so far as it perceives itself,and in so far as it per-ceives its own or any external body,nor can A be conceived in any other manner.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men；for all bodies agree in certain respects,which must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.

PROP.39.That,which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body,and which is present equally in each part of either,or in the whole,will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.

Proof.-If A be that,which is common to and a property of the human body,and external bodies,and equally present in the human body and in the said external bodies,in each part of each external body and in the whole,there will be an adequate idea of A in God,both in so far as he has the idea of the human body,and in so far as he has the ideas of the given external bodies.Let it now be granted,that the human body is affect-ed by an external body through that,which it has in common therewith,namely,A；the idea of this modification will involve the property A,and therefore the idea of this modi-fication,in so far as it involves the Property A,will be adequate in God,in so far as God is affected by the idea of the human body；that is,in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind；therefore this idea is also adequate in the human mind.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things,in proportion as its body has more in common with other bodies.

PROP.40.Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein ade-quate,are also themselves adequate.

Proof.-This Proposition is self-evident.For when we say that an idea in the hu-man mind follows from ideas which are therein adequate,we say,in other words,that an idea is in the divine intellect,whereof God is the cause,not in so far as he is infi-nite,nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many particular things,but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

PROP.41.Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity,knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

Proof.-To knowledge of the first kind we have assigned all those ideas,which are inadequate and confused；therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity.Furthermore,we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate；therefore these kinds are necessarily true.

PROP.42.Knowledge of the second and third kinds,not knowledge of the first kind,teaches us to distinguish the true from the,false.

Proof.-This proposition is self-evident.He,who knows how to distinguish be-tween true and false,must have an adequate idea of true and false.That is,he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

PROP.43.He,who has a true idea,simultaneously knows that he has a true ide-a,and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived.

Proof.-A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind.Let us suppose that there is in God,in so far as he is displayed through the human mind,an adequate idea,A.The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God,and be referred to him in the same way as the idea A.But the idea A is supposed to be referred to God,in so far as he is displayed through the human mind；therefore,the idea of the idea A must be referred to God in the same manner；that is,the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,which has the adequate idea A；therefore he,who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly,must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge；that is,obviously,he must be assured.

PROP.44.It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent,but as necessary.

Proof.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly,namely,as they are in themselves-that is,not as contingent,but as necessary.

Corollary1.-Hence it follows,that it is only through our imagination that we con-sider things,whether in respect to the future or the past,as contingent.

Corollary 2.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity.

Proof.-It is in the nature of reason to regard things,not as contingent,but as necessary.Reason perceives this necessity of things truly，-that is,as it is in itself.But this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God；therefore,it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.We may add that the bases of reason are the notions,which answer to things common to all,and which do not answer to the essence of any particular thing；which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,under a certain form of eternity.

PROP.45.Every idea of every body,or of every particular thing actually existing,necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Proof.-The idea of a particular thing actually,existing necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing.Now particular things cannot be con-ceived without God；but,inasmuch as they have God for their cause,in so far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things are modes,their ideas must necessarily involve the conception of the attribute of those ideas-that is,the eternal and infinite es-sence of God.

PROP.46.The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which every i-dea involves is adequate and perfect.

Proof.-The proof of the last Proposition is universal；and whether a thing be con-sidered as a part or a whole,the idea thereof,whether of the whole or of a part,will in-volve God s eternal and infinite essence.Wherefore,that,which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God,is common to all,and is equally in the part and in the whole；therefore this knowledge will be adequate.

PROP.47.The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Proof.-The human mind has ideas,from which it perceives itself and its own body and external bodies as actually existing；therefore it has an adequate knowledge of the e-ternal and infinite essence of God.

PROP.48.In the mind there is no absolute or free will；but the mind is deter-mined to wish this or that by a cause,which has also been determined by another cause,and this last by another cause,and so on to infinity.

Proof.-The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought,therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions；in other words,it cannot have an absolute faculty of posi-tive or negative volition；but it must be determined by a cause,which has also been de-termined by another cause,and this last by another，＆c.

PROP.49.There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation,save that which an idea,inasmuch as it is an idea,involves.

Proof.-There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition,but only,particular volitions,namely,this or that affirmation,and this or that nega-tion.Now let us conceive a particular volition,namely,the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms,that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right an-gles.This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle,that is,without the i-dea of a triangle it cannot be conceived.It is the same thing to say,that the concept A must involve the concept B,as it is to say,that A cannot be conceived without B.Fur-ther,this affirmation cannot be made without the idea of a triangle.Therefore,this affir-mation can neither be nor be conceived,without the idea of a triangle.Again,this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation,namely,that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.Wherefore,and vice versa,this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation,therefore,this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle,and is nothing besides.What we have said of this voli-tion may be said of any other volition,namely,that it is nothing but an idea.

Corollary.-Will and understanding are one and the same.

Proof.-Will and understanding are nothing beyond the individual volitions and i-deas.But a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same；therefore,will and understanding are one and the same.

Note.-We have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error.For we have shown above,that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused.Wherefore,a false idea,inasmuch as it is false,does not involve certainty.When we say,then,that a man acquiesces in what is false,and that he has no doubts on the subject,we do not say that he is certain,but only that he does not doubt,or that he acquiesces in what is false,inasmuch as there are no reasons,which should cause his imagination to waver.Thus,although the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false,we shall never say that he is certain.For by certainty we mean something positive,not merely the absence of doubt.But by the pri-vation of certainty,we understand falsity.

However,in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully explained,I will draw attention to a few additional points,and I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against our doctrine.Lastly,in order to remove every scruple,I have thought it worth while to point out some of the advantages,which follow there-from.I say“some，”for they will be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part.

I begin,then,with the first point,and warn my readers to make an accurate dis-tinction between an idea,or conception of the mind,and the images of things which imagine.It is further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words,whereby we signify,things.These three-namely,images,words,and ideas-are by many persons either entirely confused together,or not distinguished with sufficient accu-racy or care,and hence people are generally in ignorance,how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will,both for philosophic purposes and for the wise or-dering of life.Those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies,persuade themselves that the ideas of those things,whereof we can form no mental picture,are not ideas,but only figments,which we invent by the free decree of our will；they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel,and,filled with this misconception,do not see that an idea,inasmuch as it is an idea,involves an affirmation or negation.Again,those who confuse words with ideas,or with the affirmation which an idea involves,think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel,affirm,or deny.This misconception will easily be laid aside by one,who reflects on the nature of knowledge,and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension,will therefore clearly understand,that an idea（being a mode of thinking）does not consist in the image of anything,nor in words.The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions,which in no wise involve the con-ception of thought.

These few words on this subject will suffice；I will therefore pass on to consider the objections,which may be raised against our doctrine.Of these,the first is advanced by those,who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,and that there-fore it is different therefrom.The reason why they think the will extends more widely than the understanding is that they say they know by experience that they do not require a greater faculty of assenting,or affirming,and denying,than we already have,in order to assent to infinitely many other things which we do not perceive-but they do require a greater faculty of understanding.The will is thus distinguished from the intellect,the latter being finite and the former infinite.

Secondly,it may be objected that experience seems to teach us especially clearly,that we are able to suspend our judgment before assenting to things which we perceive；this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived,in so far as he perceives anything,but only in so far as he assents or dissents.For instance,he who feigns a winged horse does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists；that is,he is not de-ceived,unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist.Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience,than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding.

Thirdly,it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another；in other words,that we do not seem to need for affirming,that what is true is true,any greater power than for affirming,that what is false is true.We have,however,seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another,for as objects are some more excellent than others,so also are the ideas of them some more ex-cellent than others；this also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will.

Fourthly,it may be objected,if man does not act from free will,what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced,as in the case of Buridan s[1]ass？Will he perish of hunger and thirst？If I say that he would,I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an actual man.If I say that he would not,he would then determine his own action,and would consequently possess the facul-ty of going and doing whatever he liked.Other objections might also be raised,but,as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream,I will only set my-self to the task of refuting those I have mentioned,and that as briefly as possible.

To the first objection I answer,that I admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas；but I de-ny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions,and the faculty of forming con-ceptions；nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite,any more than the faculty of feeling；for,as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things（one after the other,for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously），so also can we,by the same faculty of feeling,feel or perceive（in succession）an infinite number of bodies.If it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive,I answer,that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking,nor,consequently,by any faculty of volition.But,it may still be urged,if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them,he would be obliged to en-dow us with a greater faculty of perception,but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already.This is the same as to say that,if God wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities,it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding,but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already,in order to grasp such infinite entities.We have shown that will is a u-niversal entity or idea,whereby we explain all particular volitions-in other words,that which is common to all such volitions.As,then,our opponents maintain that this idea,common or universal to all volitions,is a faculty,it is little to be wondered at that they assert,that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite,beyond the limits of the under-standing；for what is universal is predicated alike of one,of many,and of an infinite number of individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying,that we have a free power of suspen-ding our judgment；for,when we say that anyone suspends his judgment,we merely mean that he sees,that he does not perceive the matter adequately.Suspension of judg-ment is,therefore,strictly speaking,a perception,and not free will.In order to illus-trate the point,let us suppose a boy imagining a winged horse,and perceiving nothing else.Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse,and the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the existence of the horse,he will necessarily regard the horse as present；he will not be able to doubt of its existence,although he be not certain thereof.We find this daily in our dreams,and I do not believe that there is anyone,who would maintain that,while he is dreaming,he has the free power of sus-pending his judgment concerning the things in his dream,and bringing,it about that he should not dream those things,which he dreams that he sees；yet it happens,notwith-standing,that even in dreams we suspend our judgment,namely,when we dream that we are dreaming.

Further,I grant that no one can be deceived,so far as actual perception extends-that is,I grant that the mind s imaginations,regarded in themselves,do not involve er-ror；but I deny,that a man does not,in the act of perception,make any affirmation.For what is the perception of a winged horse,save affirming that a horse has wings？If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse,it would regard the same as present to itself；it would have no reasons for doubting its existence,nor any faculty of dissent,unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse,or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it pos-sesses of a winged horse is inadequate,in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse,or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject.

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection,namely,that the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas,and that it only signifies that which is common to all ideas,namely,an affirmation,whose adequate essence must,therefore,in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract,be in every idea,and be,in this respect alone,the same in all,not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea s essence；for,in this respect,particular affirmations differ one from the other,as much as do ideas.For instance,the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,dif-fers from that which involves,the idea of a triangle,as much as the idea of a circle dif-fers from the idea of a triangle.Further,I absolutely deny,that we are in need of an equal power of thinking,to affirm that that which is true is true,and to affirm that that which is false is true.These two affirmations,if we regard the mind,are in the same re-lation to one another as being and not-being；for there is nothing positive in ideas,which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood.

We must therefore conclude,that we are easily deceived,when we confuse univer-sals with singulars,and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities.As for the fourth objection,I am quite ready to admit,that a man placed in the equilibrium de-scribed（namely,as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,a certain food and a cer-tain drink,each equally distant from him）would die of hunger and thirst.If I am asked,whether such an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man；I an-swer,that I do not know,neither do I know how a man should be considered,who hangs himself,or how we should consider children,fools,madmen.

It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct,and this may be easily gathered from what has been said.The doctrine is good，

1.Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God,and to be partakers in the Divine nature,and so much the more,as we perform more perfect ac-tions and more and more understand God.Such a doctrine not only completely,tran-quillizes our spirit,but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is,namely,solely in the knowledge of God,whereby we are led to act only as love and pie-ty shall bid us.We may thus clearly understand,how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue,and their best actions,as for having endured the direst slavery；as if virtue and the serv-ice of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.

2.Inasmuch as it teaches us,how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune,or matters which are not in our own power,and do not follow from our nature.For it shows us,that we should await and endure fortune s smiles or frowns with an equal mind,seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by,the same necessity,as it follows from the essence of a triangle,that the three angles are e-qual to two right angles.

3.This doctrine raises social life,inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man,nei-ther to despise,to deride,to envy,or to be angry,with any.Further,as it tells us that each should be content with his own,and helpful to his neighbour,not from any woman-ish pity,favour,or superstition,but solely by the guidance of reason,according as the time and occasion demand,as I will show in Part 4.

4.Lastly,this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth；for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led,not so as to become slaves,but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best.

I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note,and I thus bring,the second part of my treatise to a close.I think I have therein explained the na-ture and properties of the human mind at sufficient length,and,considering the difficul-ty of the subject,with sufficient clearness.I have laid a foundation,whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known,as will,in what follows,be partly made plain.

[1]布里丹（Johannes Buridan），法国14世纪唯名论经院哲学家。他在论证意志自由因时曾举驴子为例：假如一个驴子处在同距离的两束青草之间，或处在同距离的食物与饮料之间，而它的饥饿与口渴同样强烈。如果这驴子没有自由意志来做抉择，无法做出决定，是否就会饿死？“布里丹的驴子”一说由此而来。

第二部分　论心灵的性质和起源

序言

现在，我将继而说明必然从神的本质或永恒无限的存在的本质推导出来的那些东西。当然，我并不是要说明所有从神的本质推导出来的东西（因为在第一部分命题十六中，我们已经证明，无限多的事物必然以无限多的方式由神的本质推导出来），而仅仅局限于讨论那些能够手把手地引导我们抵达人的心灵及其最高幸福的知识的东西。

定义

一、所谓物体，我理解为在某一确定的方式下表示神的本质的一种样式，这是就神被作为一个有广延之物而言的。

二、所谓一个事物的本质，就是有了它，那么这一事物的存在必然被确认；失去了它，这一事物必然不复存在。换句话说，离开本质，事物既不能存在也不能被理解，反之亦然。

三、所谓观念，我理解为作为思想之物的心灵所形成的概念。

说明我称之为概念而不是感知，因为感知这个名词似乎意味着心灵对于对象而言是被动的，而概念一词则表示出心灵的主动性。

四、所谓充分观念，我理解为只涉及自身而与对象无关，具有真观念的一切特性或内在标志的一种观念。

说明我称之为内在标志，是为了排除外在的标志——也就是观念与其对象之间的一致性。

五、所谓绵延，就是存在的不确定的延续。

说明我说绵延是不确定的，是因为存在的延续不能由存在物自身的存在所决定，也不能由其动力因所决定，这个动力因必然赋予一个事物的存在，而不是取消其存在。

六、所谓实在性和完满性，我将他们理解为同一的术语。

七、所谓个别事物，我理解为有限的和有条件限定的存在物。如果数个个别事物做出同一个行为，以致它们同时成为某一个结果的原因，那么在这个范围内，我将把它们全体作为一个个别事物。

公理

一、人的本质不包含必然的存在。也就是说，根据自然的法则，人的存在与否，都是同样可能发生的。

二、人有思想。

三、思想的样式，如爱情、欲望，以及其他感情，除非具有这种情感的个体具有所爱、所欲的对象的观念，便不能出现。但是即使没有任何其他思想的样式，观念仍然可以存在。

四、我们是以多种方式感知到一个确定的物体的。

五、除了物体和思想的样式之外，我们感觉或感知不到任何个别事物。

命题

命题一：思想是神的一个属性，或者神是一个能思想的东西。

证明个别思想，或这一个或那一个思想，都是以一个确定的形式表示神的本性的样式。所以，神具有这样一个属性，一切个别思想都将这一属性的概念包含在自身之中，并借助这一属性得到理解。因此，思想是神的无限属性之一，它表示神的永恒无限的本质。换句话说，神是能思想的东西。

命题二：广延是神的一个属性，换句话说，神是一个有广延的东西。

证明对于本命题的证明与前命题的证明是类似的。

命题三：在神之中，不仅必然有神的本质的观念，而且还有一切由神的本质必然推导而出的事物的观念。

证明神能够以无限多的方式思考无限多的事物，或者能够形成其自身本质的观念，以及所有由其本质必然推导而出的事物的观念。然而，任何在神的力量之中的东西都是必然存在的。因此，这种观念必然存在，而且只能存在于神之中。

命题四：以无限多的方式推导出无限多事物的神的观念只能有一个。

证明无限的理智除了神的属性及其分殊外，不能理解其他东西。而神是唯一的。所以，以无限多的方式推导出无限多事物的神的观念，只能有一个。

命题五：观念的真实存在只以神为其原因，但这只是就神作为一个思想者而言，而不是就神作为其他任何属性得以显现而言的。也就是说，神的属性的观念和个别事物的观念都不认为观念的对象或被感知的事物是它们的动力因，而只承认作为一个思想者的神本身是其动力因。

证明从本部分的命题三来看，此命题是很清楚的。我们在那里曾经证明，神之所以能够形成它的本质的观念，以及一切由其本质必然推导而出的东西的观念，只是因为神是一个能思想的东西，而不是因为它是其自身观念的对象。因此，就神作为一个思想者而言，观念的真实存在只以神为其原因。这个命题也可以从不同的角度加以证明：很明显，观念的真实存在是思想的一种样式，也就是说，就神被认为是一个思想者而言，这是以一种确定的方式表示神的本性的样式。所以，这种样式并不包含神的其他属性的概念，因此它除了是思想的结果之外，不是其他属性的结果。所以，就神被认为是一个思想者而言，观念的真实存在只承认神是它的原因。

命题六：任何一种属性的样式以神作为原因，都是就神通过这些样式所体现的属性来理解而言的，而不是就神通过任何其他属性来理解而言的。

证明每一种属性都是通过自身，而不是通过其他东西得到理解的。所以每一种属性的样式都包含有这一属性的概念在其中，但是不包含其他属性的概念。所以这些样式以神作为原因，只是就神通过这些样式所体现的属性来理解而言的，而不是就神通过任何其他属性来理解而言的。

推论由此，不是思想样式的事物，它们的真实存在，就不是由神的本性推导出来的，因为神的本性已经预先知道了这些事物。观念由思想的属性推导而出（根据我们已经指出的），与观念的对象由其所体现的属性推导而出，在方式上是相同的，而且具有同样的必然性。

命题七：观念的次序和联系与事物的次序和联系是相同的。

证明从第一部分公理四来看，这一命题是清楚的。因为每一个有原因的事物的观念，都要依靠对其原因的认识，而这一有原因的事物就是其原因的结果。

推论由此，神的思想能力等同于神的行动的现实能力。也就是说，凡是在形式上从神的无限本性推导出来的任何东西，客观上在神之中也是以相同的次序与相同的联系由神的观念推导出来的。

命题八：不存在的个别事物或样式的观念，必定包含在无限的神的观念之中，这正如个别事物或样式的形式的本质被包含在神的属性之中一样。

证明这个命题由前命题来看，是很清楚的。

推论由此，既然个别事物除非是包含在神的属性之中，否则就是不存在的，那么除非无限的神的观念存在，否则个别事物的客观存在或它们的观念，也是不存在的。并且如果个别事物被认为不仅就其被包含在神的属性之中而言是存在的，而且就其具有绵延性而言是存在的，那么它们的观念也将包含存在，通过这种存在，它们被认为具有绵延性。

命题九：一个实际存在的个别事物的观念以神作为原因，并不是就神是无限的而言的，而是就神被理解为另一个实际存在的事物的观念的分殊而言的。这样一个观念，也以神作为原因，但也是就神被理解为第三个观念的分殊而言的。以此类推，直至无穷。

证明实际存在的个别事物的观念是思想的一个个别样式，并与思想的其他样式有所区别。因此，以神作为原因，这只是就神作为一个思想者而言的。但是，这并非是就神作为绝对的思想者而言的，而只是就神被理解为另一个思想的样式的分殊而言的。而且神作为后一个思想样式的原因，也只是就神被理解为第三个思想的样式的分殊而言的。以此类推，直至无穷。但是观念的次序和联系与因果的次序和联系是相同的，所以每一个个别观念都以另一个个别观念作为原因。换句话说，每一个个别观念以作为另一个观念的分殊的神作为原因，而这第二个观念也同样以作为另一个观念的分殊的神作为原因。以此类推，直至无穷。

推论无论在观念的个别对象上发生任何变化，关于它的认识都存在于神之中，这只是就神具有该对象的观念而言的。

命题十：实体的存在不属于人的本质，换句话说，实体不构成人的真实存在。

证明实体的存在包含必然的存在。因此，如果实体的存在属于人的本质，就要既承认实体的存在，同时又必须承认人必然存在，由此人将必然存在，而这是荒谬的。所以实体的存在不属于人的本质。

推论由此推知，人的本质是由神的属性的某些分殊构成的。因为实体的存在不属于人的本质。所以，人的本质是某种在神之中的东西，没有神人就既不能存在，也不能被理解。或者，人的本质是以某种特定方式表示神的本性的一个分殊或样式。

命题十一：构成人的心灵的真实存在的第一要素，是一个真实存在着的个别事物的观念。

证明人的本质是由神的属性的某些样式所构成的，也就是由思想的样式所构成的。在所有的思想样式中，观念在本性上总是在前的。并且，如果一个人有了一个观念，必将随之具有其他的样式（也就是，对于这些样式来说，观念在本质上是在前的）。因此，观念是构成人的心灵的存在的第一要素。但是这并不是一个不存在的事物的观念。因为这样的话，这种观念本身就不能被称为是存在的。所以它必定是一个真实存在的事物的观念，而且它也不能是一个无限的事物的观念。因为无限的事物总是必然存在的。因此，这就包含了一个谬论。所以构成人的心灵的真实存在的第一要素，是一个真实存在的个别事物的观念。

推论由此推知，人的心灵是神的无限理智的一部分。因此当我们说，人的心灵感知到这一事物或那一事物时，我们就是在断定，神具有这个或者那个观念，这并非就神是无限的而言的，而只是就神由人的心灵的本性展现出来而言，或者是就神构成人的心灵的本质而言的。而当我们说神具有这个或那个观念时，这不仅是就神构成人的心灵的本性而言的，而且还是就神同时具有人的心灵和另一事物的其他观念而言的。我们由此断定，人的心灵只是部分地或不充分地感知一个事物。

命题十二：无论构成人心灵的观念的对象发生任何变化，都必定会被人的心灵所感知。或者说，必然会有一个该事物发生变化的观念存在于人的心灵之中。就是说，如果构成人的心灵的观念的对象是一个物体，这个物体身上发生的任何变化都会被心灵所感知。

证明对于任何观念的对象所发生的任何变化的认识，都必然存在于神之中，这是就该对象的观念被理解为神的分殊而言的，也就是说，只是就神构成上述事物的心灵而言的。因此，只就神构成人的心灵的本性而言，对于构成人的心灵的观念的对象发生任何变化的认识，必然存在于神之中。也就是说，对于上述事物的认识必然存在于心灵之中，换句话说，心灵可以觉察这一认识。

命题十三：构成人心灵的观念的对象是身体，换句话说，是某种真实存在着的广延的样式，而不是其他东西。

证明如果人的心灵的对象确实不是身体，那么就神是构成我们的心灵而言，就神构成另一事物的心灵而言，身体的感受的观念将不在神之中了。也就是说，关于身体的感受的观念将不在我们的心灵之中了。但是我们的确具有身体的感受的观念。所以，构成人的心灵的观念的对象就是身体，而且是真实存在着的身体。此外，如果心灵除了身体之外还有其他对象，那么这个对象所造成的结果的观念，必然会存在于我们的心灵之中，因为没有存在的事物是不会产生某种结果的。但并没有这种观念存在。因此，我们心灵的对象是一个存在着的身体，而不是其他。

推论由此推知，人是心灵和身体所组成的，而人的身体的存在，正如我们感觉的那样。

公理一：一切物体，要么处于运动之中要么处于静止状态。

公理二：每一个物体的运动，有时很缓慢，有时很迅速。

引理一：物体之间的差异是就运动与静止、迅速和缓慢而言的，而不是就实体而言的。

引理二：一切物体必定在某些方面有共同之处。

证明一切物体之所以相同，就在于它们彼此都包含有同一属性的概念。此外，物体之间还有一个共同点，就是一切物体都可以或快或慢地运动，并且都绝对地处于运动或静止状态之中。

引理三：一个物体运动还是静止，必定是由另一个物体所决定的。而这个物体运动还是静止，又是由第三个物体所决定的。而这第三个物体的运动或静止又由第四个物体所决定。以此类推，直至无穷。

证明物体是个别事物，这些个别事物之间的差异是就运动和静止而言的。因此，每个物体的运动或静止必定由另一个个别事物所决定，也就是说由另一物体所决定。而这一物体也同样要么处于运动之中要么处于静止状态。因此，这一物体也只能由第三个物体所决定，才能够开始运动或者进入静止状态。同理，这第三个物体的动与静，则由第四个物体所决定。以此类推，直至无穷。

推论由此推知，一个物体在运动时将持续运动状态，直到由其他物体所决定而进入静止状态。一个物体在静止时将持续静止状态，直到由其他事物所决定而进入运动状态。这当然是自明的。因为，当我假设一个物体，比如说甲，处于静止状态，并且没有考虑处于运动状态中的其他物体时，我除了认为物体甲处于静止状态之外不能确定其他任何事情。如果此后物体甲变为运动状态，那么其运动当然不可能是此前静止状态的结果。因为从一个物体处于静止状态出发，除了该物体继续保持静止之外，不可能包含其他东西。另一方面，如果物体甲处于运动状态，只要我们仅仅考虑物体甲本身，那么我们唯一能确认的就是甲在运动。如果此后物体甲变为静止状态，那么其静止当然不可能是此前运动状态的结果。因为从一个物体的运动状态出发，只能导致持续不断的运动。物体甲之所以处于静止状态，必定是物体甲之外的物体的结果。也就是说，必定存在一个外因决定了物体甲进入一种静止状态。

公理一：一个物体被其他物体所影响的所有样式，都同时是由影响了该物体的物体的本性和受到影响的该物体的本性推导出来的。因此，同一物体可以被许多本性不同的物体所影响，从而以不同的样式运动。另一方面，不同的物体可以被同一物体所影响，从而以不同的样式运动。

公理二：当一个物体在运动中撞击到另外一个处于静止状态的物体时，该物体必定会反射回来，从而继续保持运动状态。而这一反射运动的轨迹与所撞击到的静止物体的平面所形成的角度，将等于投射运动的轨迹与同一平面所形成的角度。

到此为止，我们的讨论都仅仅涉及最简单的物体，这些物体之间的相互区别，只是以运动和静止、迅速和缓慢为依据的。现在我们将进而讨论复合的物体。

定义：当许多具有相同或不同大小的物体，受到其他物体的压迫而聚合在一起时，或者它们以相同或不同的速度在运动，因而以某种固定的方式相互传达其运动时，我们可以说这些物体是相互联合在一起的，而且联合起来就组成了一个物体或一个个体，它和其他个体的区别就在于它是多种物体联合而成的。

公理三：根据个体或复合体各个部分相互连接的面积的比例或大或小，其各个部分要改变位置也必定或难或易。由此，要改变个体的形状也随之变得或难或易。那些各个部分之间连接面积较大的物体，就称为柔体的；那些各个部分之间连接面积较小的物体，就称为软体的；而那些各个部分相互运动的物体，则称为液体的。

引理四：如果某些物体从由数个物体组成的物体或个体中分离出来，但同时其位置由数量或性质相同的其他物体所代替，那么这一个体将仍然保持其此前的性质，其形式也没有任何变化。

证明物体之间的区别不是根据实体而来的，构成个体的形式的东西是数个物体的联合。但根据假定，即使各个物体不断发生变化，而个体的形式却仍然保持原状。因此，无论就实体还是就样式而论，个体将仍然保持其此前固有的本性。

引理五：如果组成个体的各个部分变大或变小，但是都仍然相互保持着相同的运动和静止关系，那么这一个体将仍然保持其本性，而其现存状态也没有任何变化。

证明与前一引理的证明是相同的。

引理六：如果组成一个个体的若干物体被迫改变其原有的运动方向，而向另一方向运动，但是它们仍然能继续运动，并且能够像以前一样保持相同的运动和相互之间的关系，那么这个个体将仍然保持其固有性质，其现存状态也不会有任何变化。

证明这个命题是自明的，因为按照定义，个体是被假定为我们所谈及的作为其真实存在而保持的一切东西的。

引理七：此外，这样组成的个体，无论它就整体而言是运动还是静止的，无论它沿着这个或那个方向运动，只要其各个部分能够保持自身的运动，而且能够像此前一样将其运动传达给其他部分，那么这一个体将仍然保持其本性。

证明从引理四前面的定义来看，这是很清楚的。

公设

一、人体是由许多不同性质的个体组成的，每一个个体本身则是由非常复杂的部分所组成的。

二、组成人体的个体中，有的是液体的，有的是柔体的，有的是固体的。

三、组成人体的各个个体，也就是人体本身，在许多情形下是受外界物体所影响的。

四、人体需要许多其他物体来保存自己，也可以说是借此不断地保持新生。

五、当人体的液体部分为外界物体所决定时，常常撞击其他柔体部分，改变后者的表面，并将撞击液体部分的外界物体的某些痕迹印在它上面。

六、人体能够在许多情形下移动外界物体，并且能够在许多情形下支配外界物体。

命题

命题十四：人的心灵有感知很多事物的能力，并且这种能力越强，就越能以很多方式支配其身体。

证明人的身体在很多情形下受外界物体影响，并且也能在很多情形下影响外界物体。而人的心灵必定能感知人的身体中的所有变化。因此，人的心灵有感知很多事物的能力，这种能力越强，就越能以很多方式支配其身体。

命题十五：构成人的心灵真实存在的观念不是简单的，而是由多数观念组成的。

证明构成人的心灵真实存在的观念是一个物体的观念，这个物体是由很多复杂的个体组成的。但是每一个组成这个物体的个体的观念必然存在于神之中，所以人的身体的观念是由身体各个构成部分的诸多观念组合而成的。

命题十六：人的身体为外物所影响的每一种样式的观念，必定包含人的身体的性质，也必定包含外界物体的性质。

证明任何物体受到影响而形成的一切样式，既来自于被影响的物体的性质，同时也来自于起影响作用的物体的性质，因此这些样式的观念必定包含影响与被影响的两种物体的性质。所以，人的身体为外物所影响的任何一种样式的观念必定包含人体和外物的性质。

推论一由此推知：第一，人心能够感知很多物体的性质，以及它自己身体的性质。

推论二由此推知：第二，我们对于外界物体所表示的我们自己身体状况的观念，要多于表示外界物体性质的观念。这一点我已经在第一部分的附录中充分举例说明了。

命题十七：如果人的身体以某种方式受到影响，这种方式包含了外界物体的性质，那么人的心灵将会认为这一外界物体是真实存在的或者就在面前，直到人的身体受到影响以另一种方式排除了这一外界物体的存在或在场为止。

证明这一命题是自明的。因为只要人的身体持续受到这样的影响，那么人的心灵就会注意到身体的这种情状。也就是说，人的心灵将具有一个真实存在的样式的观念，并且这一观念中包含外界物体的性质。换句话说，人的心灵将具有一个不仅不排除外界物体的性质的存在或在场、而且以此为出发点的观念。因此，心灵将认为外界物体是真实存在或者就在面前的，直到被影响为止。

推论对于曾经影响过人体的外界物体，即使它们不再存在或在场时，心灵也能将它们当作就在面前。

命题十八：如果人体曾同时被两个或多个物体所影响，那么当心灵后来想象到其中的任何一个时，也将立即回忆起其他的物体。

证明心灵想象任何既定的物体，是由于人体被一个外界物体的印记所影响和安排，其被影响的方式与其某一部分感受上述外界物体的作用是一致的。而身体随之被如此安排，以致心灵同时想象到两个物体。因此，心灵也将同时想象两个物体，并且当它随时想象着其中之一时，将立即回忆起其他物体。

命题十九：人的心灵除了通过影响到人体的情状的观念外，对于人的身体及其存在并不知晓。

证明人的心灵就是真正的观念，或者是关于人的身体的知识。就神被认为是一个真实存在的个别事物的另一个观念的分殊而言，这种观念或知识是在神之中的。或者，可以说是因为人体需要很多其他物体，借以不断地维持其新生；也因为观念的次序和联系与因果的次序和联系相同，所以就神被认为是众多个别事物的观念的分殊而言，人体的观念将在神之中。因此，神具有人的身体的观念或具有人的身体的知识，而这是就神作为众多其他观念的分殊而言的，并不是就神构成人心的本性而言的。也就是说，人的心灵并不了解人的身体。但人体的情状的观念，就神构成人的心灵的本性而言，是在神之中的。或者说，人的心灵感知这些情状，从而人的心灵感知人的身体，而且将人的身体作为真实存在。因此，只有通过影响到人体的情状的观念，心灵才得以感知人的身体。

命题二十：正如人的身体的观念或知识那样，人的心灵的观念或知识同样存在于神之中，并且以同样的方式由神推出，与神相联系。

证明思想是神的一个属性，因此在神之中必定有神自身的观念以及神的一切分殊的观念。因此在神之中也有人的心灵的观念。此外，心灵的这种观念或知识由神推出，并非就神是无限的而言的，而是就神作为一个个别事物的另一观念的分殊而言的。但观念的次序与联系与因果的次序与联系相同。所以，心灵的观念和知识存在于神之中，与神相联系，这是同人的身体的观念与知识相一致的。

命题二十一：心灵的观念和心灵之间的结合，同心灵和身体之间结合的方式是一样的。

证明我们曾经指出，心灵与身体相结合是因为身体是心灵的对象。由于相同的原因，心灵的观念必定和它的对象，也就是心灵相结合，这是同心灵和身体之间的结合方式相一致的。

命题二十二：人的心灵不仅感知人体的情状，并且感知这些情状的观念。

证明情状的观念的观念由神推来并与神相联系，其情形与情状的观念一致。证明这一命题与第二部分命题二十相同。但是人体的情状的观念是在人的心灵之中，就神构成人的心灵的本质而言，也就是在神之中。因此，就神具有人的心灵的知识或观念而言，这些观念的观念必然在神之中，就是说它们必然在人的心灵自身之中，所以心灵不仅感知人体的情状，而且感知这些情状的观念。

命题二十三：心灵只有通过感知身体的情状的观念，才能认识其自身。

证明心灵的观念或知识由神推出并且与神相联系，其情形是与身体的观念或知识一致的。但是既然人的心灵不了解人体本身，换句话说，既然就神构成人心的本性而言，人体的知识与神没有联系，所以就神构成人的心灵的本质而言，心灵的知识也与神没有联系。因此，人的心灵在此情形下并不了解自身。此外，身体受到影响而引起的情状的观念，其中包含人体自身的性质，就是说这些情状的观念与心灵的本性是一致的，因此对于这些观念的知识必然包含对于心灵的知识。而对于这些观念的知识，就在人的心灵自身之中，所以人的心灵只有通过感知身体的情状的观念，才能认识其自身。

命题二十四：人的心灵不包含关于组成人体各个部分的充分知识。

证明组成人体的各个部分属于身体自身的本质，这只是就这些部分依据某种固定的关系相互传达其运动而言的，而不是就它们被视为与人体无关的个体而言的。因为人体的各部分是很多非常复杂的个体组成的，而这些个体的各个部分可以与人体分离，并且可以依据另一种关系向其他物体传达其运动，而不会以任何方式破坏人体自身的本性和特有品质。所以，就神被认为是一个个别事物的另一观念的分殊而言，每一部分的观念或知识都将在神之中，而这个个别事物依据的自然法则是先于上述各个部分的。我们可以断言，这同样适用于组成人体的个体的每一部分，所以组成人体的每一部分的知识都存在于神之中。但这是就神作为非常多事物的观念的分殊而言的，而不是就神仅仅具有人体的观念而言的，换句话说，不是就神具有构成心灵的本性的观念而言的。因此，人的心灵不包含关于组成人体各个部分的充分知识。

命题二十五：人体的任何一个情状的观念不包含关于外界物体的充分知识。

证明我们已经指出人体的情状的观念包含外界物体的性质，只要这个外界物体是以一定的方式决定人的身体的。但外界物体是与人体没有联系的个体，那么，就神被作为另一个事物的观念的分殊而言，其观念或知识必定是在神之中，这个观念就本性而言是先于外界物体自身的。所以，就神具有人体的情状的观念而言，它并不具有外界物体的充分知识。换句话说，人体的情状的观念不包含关于外界物体的充分知识。

命题二十六：人的心灵除了通过其身体情状的观念之外，不能感知任何作为真实存在的外界物体。

证明如果人体在任何情形下都不受某个外界物体的影响，那么人体的观念——换句话说也就是人心——在任何情形下都不会被上述外界物体的存在的观念所影响，也不会在任何情形下感知它的存在。但是只要人体在任何情形下被外界物体所影响，那么心灵就会感知外界物体。

推论就人的心灵想象到一个外界物体而言，心灵并没有一种关于它的充分知识。

证明当人的心灵通过其身体的情状来关注外界物体时，我们说它在想象。这样人的心灵就只能想象作为真实存在的外界物体。所以只要人心是在想象外界物体，则人心便对它们没有充分知识。

命题二十七：人体的任何一个情状的观念不包含对人体自身的充分知识。

证明人体的情状的每一个观念都包含人体的本性，这是就人体在某种确定的情形下被影响而言的。但只要人体是一个能在很多情形下受到影响的个体，那么这一情状的观念就不包含对人体自身的充分知识。

命题二十八：只要人体的情状的观念仅仅与人的心灵相联系，就不是清晰明了的，而是混乱的。

证明人体的情状的观念包含外界物体以及人体自身的性质。它们不仅必然包含人体自身的性质，而且包含人体各个部分的性质。因为情状是人体各个部分，从而也是人的整个身体受到影响而形成的样式。但是关于外界物体和人体各个部分的充分知识是在神之中的，这并不是就神作为人的心灵的分殊而言的，而是就神作为其他观念的分殊而言的。因此，人体的情状的观念，就它们仅仅与心灵相联系而言，就好像是没有前提的结论一样，换句话说，它们是混淆的观念。

命题二十九：人体的任何一个情状的观念的观念不包含关于人的心灵的充分知识。

证明人体的情状的观念不包含人体自身的充分知识，换句话说，不能充分地表示人体的性质。更确切地说，它不能充分地与心灵的本性一致。所以，人体的情状的观念的观念不能充分地表达人的心灵的本性，也不包含关于心灵的充分知识。

推论由此推知，当人的心灵与自然的共同法则一同感知事物时，心灵对于它自身、它自己的身体，以及外界物体都没有充分的知识，而只有混乱的、不完整的知识。因为心灵除了感知身体的情状的观念之外，不能认识其自身。心灵只能通过其身体的情状的观念才能认识它自己的身体，而且只能通过同样的方式来感知外界物体。因此，就心灵具有这种身体的情状的观念而言，它关于自己、自己的身体以及外界物体，都没有充分的知识，而只有混乱的、不完整的知识。

命题三十：对于我们身体的绵延，我们只有很不充分的知识。

证明我们身体的绵延既不依赖其本质，也不依赖神的绝对本性。但是身体的存在和运转都由一定的原因所决定，而这些原因又以一种固定而明确的关系由其他原因所决定而存在并运转。这些其他原因又由另一些原因所决定，以此类推，直至无穷。因此，我们身体的绵延依赖于自然的共同法则或者事物的结构。但对于事物结构的情状的充分知识存在于神之中，这是就神具有一切事物的观念而言的，而不是就神仅仅具有人体的观念而言的。所以，仅仅就神被认为构成心灵的本质，便认为关于我们身体的绵延的知识存在于神之中，是很不充分的。这就是说，这种知识在我们心灵中是很不充分的。

命题三十一：对于在我们之外的个别事物的绵延，我们只有很不充分的知识。

证明像人的身体一样，每一个个别事物必定以一种固定而明确的关系由另外一个个别事物所决定而存在和运转。但是这一个别事物又由另一个个别事物所决定，以此类推，直至无穷。而我们在前一命题里已经证明，从个别事物的这种共同特质出发，我们对于自己的身体只有很不充分的知识。因此，关于个别事物的绵延也可以得出类似的结论，这就是，我们对它仅仅有很不充分的知识。

推论由此推知，所有个别事物都是偶然的和易逝的。因为我们对于个别事物的绵延并没有充分知识，而这就是我们所理解的事物的偶然性及其腐化的可能性。除此之外，再没有其他偶然的东西了。

命题三十二：一切与神相联系的观念都是真观念。

证明一切在神之中的观念总是与它们的对象完全一致，因此它们都是真观念。

命题三十三：在观念中没有任何绝对的东西可以使它们成为错误的。

证明如果否认这个命题是可能的，试想一下，一个绝对的思想样式怎么可能构成错误或虚妄的形式呢。这样一种思想的样式不可能在神之中；而在神之外的话，这种样式就既不能存在，也不能被理解。因此，在观念中没有任何绝对的东西使它们成为错误的。

命题三十四：在我们内心中的每一个绝对的或充分、完满的观念都是真观念。

证明当我们说我们内心中有一个充分、完满的观念时，我们其实是指一个充分、完满的观念存在于神之中——就神构成人的心灵的本质而言。因此我们也就是在说，这是一个真观念。

命题三十五：错误是由于知识的缺陷，而不充分、不完整和混乱的观念，必定包含知识的缺陷。

证明观念中没有绝对的东西导致它们成为错误的。错误不能是由于绝对的缺陷（因为我们只说心灵犯错误，而不说身体犯错误），也不能是由于绝对的愚昧，因为愚昧与错误完全是两回事。所以，错误是由于知识的缺陷，它包含在不充分、不完整和混乱的观念之中。

命题三十六：正如充分的或清晰明了的观念一样，不充分的和混乱的观念，都是由同样的必然性推导出来的。

证明一切观念都在神之中，而且就它们与神相联系而言，它们都是真观念和充分的观念。因此，除非它们与一个个别的心灵相联系，否则就不会有不充分的或混乱的观念。所以一切观念，不论充分的或不充分的，都是由同样的必然性推导出来的。

命题三十七：凡是一切事物所共同具有的，并且相等地存在于部分与整体之中的，都不构成任何个别事物的本质。

证明如果否认这个命题是可能的，设想一下，也就是认为共同的东西构成个别事物的本质——比如说，构成乙的本质。于是没有乙则这些共同的东西既不能存在也不能被认识。但这是与我们的假定相违背的。所以共同的东西不属于乙的本质，也不构成任何个别事物的本质。

命题三十八：那些一切事物所共同具有的，并且相等地存在于部分与整体之中的东西，只能被充分地认识。

证明假设甲是一切物体所共同具有的，并且相等地存在于部分与整体之中。我以为，只有甲才可以充分地被认识。因为甲的观念将必然充分地存在于神之中，这既是就神具有人的身体的观念而言的，也是就神具有人的身体情状的观念而言的。这种情状的观念部分地包含了人的身体的性质和外界物体的性质。换句话说，这种在神之中的观念将必然是充分的，这既是就神构成人的心灵而言的，也是就神具有在人的心灵中的观念而言的。所以，就其认识其自身，就其认识其身体和外界物体而言，人的心灵必然充分地认识甲，此外没有任何其他方式可以认识甲。

推论由此推知，某些观念或概念，是所有人共同具有的。因为一切物体都有其一致的东西，这些一致的东西必定被所有人充分地或清晰明了地感知着。

命题三十九：对于人体和常常影响人体的外界物体所共有和所特有的，并且相等地存在于部分或整体之中的东西，心灵中将呈现出充分的观念。

证明假设甲是人的身体与外界物体所共有和特有的东西，它相等地呈现在人的身体和上述外界物体之中，以及每个外界物体的每个部分和整体之中。那么，就神具有人的身体的观念和某种外界物体的观念而言，甲自身的充分观念将存在于神之中。假设人的身体被它和外界物体共同具有的东西所影响，换句话说，被甲所影响，那么这种情状的观念将包含甲的特质，因此，就其包含甲的特质而言，这个情状的观念将充分地存在于神之中——就神作为人的身体的观念而言，换句话说，就神构成人的心灵的本性而言。因此，这个情状的观念也充分地存在于人的心灵之中。

推论由此推知，人的身体与其他物体共同的东西越多，人的心灵能感知的事物也就越多。

命题四十：凡是由心灵之中的充分观念推导出来的观念，它们自身也是充分的。

证明这一命题是自明的。因为，所谓由人的心灵之中的充分观念推导出来的观念，我们指的也就是，在神的理智中存在一个观念，这个观念以神作为原因，这并非就神是无限的而言的，也不是就神作为众多个别事物的观念而言的，而只是就它构成人的心灵的本质而言的。

命题四十一：只有第一种知识是错误的原因，第二和第三种知识必然是真知识。

证明我们已经指出，凡是不充分的、混乱的观念，都属于第一种知识。所以只有这种知识是错误的原因。此外，我们还曾指出，凡是充分的观念，都属于第二种和第三种知识。所以，这些知识必然是真知识。

命题四十二：是第二种和第三种知识，而不是第一种知识，在教导我们辨别真理与错误。

证明这一命题是自明的。因为凡是知道辨别真理与错误的人，必定具有关于真理与错误的充分观念。换句话说，他必定依据第二种和第三种知识来认识真理与错误。

命题四十三：具有真观念的人，同时也知道他具有真观念，他决不能怀疑他所认识到的事物的真理性。

证明一个在我们心灵之中的真观念，就是在神之中的充分观念——就人的心灵的本性显现神而言。让我们假设，就人的心灵的本性显现神而言，有一个充分观念——观念甲在神之中。那么这个观念甲的观念，必然就存在于神之中，它和神的联系同它和观念甲的联系方式是一样的。但是根据假设，观念甲和神的联系，是就人的心灵的性质显现神来说明的。因此，观念甲的观念也必定以同样的方式与神相联系。这就是说，观念甲的充分观念也将存在于具有充分观念的观念甲的心灵自身之中。所以凡是具有充分观念的人，换句话说，凡是真正了解一个事物的人，必定同时具有关于它的知识的充分观念或真实知识。显然，这就是说他必定同时确信他所知道的东西的真理性。

命题四十四：理性的本性不在于认为事物是偶然的，而在于认为事物是必然的。

证明理性的本性在于真正地认知事物，在于认知事物自身——换句话说，不是将事物当作偶然的，而是将事物当作必然的。

推论一由此推知，无论就过去还是未来而言，只有凭借想象的力量，我们才把事物认为是偶然的。

推论二理性的本性在于，在某种永恒的形式下认知事物。

证明理性的本性在于认为事物是必然的，而不是偶然的。理性对事物的这种必然性具有真正的认识，也就是认知事物的自身。但事物的这种必然性是神的永恒本性自身的必然性，所以理性的本性就在于在这种永恒的形式下来认知事物。我们还可以补充说，理性的基础是表示事物的共同特质的概念，而这些概念并不表示任何个别事物的本质，因此必须避免从任何时间的关系中去认识事物，而要在某种永恒的形式下去认识事物。

命题四十五：每个物体或真实存在的个别事物的每个观念，必然包含神的永恒无限的本质。

证明一个真实存在的个别事物的观念必然包含这个事物的本质和存在。但是个别事物没有神就不能被认识，而且就神以个别事物作为样式所隶属的属性来认识而言，个别事物以神为原因。因此个别事物的观念必然包含这些观念的属性的概念，换句话说，必然包含神的永恒无限的本质。

命题四十六：每个观念所包含的神的永恒无限的本质的知识，都是充分的和完满的。

证明前一个命题的证明是普遍适用的，并且无论一个事物被当作整体或一个部分，该事物的观念——无论是整体还是一个部分，将必定包含神的永恒无限的本质。因此，所有关于神的永恒无限本质的知识，都是一切事物所共同具有的，并且相等地存在于部分或整体之中。所以这种知识必然是充分和完满的。

命题四十七：人的心灵具有神的永恒无限的本质的充分知识。

证明人的心灵具有观念，通过这些观念，心灵得以认知它自身、它的身体以及外界物体，将它们作为真实的存在。所以，人的心灵具有神的永恒无限的本质的充分知识。

命题四十八：在心灵中没有绝对的或自由的意志。心灵有这样或那样的意愿，是被一个原因所决定的。这个原因又由另外一个原因所决定。而这后一个原因也同样由其他原因所决定，以此类推，直至无穷。

证明心灵是思想的一种固定、明确的样式，所以心灵不能是自己行为的自由因。换句话说，心灵没有肯定或否定意志的绝对能力。它必定由一个原因所决定，这一原因又由另外一个原因所决定，而这后一个原因也同样为其他原因所决定。以此类推，直至无穷。

命题四十九：在心灵之中，除了观念作为观念所包含的意志或者肯定与否定之外，再没有意志或者肯定与否定。

证明心灵中没有肯定或否定意志的绝对能力，而只有个别的意志，也就是这个肯定或那个肯定，这个否定或那个否定。让我们设想，依据一个个别意志，也就是思想的一个样式，心灵肯定三角形的三个内角之和等于两个直角。那么这一肯定包含了三角形的概念或观念，换句话说，没有三角形的概念，刚才的肯定就不可能被理解。因为，说甲必定包含乙的概念，也就等于是在说，没有乙就不可能理解甲。此外，如果没有三角形的观念，这一肯定就不可能存在。因此，没有三角形的观念，那么这一肯定既不可能存在也不可能被理解。再者，三角形的观念必定包含这一肯定，也就是，必定包含三个内角之和等于两个直角。因此，反过来说，三角形的观念没有这一肯定也不可能存在或被理解。所以这一肯定属于三角形的观念的本质，除此之外，再不是其他什么东西了。我们所说的这个意志，适用于所有其他意志。换句话说，除了观念之外，没有其他意志存在。

推论意志与理智是同一的。

证明意志与理智不是其他任何东西的，而只是个别的意志与观念。但个别的意志与观念是同一的，所以意志与理智是同一的。

注释这样，我就已经去除通常被归因于错误的原因了。因为以上我们已经证明，错误仅仅在于不完整和混乱的观念所包含的缺陷。因此，一个错误的观念，仅仅因为它是错误的并且不包含确定性。因而当我们说，一个人默认错误的观念并且对此毫不怀疑，我们并没有说他是确定的，而只是说他没有怀疑，或者说他默认错误的观念，因为没有原因能够使他的想象动摇。因此，尽管这个人坚持错误的观念，我们也决不会因此就认为他是确定的。因为所谓确定性，我们指的是某种肯定的东西，而不只是怀疑的缺乏。而所谓缺乏确定性，我们理解为错误。

不过，为了充分说明前一个命题，我还要补充几点。此外，对于反对我们学说的论点，也要给予回答。最后，为了消除对于我的学说的全部顾虑，我认为有必要说出这一学说所带来的一些效用。我只说一些效用，是因为主要的效用必须等到第五部分才能得到更明确的说明。

我将从第一点开始说明，并要劝告我的读者们，在心灵的一个观念或概念和通过想象形成的事物的意象二者之间作出准确的区分。此外，对观念和用来表示观念的名词之间加以区别也是必要的。很多人对于这三者——也就是意象、名词和观念——要么完全混淆在一起，要么没有充分准确或严谨地加以区别。所以他们才会对关于意志的这种学说的绝对必要性浑然不知，而了解此说的必要性既是针对哲学的宗旨而言的，也是针对生活的审慎指导而言的。那些认为观念是由意象所构成的人——这种意象是通过身体与外界物体接触而形成的——都相信，那些我们无法对其形成内心图像的观念就不是观念，而仅仅是任意虚构的幻象。因此，他们将观念理解为画板上的单调图像，而且既然被这种误解所占据，他们就无法看到一个观念作为观念本身而言包含肯定与否定。再者，那些将名词与观念或将名词与一个观念本身所包含的肯定混淆起来的人，都认为他们能够要求一些与他们的感觉、肯定或否定相反的东西。这种误解是很容易去除的。只要我们思考知识的本性，并注意到它绝对不包含广延的概念，就会清楚地认识到，一个观念（作为思想的一个样式）决不会存在于任何事物的意象之中，也不会存在于名词之中。名词和意象的本质是由身体的运动所构成的，而身体的运动是绝对不包含思想的概念的。

关于这个话题到此也就足够了。因此现在我将继续讨论那些或许会进而反对我们学说的理由。第一个反对的理由，就在于他们确信意志的范围比知性更广泛，因此意志不同于知性。意志的范围比知性更广泛的原因就在于，根据经验，他们认为与其现在所具有的能力相比，他们不需要更强的认可或者肯定与否定的能力，以便认可我们没有认识到的无限多的其他事物。但是他们又的确需要一种更强的知性能力，以便认识我们没有认识到的无限多的事物。因此意志有别于理智，前者是无限的，而后者则是有限的。

第二个反对我们的理由，在于经验似乎特别明显地教导我们，我们能够在认可我们认识到的事物之前保留我们的判断。这种说法得到这一论据的证实：没有人可以说是因为感知一个事物而被欺骗，只会因为他认可或不认可而受到欺骗。比如，一个人想象到一匹有翼之马，但是他并不因此就承认这一有翼之马的存在。换句话说，除非他同时承认有翼之马的存在，就不能说是受到了欺骗。所以从经验的教训来看，似乎没有什么比意志或认可能力是自由的并且与知性能力有所区别这一事实更清楚的了。

第三个可以反对我们的理由，在于他们认为一个肯定所包含的实在性并不明显地比另外一个肯定多，换句话说，似乎肯定一个真实事物为真比肯定一个虚假事物为真并不需要更强大的力量。然而我们已经看到一个观念要比另一个观念包含更多的实在性和完满性，因为如果一个事物比其他事物更加卓越，该事物的观念也比其他事物的观念更加卓越。这似乎也表明知性与意志之间是有区别的。

第四个可以反对我们的理由是，如果人的行为不是出于自由的意志，当他的行为动机达到一种均衡状态时——就像布里丹的驴子那样，将会发生什么呢？他会因为饥渴而死去吗？如果我说他会这样，那我不是将他当作一头驴子或者一座雕像而不是一个真实的人吗？如果我说他不会，那么他将能决定自己，因此就会具有去他想去的地方和做他想做的事情的能力。除此之外，也许还有其他的反对意见，但我并无必要将任何人可能想到的证据一一罗列。我将仅仅就以上所提及的论点，尽量简短地予以反驳。

为了回答第一个反对理由，我承认如果知性仅仅指清晰明了的观念的话，意志的范围比知性更加广泛。但是我不承认意志的范围比知觉或者构成概念的能力更加广泛，而且我也看不出来为什么意志能力比感觉能力更可以说是无限的。因为，凭借相同的意志能力我们可以肯定无限多的事物（一个接一个地，因为我们不可能同时肯定无限多的事物），同样，凭借相同的感觉能力，我们可以（一个接一个地）感觉或感知数量无限多的物体。如果有人说，有无限多的事物是我们无法感知到的，我的回答是：我们的思想所不能达到的东西，也就是我们的意志所不能达到的东西。但他们又会说，如果上帝想让我们感知这些事物，那么他必须赋予我们一种比他已经赋予了我们的更强的感知能力，而不是赋予我们一种更强的意志能力。这也就等于说，如果上帝想让我们认识无限多的其他实体，他就有必要赋予我们一个比他已经赋予我们的更多的知性，而不是赋予我们关于实体的一个更普遍的观念，以便把握这样无限多的实体。我们已经指出，意志是一种普遍的实体或观念，可以通过它来解释一切个别意愿。换句话说，意志是一切个别意愿共同的东西。因此那些相信一切意愿的共同或者普遍的观念是一种能力的人，要说意志的范围无限度地超过知性的范围，我们就不会感到奇怪了。因为，普遍性是以同样的方式作为一个、多个或无限多个体的属性的。

作为对第二个反对理由的回答，我否认我们具有保留判断的自由能力。因为当我们说，某个人保留了他的判断，我们只不过是说，他知道自己没有充分感知这个事物。因此，判断的保留严格地说是一种知觉，而不是自由意志。为了证明这一点，让我们假设有一个男孩想象着一匹马，并且对此毫无感知。因为这一想象包含着马的存在，而这个男孩没有感知到任何东西从而否定这匹马的存在，因此他将必然认为这匹马是在场的，他不可能怀疑它的存在，尽管他对于这匹马的存在并不确定。这是我们经常在梦中发现的情形。我不相信，有人会觉得在梦中他有自由能力可以保留他对于梦中事物的判断，或者可以阻止他自己不梦到他在梦中所看到的事物。尽管在梦中，我们甚至也有保留判断的情况发生，但那只是当我们梦到我们正在做梦的时候。

此外，我还承认没有人会因为知觉而受到欺骗，换句话说，我承认心灵的想象就其本身而言并不包含错误。但是我否认一个人既有所知觉，却又会毫无所肯定。因为，所谓看见一匹有翼的马，除了肯定一匹马是有翼的之外，还有什么别的呢？如果心灵除了这匹有翼的马之外，没有看见任何其他东西，那么它将认为这匹马就在眼前，而不会有其他理由来怀疑它的存在，也没有任何力量能够拒绝承认这匹有翼的马，除非有翼之马的形象与另外一个否定这匹马的存在的观念相结合，或者心灵自己认识到它所具有的有翼之马的观念是不充分的。这样，心灵必然会否认或者怀疑这匹有翼之马的存在。

我认为我也已经充分答复了第三条反对的理由，就是说，意志是一种普遍性的东西，它是一切观念所共有的，并且意志只表示一切观念的共同点，也就是肯定。因此肯定的充分本质，抽象地来看，必定存在于每个观念之中。并且只有在这个意义上，而不是就其被理解为构成观念的本质而言，肯定才是同样地在一切观念之中的。因为个别肯定之间的相互区别，与个别观念之间的相互区别是相似的。比如，圆形的观念所包含的肯定不同于三角形的观念所包含的肯定，正如圆的观念不同于三角形的观念。此外，我绝对否定我们肯定真实事物为真与肯定虚假事物为真需要同等强大的思想力量。如果我们考虑到心灵的话，这两种肯定相互之间的关系，与存在和不存在是相同的。因为观念中没有肯定的东西构成错误的真实实在。

我们因此必定得出结论，当我们将普遍与个别、理性和抽象的实体与实在混淆时，我们是很容易受到欺骗的。至于说到第四条反对的理由，我会完全承认，如果一个人处在那种均衡的状态之中（也就是他除饥渴之外没有其他知觉，而且食物和饮料也和他有同样远的距离），那么他将会死于饥渴。如果问我，这样的人究竟应该被当作驴子还是当作人，我只能回答我不知道。我既不知道那悬梁自尽的是否应该被当作人，也不知道孩子、白痴、疯子等等是否应该被当作人。

现在还要指出的，就是这一学说的知识对于我们的生活有何效用。这一点可以很容易从下面的讨论里得出：

第一，这一学说的效用在于教导我们，我们的一切行为都只依据神的天命。我们的行为越是完满，我们对神越是理解，那么我们参与到神的本性之中的程度就越高。这一学说不仅可以使我们的灵魂保持完全宁静的状态，而且可以指示我们，至高无上的幸福只存在于神的知识当中，只有它才能引导我们一切行为都以仁爱和虔诚为准则。由此我们可以清楚地理解，那些希望上帝对于其德行、善举以及苦役有所表彰与酬劳的人，他们离德行的真正价值实在太远，似乎德行和崇敬神本身并不是幸福和至上自由一样。

第二，这一学说的效用在于教导我们应该如何面对命运的馈赠，或者那些不在我们能力范围之内的事情，以及不是由我们的本性推导出来的事情。因为这一学说教导我们对于命运中的幸运与不幸，都要保持同样的心情去镇静地等候和忍耐，知道一切事物都依据必然的法则出于神的永恒天命，正如从三角形的本质必然推出三个内角之和等于两个直角一样。

第三，这一学说对于我们的社会生活也有帮助，因为它教导我们不要憎恨、轻视、嘲笑、嫉妒任何人，也不要愤怒。此外，这一学说告诉我们要自我满足，帮助邻里，但又不是出于妇人之仁、偏袒或者迷信，而仅仅是依据理性的指导，按照时势和场合的需要，这正如我将在第四部分中所要指出的那样。

第四，这一学说对于政治的公共生活也不无益处，因为它教导我们应该以什么方式来统治并领导公民，不是让他们成为奴隶，而是让他们可以自由地做最好的事情。

至此我已完成在这一注释的开始答应讨论的内容，并将就此结束第二部分的论述。我认为，鉴于问题的困难程度，我已经算是充分清楚地解释了人的心灵的本性及其特质。我已经奠定了一个基础，在此基础之上，很多关于最高效用和最需要了解的知识的卓越结论，都可以应运而生。从以下的讨论中，就可以部分地明白这一点。

Part Ⅲ　On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions

Preface

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature s general laws.They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom；for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature s order,that he has absolute control o-ver his actions,and that he is determined solely by himself.They attribute human infir-mities and fickleness,not to the power of nature in general,but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man,which accordingly they bemoan,deride,despise,or,as usually happens,abuse；he,who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows,is looked upon as a seer.Still there has been no lack of very excellent men（to whose toil and industry I confess myself much in-debted），who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life,and have given much sage advice to mankind.But no one,so far as I know,has defined the nature and strength of the emotions,and the power of the mind against them for their re-straint.

I do not forget,that the illustrious Descartes,though he believed,that the mind has absolute power over its actions,strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes,and,at the same time,to point out a way,by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them.However,in my opinion,he accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect,as I will show in the Proper place.For the present I wish to revert to those,who would rather abuse or deride human emo-tions than understand them.Such persons will,doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically,and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason,frivo-lous,absurd,and dreadful.However,such is my plan.Nothing comes to pass in na-ture,which can be set down to a flaw therein；for nature is always the same,and every-where one and the same in her efficacy and power of action；that is,nature s laws and ordinances,whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another,are everywhere and always the same；so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever,namely,through nature s universal laws and rules.Thus the passions of hatred,anger,envy,and so on,considered in themselves,follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature；they answer to cer-tain definite causes,through which they are understood,and possess certain Properties as worthy of being known as the Properties of anything else,whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight.I shall,therefore,treat of the nature and strength of the emo-tions according to the same method,as I employed heretofore in my investigations con-cerning God and the mind.I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner,as though I were concerned with lines,planes,and solids.

Definitions

1.By an adequate cause,I mean a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived.By an inadequate or partial cause,I mean a cause through which,by itself,its effect cannot be understood.

2.I say that we act when anything takes place,either within us or externally to us,whereof we are the adequate cause；that is when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us,which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood.On the other hand,I say that we are passive as regards something when that something takes place within us,or follows from our nature externally,we be-ing only the partial cause.

3.By emotion I mean the modifications of the body,whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished,aided or constrained,and also the ideas of such modifications.

Therefore,if we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications,I then call the emotion an activity；otherwise I call it a passion,or state wherein the mind is passive.

Postulates

1.The human body can be affected in many ways,whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished,and also in other ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or less.

2.The human body can undergo many changes,and,nevertheless,retain the im-pressions or traces of objects,and,consequently,the same images of things.

Propositions

PROP.1.Our mind is in certain cases active,and in certain cases passive.In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active,and in so far as it has inadequate i-deas,it is necessarily passive.

Proof.-In every human mind there are some adequate ideas,and some ideas that are fragmentary and confused.Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in God,inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind,and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise adequate in God,not inasmuch as he contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone,but as he,at the same time,contains the minds of other things.Again,from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow；of this effect God is the adequate cause,not inasmuch as he is infinite,but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by the given idea.But of that effect whereof God is the cause,inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in a given mind,of that effect,I repeat,the mind in question is the adequate cause.Therefore our mind,in so far as it has adequate ideas,is in certain cases necessarily active；this was our first point.Again,whatsoever necessarily,follows from the idea which is adequate in God,not by virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man only,but by virtue of his containing,together with the mind of that one man,the minds of other things also,of such an effect the mind of the given man is not an adequate,but only a partial cause；thus the mind,inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas,is in certain cases necessarily pas-sive；this was our second point.Therefore our mind，＆c.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable to be acted upon,in Proportion as it possesses inadequate ideas,and,contrariwise,is more or less active in Proportion as it possesses adequate ideas.

PROP.2.Body cannot determine mind to think,neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these,if such there be.

Proof.-All modes of thinking have for their cause God,by virtue of his being a thinking thing,and not by virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute.That,therefore,which determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought,and not a mode of extension；that is,it is not body.This was our first point.Again,the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body,which has also been determined to a state of mo-tion or rest by a third body,and absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring from God,in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of extension,and not by some mode of thought；that is,it cannot spring from the mind,which is a mode of thought.This was our second point.Therefore body cannot determine mind，＆c.

PROP.3.The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas；the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas.

Proof.-The first element,which constitutes the essence of the mind,is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent body,which is compounded of many other ide-as,whereof some are adequate and some inadequate.Whatsoever therefore follows from the nature of mind,and has mind for its proximate cause,through which it must be un-derstood,must necessarily follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea.But in so far as the mind has inadequate ideas,it is necessarily passive；wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from adequate ideas,and accordingly the mind is only passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas.

Note.-Thus we see,that passive states are not attributed to the mind,except in so far as it contains something involving negation,or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts；I could thus show,that passive states are attributed to individual things in the same way that they are attributed to the mind,and that they cannot otherwise be per-ceived,but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.

PROP.4.Nothing can be destroyed,except by a cause external to itself.

Proof.-This Proposition is self-evident,for the definition of anything affirms the essence of that thing,but does not negative it；in other words,it postulates the essence of the thing,but does not take it away.So long therefore as we regard only the thing it-self,without taking into account external causes,we shall not be able to find in it any-thing which could destroy it.

PROP.5.Things are naturally contrary,that is,cannot exist in the same object,in so far as one is capable of destroying the other.

Proof.-If they could agree together or co-exist in the same object,there would then be in the said object something which could destroy it；but this,by the foregoing Proposition,is absurd,therefore things.

PROP.6.Everything,in so far as it is in itself,endeavours to persist in its own being.

Proof.-Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of God are expressed in a given determinate manner；that is,they are things which express in a given determi-nate manner the power of God,whereby God is and acts；now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be destroyed,or which can take away its existence；but contra-riwise it is opposed to all that could take away its existence.Therefore,in so far as it can,and in so far as it is in itself,it endeavours to persist in its own being.

PROP.7.The endeavour,wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being,is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question.

Proof.-From the given essence of any thing certain consequences necessarily fol-low,nor have things any power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as de-termined；wherefore the power of any given thing,or the endeavour whereby,either a-lone or with other things,it acts,or endeavours to act,that is,the power or endeavour,wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,is nothing else but the given or actu-al essence of the thing in question.

PROP.8.The endeavour,whereby a thing endeavours to persist in its being,in-volves no finite time,but an indefinite time.

Proof.-If it involved a limited time,which should determine the duration of the thing,it would then follow solely,from that power whereby the thing exists,that the thing could not exist beyond the limits of that time,but that it must be destroyed；but this is absurd.Wherefore the endeavour wherewith a thing exists involves no definite time；but,contrariwise,since it will by the same power whereby it already exists always continue to exist,unless it be destroyed by some external cause,this endeavour involves an indefinite time.

PROP.9.The mind,both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas,and also in so far as it has confused ideas,endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period,and of this endeavour it is conscious.

Proof.-The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas,therefore,both in so far as it possesses the former,and in so far as it possesses the lat-ter,it endeavours to persist in its own being,and that for an indefinite time.Now as the mind is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body,the mind is therefore conscious of its own endeavour.

Note.-This endeavour,when referred solely to the mind,is called will,when re-ferred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite；it is,in fact,nothing else but man s essence,from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation；and which man has thus been determined to perform.

Further,between appetite and desire there is no difference,except that the term desire is generally applied to men,in so far as they are conscious of their appetite,and may accordingly be thus defined：Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.It is thus plain from what has been said,that in no case do we strive for,wish for,long for,or desire anything,because we deem it to be good,but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good,because we strive for it,wish for it,long for it,or desire it.

PROP.10.An idea,which excludes the existence of our body,cannot be postula-ted in our mind,but is contrary thereto.

Proof.-Whatsoever can destroy our body,cannot be postulated therein.Therefore neither can the idea of such a thing occur in God,in so far as he has the idea of our body；that is,the idea of that thing cannot be postulated as in our mind,but contrari-wise,since the first element,that constitutes the essence of the mind,is the idea of the human body as actually existing,it follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body；thus,an idea,which negatives the existence of our body,is contrary to our mind，＆c.

PROP.11.Whatsoever increases or diminishes,helps or hinders the power of ac-tivity in our body,the idea thereof increases or diminishes,helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.

Proof.-This Proposition is evident from II.7.or from II.14.

PROP.12.The mind,as far as it can,endeavours to conceive those things,which increase or help the power of activity in the body.

Proof.-So long as the human body is affected in a mode,which involves the na-ture of any external body,the human mind will regard that external body as present,and consequently,so long as the human mind regards an external body as present,that is,conceives it,the human body is affected in a mode,which involves the nature of the said external body；thus so long as the mind conceives things,which increase or help the power of activity in our body,the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of activity；consequently the mind s power of thinking is for that period in-creased or helped.Thus the mind,as far as it can,endeavours to imagine such things.

PROP.13.When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body s power of activity,it endeavours,as far as possible,to remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named things.

Proof.-So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded to,the power of the mind and body is diminished or constrained；nevertheless it will continue to con-ceive it,until the mind conceives something else,which excludes the present existence thereof；that is,the power of the mind and of the body is diminished,or constrained,until the mind conceives something else,which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived；therefore the mind,as far as it can,will endeavour to conceive or re-member the latter.

Corollary.-Hence it follows,that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things,which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body.

Note.-From what has been said we may,clearly understand the nature of Love and Hate.Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea,of an external cause：Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.We further see,that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,and to keep present to him,the object of his love；while he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.

PROP.14.If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time,it will,whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two,be also affected by the other.

Proof.-If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once,whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them,it will straightway remember the other also.But the mind s conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the nature of external bodies；therefore,if the body,and consequently the mind has been once affect-ed by two emotions at the same time,it will,whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two,be also affected by the other.

PROP.15.Anything can,accidentally,be the cause of pleasure,pain,or desire.

Proof.-Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously affected by two emotions,of which one neither increases nor diminishes its power of activity,and the other does either increase or diminish the said power.From the foregoing Proposition it is evident that,whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the former,through its true cause,which（by hypothesis）neither increases nor diminishes its power of action,it will be at the same time affected by the latter,which does increase or diminish its power of activi-ty,that is it will be affected with pleasure or pain.Thus the former of the two emotions will,not through itself,but accidentally,be the cause of pleasure or pain.In the same way also it can be easily shown,that a thing may be accidentally the cause of de-sire.

Corollary.-Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain,though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion,we can ei-ther love or hate it.

Proof.-For from this fact alone it arises,that the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain,that is,according as the pow-er of the mind and body may be increased or diminished，＆c.；and consequently,ac-cording as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it,in other words,ac-cording as it may love or hate the same.

Note.-Hence we understand how it may happen,that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us；merely,as the phrase is,from sympathy or antipathy.We should refer to the same category those objects,which affect us pleasurably or painfully,simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way.This I will show in the next Prop.I am aware that certain authors,who were the first to introduce these terms“sympathy”and“antipathy”，wished to sig-nify thereby some occult qualities in things；nevertheless I think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities.

PROP.16.Simply from the fact that we conceive,that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object which is wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully,although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emo-tions,we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.

Proof.-The point of resemblance was in the object（by hypothesis），when we re-garded it with pleasure or pain,thus,when the mind is affected by the image thereof,it will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion,and consequently the thing,which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance,will be accidentally a cause of pleasure or pain.Thus,although the point in which the two objects resemble one anoth-er be not the efficient cause of the emotion,we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.

PROP.17.If we conceive that a thing,which is wont to affect us painfully,has any point of resemblance with another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure,we shall hate the first-named thing,and at the same time we shall love it.

Proof.-The given thing is（by hypothesis）in itself a cause of pain,and,in so far as we imagine it with this emotion,we shall hate it；further,inasmuch as we conceive that it has some point of resemblance to something else,which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure,we shall with an equally strong impulse of pleas-ure love it；thus we shall both hate and love the same thing.

Note.-This disposition of the mind,which arises from two contrary emotions,is called vacillation；it stands to the emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the i-magination；vacillation and doubt do not differ one from the other,except as greater dif-fers from less.But we must bear in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from cau-ses,which give rise through themselves to one of the emotions,and to the other acci-dentally.I have done this,in order that they might be more easily deduced from what went before；but I do not deny that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an object,which is the efficient cause of both emotions.The human body is composed of a variety of individual parts of different nature,and may therefore be affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body；and contrariwise,as one and the same thing can be affected in many ways,it can also in many different ways affect one and the same part of the body.Hence we can easily conceive,that one and the same object may be the cause of many and conflicting emotions.

PROP.18.A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present.

Proof.-So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,he will regard that thing as present,even though it be non-existent,he will not conceive it as past or fu-ture,except in so far as its image is joined to the image of time past or future.Where-fore the image of a thing,regarded in itself alone,is identical,whether it be referred to time past,time future,or time present；that is,the disposition or emotion of the body is identical,whether the image be of a thing past,future,or present.Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same,whether the image be of a thing past or future.

Note 1.-I call a thing past or future,according as we either have been or shall be affected thereby.For instance,according as we have seen it,or are about to see it,ac-cording as it has recreated us,or will recreate us,according as it has harmed us,or will harm us.For,as we thus conceive it,we affirm its existence；that is,the body is af-fected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing,and therefore the body is affected by the image of the thing,in the same way as if the thing were actually present.However,as it generally happens that those,who have had many experiences,vacil-late,so long as they regard a thing as future or past,and are usually in doubt about its issue；it follows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so constant,but are generally disturbed by the images of other things,until men become assured of the issue.

Note 2.-From what has just been said,we understand what is meant by the terms Hope,Fear,Confidence,Despair,Joy,and Disappointment.Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure,arising from the image of something future or past,whereof we do not yet know the issue.Fear,on the other hand,is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we are in doubt.If the element of doubt be removed from these emotions,hope becomes Confidence and fear becomes Despair.In other words,Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.Again,Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof we doubted the issue.Disappointment is the Pain opposed to Joy.

PROP.19.He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain；if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure.

Proof.-The mind,as far as possible,endeavours to conceive those things which increase or help the body s power of activity；in other words,those things which it loves.But conception is helped by those things which postulate the existence of a thing,and contrariwise is hindered by those which exclude the existence of a thing；therefore the images of things,which postulate the existence of an object of love,help the mind s endeavour to conceive the object of love,in other words,affect the mind pleasurably；contrariwise those things,which exclude the existence of an object of love,hinder the aforesaid mental endeavour；in other words,affect the mind painfully.He,therefore,who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain，＆c.

PROP.20.He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleas-ure.

Proof.-The mind endeavours to conceive those things,which exclude the exist-ence of things whereby the body s power of activity is diminished or constrained；that is,it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the existence of what it hates；therefore the image of a thing,which excludes the existence of what the mind hates,helps the aforesaid mental effort,in other words,affects the mind pleasurably.Thus he who con-ceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure.

PROP.21.He who conceives,that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully,will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully；and the one or the other e-motion will be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved.

Proof.-The images of things which postulate the existence of the object of love,help the mind s endeavour to conceive the said object.But pleasure postulates the exist-ence of something feeling pleasure,so much the more in Proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater；for it is a transition to a greater perfection；therefore the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental endeavour of the lover；that is,it affects the lover pleasurably,and so much the more,in Proportion as this emotion may have been greater in the object of love.This was our first point.Further,in so far as a thing is affected with pain,it is to that extent destroyed,the extent being in Proportion to the amount of pain；therefore he who conceives,that the object of his love is affected pain-fully,will himself be affected painfully,in Proportion as the said emotion is greater or less in the object of love.

PROP.22.If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love,we shall be affected with love towards that thing.Contrariwise,if we conceive that it affects an object of our love painfully,we shall be affected with hatred towards it.

Proof.-He,who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of our love,affects us also pleasurably or painfully-that is,if we conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or pain.But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come to us accompa-nied by the idea of an external cause；therefore,if we conceive,that anyone affects an object of our love pleasurably or painfully,we shall le affected with love or hatred to-wards him.

PROP.23.He who conceives,that an object of his hatred is painfully affected,will feel pleasure.Contrariwise,if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected,he will feel pain.Each of these emotions will be greater or less,according as its contra-ry is greater or less in the object of hatred.

Proof.-In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected,it is destroyed,to an extent Proportioned to the strength of the pain.Therefore,he who conceives,that some object of his hatred is painfully affected,will feel pleasure,to an extent Proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred.This was our first point.A-gain,pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected thing,in Proportion as the pleasure is greater or less.If anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasur-ably affected,this conception will hinder his own endeavour to persist；in other words,he who hates will be painfully affected.

Note.-This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed,and without any mental con-flict.For,in so far as a man conceives that something similar to himself is affected by pain,he will himself be affected in like manner；and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary circumstances.But here we are regarding hatred only.

PROP.24.If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate,we shall feel hatred towards him also.If we conceive that he painfully affects the said ob-ject,we shall feel love towards him.

Proof.-This Proposition is proved in the same way as Part3.22.，which see.

Note.-These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to envy,which,ac-cordingly,is nothing else but hatred,in so far as it is regarded as disposing a man to re-joice in another s hurt,and to grieve at another s advantage.

PROP.25.We endeavour to affirm,concerning ourselves,and concerning what we love,everything that we conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves,or the loved ob-ject.Contrariwise,we endeavour to negative everything,which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.

Proof.-That,which we conceive to affect an object of our love pleasurably or painfully,affects us also pleasurably or painfully.But the mind endeavours,as far as possible,to conceive those things which affect us pleasurably；in other words,it en-deavours to regard them as present.And,contrariwise,it endeavours to exclude the ex-istence of such things as affect us painfully；therefore,we endeavour to affirm concern-ing ourselves,and concerning the loved object,whatever we conceive to affect our-selves,or the loved object pleasurably.

PROP.26.We endeavour to affirm,concerning that which we hate,everything which we conceive to affect it painfully；and,contrariwise,we endeavour to deny,con-cerning it,everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.

Proof.-This Proposition follows from III.23.，as the foregoing Proposition fol-lowed from III.21.

Note.-Thus we see that it may readily happen,that a man may easily think too highly of himself,or a loved object,and,contrariwise,too meanly of a hated object.This feeling is called pride,in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself,and is a species of madness,wherein a man dreams with his eyes open,thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception,and thereupon ac-counting them real,and exulting in them,so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence,and determines his own power of action.Pride,there-fore,is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself.Again,the pleas-ure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over-esteem.Where-as the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain.

PROP.27.By the very fact that we conceive a thing,which is like ourselves,and which we have not regarded with any emotion,to be affected with any emotion,we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.

Proof.-The images of things are modifications of the human body,whereof the i-deas represent external bodies as present to us；in other words,whereof the ideas in-volve the nature of our body,and,at the same time,the nature of external bodies as present.If,therefore,the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our body,then the idea which we form of the external body will involve a modification of our own body similar to the modification of the external body.Consequently,if we conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion,this conception will express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.Thus,from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion,we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.If,however,we hate the said thing like ourselves,we shall,to that extent,be affected by a contrary,and not similar,emotion.

Note.-This imitation of emotions,when it is referred to pain,is called compas-sion；when it is referred to desire,it is called emulation,which is nothing else but the desire of anything,engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire.

Corollary1.-If we conceive that anyone,whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion,pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves,we shall be affected with love towards him.If,on the other hand,we conceive that he painfully affects the same,we shall be affected with hatred towards him.

Proof.-This is proved from the last Proposition in the same manner as III.22.is proved from III.21.

Corollary2.-We cannot hate a thing which we pity,because its misery affects us painfully.

Proof.-If we could hate it for this reason,we should rejoice in its pain,which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Corollary3.-We seek to free from misery,as far as we can,a thing which we pity.

Proof.-That,which painfully affects the object of our pity,affects us also with similar pain；therefore,we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its exist-ence,or which destroys it；in other words,we shall desire to destroy it,or we shall be determined for its destruction；thus,we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity.

PROP.28.We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure；but we endeavour to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly re-pugnant thereto,or to conduce,to pain.

Proof.-We endeavour,as far as possible,to conceive that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure；in other words we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as possible as present or actually existing.But the endeavonr of the mind,or the mind s power of thought,is equal to,and simultaneous with,the endeavour of the body,or the body s power of action.Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its existence,in other words we desire and strive for it；this was our first point.Again,if we conceive that something,which we believed to be the cause of pain,that is which we hate,is de-stroyed,we shall rejoice.We shall,therefore,endeavour to destroy the same,or to remove it from us,so that we may not regard it as present；this was our second point.Wherefore whatsoever conduces to pleasure，＆c.

PROP.29.We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to regard with pleasure,and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.

Proof.-From the fact of imagining,that men love or hate anything,we shall love or hate the same thing.That is,from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the thing s presence.And so we shall endeavour to do whatever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure,etc.

Note.-This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone,solely in order to please men,we call ambition,especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar,that we do or omit certain things to our own or another s hurt；in other cases it is gener-ally called kindliness.Furthermore I give the name of praise to the pleasure,with which we conceive the action of another,whereby he has endeavoured to please us；but of blame to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.

PROP.30.If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably,he will be affected by pleasure,accompanied by the idea of himself as cause；in other words,he will regard himself with pleasure.On the other hand,if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,he will regard him-self with pain.

Proof.-He who conceives,that he affects others with pleasure or pain,will,by that very fact,himself be affected with pleasure or pain,but,as a man is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby he is determined to action,it follows that he who conceives,that he affects others pleasurably,will be affected with pleasure accom-panied by the idea of himself as cause；in other words,will regard himself with pleas-ure.

Note.-As love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause,and ha-tred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause；the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred.But,as the terms love and hatred are used in reference to external objects,we will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion；pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we will style Honour,and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame；I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man s belief,that he is being praised or blamed：other-wise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is called self-complacency,and its contrary pain is called repentance.Again,as it may happen that the pleasure,wherewith a man conceives that he affects others,may exist solely in his own imagina-tion,and as everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he con-ceives will affect him with pleasure,it may easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,when in reality he may be an annoy-ance to all.

PROP.31.If we conceive that anyone loves,desires,or hates anything which we ourselves love,desire,or hate,we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love，＆c.On the contrary,if we think that anyone shrinks from some-thing that we love,we shall undergo vacillation of soul.

Proof.-From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves anything we shall our-selves love that thing；but we are assumed to love it already；there is,therefore,a new cause of love,whereby our former emotion is fostered；hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly.Again,from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from any-thing,we shall ourselves shrink from that thing.If we assume that we at the same time love it,we shall then simultaneously love it and shrink from it；in other words,we shall be subject to vacillation.

Corollary.-From the foregoing,and also from Part 3.28.it follows that everyone endeavours,as far as possible,to cause others to love what he himself loves,and to hate what he himself hates.

Note.-This endeavour to bring it about,that our own likes and dislikes should meet with universal approval,is really ambition；wherefore we see that everyone by na-ture desires,that the rest of mankind should live according to his own individual disposi-tion；when such a desire is equally present in all,everyone stands in everyone else s way,and in wishing to be loved or praised by all,all become mutually hateful.

PROP.32.If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something,which only one person can possess,we shall endeavour to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof.

Proof.-From the mere fact of our conceiving that another person takes delight in a thing we shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight therein.But we as-sumed that the pleasure in question would be prevented by another s delight in its ob-ject；we shall,therefore,endeavour to prevent his possession thereof.

Note.-We thus see that man s nature is generally so constituted,that he takes pity on those who fare ill,and envies those who fare well with an amount of hatred Propor-tioned to his own love for the goods in their possession.Further,we see that from the same Property of human nature,whence it follows that men are merciful,it follows also that they are envious and ambitious.Lastly,if we make appeal to Experience,we shall find that she entirely confirms what we have said；more especially if we turn our atten-tion to the first years of our life.We find that children,whose body is continually,as it were,in equilibrium,laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying；moreover,they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see others doing,and to possess themselves whatever they conceive as delighting others；inasmuch as the images of things are,as we have said,modifications of the human body,or modes wherein the hu-man body is affected and disposed by external causes to act in this or that manner.

PROP.33 When we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour,as far as we can,to bring about that it should love us in return.

Proof.-That which we love we endeavour,as far as we can,to conceive in prefer-ence to anything else.If the thing be similar to ourselves,we shall endeavour to affect it pleasurably in preference to anything else.In other words,we shall endeavour,as far as we can,to bring it about,that the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves,that is,that it should love us in return.

PROP.34.The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be af-fected towards us,the greater will be our complacency.

Proof.-We endeavour,as far as we can,to bring about,that what we love should love us in return；in other words,that what we love should be affected with pleasure ac-companied by the idea of ourself as cause.Therefore,in Proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected because of us,our endeavour will be assisted.-that is the greater will be our pleasure.But when we take pleasure in the fact,that we pleasurably affect something similar to ourselves,we regard ourselves with pleasure；therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected，＆c.

PROP.35.If anyone conceives,that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to,he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival.

Proof.-In Proportion as a man thinks,that a loved object is well affected towards him,will be the strength of his self-approval,that is,of his pleasure；he will,there-fore,endeavour,as far as he can,to imagine the loved object as most closely bound to him；this endeavour or desire will be increased,if he thinks that someone else has a similar desire.But this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved object has joined to itself；therefore he will for that reason be affected with pain,accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his rival；that is,he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and also towards his rival,which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved object.

PROP.36.He who remembers a thing,in which he has once taken delight,de-sires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.

Proof.-Everything,which a man has seen in conjunction with the object of his love,will be to him accidentally a cause of pleasure；he will,therefore,desire to possess it,in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight；in other words,he will desire to possess the object of his love under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.

Corollary.-A lover will,therefore,feel pain if one of the aforesaid attendant cir-cumstances be missing.

Proof.-For,in so far as he finds some circumstance to be missing,he conceives something which excludes its existence.As he is assumed to be desirous for love s sake of that thing or circumstance,he will,in so far as he conceives it to be missing,feel pain.

Note.-This pain,in so far as it has reference to the absence of the object of love,is called Regret.

PROP.37.Desire arising through pain or pleasure,hatred or love,is greater in Proportion as the emotion is greater.

Proof.-Pain diminishes or constrains man s power of activity,in other words,di-minishes or constrains the effort,wherewith he endeavours to persist in his own being；therefore it is contrary to the said endeavour；thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed to removing that pain.But,in Proportion as the pain is greater,so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater part of man s power of activity；therefore the greater the pain,the greater the power of activity employed to remove it；that is,the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to remove it.Again,since pleasure increases or aids a man s power of activity,it may easily be shown in like manner,that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it,and his desire will be in Proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.

Lastly,since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain and pleasure,it fol-lows in like manner that the endeavour,appetite,or desire,which arises through hatred or love,will be greater in Proportion to the hatred or love.

PROP.38.If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,so that love is thor-oughly destroyed,he will,causes being equal,regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,and his hatred will be in Proportion to the strength of his former love.

Proof.-If a man begins to hate that which he had loved,more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never loved it.For love is a pleasure which a man endeavours as far as he can to render permanent；he does so by regarding the object of his love as present,and by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably；this endeavour is greater in Proportion as the love is greater,and so also is the endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his affection.Now these endeavours are constrained by hatred towards the object of love；wherefore the lover will for this cause also be affected with pain,the more so in Proportion as his love has been greater；that is,in addition to the pain caused by hatred,there is a pain caused by,the fact that he has loved the ob-ject；wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain,or in other words,will hate it more than if he had never loved it,and with the more intensity in Proportion as his former love was greater.

PROP.39.He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury,unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself；on the other hand,he who loves anyone will,by the same law,seek to benefit him.

Proof.-To hate a man is to conceive him as a cause of pain；therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to remove or destroy him.But if anything more painful,or,in other words,a greater evil,should accrue to the hater thereby-and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying out the injury,which he planned against the object of his hate-he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury,and the strength of his endeavour will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury and will therefore prevail over it,as we asserted.The second part of this proof proceeds in the same manner.Wherefore he who hates another,etc.

Note.-By good I here mean every kind of pleasure,and all that conduces thereto,especially that which satisfies our longings,whatsoever they may be.By evil,I mean every,kind of pain,especially that which frustrates our longings.For I have shown that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good,but,contrariwise,we deem a thing good because we desire it；consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from；everyone,therefore,according to his particular emotions,judges or estimates what is good,what is bad,what is better,what is worse,lastly,what is best,and what is worst.Thus a miser thinks that abundance of money is the best,and want of money the worst；an ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory,and fears nothing so much as shame.To an envious man nothing is more delightful than another s misfortune,and nothing more painful than another s success.So every man,according to his emotions，judges a thing to be good or bad,useful or useless.The emotion,which induces a man to turn from that which he wishes,or to wish for that which he turns from,is called ti-midity,which may accordingly be defined as the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future by encountering a lesser evil.But if the evil which he fears be shame,timidity becomes bashfulness.Lastly,if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another evil,so that the man knows not which to choose,fear becomes consternation,especially if both the evils feared be very great.

PROP.40.He,who conceives himself to be hated by another,and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred,will hate that other in return.

Proof.-He who conceives another as affected with hatred,will thereupon be af-fected himself with hatred,that is,with pain,accompanied by the idea of an external cause.But,by the hypothesis,he conceives no cause for this pain except him who is his enemy；therefore,from conceiving that he is hated by some one,he will be affected with pain,accompanied by the idea of his enemy；in other words,he will hate his ene-my in return.

Corollary1.-He who conceives,that one whom he loves hates him,will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.For,in so far as he conceives that he is an object of ha-tred,he is determined to hate his enemy in return.But,by the hypothesis,he never-the less loves him；wherefore he will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.

Corollary2-If a man conceives that one,whom he has hitherto regarded without e-motion,has done him any injury from motives of hatred,he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind.

Proof.-He who conceives,that another hates him,will hate his enemy in return,and will endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully；he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury.Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury done to himself；he will,therefore,forthwith endeavour to repay it in kind.

Note.-The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called Anger；the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves is called Revenge.

PROP.41.If anyone conceives that he is loved by another,and believes that he has given no cause for such love,he will love that other in return.

Proof.-This Proposition is proved in the same way as the preceding one.See also the note appended thereto.

Note.-If he believes that he has given just cause for the love,he will take pride therein；this is what most often happens,and we said that its contrary took place when-ever a man conceives himself to be hated by another.This reciprocal love,and conse-quently the desire of benefiting him who loves us,and who endeavours to benefit us,is called gratitude or thankfulness.It thus appears that men are much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.

Corollary.-He who imagines,that he is loved by one whom he hates,will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.This is proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding Proposition.

Note.-If hatred be the prevailing emotion,he will endeavour to injure him who loves him；this emotion is called cruelty,especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary cause for hatred.

PROP.42.He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or hon-our will feel vain,if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude.

Proof.-When a man loves something similar to himself,he endeavours,as far as he can,to bring it about that he should be loved thereby in return.Therefore he who has conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire,which he feels of being loved in return；that is from the hope of honour or pleasure；hence he will endeavour,as far as he can,to conceive this cause of honour,or to regard it as actually existing.But,by the hypothesis,he conceives something else,which excludes the existence of the said cause of honour；wherefore he will thereat feel pain.

PROP.43.Hatred is increased by being reciprocated,and can on the other hand be destroyed by love.

Proof.-He who conceives,that an object of his hate hates him in return,will thereupon feel a new hatred,while the former hatred still remains.But if,on the other hand,he conceives that the object of hate loves him,he will to this extent regard him-self with pleasure,and will endeavour to please the cause of his emotion.In other words,he will endeavour not to hate him,and not to affect him painfully；this endeav-our will be greater or less in Proportion to the emotion from which it arises.Therefore,if it be greater than that which arises from hatred,and through which the man endeavours to affect painfully the thing which he hates,it will get the better of it and banish the ha-tred from his mind.

PROP.44.Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love；and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it.

Proof.-The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop.38.of this Part；for he who begins to love a thing,which he was wont to hate or regard with pain,from the very fact of loving,feels pleasure.To this pleasure involved in love is added the pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the pain involved in hatred,accompanied by the idea of the former object of hatred as cause.

PROP.45.If a man conceives,that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself which he loves,he will hate that person.

Proof.-The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him who hates it；therefore the lover,in conceiving that anyone hates the beloved object,conceives the beloved thing as affected by hatred,in other words,by pain；consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause；that is,he will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves.

PROP.46.If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone,of a class or nation different from his own,and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause,under the general category of the class or na-tion；the man will feel love or hatred,not only to the individual stranger,but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.

Proof.-This is evident from III.16.

PROP.47.Joy arising from the fact,that anything we hate is destroyed,or suffers other injury,is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us.

Proof.-This is evident from III.27.For in so far as we conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,we ourselves feel pain.

PROP.48.Love or hatred towards,for instance,Peter is destroyed,if the pleas-ure involved in the former,or the pain involved in the latter emotion,be associated with the idea of another cause；and will be diminished in Proportion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.

Proof.-This Prop.is evident from the mere definition of love and hatred.For pleasure is called love towards Peter,and pain is called hatred towards Peter,simply in so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the other.When this condition of causality is either wholly or partly removed,the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part vanishes.

PROP.49.Love or hatred towards a thing,which we conceive to be free,must,other conditions being similar,be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.

Proof.-A thing which we conceive as free must be perceived through itself without anything else.If,therefore,we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain,we shall therefore love it or hate it,and shall do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the given emotion.But if the thing which causes the emotion be conceived as act-ing by necessity,we shall then conceive it not as the sole cause,but as one of the cau-ses of the emotion,and therefore our love or hatred towards it will be less.

PROP.50.Anything whatever can be,accidentally,a cause of hope or fear.

Proof.-This Proposition is proved in the same way as III.xv.，which see,togeth-er with the note to III.xviii.

PROP.51.Different men may be differently affected by the same object,and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object.

Proof.-The human body is affected by external bodies in a variety of ways.Two men may therefore be differently affected at the same time,and therefore may be differ-ently affected by one and the same object.Further the human body can be affected sometimes in one way,sometimes in another；consequently it may be differently affected at different times by one and the same object.

PROP.52.An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others,and which we do not conceive to have any Property that is not common to many,will not be regarded by us for so long,as an object which we conceive to have some Property pecul-iar to itself.

Proof.-As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in conjunction with others,we at once remember those others,and thus we pass forthwith from the contem-plation of one object to the contemplation of another object.And this is the case with the object,which we conceive to have no Property that is not common to many.For we thereupon assume that we are regarding therein nothing,which we have not before seen in conjunction with other objects.But when we suppose that we conceive in an object something special,which we have never seen before,we must needs say that the mind,while regarding that object,has in itself nothing which it can fall to regarding instead thereof；therefore it is determined to the contemplation of that object only.Therefore an object，＆c.

Note.-This mental modification,or imagination of a particular thing,in so far as it is alone in the mind,is called Wonder；but if it be excited by an object of fear,it is called Consternation,because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof,that he has no power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil.If,however,the object of wonder be a man s prudence,industry,or an-ything of that sort,inasmuch as the said man is thereby regarded as far surpassing our-selves,wonder is called Veneration；otherwise,if a man s anger,envy，＆c.，be what we wonder at,the emotion is called Horror.Again,if it be the prudence,industry,or what not,of a man we love,that we wonder at,our love will on this account be the greater,and when joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion.We may in like manner conceive hatred,hope,confidence,and the other emotions,as associated with wonder；and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than those which have ob-tained names in ordinary speech.Whence it is evident,that the names of the emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their nature.

To wonder is opposed Contempt,which generally arises from the fact that,because we see someone wondering at,loving,or fearing something,or because something,at first sight,appears to be like things,which we ourselves wonder at,love,fear，＆c.，we are,in consequence,determined to wonder at,love,or fear that thing.But if from the presence,or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,we are compelled to de-ny concerning it all that can be the cause of wonder,love,fear，＆c.，the mind then,by the presence of the thing,remains determined to think rather of those qualities which are not in it,than of those which are in it；whereas,on the other hand,the presence of the object would cause it more particularly to regard that which is therein.As devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love,so does Derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear,and Scorn from contempt of folly,as veneration from won-der at prudence.Lastly,we can conceive the emotions of love,hope,honour，＆c.，in association with contempt,and can thence deduce other emotions,which are not distin-guished one from another by any recognized name.

PROP.53 When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity,it feels pleasure；and that pleasure is greater in Proportion to the distinctness wherewith it con-ceives itself and its own power of activity.

Proof.-A man does not know himself except through the modifications of his body,and the ideas thereof.When,therefore,the mind is able to contemplate itself,it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection,or to feel pleasure；and the pleasure will be greater in Proportion to the distinctness,wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own power of activity.

Corollary.-This pleasure is fostered more and more,in Proportion as a man con-ceives himself to be praised by others.For the more he conceives himself as praised by others,the more will he imagine them to be affected with pleasure,accompanied by the idea of himself；thus he is himself affected with greater pleasure,accompanied by the i-dea of himself.

PROP.54.The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity.

Proof.-The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual essence thereof；but the essence of the mind obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do；not that which it neither is nor can do；therefore the mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its power of activity.

PROP.55.When the mind contemplates its own weakness,it feels pain thereat.Proof.-The essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind is,or can do；in other words,it is the mind s nature to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity.Thus,when we say that the mind contemplates its own weakness,we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting to conceive something which asserts its power of activity,it is checked in its endeavour-in other words,it feels pain.

Corollary.-This pain is more and more fostered,if a man conceives that he is blamed by others；this may be proved in the same way as the corollary to III.53.

Note.-This pain,accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,is called humili-ty；the pleasure,which springs from the contemplation of ourselves,is called self-love or self-complacency.And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as often as a man contem-plates his own virtues,or his own power of activity,it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own exploits,and displaying the force both of his body and mind,and also that,for this reason,men are troublesome one to another.Again,it follows that men are naturally envious,rejoicing in the shortcomings of their equals,and feeling pain at their virtues.For whenever a man conceives his own actions,he is affected with pleas-ure,in Proportion as his actions display more perfection,and he conceives them more distinctly-that is in Proportion as he can distinguish them from others,and regard them as something special.Therefore,a man will take most pleasure in contemplating him-self,when he contemplates some quality which he denies to others.But,if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in general,he will not be so greatly pleased；he will,on the contrary,feel pain,if he conceives that his own actions fall short when compared with those of others.This pain he will endeavour to re-move,by putting a wrong construction on the actions of his equals,or by,as far as he can,embellishing his own.It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy,which latter is fostered by their education.For parents are accustomed to in-cite their children to virtue solely by the spur of honour and envy.But,perhaps,some will scruple to assent to what I have said,because we not seldom admire men s virtues,and venerate their possessors.In order to remove such doubts,I append the following corollary.

Corollary.-No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his equal.

Proof.-Envy is a species of hatred or pain,that is,a modification whereby a man s power of activity,or endeavour towards activity,is checked.But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,which cannot follow from his nature as it is given；therefore a man will not desire any power of activity or virtue to be attributed to him,that is apPropriate to another s nature and foreign to his own；hence his desire cannot be checked,nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue in some one unlike him-self,consequently he cannot envy such an one.But he can envy his equal,who is assumed to have the same nature as himself.

PROP.56.There are as many kinds of pleasure,of pain,of desire,and of every e-motion compounded of these,such as vacillations of spirit,or derived from these,such as love,hatred,hope,fear，＆c.，as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.

Proof.-Pleasure and pain,and consequently the emotions compounded thereof,or derived therefrom,are passions,or passive states；now we are necessarily,passive,in so far as we have inadequate ideas；and only,in so far as we have such ideas are we passive；that is,we are only necessarily passive,in so far as we conceive,or in so far as we are affected by an emotion,which involves the nature of our own body,and the nature of an external body.Wherefore the nature of every,passive state must necessarily be so explained,that the nature of the object whereby we are affected be expressed.Namely,the pleasure,which arises from,say,the object A,involves the nature of that object A,and the pleasure,which arises from the object B,involves the nature of the object B；wherefore these two pleasurable emotions are by nature different,inasmuch as the causes whence they arise are by nature different.So again the emotion of pain,which arises from one object,is by nature different from the pain arising from another object,and,similarly,in the case of love,hatred,hope,fear,vacillation，＆c.

Thus,there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure,pain,love,hatred，＆c.，as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.Now desire is each man s essence or nature,in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any given modification of itself；therefore,according as a man is affected through external causes by this or that kind of pleasure,pain,love,hatred，＆c.，in other words,according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner,so will his desire be of one kind or anoth-er,and the nature of one desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another de-sire,as widely as the emotions differ,wherefrom each desire arose.Thus there are as many kinds of desire,as there are kinds of pleasure,pain,love，＆c.，consequently there are as many kinds of desire,as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.

Note.-Among the kinds of emotions,which,by the last Proposition,must be very,numerous,the chief are luxury,drunkenness,lust,avarice,and ambition,being mere-ly species of love or desire,displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according to the object,with which they are concerned.For by luxury,drunkenness，lust,avarice,ambition，＆c.，we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting,drink-ing,venery,riches,and fame.Furthermore,these emotions,in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects wherewith they are concerned,have no contra-ries.For temperance,sobriety,and chastity,which we are wont to oppose to luxury,drunkenness,and lust,are not emotions or passive states,but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the last-named emotions.However,I cannot here explain the re-maining kinds of emotions（seeing that they are as numerous as the kinds of objects），nor,if I could,would it be necessary.It is sufficient for our purpose,namely,to deter-mine the strength of the emotions,and the mind s power over them,to have a general definition of each emotion.It is sufficient,I repeat,to understand the general Properties of the emotions and the mind,to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the mind s power in moderating and checking the emotions.Thus,though there is a great difference between various emotions of love,hatred,or desire,for instance between love felt towards children,and love felt towards a wife,there is no need for us to take cogni-zance of such differences,or to track out further the nature and origin of the emotions.

PROP.57.Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another in-dividual,only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other.

Proof.-We will prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.

All emotions are attributable to desire,pleasure,or pain,as their definitions above given show.But desire is each man s nature or essence；therefore desire in one individ-ual differs from desire in another individual,only in so far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature or essence of the other.Again,pleasure and pain are passive states or passions,whereby every man s power or endeavour to persist in his be-ing is increased or diminished,helped or hindered.But by the endeavour to persist in its being,in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in conjunction,we mean appe-tite and desire；therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or appetite,in so far as by external causes they are increased or diminished,helped or hindered,in other words,they are every man s nature；wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man,only in so far as the nature or es-sence of the one man differs from the essence of the other；consequently,any emotion of one individual only differs，＆c.

Note.-Hence it follows,that the emotions of the animals which are called irration-al（for after learning the origin of mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel）only differ from man s emotions,to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature.Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation；but the desire of the former is equine,the desire of the latter is human.So also the lusts and appetites of insects,fi-shes,and birds must needs vary according to the several natures.Thus,although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being,yet the life,wherein each is content and rejoices,is nothing else but the idea,or soul,of the said individual,and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another,to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another.Lastly,it follows from the foregoing Proposition,that there is no small difference be-tween the joy which actuates,say,a drunkard,and the joy possessed by a philosopher,as I just mention here by the way.Thus far I have treated of the emotions attributable to man,in so far as he is passive.It remains to add a few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active.

PROP.58.Besides pleasure and desire,which are passivities or passions,there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire,which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.

Proof.-When the mind conceives itself and its power of activity,it feels pleasure；now the mind necessarily contemplates itself,when it conceives a true or adequate idea.But the mind does conceive certain adequate ideas.Therefore,it feels pleasure in so far as it conceives adequate ideas；that is,in so far as it is active.Again,the mind,both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas,and in so far as it has confused ideas,en-deavours to persist in its own being；but by such an endeavour we mean desire；there-fore,desire is also attributable to us,in so far as we understand,or in so far as we are active.

PROP.59.Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active,there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or pain.

Proof.-All emotions can be referred to desire,pleasure,or pain,as their defini-tions,already given,show.Now by pain we mean that the mind s power of thinking is diminished or checked；therefore,in so far as the mind feels pain,its power of under-standing,that is,of activity,is diminished or checked；therefore,no painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active,but only emotions of pleasure and desire,which are attributable to the mind in that condition.

Note.-All actions following from emotion,which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding,I set down to strength of character，which I divide into courage and highmindedness.By courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.By highminded-ness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,solely under the dictates of rea-son,to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship.Those actions,there-fore,which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to courage,those which aim at the good of others I set down to highmindedness.Thus temperance,sobrie-ty,and presence of mind in danger，＆c.，are varieties of courage；courtesy,mercy，＆c.，are varieties of highmindedness.

I think I have thus explained,and displayed through their primary causes the prin-cipal emotions and vacillations of spirit,which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,to wit,desire,pleasure,and pain.It is evident from what I have said,that we are in many ways driven about by external causes,and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate.But I have said,that I have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions,not all that might be given.For,by proceeding in the same way as above,we can easily show that love is united to repentance,scorn,shame，＆c.I think everyone will agree from what has been said,that the emotions may be compounded one with another in so many ways,and so many variations may arise therefrom,as to exceed all possibility of computation.However,for my purpose,it is enough to have enumerated the most important；to reck-on up the rest which I have omitted would be more curious than profitable.It remains to remark concerning love,that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a thing which we longed for,the body,from the act of enjoyment,acquires a new disposition,whereby it is determined in another way,other images of things are aroused in it,and the mind begins to conceive and desire something fresh.For example,when we con-ceive something which generally delights us with its flavour,we desire to enjoy,that is,to eat it.But whilst we are thus enjoying it,the stomach is filled and the body is other-wise disposed.If,therefore,when the body is thus otherwise disposed,the image of the food which is present be stimulated,and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be stimulated also,the new disposition of the body will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt,and consequently the presence of the food which we formerly longed for will be-come odious.This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or weariness.For the rest,I have neglected the outward modifications of the body observable in emotions,such,for in-stance,as trembling,pallor,sobbing,laughter，＆c.，for these are attributable to the body only,without any reference to the mind.Lastly,the definitions of the emotions re-quire to be supplemented in a few points；I will therefore repeat them,interpolating such observations as I think should here and there be added.

Definitions of the Emotions

1.Desire is the actual essence of man,in so far as it is conceived,as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.

Explanation.-We have said above,that desire is appetite,with consciousness thereof；further,that appetite is the essence of man,in so far as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own persistence.But,in the same note,I also remarked that,strictly speaking,I recognize no distinction between appetite and desire.For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not,it remains one and the same appetite.Thus,in order to avoid the appearance of tautology,I have refrained from explaining de-sire by appetite；but I have taken care to define it in such a manner,as to comprehend,under one head,all those endeavours of human nature,which we distinguish by the terms appetite,will,desire,or impulse.I might,indeed,have said,that desire is the essence of man,in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity；but from such a definition it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite.Therefore,in order to imply the cause of such consciousness,it was necessary to add,in so far as it is determined by some given,modification，＆c.For,by,a modi-fication of man s essence,we understand every disposition of the said essence,whether such disposition be innate,or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought,or solely under the attribute of extension,or whether,lastly,it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.By the term desire,then,I here mean all man s endeavours,impulses,appetites,and volitions,which vary according to each man s dis-position,and are,therefore,not seldom opposed one to another,according as a man is drawn in different directions,and knows not where to turn.

2.Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.

3.Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection.

Explanation.-I say transition；for pleasure is not perfection itself.For,if man were born with the perfection to which he passes,he would possess the same,without the emotion of pleasure.This appears more clearly from the consideration of the contrary emotion,pain.No one can deny,that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection,and not in the less perfection itself；for a man cannot be pained,in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree.Neither can we say,that pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection.For absence is nothing,whereas the emotion of pain is an activity；wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less per-fection-in other words,it is an activity whereby a man s power of action is lessened or constrained.I pass over the definitions of merriment,stimulation,melancholy,and grief,because these terms are generally used in reference to the body,and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain.

4.Wonder is the conception of anything,wherein the mind comes to a stand,be-cause the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts.

Explanation.-We showed the reason,why the mind,from the contemplation of one thing,straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing,namely,because the images of the two things are so associated and arranged,that one follows the other.This state of association is impossible,if the image of the thing be new；the mind will then be at a stand in the contemplation thereof,until it is determined by other causes to think of something else.Thus the conception of a new object,considered in itself,is of the same nature as other conceptions；hence,I do not include wonder among the emotions,nor do I see why I should so include it.

5.Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind so little,that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it.

6.Love is pleasure,accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Explanation.-This definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love；the definition given by those authors who say that love is the lover s wish to unite himself to the loved object expresses a Property,but not the essence of love；and,as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love s essence,they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its Properties,accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure.It must,however,be noted,that when I say that it is a Property of love，that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object,I do not here mean by wish consent,or conclusion,or a free decision of the mind；neither do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is absent,or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand；for love can be conceived without either of these desires；but by wish I mean the contentment,which is in the lover,on account of the presence of the beloved object,whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened,or at least maintained.

7.Hatred is pain,accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

8.Inclination is pleasure,accompanied by the idea of something which is acciden-tally a cause of pleasure.

9.Aversion is pain,accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain.

10.Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.

Explanation.-Wonder arises from the novelty of a thing.If,therefore,it happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us,we shall cease to wonder at it；thus we see,that the emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love.

11.Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality,which we despise,in an object which we hate.

Explanation.-In so far as we despise a thing which we hate,we deny existence thereof,and to that extent rejoice.But since we assume that man hates that which he derides,it follows that the pleasure in question is not without alloy.

12.Hope is an inconstant pleasure,arising from the idea of something past or fu-ture,whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.

13.Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea,of something past or future,whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.

Explanation.-From these definitions it follows,that there is no hope unmingled with fear,and no fear unmingled with hope.For he,who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything,is assumed to conceive something,which excludes the existence of the said thing in the future；therefore he,to this extent,feels pain；conse-quently,while dependent on hope,he fears for the issue.Contrariwise he,who fears,in other words doubts,concerning the issue of something which he hates,also conceives something which excludes the existence of the thing in question；to this extent he feels pleasure,and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as he desires.

14.Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future，wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

15.Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future,wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

Explanation.-Thus confidence springs from hope,and despair from fear,when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event has been removed；this comes to pass,be-cause man conceives something past or future as present and regards it as such,or else because he conceives other things,which exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt.For,although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular e-vent,it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt concerning it.For we have shown,that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it.Thus it may happen that we are affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain con-cerning a thing past or future,as concerning the conception of a thing present.

16.Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,which has had an issue beyond our hope.

17.Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of something past,which has had an issue contrary to our hope.

18.Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil,which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves.

Explanation.-Between pity and sympathy there seems to be no difference,unless perhaps that the former term is used in reference to a particular action,and the latter in reference to a disposition.

19.Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.

20.Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another.

Explanation.-I am aware that these terms are employed in senses somewhat differ-ent from those usually assigned.But my purpose is to explain,not the meaning of words,but the nature of things.I therefore make use of such terms,as may convey my meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary signification.

21.Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him.

22.Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone,because we hate him.

Explanation.-Thus partiality is an effect of love,and disparagement an effect of hatred；so that partiality may also be defined as love,in so far as it induces a man to think too highly of a beloved object.Contrariwise,disparagement may be defined as ha-tred,in so far as it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object.

23.Envy is hatred,in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another s good fortune,and to rejoice in another s evil fortune.

Explanation.-Envy is generally opposed to sympathy.

24.Sympathy is love,in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another s good fortune,and pain at another s evil fortune.

Explanation.-These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of something external,as cause either in itself or accidentally.I now pass on to other emotions,which are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.

25 Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man s contemplation of himself and his own power of action.

26.Humility is pain arising from a man s contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.

Explanation.-Self-complacency is opposed to humility,in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own power of action；but,in so far as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind,it is opposed to repentance,which we may thus define：

27.Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some action,which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind.

28.Pride is thinking too highly of one s self from self-love.

Explanation.-Thus pride is different from partiality,for the latter term is used in reference to an external object,but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of him-self.However,as partiality is the effect of love,so is pride the effect or Property of self-love,which may therefore be thus defined,love of self or self-approval,in so far as it leads a man to think too highly of himself.To this emotion there is no contrary.For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self-hatred；I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself,in so far as he conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that.For whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing,he imagines this of neces-sity,and by that notion he is so disposed,that he really cannot do that which he con-ceives that he cannot do.For,so long as he conceives that he cannot do it,so long is he not determined to do it,and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it.However,if we consider such matters as only depend on opinion,we shall find it con-ceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself；for it may happen,that a man，sorrowfully regarding his own weakness,should imagine that he is despised by all men,while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him.Again,a man may think too meanly of himself,if he deny of himself in the present something in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain.As,for instance,if he should say that he is unable to form any clear conceptions,or that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base，＆c.We may also say,that a man thinks too meanly of him-self.when we see him from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things which others,his equals,venture.We can,therefore,set down as a contrary to pride an emotion which I will call self-abasement,for as from self-complacency springs pride,so from hu-mility springs self-abasement,which I will accordingly thus define：

29.Self-abasement is thinking too meanly of one s self by reason of pain.

Explanation.-We are nevertheless generally accustomed to oppose pride to humili-ty,but in that case we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than to its na-ture.We are wont to call proud the man who boasts too much,who talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people s faults,who wishes to be first；and lastly who goes through life with a style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station.On the oth-er hand,we call humble the man who too often blushes,who confesses his faults,who sets forth other men s virtues,and who,lastly,walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.However,these emotions,humility and self-abasement,are extremely rare.For human nature,considered in itself,strives against them as much as it can；hence those,who are believed to be most self-abased and humble,are generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.

30.Honour is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own,which we believe to be praised by others.

31.Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own,which we believe to be blamed by others.

Explanation.-We should here remark the difference which exists between shame and modesty.Shame is the pain following the dead whereof we are ashamed.Modesty is the fear or dread of shame,which restrains a man from committing a base action.Mod-esty is usually opposed to shamelessness,but the latter is not an emotion,as I will duly show；however,the names of the emotions（as I have remarked already）have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature.

32.Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,kept alive by the remem-brance of the said thing,and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.

Explanation.-When we remember a thing,we are by that very fact,as I have al-ready said more than once,disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something present；but this disposition or endeavour,while we are awake,is gen-erally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which we re-member.Thus when we remember something which affected us with a certain pleasure,we by that very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure as though it were present,but this endeavour is at once checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence of the thing in question.Wherefore regret is,strictly speaking,a pain opposed to that pleasure,which arises from the absence of something we hate.But,as the name regret seems to refer to desire,I set this emotion down,among the e-motions springing from desire.

33.Emulation is the desire of something,engendered in us by our conception that others have the same desire.

Explanation.-He who runs away,because he sees others running away,or he who fears,because he sees others in fear；or again,he who,on seeing that another man has burnt his hand,draws towards him his own hand,and moves his body,as though his own hand were burnt；such an one can be said to imitate another s emotion,but not to emulate him；not because the causes of emulation and imitation are different,but be-cause it has become customary to speak of emulation only in him,who imitates that which we deem to be honourable,useful,or pleasant.

34.Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing from love,whereby we endeavour to benefit him,who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us.

35.Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.

36.Anger is the desire,whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate.

37.Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced,through mutual hatred,to in-jure one who,with similar feelings,has injured us.

38.Cruelty or savageness is the desire,whereby a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.

Explanation.-To cruelty is opposed clemency,which is not a passive state of the mind,but a power whereby man restrains his anger and revenge.

39.Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil,which we dread,by undergoing a lesser evil.

40.Daring is the desire,whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.

41.Cowardice is attributed to one,whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.

Explanation.-Cowardice is,therefore,nothing else but the fear of some evil,which most men are wont not to fear；hence I do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.Nevertheless,I have chosen to explain it here,because,in so far as we look to the desire,it is truly opposed to the emotion of daring.

42.Consternation is attributed to one,whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.

Explanation.-Consternation is,therefore,a species of cowardice.But,inasmuch as consternation arises from a double fear,it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering,that he is not able to remove the evil.I say bewildered,in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be con-strained by his amazement.I say wavering,in so far as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the fear of another evil,which equally torments him；whence it comes to pass that he knows not,which he may avert of the two.

43.Courtesy or deference,is the desire of acting in a way that should please men,and refraining from that which should displease them.

44.Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.

Explanation.Ambition is the desire,whereby all the emotions are fostered and strengthened；therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome.For,so long as a man is bound by any desire,he is at the same time necessarily bound by this.“The best men，”says Cicero，“are especially led by honour.Even philosophers,when they write a book contemning honour,sign their names thereto”.

45.Luxury is excessive desire,or even love of living sumptuously.

46.Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.

47.Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.

48.Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse.

Explanation.-Whether this desire be excessive or not,it is still called lust.

If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions,and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind,we shall be able thus to define the emotions,in so far as they are referred to the mind only.

General Definition of the Emotions

Emotion,which is called a passivity of the soul is a confused idea,whereby the mind affirms concerning its body,or any part thereof,a force for existence greater or less than before,and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.

Explanation.-I say,first,that emotion or passion of the soul is a confused idea.For we have shown that the mind is only passive,in so far as it has inadequate or con-fused ideas.I say,further,whereby the mind affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than before.For all the ideas of bodies,which we possess,denote rather the actual disposition of our own body than the nature of an exter-nal body.But the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the disposition of the body,or of some part thereof,which is possessed by the body,or some part thereof,because its power of action or force for existence is increased or di-minished,helped or hindered.But it must be noted that,when I say a greater or less force for existence than before,I do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition of the body,but that the idea which constitutes the reality of an e-motion affirms something of the body,which,in fact,involves more or less of reality than before.

And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact,that it affirms the actual existence of its own body,and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very es-sence of a thing,it follows that the mind passes to greater or less perfection,when it happens to affirm concerning its own body,or any part thereof,something involving more or less reality than before.

When,therefore,I said above that the power of the mind is increased or dimin-ished,I merely meant that the mind had formed of its own body,or of some part there-of,an idea involving more or less of reality,than it had already affirmed concerning its own body.For the excellence of ideas,and the actual power of thinking are measured by the excellence of the object.Lastly,I have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another,so that,besides the nature of pleasure and pain,which the first part of the definition explains,I might also express the nature of desire.

第三部分　论情感的起源和性质

序言

大部分作家在写文章讨论人类的情感和生活方式时，与其说在讨论遵守自然界一般规律的自然事物，还不如说在讨论超出自然以外的事物。他们看上去要把在自然界中的人当作王国中的王国。因为他们相信：人是在破坏自然法则而不是在遵守自然法则，人有绝对的力量来控制自己的行为，并且是完全由自我决定的。他们不把人类的软弱无力和变化无常归因于自然的一般力量，而是归因于人性中某些难解的缺陷，对于这些缺陷他们表示悲哀、嘲笑、蔑视，甚或通常加以诅咒。并且谁能够成功地最雄辩或最犀利地指出人类理智的弱点，他便被尊为先知。诚然，有许多出色的人物（对于他们的劳动和业绩我们表示十分感激），他们曾经写下许多优秀的作品来讨论正确的生活方式，并给予人们许多充满智慧的忠言，但是就我所知，还没有人曾经解释过人类情感的本性和力量，以及人的理智如何可以克制人的情感。

我没有忘记那位大名鼎鼎的笛卡尔，虽然他也以为人的理智有绝对力量来控制自己的行为，但是他却曾经努力从人的情感的根源去解释人的情感，并且同时指出人的理智能够获得绝对力量来控制情感的途径。然而，在我看来，他所做的，除了展示了他自己的伟大机智外，并没有实现什么，这一点我将在适当的地方加以说明。我现在打算回到那些只是一味嘲笑或诅咒人类情感而不求理解人类情感和行为的人那里。在他们这些人看来，像我这样试图用几何方法来研究人们的缺陷和愚昧，并且想用严格的推理来证明他们大声斥责为违反理性、轻佻、荒谬、可怕的事物，无疑会使他们惊异万分。但是，我的想法是这样的：在自然界中，没有任何东西源于自然的缺陷；因为自然何时何地都是同一的，自然作用的功效和力量，也即万事万物从一种形式变化到另一种形式的自然规律和法则，也都无论何时何地都是同一的。所以也应该运用同样的方法去理解自然界一切事物的性质。这就是说，应该运用普遍的自然规律和法则去理解一切事物的性质。因此，仇恨、愤怒、嫉妒等情感就其本身而言，也都是出于自然的同一的必然性和力量。所以它们也有一定的原因，通过这些原因可以理解它们，它们具有一定的值得我们去认识的特性，正如我考察其他事物的特性一样，沉浸于考察它们时能带给我们的快乐。因而，我将采用前面两部分中考察神和心灵的同样的方法来考察情感的本性和力量；并且我将要考察人类的行为和欲望，如同我考察线、面和体积一样。

定义

一、通过一个原因可以清晰明确地认识其结果，那么这个原因便称为充分原因；只通过一个原因不能理解其结果，那么这个原因便称为不充分的或部分的原因。

二、当有些事情在我们内部或外部发生的时候，而我们又是这事情的充分原因，那么我们便称之为主动，也就是说，所谓主动就是当有些事情在我们内部或外部发生时，其发生是源于我们的本性，只要通过我们的本性，对这事就能够有清晰明确的理解。另一方面，当有某些事情在我们内部发生，或者说，有什么事情源于我们的本性时，而我们只是这事情的部分的原因，这样我们便称之为被动。

三、所谓情感，我理解为身体的情状，这些情状使身体活动的力量增强或减弱，顺畅或阻滞，而这些情状的观念同时也随之增强或减弱，顺畅或阻滞。

所以对这些情状中的任何一个情状，如果我们能成为它的充分原因，那么我们就称它是一种主动的情感，反之，便是一种被动的情感。

公理

一、人的身体会在许多情况下被影响而增强或减弱其活动的力量，而在另一些情况下，也可使其活动的力量不增多也不减少。

二、人的身体能够承受许多变化，但它却仍然能够保持对于对象的印象或迹象，因此它仍然能够保持对事物的同样的意象。

命题

命题一：我们的心灵有时主动，有时被动；只要具有充分的观念，它必然主动，只要具有不充分的观念，它必然被动。

证明在每个人的心灵中，都有些充分的观念，当然也有些观念是歪曲的、混淆的。但那些在人的心灵中是充分的观念，在神中也是充分的，因为神构成一个心灵的本质；而那些在人的心灵中不充分的观念，在神中却仍然是充分的，因为神在自身中不仅仅包含这一个心灵的本质，而且同时也包含着其他事物的观念。再者，从任何一个观念出发，有些结果必然随之而来，其中神便是这个结果的充分原因，并不是因为神是无限的，而是因为神被认为是构成该观念的观念。而神被作为这个结果的原因，是因为它构成某个人心中的充分观念。我重申，心灵就是这一结果的充分原因。因此，我们的心灵，只要具有充分的观念，它们就必然是主动的。这是我们要证明的第一点。再者，凡是必然出自神的充分观念的东西，不是由于神拥有他心灵自身，而是由于在其自身中不仅包含着一个人的心灵，也包含着其他事物的心灵，那么这个人的心灵就不是该事物的充分原因，而只是部分原因。因此只要心灵具有不充分的观念，就必然被动。这是我们要证明的第二点。所以，我们的心灵有时主动，有时被动。

推论由此推知，心灵具有不充分的观念越多，那么它便越受情欲的支配不能自我控制，反之，心灵具有的充分的观念越多，那么它便越能自我控制。

命题二：身体不能决定心灵去思想，心灵也不能决定身体使它运动或静止，更不能决定它成为任何其他事物，如果有其他东西的话。

证明一切思想的样式都以神为原因，这是因为神作为一个能思想的东西，而不是因为神表现为任何其他属性。所以凡是决定心灵思考的，必是一个思想的样式，而不是广延的样式。换句话说，即它不是身体。这是我们要证明的第一点。再者，身体的运动与静止一定起于另一个物体，而这一物体的运动与静止又被第三个物体所决定，并且，就神被认为是构成某种广延的样式的东西，而不是构成一些思想的样式的东西而言，任何发生在身体方面的，绝对起源于神；这就是说，任何发生在身体方面的，不能起源于心灵，因为心灵是思想的一个样式。这是我们要证明的第二点。因而，身体不能决定心灵，反之亦然。

命题三：心灵的主动只源于充分的观念，而心灵的被动只基于不充分的观念。

证明首先，构成心灵本质的成分不是别的，而是一个实际存在着的身体的观念。这个观念由许多其他观念组成，而在这些其他观念中有的是充分的，有的是不充分的。所以，任何源于心灵本性，并把心灵作为它的直接原因，以及必须凭借心灵才能被理解的事物，一定是出于一个充分的观念或一个不充分的观念。但是只要心灵具有不充分的观念，那么心灵一定被动。因此，心灵的主动只源于充分的观念，而只有当心灵具有不充分的观念时，它才是被动的。

注释由此可知，被动的状态不能归因于心灵，除非心灵包含有否定性的东西。换句话说，被动的状态只是与这样的心灵相联系，这心灵被认为是自然的一部分，单就其自身而言，如果不与其他部分联系起来，它就不能清晰明确地被感知。用同一方式，我可以指出被动的状态与个别事物的关系也和它与心灵的关系一样，也不是通过其他方式可以被感知的。但我的意图只在于讨论人的心灵。

命题四：万事万物除非存在外因，否则是不能被毁灭的。

证明这一命题是自明的，因为任何事物的定义都肯定该事物的本质而不否定该事物的本质。换句话说，它的定义建立它的本质，而不是取消它的本质。所以我们只要只关注事物自身，而不考虑它的外因，我们将决不能在它内部发现任何可以毁灭它的东西。

命题五：只要一个事物能毁灭另一个事物，那么这两个事物的性质是天然相反的，换句话说，它们不能共存于同一对象中。

证明如果两物能互相协调或共存在同一对象中，而且上述对象中还有某些东西能够毁灭它，那么根据前面的命题，这就是荒谬的。

命题六：每一个自在的事物都努力地保持其自身的存在。

证明个别事物是用既定的形式来表示神的属性的样式。这就是说，个别事物用既定的形式来表示神之为神以及神的力量的事物。目前，没有什么事物在它自己内部包含有自己毁灭自己或自己取消自己存在的东西。反之，一切事物都反抗那些足以取消自身存在的东西。因此这种事物能够，并且只要这种事物是自在的，它都会努力保持其自身的存在。

命题七：一切事物竭力保持其存在的努力不是别的，而是该事物的现实本质。

证明从事物的既定本质出发，必然有某种结果随之产生，并且，任何事物除了按照既定本性产生的必然结果外，不能产生其他的东西。所以，事物活动的力量，或被迫而不得不作某事的努力，不论出于自己或是出于与他物合作——换句话说，事物竭力保持自己的存在的力量或努力不是别的，而是该事物自身的某种特定的或现实的本质。

命题八：事物竭力保持其自身存在的努力，不包含有限的时间，而是包含无限的时间。

证明如果事物保持其存在的努力包含着任何有限的时间，这有限的时间将要决定该事物的绵延，那么，单是从事物借以保持其存在的努力就可以推知，事物经过一定限度的时间之后，它一定会被毁灭即必须毁灭，无法存在。但这是荒谬的。因而，事物保持其自身存在的努力，并不包含任何限定的时间，反之，如果该事物不被某种外因所毁灭，它将借助它此时借以存在的同一种力量而继续存在。所以，事物竭力保持其自身存在的努力包含无限的时间。

命题九：心灵既有清晰明确的观念，也有混淆的观念，都努力在无限的时间中保持其自身的存在，并且自己意识到这种努力。

证明心灵的本质由充分观念与不充分观念组成，所以只要具有前者或后者，它一定努力保持其自身的存在，并且在无限的时间中保持其存在。因为心灵通过身体的情状的观念，必然意识到它自身，所以它也意识到自己的努力。

注释这种努力，当它单单与心灵相关联时，就叫做意志。当它与心灵及身体同时相关联时，就叫做冲动。所以这种努力不是别的，而是人的本质。从人的本质本身出发，必然产生足以保持他自己存在的东西，因而人类就被决定去做相应的事情。

其次，冲动与欲望之间只有一个差别，即欲望一般单指人对它的冲动有了自我意识而言。所以欲望可以定义为我们意识到的冲动。从以上所说就可以明白，对于许多事物我们追求它、希望它、渴望它或期望它，因为我们以为它是好的，但是，另一方面，因为我们追求它、希望它、渴望它或期望它，所以，我们认定它是好的。

命题十：我们心灵中不能有排斥我们身体存在的观念，因为这样的观念是违反心灵的本质的。

证明我们身体中决不能具有任何能够毁灭我们身体的东西。因而只要神具有我们身体的观念，这种能够毁灭我们身体的东西的观念也就不能在神内存在。换句话说，那个东西的观念不是存在于我们的心灵中。而反之，因为构成心灵本质的首要成分就是一个现实存在的身体的观念，所以我们心灵的首要的、基本的努力就是努力去肯定我们身体的存在，因此否定我们身体存在的观念是违反我们心灵的。

命题十一：如果事物增加或减少，促进或阻碍我们身体活动的力量，那么事物的观念就会增加或减少，促进或阻碍我们心灵思考的力量。

证明这一命题从第二部分命题七或第二部分命题十四可以得到证明。

命题十二：心灵总是尽可能努力去想象足以增强或帮助身体的活动力量的东西。

证明只要人的身体受到包含外界物体性质的状态的影响，那么人的心灵将把这个外界物体看作即在面前的东西；只要人的心灵把一个外界物体看作即在面前的东西，换句话说，如果人的心灵想象外界事物，那么人的身体也将受到包含外界物体性质的状态的影响。所以只要心灵想象到足以增加或促进我们身体的活动力量的东西，我们的身体就将处于一种足以增加或促进这种力量的状态下，所以心灵的思想力量也将随之被增加或促进。所以，心灵总是尽可能努力想象这些东西。

命题十三：当心灵想象那些会减少或阻碍身体活动的力量的某种东西时，那么它将尽可能努力回忆那些足以排除这种东西存在的东西。

证明只要心灵想象到任何这类东西，则身体与心灵的力量都会受到减少或阻碍。但是同时心灵将仍然继续想象这类东西，直到它能想象到足以排除它们当前的存在的某种其他东西为止。换句话说，心灵与身体的力量将受减削或受限制，直到心灵想象到一些足以排除这类事物存在的东西时为止。所以，心灵将尽可能努力去想象或回忆后者。

推论由此可知，心灵总是不情愿去想象那些足以减少或阻碍其自身的力量和身体的力量的东西。

注释由上可知，我们可以清楚地理解爱的本性和恨的本性了：爱不是别的，而是由一个外在原因的观念所伴随着的快乐。恨不是别的，而是被一个外在原因的观念所伴随着的痛苦。我们进一步明白，努力去爱他所爱的对象的人，必然努力使他所爱的能在他的面前，并努力保持该事物，反之，憎恨一个事物的人，必然努力去排斥甚至消灭该事物。关于这点，接下来，我将更详尽地讨论。

命题十四：如果心灵曾经同时被两种感情所影响，那么此后当心灵被它们中的一种感情所影响时，也将被另外一种感情所影响。

证明如果人的身体曾经同时被两个物体所影响，那么此后当心灵想起它们中的一个物体时，也将立刻回忆起另外一个物体。但心灵的想象显示我们身体的感情多于显示外物的性质，所以，人的身体，受心灵影响，如果曾经同时被两种感情所影响，那么此后当心灵被它们中的一种感情所影响时，也将被另外一种感情所影响。

命题十五：任何事物都能偶然地成为快乐、痛苦或欲望的原因。

证明如果我们承认心灵同时被两种感情所影响，心灵的活动力量并不因它们中的一种感情有所增强或减弱，但却会为那另外一种感情所增强或减弱。从前面的命题可以明白，当心灵后来被前一种感情所影响，尽管这种感情的真正原因本身既不增强也不减弱心灵的力量时，而心灵将同时被后一种感情所影响，这种感情将增强或者减弱心灵活动的力量，换句话说，心灵将会感受到快乐或痛苦。因此可见，这两种感情的前者不是因为它自身，而是因为偶然性，成为了引起快乐或者痛苦的原因。同样的道理很容易表明何以一个事物可以偶然地成为欲望的原因。

推论单就我们用快乐或痛苦的感情来考察一个事物的事实来看，虽然该事物并不是感情发生的动力因，但我们也能够爱或恨这一事物。

证明之所以如此，是由于当心灵后来想起以前的事物时，会被快乐或痛苦的感情所影响，也就是说，心灵或身体的力量也同时有所增强或减弱。因此，心灵也许希望想起或者不愿想起该事物，换句话说，心灵也许爱或恨该事物。

注释由此可知，为什么我们仅仅是出于习惯所谓的“同情”或“反感”而没有原因地爱或恨一个事物。同样，一些引起我们快乐或痛苦的东西，只不过因为它们与平时常常引起我们快乐或痛苦感情的东西有一些相似，也应归入此类。正如我将在下一个命题所指出的那样，我明白那些最初提出“同情”、“反感”这些术语的作者，他们希望用这些术语表示事物某种隐藏的性质，然而我却认为，我们可以使用这些同样的术语来表示尽人皆知、显而易见的性质。

命题十六：单从我们设想的这样一个实际出发，如果一个既定对象具有与其他引起心灵快乐或痛苦的对象相似的性质，虽然这些相似的性质，并不是这些情感的动力因，但我们仍然会对该对象爱或恨。

证明如果一个对象的性质相似于平常引起我们痛苦或快乐的对象，那么只要当心灵受到具有这种性质的意象的影响，心灵就将立即受到这种或那种情感的影响，而我们所看见的具有同样相似性质的东西，将偶然地成为快乐或痛苦的原因。所以，通过进一步推论，两个对象相似的性质虽然说不是那些情感的动力因，而我们将仍然会对该对象爱或恨。

命题十七：如果我们设想一个常常引起我们痛苦情感的事物，与另一个常常引起我们同等强度的快乐情感的事物有一些相似之处，那么我们将对该事物同时既恨且爱。

证明这个既定事物本身就是我们痛苦的原因，只要我们想象着它能引起这种情感，我们总是恨它；此外，由于我们设想着它与一个常常引起同样强度的快乐情感的对象有相似之处时，我们又将会以同样强度的快乐去爱它。因此我们将同时既爱它，又恨它。

注释这种源于两种相反情感的心灵状态就叫做游移不定。这种游移不定与情感的关系如同怀疑与想象的关系。游移不定与怀疑不是这个不同于那个，两者只是程度上的差别而已。但是我们必须记住：我从许多原因中推论出这种游移不定。这些原因，一个是由于本身性质引起某一情感的原因，另一个是由于偶然性引起另一情感的原因。我之所以这样做，是因为从上述命题更易于推论，但是我不否认这种游移不定的状态一般起源于作为快乐和痛苦的两种情感的动力因的对象。因为人的身体是由多种多样性质不同的个体所组成，所以它可以受同一物体的多种多样不同的方式的影响。反之，同一对象也可以被许多情形影响，它也可以用许多不同的方式影响一个身体的同一部分。因此显而易见，同一对象怎样可以成为引起许多相反情感的原因。

命题十八：一个人被一个过去或将来的事物的意象所引起的快乐或痛苦的情感，与被一个现在的事物的意象所引起的情感是一样的。

证明只要一个人被事物的意象所影响，即使该事物并不存在，他也将认为该事物如在眼前，并且只有当该事物的意象与过去或将来的时间的意象结合在一起时，他才会想象该事物是存在于过去或将来。因而，单就一个事物意象的本身而论，不论它涉及到过去、将来的时间或是现在的时间，它总是一样的。换句话说，不论这意象是属于过去、将来或现在的事物，它所引起的情感或身体的状态是同样的。所以，不论这意象是属于过去、将来或现在的事物，它所引起的快乐或痛苦的情感是同样的。

注释一我称一个事物为过去或将来，是就我曾经或以后将要被该事物影响而言。例如，就我曾经看见它或将要看见它而言，也就是就该事物曾经给我们活力，或将要给我们活力；曾经伤害我们，或将要伤害我们而言。因为只要我们这样设想该事物，我们便肯定它的存在。这就是说，当我们感觉不到事物的存在时，身体就不会被任何情感影响。所以，事物的意象引起身体上的状态与该事物真的在眼前发生是一样的。然而，常常有一些经历丰富的人，只要他们想到过去或将来的事物时，总是游移不定，对于该事物所能引起的结果常常怀疑。因此，这些事物的相似意象所引起的情感，并不十分稳定，而且通常被其他事物的意象所扰乱，除非人们对于该事物的结果更加深信不疑，否则情感便不能稳定。

注释二从上所述，我们理解了这些术语：希望、恐惧、信心、绝望、高兴、失望的性质。希望，不是别的，而是一种源于将来或过去的事物的意象所引起的变化无常的快乐，而这一事物的结果我们还尚存怀疑。另一方面，恐惧是一种源于我们怀疑的事物的意象所引起的变化无常的痛苦。如果将怀疑的成分从这些情感中排除，那么希望会变成信心，恐惧会变成绝望。这就是说，变成我们所希望的或恐惧的事物的意象所引起的愉快或痛苦。其次，高兴是一种源于过去的事物的意象所引起的快乐，而那一事物的结果我们曾经怀疑。失望是与高兴相反的一种痛苦。

命题十九：当一个人想到他所爱的对象毁灭时，他将感到痛苦；如果他想到他所爱的对象依然存在时，他将感到快乐。

证明心灵总是尽可能努力去设想那些足以增强或促进身体的活动力量的事物。换句话说，心灵总是尽可能努力去设想它所爱的事物。肯定事物存在的意象可以增进心灵的活动能力，而否定事物存在的意象会减弱心灵的活动力量。所以，那些肯定所爱的对象存在的事物的意象能够帮助心灵努力去想象所爱的对象，换句话说，这种事物的意象能够使心灵感到快乐。反之，那些排斥所爱的对象存在的意象，会阻碍上述精神的努力，这就是说，这种意象会使心灵感到痛苦。所以，当一个人想到他所爱的对象毁灭时，他将感到痛苦；如果他想到他所爱的对象依然存在时，他将感到快乐。

命题二十：当一个人想到他所憎恨的对象毁灭时，他将感到快乐。

证明心灵总是努力想象着那些足以排除减少或阻碍身体活动力量的事物的存在的事物。这就是说，心灵努力想象那些足以排除它所恨的对象的存在的事物，因此，一个足以排除心灵所恨的对象的事物的意象能够促进心灵的这种努力，换句话说，这种意象会使心灵感到快乐。所以，当一个人想到他所恨的对象毁灭时，他将感觉快乐。

命题二十一：当一个人想到他所爱的对象而感到快乐或痛苦时，他自己也将随之感到快乐或痛苦；爱者所感受到的快乐或痛苦的程度和被爱的对象所感到的快乐或痛苦的程度是一样的。

证明肯定所爱的对象存在的事物的意象足以促进心灵努力去想象上面所说的对象。快乐足以肯定引起快乐的东西的存在，而且快乐的情感越大，那么它肯定后者的存在也越多，因为快乐是达到更大的完满的过渡。因此所爱的对象感到快乐的意象足以促进爱者的心灵去努力，这就是说，它使爱者感到快乐，而且所爱的对象感到的快乐越大，那么爱者所感到的快乐也越大。这是我们要证明的第一点。再者，只要一个事物感觉痛苦，那么它就是在一定程度上被毁坏了，而且这个事物所感到的痛苦越大，其被毁坏的程度也越大。所以，当一个人想到他所爱的对象感觉痛苦时，他也将随之感觉痛苦。被爱的人所感到的痛苦越大，那么爱者所感到的痛苦也随之越大。

命题二十二：如果我们设想到一些事物使我们所爱的对象感到快乐，那么我们将对该事物有一种爱的情感。反之，如果我们设想到一些事物使我们所爱的对象感到痛苦，那么我们对它又将有一种恨的情感。

证明如果我们想象到我们所爱的对象会感到快乐或痛苦，那么当这个人能使我们所爱的对象快乐或痛苦时，也能使我们快乐或痛苦。根据假设，这种快乐或痛苦存在于我们心中是有一个外在的原因伴随着的。所以，如果我们设想任何人能使我们所爱的对象感到快乐或痛苦，那么我们将对他产生爱或恨的情感。

命题二十三：当一个人想到他所恨的对象会感到痛苦时，他将感到快乐；反之，如果他想到他所恨的对象感到快乐时，那么他将感到痛苦。所以，他所感到的快乐或痛苦的情感的强弱，将以他所恨的对象所感到的相反的情感的强弱为准。

证明只要被恨的对象感到痛苦，那么它就是被破坏了，而且其痛苦越大，其被破坏的程度也越大。所以，当一个人想到他所恨的对象会感到痛苦时，他会感到快乐，当他想到他所恨的对象感到的痛苦越大，他感到的快乐也将越大。这是我们要证明的第一点。再者，快乐的情感肯定感到快乐的事物的存在，快乐的情感越强烈，它就越肯定后者的存在。所以，如果一个人想到他所恨的对象感到快乐，那么这种想法将阻碍他自己寻求快乐的努力，换句话说，他将感到痛苦。

注释这种快乐很难纯粹而没有任何心理斗争地被感受到。因为只要一个人想到和自己相似的人感到痛苦时，他必将感到痛苦，反之，如果他想到与他相似的人感到快乐，他也必将感到快乐。而在这里，我们仅仅讨论恨的情感。

命题二十四：如果我们想到有人会使我们所恨的对象感到快乐时，我们也将恨他。如果我们想到他会使我们所恨的对象感到痛苦时，那么我们将去爱他。

证明这个命题与第三部分命题二十二用同样的方式证明。请参看。

注释这些情感和类似恨的情感都属于嫉妒。嫉妒不是别的，而是恨的情感，即对于他人的痛心感到欣喜，对于他人的优势感到伤心罢了。

命题二十五：我们努力去肯定那些可以使我们或我们所爱的对象感到快乐的任何东西。反之，我们努力去否定那些足以引起我们和我们所爱的对象感到痛苦的任何东西。

证明那些我们想到会使我们所爱的对象快乐或痛苦的东西也将使我们感到快乐或痛苦。但是，心灵总是尽可能地去努力设想那些足以使我们快乐的东西，这就是说，把那些足以使我们快乐的东西看作如在眼前。反之，心灵总是努力排斥那些足以使我们痛苦的东西的存在。所以，我们努力去肯定那些可以使我们或我们所爱的对象感到快乐的任何东西。反之亦然。

命题二十六：我们努力去肯定那些可以使我们恨的对象感到痛苦的任何东西；反之，我们努力去否定那些可以使我们恨的对象感到快乐的任何东西。

证明这个命题从命题二十三中推出，如前一命题是从命题二十一推出一样。

注释由此可见，一个人会很容易对他自己或他所爱的人评价过高，而对于他所恨的人，又过于贬低。一个人自视太高，这种情感就叫做骄傲，它是一种疯狂的行为。因为他睁着眼睛做梦，想象自己能够做到他想象中所能做到的一切事情，于是，他把那些事情当成真的，并引以为豪。因为他想象不出有什么事物能够足以排斥它们的存在并限制他自己活动的力量。所以，骄傲是产生于一个人自视过高而引起的快乐。再者，由他人评价太高而引起的快乐叫做“过誉”，反之，由鄙视他人而引起的快乐便叫做“轻蔑”。

命题二十七：我们设想一个与我们相似的事物，我们虽然对它没有任何感情，但是当它被一些情感影响时，我们自己也将被同样的感情所影响。

证明事物的意象是人体的情状，而这些情状的观念表现为如在眼前的外在物体。换句话说，这些观念包括我们身体的性质同时又包含如在眼前的外在物体的性质。因而，如果外界物体的性质与我们身体的性质相似，那么我们所想象的外界物体形态的观念将包含类似于外界物体的情状的我们身体的情状。所以，如果我们设想与我们相似的任何人有了某种情感，这种想象将表现出与那种情感相似的我们身体的一种情状。因而，我们设想一个与我们相似的事物被一些情感影响时，我们自己也将被同样的感情所影响。反之，如果我们恨一个与我们相似的对象，那么我们将感受到与它相反而不相同的感情。

注释这种情感的模仿，当它与痛苦有关时，就称为同情；当它与欲望有关时，就称为好胜，好胜不是别的，而是由于当我们对某事物产生想望时，我们想象着其他人也具有同样的欲望。

推论一如果我们想到某个我们至今对他都没有感情的人，想到他与我们相同，我们感到快乐，那么我们将会爱他。反之，如果我们想到他与我们相同而使我们感到痛苦，那么我们将会恨他。

证明这一推论可以从前一命题中得到证明。正如第三部分命题二十二是从第三部分命题二十一推出的一样。

推论二我们不能恨我们怜悯的事物，因为它的不幸使我们痛苦。

证明如果我们因此而恨它的话，那么我们将因为它的痛苦而欣喜不已，这显然与假设的原意相反。

推论三我们总是尽我们所能地使我们怜悯的事物脱离苦海。

证明那些使我们怜悯的对象痛苦的东西，也会使我们感到同样的痛苦；所以，我们总是努力设法去排除或消灭那些会使我们痛苦事物的存在。换句话说，我们总是力求消灭它，或者决定毁灭它。所以，我们将努力使我们怜悯的事物脱离苦海。

命题二十八：我们努力增进那些我们想象中可以使我们快乐的东西；反之，我们努力消除或消灭那些我们想象中违反快乐或者足以引起痛苦的东西。

证明我们总是尽可能地，努力去想象那些可以增进快乐的东西，这就是说，我们将尽可能地努力，去想象那些可以增进快乐的东西如在眼前，或者认为它真实存在。但心灵的努力或思维力与身体的努力或行动力是同样大的也是同时发生的。所以，凡是可以增进快乐的，我们总是竭尽全力使它存在。这就是说，我们总向往它，争取它。这是我们要证明的第一点。再者，如果我们想到一些事物，我们确信这一事物是我们痛苦的原因，换句话说，我们所恨的如果被摧毁，我们将感到高兴。所以，我们将努力去消灭该事物或设法排除它，使它远离我们，这样我们就不至于以为它在眼前。这是我们要证明的第二点。所以，我们努力增进那些我们想象中可以使我们快乐的东西；反之亦然。

命题二十九：我们将努力做那些我们想象着人们会用快乐的目光注视的事情，反之，我们将避免做那些我们想象着人们厌烦的事情。

证明如果我们设想到人们爱或恨某物，我们也将爱或恨那物，这就是说，如果我们在某一事物出现时会感到快乐或痛苦，那么我们就应该努力去做我们想象着人们喜爱或会报以快乐目光注视的事情，而不是相反。

注释这样努力去做某事与不做某事，完全是为了取悦他人的行为，我们称为野心。尤其是当我们急切地努力去取悦某个一般人时，因为我们做某事或不作某事，会导致伤害我们自己或其他的人。在其他事情上，这种行为一般称为亲切。此外，当我们想象着他人的行为是在极力取悦我们时我们所感到的快乐，我把它叫做称赞；反之，当我们感觉到他人的行为正好相反时我们所感到的痛苦，我称之为责备。

命题三十：如果某人曾经做过一些我认为会使他人快乐的事情，那么他也将感到快乐，而且意识到他自己就是快乐的原因，这就是说，他将在反观自身中感到快乐。反之，如果他曾经做过一些他认为会使他人痛苦的事情，那么他将在反省中感到痛苦。

证明一个人想到他使别人快乐或痛苦，他因此也将必然感到快乐或痛苦。因为人是通过足以决定他去行动的身体的情状才意识到他自己的，所以，只要曾经做过他认为会使他人快乐的事情，他就将感到快乐，而且意识到他自己就是这种快乐的原因，这就是说，他将在反观自己中感到快乐。

注释既然爱是由一个外在原因的观念所伴随着的快乐，恨是由一个外在原因的观念所伴随着的痛苦，那么在此命题中的快乐和痛苦也将是爱与恨的一种。正因为爱与恨这些术语常常与外在对象相关联，所以，我们在这里将使用其他的名词，来称谓在以下讨论中论及的各种情感。我们将称这种由外在原因的观念所伴随着的快乐为光荣；而与之相反的痛苦，我们称之为耻辱。我认为，使人快乐的光荣或使人感到痛苦的耻辱均来自于人的信仰，伴随着外在原因而来的快乐被称为满足，与此相反的痛苦被称为懊悔。再者，既然那种一个人想象着他会使别人快乐的想法也许仅仅存在于他自己的想象中，既然每一个人都总是努力想着他认为足以引起他自己快乐的东西，那么或许很容易发生一种变化：一个虚荣的人变得自大，幻想着他可以使所有人都满意，然而在现实中他或许是大家都讨厌的对象。

命题三十一：如果我们设想一些人对于我们所爱、所想或所恨的事物也爱、也想或也恨，我们将因此而对于该事物的爱、想或恨更坚定。反之，如果我们认为一些人爱我之所恨，恨我之所爱，那么我们就会感受到心情的游移不定。

证明可以想象这个显而易见的事实：如果有人爱某物，我们也将因此爱那个事物。假定我们已经爱上了这一事物，然后想象着他人也同样爱该事物，我们前面的感情得到了加强，那么加上这一新原因，我们对该事物的爱将更加坚定。再者，又有这样一个可以想象的显而易见的事实：如果有人讨厌某物，我们也将远离该事物，而现在假定我们又同时爱该事物，那么我们将既爱它又讨厌它，换句话说，我们将感受到心情的摇摆不定。

推论从这一命题及第三部分命题二十八可以推出，每个人总是尽可能努力使他人爱其所爱，恨其所恨。

注释这种想让人人都赞同我所爱或所恨的东西的努力，其实就是野心。由此可见，每个人生性就是想要其他人按照他自己的意愿去生活；但如果人人都同样这样做的时候，那么人与人之间就会相互阻碍，甚至于如果人人都希望被所有人爱或称赞，那么所有的人都会变得相互仇恨。

命题三十二：如果我们设想有人享受着那个只有一个人能够占有的东西，那么我们将尽力使这个人不能获得此物。

证明如果我们想到有人以某事物为乐，那么我们也将爱好该事物并且愿意享受该事物。但是如果我们假定其他人享受该事物对于我们的快乐是一种障碍时，我们将努力使他不能占有该事物。

注释由此可见，人的本性通常是同情失意者而嫉妒得意者的，并且如果他越爱那个别人占有的东西，那么他因为嫉妒而产生的恨也将越大。这样，我们就可以看出，人的本性中有种同样的特性，这特性既是源于人们的同情心，也是源于他们的嫉妒和野心。最后，如果我们凭借经验，我们将发现经验完全可以印证我们刚刚所说的。特别是当我们回顾我们早年生活的时候，我们发现儿童的身体好似处在平衡状态之中，他们不断地笑或哭完全是因为他们看见别人也在笑或哭。而且，只要他们看见别人做什么事，他们就立刻想要去模仿。他们想象着别人感到快乐的任何东西，也都想去拥有。正如我们已经说过的那样，这是因为，事物的意象是人体自身的情状，或者是因为人体受外界原因的影响而倾向于做这或那样事情的状态。

命题三十三：如果我们爱一个与我们相同的对象，那么我们将尽可能努力使他也反过来爱我们。

证明我们尽可能努力去想象我们所爱的对象胜过其他任何对象。如果这一对象与我们相同，那么我们将努力使他比其他任何对象都快乐。这就是说，我们总是尽可能努力使所爱的对象在我们思想的伴随下感到快乐，换句话说，我们将努力使他也反过来爱我们。

命题三十四：我们越是想到我们所爱的对象因为我们而快乐，那么我们所感到的满足感也就越强。

证明我们总是尽可能努力使我们所爱的对象也爱我们，这就是说，我们所爱的对象应该在我们思想的伴随下感到快乐，我们是他们快乐的原因。所以，如果我们想象着我们所爱的对象因为我们而感到更加快乐，那么我们将更加努力，来使我们更加快乐。而我们感到快乐既然是因为我们使与我们相同的别人也感到快乐，那么我们将快乐地看待自己。所以，我们越是想到所爱的对象因为我们而快乐，那么我们所感到的满足感也越强。

命题三十五：如果有人想象着他所爱的对象与另一个人有着超过与他更亲密的情谊，那么他将恨他所爱的对象，并且嫉妒那另一个人。

证明一个人想象着他所爱的对象对于他的爱越多，那么他对自我的肯定力量也就越强，换句话说，他所感到的快乐也将越大。因此，他将尽可能努力去想象他所爱的对象与他的关系最紧密，而且如果他认为有人也想得到他所爱的对象，那么这种努力或欲望将更加强烈。而假定这种努力或欲望被所爱的对象的形象和伴随与所爱对象联结着的另一个人的形象所阻碍，那么他将因此感到痛苦。换句话说，因为伴随着所爱的对象的观念和另一个人的形象，他将恨所爱的对象，也将嫉妒他的竞争对手，因为这个人享受了他所爱的对象。

命题三十六：当一个人回忆起他曾经享受过的事物，在初次享受该事物的同样境况下，他还会想要去占有它。

证明如果某事物曾经是一个人看到过的与他所爱的对象有关的事物，那么该事物将可能偶然地成为使他快乐的原因；所以，他希望拥有此物，因为它曾经是令他愉快的对象。这就是说，在他初次享受该事物时的同样境况下，他还想再度占有它。

推论所以，如果在上述境况中少了一些什么，那么爱者将会感到痛苦。

证明因为如果他发现在这一境况中缺少了某种东西，他就会想象有某种事物在排斥他所爱的存在。如果他想得到某种东西或某种境况，而这种境况一旦缺少，他就会感到痛苦。

注释由于我们所爱对象的不在而引起的痛苦，就叫做遗憾。

命题三十七：由恨或爱而来的欲望越大，那么随之而感受到的痛苦或快乐也越大。

证明痛苦会减弱或阻碍人的活动力量，换句话说，会减弱或阻碍他努力保持自身存在的努力，因而，痛苦与自我保存的努力是相反的，所以，一个感到痛苦的人的所有努力就是驱除痛苦，而这种痛苦越大，要用来反抗这种痛苦的活动力量也越大，所以，痛苦越大，驱除痛苦所需要的活动力量也越大。换句话说，努力驱除这种痛苦的欲望或冲动也越大。再者，因为快乐可以增强或助长人的活动力量，同理可证，一个感觉快乐的人只想保留这种快乐，没有其他欲望，而且他的欲望的大小与快乐的大小成正比例。

最后，既然因为恨与爱本身就是表示痛苦或快乐这两种情感，那么由此可推知，由于恨与爱的情感越强烈，那么伴随爱与恨而来的努力、欲望或冲动也将越强烈。

命题三十八：如果一个人开始恨他所爱的对象，那么这种爱就彻底消失了。同理，他将比他从来没有爱过它还会更恨它，而且这种恨的程度与先前爱的程度成正比例。

证明如果一个人开始恨他所爱的某一对象，那么比起从未爱过它，这种阻碍了爱的恨的欲望会更加强烈。因为爱是一种快乐，人总是尽可能努力地去保持它，使它持久，或做一些事，使这个所爱的对象如在眼前，或尽可能努力用使它快乐的办法去保持它。这种努力的程度与爱的程度成正比，也是使所爱的人也爱自己的一种努力。但是这些努力被对所爱对象的恨阻碍了；所以爱者因此也将感觉到痛苦，他的爱越深，他所感到的痛苦也越大；这就是说，除了由恨而起的痛苦外，再加上因为他曾经爱过那个对象所引起的痛苦，因此他将更加痛苦地去看待他深爱的对象，这就是说，他将比从来没有爱过它还更加恨它，并且他先前对它的爱越深，现在对它的恨也将越深。

命题三十九：如果一个人恨另一个人，他将努力去做伤害他的事，除非他害怕他自己因此会受到更大的危害；反之，如果一个人爱另一个人，同理，他将努力去为后者谋幸福。

证明所谓恨一个人即是设想他是自己痛苦的原因，因此一个人恨另一个人，他将努力去排挤他或毁灭他。但是如果这样会产生更大的痛苦，或有更大的危险落在他自己身上，如果他认为不去实行伤害他的计划，他便可以避免这个更大的危险，那么他宁愿不去伤害那个人；而他此刻不去伤害那个人的努力较之前此存心去害他的努力更为强大，甚至超过它。以上是对这一命题第一部分的证明。第二部分可用同样的方法去证明。所以如果一个人恨另一个人，他将努力去伤害他，除非他害怕他自己因此会受到更大的危害。反之亦然。

注释所谓善，在我这儿，是指一切快乐，和一切能产生快乐的东西，特别是那些能够满足我们愿望的任何东西。所谓恶，在我这儿，是指一切痛苦，特别是那些阻挠我们愿望的东西。因为我们已经指出，我们决不是因为认为某物是好的，所以才想要它，相反，是因为我们想要某物，我们才认为它是好的。因此，我们认为恶是我们都厌恶的事物。所以每一个人都是根据自己特有的情感来判断或估量什么是好的，什么是坏的；什么是较好的，什么是较坏的；什么是最好的，什么是最坏的。因此，一个吝啬鬼认为金钱充裕是最好的，缺乏金钱是最坏的；一个野心勃勃的人希望的无非是荣誉，而所惧怕的无非是羞辱；对于一个嫉妒心重的人来说，没有比他人的不幸更能使他快乐，也没有比他人的成功更能使他痛苦的。所以，每一个人总是根据他的情感来判断事物的好坏，有用或无用。

人的这种情感促使一个人不敢要他所想要的东西，或只敢要他所不想要的东西，这种情感被叫做胆怯。胆怯也可被定义为恐惧，这种恐惧促使人为了避免将来遭遇大的不幸，而宁可现在受较小的不幸。如果他害怕的不幸是羞耻，那么胆怯就变成了害羞。最后，如果避免将来的不幸的欲望被害怕另一个不幸所阻挠，以致他不知道该怎样选择，那么这种恐惧就成了惊惶失措，尤其是当他所恐惧的两种不幸都很大时。

命题四十：如果一个人想象着有人恨自己，而他相信自己没有给那个人任何恨的理由，那么他将反过来恨那个人。

证明如果一个人想象着别人恨自己，那么他将因此也恨自己，也就是说，他将感到为一个外在原因的观念所伴随着的痛苦。但是，假定除了恨他的那个敌人外，他想象不出任何引起这种痛苦的原因，而因为他想象别人恨他，他将感到与恨他的那个人的观念伴随着的痛苦；这就是说，他将反过来恨那个人。

推论一如果一个人想到他所爱的人却恨他，他将被这相冲突的爱和恨所折磨。因为如果他想到那个人只是个可恨的对象，他可以反过来去恨他，但是，依据假定他仍然爱他，所以他将承受着爱和恨两种情感的折磨。

推论二如果一个人想到一个和他素来没有恩怨的人，由于恨他而作一件事来害他，那么他将立刻用同样的手段去报复那个人。

证明如果一个人认为别人恨他，他也将反过来恨那个人，并且他将努力设法，回想一切能够使那个人感到痛苦的事情，并且努力做出那些事情来伤害他。现在第一件他可以回想的足以使那个人受伤害的事情，就是那个人做的来害他的那件事，所以，他将立刻努力用同样的手段去报复那个人。

注释努力去伤害那个我们恨的人叫做愤怒，努力去以同样手段回敬伤害了我们的人叫做复仇。

命题四十一：如果一个人想到有人爱他，而他认为自己没有原因使人如此爱他，那么他也将爱那个人。

证明本命题的证明方式与前一命题相同，请参看前一命题的注释。

注释如果一个人相信他有充分的原因使人去爱他，那么他将因此感到自豪。而这种情况的发生比它的反面发生的几率更高，而反面情况的发生正如前面所说，就是当他想到有人恨他的时候。这种相互的爱，然后替爱我们的人或者为我们谋幸福的人谋幸福的努力，便叫做感谢或感激。由此可见，人们是怎样地急于报仇而不报恩了。

推论如果一个人想到他恨的人爱他，则他将被爱与恨两种情感折磨。证明本推论的方式与证明前一命题的第一推论的方式相同。

注释如果恨占了上风，那么他将努力去伤害爱他的人；这种情感就叫做残忍，尤其是如果那个受害人相信爱他的那个人没有任何足以使他去恨他的理由，那么这会更加残忍。

命题四十二：当一个人给予他人恩惠是为了爱或荣誉时，那么如果他发现他的恩惠只有接受没有报答，他将感到痛苦。

证明当一个人爱一个与他相同的对象时，他总是尽可能努力使那个人也来爱他。所以如果他给予别人恩惠是为了得到爱，那么他将会有种希望别人用爱来报答他的愿望。这就是说，他抱有一种求荣誉的希望或者求快乐的希望；所以他将尽可能努力去想象这种荣誉的原因，或把它当作实际存在。根据假定，他认为有些其他足以排斥这种原因的存在的东西，所以结果他将因此感到痛苦。

命题四十三：互相的恨可以使恨加剧，而爱却可以消灭恨。

证明如果一个人想到他恨的对象也反过来恨他，他将因而产生一种新的仇恨，而旧恨仍然存在。另一方面，如果他认为他恨的对象，反而爱他，那么他只要这样想，他就感到快乐，并且将努力去取悦那个人；这就是说，他将努力不再去恨他，也不再设法使他痛苦。他这种努力的大小与引起爱的情感的大小成正比。所以如果引起爱的情感大于引起恨的情感，或者大于那个人努力使他所恨的对象感受痛苦的恨，那么爱就会胜过恨，从而把他的恨从心中抹去。

命题四十四：完全被爱征服的恨，也将变成爱，而这种爱将比此前从未恨过一个人的爱更大。

证明这一命题的证明与第三部分命题三十八的证明相同。因为如果一个人开始去爱他恨的事物或使他感到痛苦的事物，那么他将从中感到快乐，并且在这种因爱而来的快乐上，又加上一种新的，起于竭尽全力解除与恨的对象的观念相伴随的痛苦的努力而带来的快乐。随着他恨的观念成为快乐的原因，快乐将逐渐增加。

命题四十五：如果一个人认为有个与他相似的人恨他所爱的与他相似的对象，那么他将会恨那个人。

证明被爱的对象也恨恨他的人，因而，爱者认为有人恨他所爱的对象，同时必定也认为被爱的对象也恨恨自己的人，换句话说，被爱的对象感到痛苦，因此爱者也将感到痛苦。而爱者的痛苦伴随恨他所爱的对象那个人的观念而来，而那个人的观念就成为他痛苦的原因，换句话说，他将恨那个人。

命题四十六：如果任何一个不同于自己阶级或国家的人使自己感到快乐或痛苦，而且如果自己的快乐或痛苦，伴随着那个人的观念，且又因为这种观念隶属于他的阶级与国籍的共同名目下，那么他将不但是爱或恨那个人而已，而且还会将爱或恨延伸到那个人所隶属的整个阶级或国家。

证明这一命题的证明方式与第三部分命题十六相同。

命题四十七：因为我们所恨的任何对象都被消灭了或遭到了损害而引起的快乐，并不是没有某种痛苦的情感伴随着的。

证明从第三部分命题二十七可见，这个命题是显而易见的：因为只要我们想象着一个与我们相似的对象感到了痛苦，那么我们也将感觉痛苦。

命题四十八：例如，如果对彼得的爱所包含的快乐与对彼得的恨所包含的痛苦都与另一原因的观念有关，那么对彼得的爱与恨都将被摧毁；而只要我们设想彼得不是任何一种情感的唯一原因，那么快乐与痛苦这两种情感又将会减少。

证明这一命题只要从爱与恨的定义中就可证明。之所以说快乐就是对彼得的爱，痛苦就是对彼得的恨，仅仅因为彼得被当作是这一情感或那一情感的唯一原因。而当彼得作为引起某种情感的原因完全地或部分地被取消时，那么对他的那种情感也就会完全消失或部分被取消。

命题四十九：在其他条件相似的时候，对于一个我们认为它很自由的东西的爱和恨，会比对于一个必然的东西的爱和恨更强烈。

证明我们认为自由的东西一定是通过自身而不假借他物而被认知的事物，所以，如果我们认为它是我们快乐或痛苦的原因，那么我们将因此爱它或恨它，并且将从那种情感所能产生的最大的爱或最大的恨去爱它或恨它。反之，如果我们认为引起情感的原因是一个必然的东西，那么我们将认为它不是引起某种情感的唯一原因，而只是引起这种情感的其中一种原因，因而我们对它的爱或恨也将变少。

命题五十：每一个东西都可以偶然地成为希望或恐惧的原因。

证明这个命题的证明方式与第三部分命题十五相同，同时还可以参看第三部分命题十八注释二。

命题五十一：同一对象对于不同的人可以产生不同的影响，同一对象对于同一个人在不同的时间也可以引起不同的影响。

证明人的身体被外界物体用各种各样的方式影响。所以，两人在同一时间内也许会受到不同的影响，并且甚至同一个的对象也可以使他们受到不同的影响。进一步说，人的身体有时被这种状况影响，有时又受到那种状况的影响，因此，同一对象在不同的时间内会受到不同的影响。

命题五十二：一个先前我们曾经见过总是与其他东西在一起的对象，或一个我们认为除了具有与许多东西相同的性质外就毫无特点的对象，我们将不会认为它是我们认为的那种本身具有某些特性的东西。

证明每当我们想到一个我们曾经见过总与其他东西在一起的对象时，我们会立刻记起与它在一起的东西，因此我们想到这个东西就会联想到另一个东西。当一个我们认为除了具有与许多东西相同的性质外就毫无特点的对象时，我们也会产生同样的心理，因为我们总是设想那些我们从前在其他东西内没有看见过的成分，也不会出现在它里面。反之，如果我们想象着一个对象很特别，具有我们以前没有看见过的特点，我们必定会说，当心灵观察那个对象时，其中并没有能够取代它的其他事物，因而它只作为那个对象受到注视。所以一个先前我们曾经见过总是与其他东西在一起的对象，或一个我们认为除了具有与许多东西相同的性质外就毫无特点的对象，我们将不会认为它是我们认为的那种本身具有某些特性的东西。

注释心灵的这种情感或关于独特事物的想象，只就其单独存在于心灵而言，就叫做惊奇。如果这种惊异是由我们所恐惧的东西引起的，就叫做惊愕。因为灾祸猝不及防的来临而产生的惊奇，使我们的心灵完全为这种灾祸所占据，没有能力再去想其他的事，只想着如何躲避灾祸。反之，如果我们感到惊奇的是人的深谋远虑、勤勉或诸如此类的东西，我们就认为具有这种特殊品质的人远远超过了我们自己，那么这种惊奇就叫做崇拜。当惊奇的对象是人的愤怒、嫉妒等等东西时，就叫做畏惧。再者，如果我们对一个所爱的人的深谋远虑、勤勉表示惊奇，那么我们对他的爱将因此增强。而当这种爱与惊奇或崇拜联系在一起的时候，它就叫做热爱。我们还可用同样的方式设想出恨、希望、信心，以及其他一些情感与惊奇的结合，推演出更多的情感，超出通常应用的语言所能表达的。由此可知，情感的名称都是由通常应用的语言习惯创造出来的，而不是基于情感性质的精确知识。

与惊奇相反的情感是轻蔑，但它一般起因于我们最初惊奇、爱慕或恐惧的对象，或者是因为我们看见别人也惊奇、爱慕或恐惧的对象，或者是因为初看起来，它与我们所惊奇、爱慕或恐惧的对象有相似之处，但是当那个对象到了眼前，对它加以更精确的观察后，我们认为那个对象没有足以引起我们惊奇、爱慕或恐惧的原因。相反，这个对象的存在将引起心灵的格外关注。再者，正如热爱起于对我们所爱的对象的惊奇，同样，嘲笑是起于对我们所恨或所恐惧的对象的蔑视。同时，正如崇拜是起于对深谋远虑的惊奇，同样，嘲弄是起于对愚昧的轻蔑。最后，我们也可以设想把爱、希望、荣誉等等这类情感与轻蔑联系在一起，而推演出许多其他情感来。对于这些情感，我们通常也不能用任何公认的名词去把它们区分开来。

命题五十三：当心灵反思它自身和它自身的活动力量时，它将感到愉快，如果它认为它自身和它的活动力量越明显，那么它愉快的感觉就越强烈。

证明人只有通过他的身体的感触和这些感触的观念认识他自己。所以，当心灵能够自己反思自己时，心灵就算是达到一个较大的完满。这就是说，心灵已感到这种愉快，并且如果它认为它自身和它的活动力量越明显，那么它愉快的感觉就越强烈。

推论当一个人越是想到他被别人称赞，那么他的这种愉快的情感也就越强烈。因为一个人越是想象着他被别人称赞，他将越是感到他能给别人带来快乐，而这种快乐是有他自己的观念伴随着的。正因为是有他自己的观念伴随着的，所以他自己才会感到更大的快乐。

命题五十四：心灵只努力去想象那些肯定它活动力量的东西。

证明心灵的努力或力量就是心灵的真实本质，但心灵的本质显然只肯定心灵所有的与心灵所能的东西，而不去肯定心灵所没有的东西与心灵所不能做的事情，所以心灵只努力去想象那些足以肯定它活动力量的东西。

命题五十五：当心灵反省它自己的缺点时，它会因此而感到痛苦。

证明心灵的本质只肯定心灵所有的或心灵所能的东西，换句话说，心灵的本性只想象那些足以肯定它自己活动力量的东西。所以，当我们说，心灵在反省自己的缺点时，这完全是在说，当心灵试图去想象那些足以肯定它自己的活动力量的东西的努力时，却受到了阻碍，换句话说，心灵将因此感到痛苦。

推论如果一个人想到他会受到别人的责备，那么这种痛苦就越会增加。这条推论的证明方式与证明第三部分命题五十三的推论相同。

注释由我们自身缺点的观念而引起的痛苦叫做谦卑。由反省自己而引起的快乐叫做自爱，或自得。因为每当一个人反省他自己的德行或他自己的活动力量时，这种自爱或自得的感情常常重现。于是每个人都乐于向他人讲述他自己的功绩，展示他自己身体和心灵的力量，也由于这个原因，人与人之间会产生厌烦。再者，人生性是爱嫉妒的，换句话说，人总是因为那些与自己不相上下的人的短处而感到快乐，因为那些与自己不相上下的人的才能而感到痛苦。因为一个人只要一想到他自己的行为，就会感到快乐，而且如果他认为他的行为表现得越好时，或者认为他的行为更明晰时，换句话说，如果他越能将他自己的行为同别人的行为分开，认为他的行为越与众不同时，那么他将越是感到快乐。因而当一个人观赏着他自己所独有而他人所没有的东西时，他所感到的快乐将是最大的。但是，如果他认为他所肯定的自己的一切，属于人或动物的一般观念，那么他将不会感到多么快乐。反之，如果他在想象中将他的行为与别人的行为比较，发现比别人的行为更软弱时，他将感到痛苦。他将利用错误解释对手的行为，或尽可能夸大他自己的行为，努力去解除这种痛苦。由此可见，人生性就倾向于恨与嫉妒，而他们的教育更是助长嫉妒的发展：因为当父母的总是习惯用荣誉与嫉妒去引诱，以激励子女遵守德行。说到这里，也许有人怀疑我们所说的，我们未尝不赞美他人的德行、不尊敬他人。为消除这种疑虑，我将附加下面一条推论：

推论没有人会嫉妒那不是他的对手的人的德行。

证明嫉妒只是恨或痛苦的一种，这就是说，是妨害一个人的活动能力或努力的情感。但是，一个人只从他的天性出发，去做或想要做一些事。因为他并不想望那些由他人的本性或与自己无关的本性而产生的活动力量或德行，所以，他不想努力或不想做任何不能从他本性产生的任何事情，因而他的欲望也并不因此受妨害，这就是说，他不会由此感到痛苦，因为他认为那个德行是属于与他完全不相同的另一人，所以他不会嫉妒那人，但他只嫉妒一个地位与他相等、性质与他相同的人。

命题五十六：影响我们的对象有多少种，它们所引起的情感就有多少种：快乐、痛苦、欲望，和一切由这三种情感组合而成的情感，例如，心情的波动；以及从这三种情感派生出来的情感，例如爱、恨、希望、恐惧等。

证明快乐、痛苦以及由它们混合而成或从它们派生出来的情感，就是激情，或被动的情形。但只要我们有了不充分的观念，我们就必然被动；并且仅仅因为我们有了不充分的观念，我们才必然被动，这就是说，如果我们只知道想象事物，或者我们被某种包含着我们身体的性质和外界物体的性质的情感影响，那么我们必然被动。因此要解释每一个被动情况的性质，必须能表达出那影响我们的被动情感的对象的性质。例如，对象甲所引起的快乐，必然包含对象甲的性质；对象乙所引起的快乐，必然包含对象乙的性质，所以这两种快乐的情感，从性质上说是不同的。因为它们是由不同性质的原因产生的。同样，由这一对象所引起的痛苦，与由另一对象所引起的痛苦，在性质上说也是各不相同的。同理，关于爱、恨、希望、恐惧、心情波动等情感都是如此。所以影响我们的对象有多少种，它们所引起的欲望，以及快乐、痛苦、爱等等就必然有多少种。

只要欲望被认为是为一个人的某种既定情况所决定而引发的行为，它就是一个人的本质或本性的本身，因为一个人受到外界原因的影响而引起的这种或那种快乐、痛苦、爱、恨等情感，或说，因为他的性质被这种或那种情况所决定，所以他的欲望将变化无常，而且因为不同的欲望带来的情感也不同，所以这一欲望的性质与另一欲望的性质，也必定各不相同。因此，有多少种欲望，就会有多少种快乐、痛苦、爱、恨等情感，因此有多少种影响我们的对象，就会引起我们多少种欲望。

注释根据前一个命题，在这些不同种类的情感中，必定有一些是最主要的，它们是：好吃、酗酒、性欲、贪财和野心；这些情感不外是爱或欲望的概念，根据这两个概念以及与这两种概念有关的对象，以展示这些情感的本质。因为所谓好吃、酗酒、性欲、贪财和野心，我们简单理解为对于盛宴、对于喝酒、对于性欲、对于财富、对于声望的无节制的爱好。此外，我们把这些情感的性质从与它们相关联的对象中作出区分，我们看不出有与它们相反的情感。因为，我们通常提出来反对好吃、好酒和好色的节制、清醒和贞操，并不是情感，也不是被动的情感，而是表示心灵克制这些情感的力量。然而，我不能在这里一一解释其余各种情感（因为它们的数目之大与对象的种类之多相当）。即使我能那样做，也无此必要。因为我们现时的目的只在于决定情感的力量，和心灵克制情感的能力，以及对每一种情感下一个一般的定义，这也就足够了。我重申，只要了解心灵和情感的一般特质，使我们可以决定心灵的力量和广度有多强、有多大，以及它如何去克制并控制情感，也就足够了。所以，虽然不同的爱、恨或欲望之间，有很大的区别，例如，对于小孩的爱与对于妻子的爱，对我们来说是用不着去分辨这些区别的，或更进一步去研究这些情感的性质和起源的。

命题五十七：只要这一个个体的本质与另一个个体的本质不同，那么这一个个体的感情就与那一个个体的情感不同。

证明我将从三个原始情感的定义，加以证明。

一切情感都和欲望、快乐和痛苦相关联，正如上面我们所给的定义所指出的那样。而欲望既是每一个人的本质或本性自身，所以一个人的本质或本性与另一人的本质或本性不同，那么这个人的欲望与那个人的欲望就不相同。再者，当一个人保持他自己的存在的力量或努力的情感被增加或减少、助长或妨碍时，那么快乐与痛苦就会是被动或主动的状态。但所谓保持他自己的存在的努力，就其同时与心灵和身体相关联而言，就是冲动和欲望。所以快乐与痛苦就是指由外因所决定而增加或减少、助长或限制的冲动与欲望；这就是说，快乐与痛苦即是每个人的本性。因此只要一个人的本质或本性与另一个人的本质不同，那么这个人的快乐或痛苦也就与那个人的快乐或痛苦不同。因此，每个个体的情感是互不相同的。

注释由此可见，禽兽的本性在一定程度上不同于人的本性，也就与人的情感不同，因此动物的情感被称为无理性（因为在我们懂得了心灵的起源之后，我们绝不能怀疑禽兽有情感）。比如，马与人一样，同样被生殖的欲望所驱使，但前者的欲望是马的，而后者的欲望是人的。所以，昆虫鱼鸟因为它们的本性不同，它们的性欲与欲望也必定各不相同。所以，虽然每一个体都按照其天性的存在，生活得满足而快乐，但是他们以为乐、以为满足的生活不是别的，而是每一个个体的观念或灵魂。所以，只要一个个体的本性与另一个个体的本性不同，那么它们的快乐、性质也随之不同。最后，从上一命题还可以推知，一个醉汉沉溺其中的快乐与一个哲学家所获得的快乐也必定不相同。我只是在这里顺便提一下。以上所论，都是关于人被动时的一些情感。此后，我将会简略地讨论一些关于人主动时的情感。

命题五十八：快乐与欲望既属于被动的情感也属于主动的情感，当我们是主动的时候，我们的快乐与欲望也是主动的。

证明当心灵想到它自身和它的活动力量时，它将感到快乐。而当心灵想到一个正确观念或充分观念时，它将必然反思自身。如果心灵确实具有某个充分观念，那么由于心灵想到了充分观念而它又是主动的，那它将因此感到快乐。再者，不论心灵具有的是清晰明了的观念，还是混乱的观念，它总是要努力保持它自身的存在。而这种保持自身存在的努力，我们认为就是欲望。所以，就我们理解的而言，或者就我们是主动的而言，欲望也与我们相关。

命题五十九：在所有与心灵有关的情感中，只要心灵是主动的，就没有哪个情感不是与快乐或欲望有关的。

证明所有情感都与欲望、快乐或痛苦有关，正如这些情感的定义所指出的那样。痛苦是表示心灵的思想力量被减少或被阻碍时的情感，所以只要心灵感到痛苦，那么它的理解力，或说，它的活动力量就会被减少或被阻碍。所以，只要心灵是主动的，痛苦的情感就与它无关，而只有快乐和欲望的情感与它有关。

注释所有来源于那些与可以理解的心灵有关的情感的行为，我都把它们看作是性格的力量，我把它分为意志力与仁爱力两种。所谓意志力，我认为是指那种每个人基于理性的命令努力去保持自己存在的欲望。所谓仁爱力，我认为是指那种每个人基于理性的命令努力去帮助他人，赢得他们对自己友谊的欲望。所以，那些只是为行为的当事者谋福利的行为，就属于意志力；而那些为他人谋福利的行为，就属于仁爱力。因而，节欲、清醒、危难中的镇定等，就是意志力的种类。而谦恭、仁慈等就是仁爱力的种类。

现在我相信我已经将由欲望、快乐、痛苦三个原始情感组合而成的一些最主要的情感和心情的波动解释明白了，并且是从它们的根源加以说明的。从上可知，我们在许多情形下，被外界的原因所困扰，因为我们的前途与命运都难以预料，所以我们辗转反侧，就像是海洋里被逆风吹动的波浪。但我已经说过，我只能解释主要的心灵矛盾，不能解释所有一切心灵矛盾。因为根据上面我们所采用的同样方法，我们很容易看出，爱是与后悔、轻蔑、羞耻等等情感相关的。我相信，从我的解释中人人都会同意，情感可以由许多方式组成，在这些组成的方式中有许多不同的种类，而这些不同种类的数目是没有限度的。然而，为了我们的目的，我们只要把最重要的情感加以考察就够了；其余我没有提到的情感，虽可满足好奇的兴趣，但无关宏旨，就不再赘述了。关于爱值得一提的，就是当我们享受着我们渴望享受的东西时，我们的身体将因此呈现一种新的状态，这种新状态将给予身体以特殊影响，而在身体中其他事物的形象将被唤起，而且心灵也将开始想象或想要其他新鲜事物了。比如，当我们想到一种通常会引起我们快感的美味，我们就想要享受它、吃它。而当我们享受这种美味时，肠胃过于饱满，身体因而也就有了变化。所以，如果当身体因此发生变化，当前的食物的形象被激发，以及想要吃这个食物的要求或欲望被激发时，那么这种身体的新状态就会对于美味的要求或欲望感觉恶心，我们先前渴望享受的食物，到了现在，我们就觉得它讨厌了。这种情感的突变被称为我们所说的过饱或疲倦。此外关于身体外在的感受，如战栗、失色、啜泣、大笑等情感可以观察出来的状态，我都省略未提，因为这些都只是属于身体的感受，与心灵无关。最后，关于情感的定义需要补充几点。我将因此重申各个情感的定义，必要时，我将加以说明。

情感的定义

一、就欲望被认为是由人的任何一个情感所决定而发出某种行为而言，欲望是人的现实本质。

说明我们已经说过，欲望是有意识的冲动，就它是被决定而引发有利于保存自己的行为而言，欲望就是人的本质。但在同一注释里，我也曾经提到，严格地说，我并不认为人的冲动和欲望之间有什么区别。因为不论一个人意识到他的欲望与否，它仍是那一个同样的欲望。所以，为了避免同义反复的现象出现，我不让自己用冲动去解释欲望，不过我曾经设法给欲望下一个定义，以便欲望的意义可以把人性中的一切努力，即我们所谓的冲动、意志、欲望或本能等包括在一起。因为，我实际上也可以说，就其被认为被决定而引发某种行为而言，欲望是人的本质，但根据这个定义，不能推出心灵能够意识到它的欲望或冲动。所以，为了能够包括这种意识的原因，必须加上“就欲望被认为是由人的任何一个情感所决定而发出某种行为而言”。因为所谓人的本质情状是我们认为的泛指本质的任何状态，不论这个状态是天生的，或者不论它仅仅是通过思想的属性被认知，或是仅仅通过广延的属性被认知，或者与两个属性同时相联系。所以，所谓欲望这个术语，我认为是指人的一切努力、本能、冲动、意愿等情感。这些情感随着每个人的身体状态的变化而变化，甚至常常是互相反对的，所以人总被它们驱使到不同的方向，不知道应该转向何方。

二、快乐是一个人从不太完满到较完满的转换。

三、痛苦是一个人从较完满到不太完满的转换。

说明我说转换，因为快乐并不是完满本身。如果一个人生来就经历着完满，那么当他拥有相同的完满时，他将不会感到快乐。如果从与快乐相反的情感——痛苦去看，这个道理将会更加明白。没有人会否认，痛苦存在于向不太完满的转换之中，而不是存在于不太完满本身，因为只要一个人分享到任何程度的完满，他都不会感到痛苦。而且我们也不能说痛苦存在于较完满的缺少，因为缺少就是没有。而痛苦的情感是一个活动事实，这种活动只能是从较完满到不太完满的转换活动，这就是说，一个人的活动能力被减弱或阻碍的活动。我省略了欢喜、鼓舞、忧郁、悲痛的定义，因为这些术语主要是与身体有关的情感，完全只是快乐或痛苦中的一些种类罢了。

四、惊奇是心灵全神贯注于某个对象的想象，因为这个特殊的想象与其他想象无关。

说明我们曾经指出，心灵从对一个事物的想象直接跳跃到对其他事物的想象的原因，是由于这两个事物的形象是彼此联系、互相参照着排列的。如果某个事物的形象是新奇的，那么这种相互联系的状态就不可能存在。因为心灵将持续全神贯注于那个新的对象，直到其他原因使心灵思考其他的事物为止。所以这种对于新奇对象的想象，就其本身而言，与其他的想象有着同样的性质。因此我将不把惊奇列入情感之中，我也不知道我为什么应将惊奇包括在情感之中。

五、轻蔑是心灵对于无关轻重的事物的想象，该事物的出现使心灵总是想象那些它缺乏的性质，而不去想象它所具有的性质。

六、爱是由一个外在原因的观念伴随着的快乐。

说明这个定义足以清楚说明爱的本质。那些由作家们给爱所下的定义，认为爱是爱者希望与被爱者合而为一的欲望，这只是爱的特质之一，并不是爱的本质。因为他们对于爱的本质没有充分理解，他们不能对爱的特质形成一个真实的概念，所以许多人都认为那些作家的定义晦涩难懂。然而，我必须声明，当我说爱是爱者希望与被爱者合而为一的欲望，是爱的特质时，我并不认为这种欲望是心灵的满足或它的最后决定，或心灵的一个自由决定，我也不认为爱是当被爱的人不在时，爱者希望和被爱者合而为一的欲望，更不认为爱是当被爱的人在前面时，爱者希望继续在他所爱的人的前面的欲望，因为即使没有这些欲望，我们也可以想象爱。而我所谓的欲望是指被爱的对象在爱者的面前时所引起的满足感，它加强，或者至少促进了爱者的快乐。

七、恨是由一个外在原因的观念伴随着的痛苦。

八、爱好是由偶然引起快乐的事物的观念所伴随着的快乐。

九、厌恶是由偶然引起痛苦的事物的观念所伴随着的痛苦。

十、热爱是对我们赞美的对象的爱。

说明惊奇是起于一个事物的新奇。因此，如果我们常常想到我们感到惊奇的对象，后来我们就会对它不再惊奇。由此可见，热爱的情感很容易减弱成简单的喜爱。

十一、嘲笑是由于想象着我们所恨的对象身上有种我们轻视的特征而引起的快乐。

说明只要我们轻视所恨的事物，我们就会否认它的存在，并且在一定程度上感到快乐。但是我们既然假定一个人恨他所嘲笑的事物，就可以推知这种快乐并不是持久的快乐。

十二、希望是一种不稳定的快乐，它起于关于过去或将来某一事物的观念，而对于那一事物的前途，我们还有一定程度的怀疑。

十三、恐惧是一种不稳定的痛苦，它起于关于过去或将来某一事物的观念，而对于那一事物的前途，我们还有一定程度的怀疑。

说明从以上这些定义可以推知，没有哪种希望不与恐惧同行，也没有哪种恐惧不与希望同行。因为当一个人依靠于某种希望，并怀疑某一事物的前途时，总是设想某种足以排斥那未来事物存在的东西，所以他不免感到痛苦。因而，当他依靠于某种希望时，他恐惧这个结果。反之，如果一个人恐惧或怀疑他所恨的事物的前途，那么他也想象一些足以排斥他所恨的事物的存在的东西，并因此而感到愉快，因而，在一定程度上他希望他所恨的事物失败。

十四、信心是一种源于毋庸置疑的过去或将来的事物的观念的快乐。

十五、失望是一种源于毋庸置疑的过去或将来的事物的观念的痛苦。

说明由此可见，当希望或恐惧的对象的结果已是毋庸置疑的时候，信心源于希望，失望源于恐惧。希望或恐惧的发生，或是因为我们把一个过去或将来的东西想象着如在眼前，并认为它现实存在，或是因为我们想象某种其他东西，足以把我们怀疑的原因的存在排除。因为虽然我们对于个别事情的结果不能确定，但事实上我们对此也毫不怀疑。因为我们曾经说过，对一件事情不怀疑与对它十分确定不是一回事。所以，对于一个过去或将来的事物，我们可以感到同样的快乐或痛苦的情感，就像我们从一个当前的事物形象所感到的快乐或痛苦的情感是一样的。

十六、欣慰是由一件过去事情的结果比我们所曾希望的要好的观念所伴随着的快乐。

十七、惋惜是由一件过去事情的结果比我们所曾希望的要坏的观念所伴随着的痛苦。

十八、同情是由我们想象着和我们相同的人受灾难的观念所伴随着的痛苦。

说明同情与怜悯之间，看上去好像没有什么区别。只不过，前者常常与个别情感相联系，而后者与同情情感的精神状态相联系。

十九、赞许是对一个曾为他人做好事的人的爱。

二十、愤慨是对一个曾对他人做坏事的人的恨。

说明我知道，这些术语的使用与一般的日常用语的使用，具有不同的意义。但是我的目的不在于解释词语的意义，而在于解释事物的性质。因而，我运用这些术语，它们可以传达我的解释，而又与它们通常的意义并不违背。

二十一、偏袒是因爱而对一个人的过高评价。

二十二、轻视是因恨而对一个人的过低评价。

说明由此可见，偏袒是爱的作用，而轻视是恨的作用。以至于，偏袒也可以定义为一种因为爱，导致一个人对他所爱的对象评价过高，反之，轻视可以定义为一种因为恨，导致一个人对他所恨的对象看得太低。

二十三、嫉妒是一种恨，它使一个人对他人的好运感到痛苦，对他人的灾难感到快乐。

说明嫉妒一般与怜悯相反。

二十四、怜悯是一种爱，它使一个人对他人的好运感到快乐，对他人的不幸感到痛苦。

说明这些情感也是源于一些外在事物的观念所伴随着的快乐和痛苦的情感，而这些作为原因的外在事物的观念，或者在于其本身，或者在于一些偶然原因。现在我将进而讨论那些由我们内心事物的观念作为原因所伴随着的情感。

二十五、自满是由于一个人反思他自己和他的活动力量而引起的快乐。

二十六、谦恭是由于一个人反省他思想或身体的缺点而引起的痛苦。

说明就自满是我们反思我们的活动力量而引起的快乐而言，自满与谦恭相反。但是就自满是我们相信出于心灵的自由命令而做的事情的观念所伴随着而引起的快乐而言，自满就与后悔相反。因而，我们可以把后悔定义如下：

二十七、后悔是由我们相信出于心灵的自由命令而做的事情的观念所伴随着而引起的痛苦。

二十八、骄傲是由于爱自己而对自己评价过高。

说明由此可见，骄傲不同于偏袒。因为偏袒是指对一个外在对象评价过高，而骄傲是指一个人对自己评价过高。因为偏袒是爱别人的结果，而骄傲是爱自己的结果或特质，所以骄傲可以定义为由于自爱或自满而使得一个人对自己评价过高的情感。这种情感没有相反的情感，因为没有哪一个人会因为恨自己而对自己看得太低。即使这个人认为他自己没有能力去做这事或那事，他也不会把他自己看得太低。因为当一个人想象着他没有能力去做某事的时候，他认为他做不到是必然的。由于有了这种念头，他如此放弃，以至于他真的做不到他所想象着他没有能力做到的事。因为，只要他想象着自己不能做某事，结果他就真的不可能做到某事。但是，如果我们认为事情的成功与否仅仅依赖信念时，我们将发现一个人把自己看得太低是可以了解的，因为那是很可能的事：一个人轻视自己的弱点，他会想象着他被所有人轻视，即使其他人并没有轻视他的意思。再者，如果一个人否定一切与他不能确定的未来相关的眼前事物，那么这个人或许将他自己看得太低。例如，如果他宣称他不能设想任何确定的概念，或宣称他能想，却除了卑鄙邪恶的事之外什么也不能做，我们也可以说，这个人对自己的评价太低，当我们看见他因为过于恼羞而拒绝做与他同等的人敢于冒险去做的事，我们因而可以提出一种情感作为骄傲的反面，我们称之为自卑。正如自满源于骄傲一样，自卑则出于谦恭，因此我们可以这样定义：

二十九、自卑是由于痛苦的原因而将自己看得太低。

说明我们一般还是习惯地认为骄傲与谦恭相反，但是，也许我们只是太多地关注这两种情感的作用而不是它们的本质。我们常常称一个吹牛太多的人为骄傲的人，他们除了夸张他自己的优点和指斥别人的缺点外什么也不谈，他总是希望争第一，然后过着一种高高在上的格调高雅、衣饰华丽的生活；反之，我们称一个常常面赤耳热的人为谦恭的人，他们总是坦白自己的过错，称赞别人的美德，走路时低着头，不修边幅。然而，像这种谦恭与自卑的情感是很少见的。因为人的本性总是尽可能地努力去反对这些情感，因此那些被相信是最谦恭和最自卑的人，在现实中一般是最有野心、最易嫉妒的人。

三十、荣誉是由我们想象着自己的某种我们相信会受人称赞的行为的观念所伴随着的快乐。

三十一、羞耻是由我们想象着自己的某种我们相信会受人指责的行为的观念所伴随着的痛苦。

说明这里我们还必须关注一下羞耻与害羞之间的区别。羞耻是从我们感到羞耻的行为中产生的一种痛苦。害羞是恐惧或害怕羞耻的情感，这种情感可以阻止人不去做某些卑鄙的事情。害羞一般常与无耻对立，其实无耻并不是一种情感，我将在适当时指出这一点。但我已经说过，情感的名称大都基于运用，而不是基于情感的性质。

三十二、遗憾是想要拥有某种东西的欲望或愿望，这种欲望由于对该事物的回忆而加强，但同时又由于对其他排斥它存在的事物的回忆而被阻碍。

说明正如我已屡次说过的那样，当我们回忆一个事物时，我们总是想用同样的情感，把它当作如在眼前似的去怀念它。但是，只要我们是清醒的，这种状态或努力总是被我们所回忆着的足以排斥那个事物存在的意象所阻碍。所以当我们回忆某些足以引起某种快乐的事物时，我们总是努力用同样快乐的情感，把它当作如在眼前似的去怀念它。但是，这种努力立刻就被关于那些排斥那个事物存在的事物的回忆所阻碍。所以，严格地说，遗憾实在是一种与快乐相对的痛苦，它来源于我们所恨的东西的缺点。但是，因为遗憾这个名称好似与欲望有关。所以我认为它是属于欲望的情感。

三十三、好胜是对于某物的欲望，这种欲望的发生是由于我们认为其他人也和我们有同样的欲望。

说明一个人因为看见别人逃跑，他也跟着逃跑；一个人因为看见别人害怕，他也跟着害怕。再或者一个人正因为看见他人被烧着了手，因而他也立即缩回他的手，移动他的身体，好像他自己的手也被烧着了似的。像这些情形就可以说，人是在模仿他人的情感，但不能说是与别人争胜。这不是因为好胜的原因与模仿的原因有什么不同，而是因为即使他模仿我们所认为高尚的、有用的或快乐的事情，我们还是只习惯于用好胜来称一个人。

三十四、感恩或感激是源于爱的欲望或热诚，努力去报答那些用同样的爱使我们受惠的人。

三十五、仁慈是源于使我们所怜悯的人受的恩惠的欲望。

三十六、愤怒是我们因恨而被激起想伤害我们所恨的人的欲望。

三十七、复仇是我们被相互的恨所激起，而想伤害那些因为同样的情感曾经伤害过我们的人的欲望。

三十八、残忍或野蛮是一个人被激动而伤害他所爱或他所怜悯的人的欲望。

说明与残忍正相反的是慈善，它不是心灵的被动的状态，而是一个人克制他的愤怒和复仇的心灵力量。

三十九、胆怯是为了避免所恐惧的较大的灾难而忍受较小的灾祸的欲望。

四十、勇敢是一个人被怂恿而做出与自己差不多的人所不敢做的危险事情的欲望。

四十一、我们说一个人胆小，是因为他害怕与他差不多的人都敢于承当的危险而压制他自己的欲望。

说明所以胆小不是别的，而是对于多数人通常并不感觉恐惧的灾难表示恐惧，因此我不将胆小算作欲望的情感。而我还是在这里加以解释，是因为就欲望而言，胆小实在是与勇敢正相反。

四十二、我们说一个人惊惶失措，是因为他避免灾难的欲望因对他所恐惧的灾难表示惊异而被阻碍。

说明由此可见，惊惶失措是胆小的一种。但是，因为惊惶失措是起于双重的恐惧，所以，它也许可以更恰当地被定义为一种使人不知所措和摇摆不定，而不知如何解除灾难的恐惧。就我们所理解他解除灾难的欲望被惊异而阻碍而言，我称之为不知所措。就我们所理解他避免灾难的欲望被另一种同样会使他受苦痛的灾难的恐惧所阻碍，因此他对于两种祸害，不知避免哪一种是好而言，又可叫做摇摆不定。

四十三、礼貌或顺从是只做使人愉快的事而不去做使人不快的事的欲望。

四十四、野心是对权利无止境的欲望。

说明野心是助长并加强一切情感的欲望，因此，这种情感很难被克制。因为只要一个人被任何欲望束缚，他必然也被野心束缚着。西赛罗说过：“最伟大的人物都是受荣誉的支配。即使有许多哲学家，当他们著书教人蔑视荣誉时，他们仍然将他们的姓名写在封面上。”

四十五、奢侈是对于奢华的生活无节制的欲望或爱好。

四十六、酗酒是对于醇酒无节制的欲望和爱好。

四十七、贪财是对于财富无节制的欲望和爱好。

四十八、淫欲是对于性交无节制的欲望和爱好。

说明对于要求性交的欲望通常都叫做淫欲，不论有节制与否。

如果现在我们把注意力指向这些原始的情感，以及上面所说的关于心灵的性质，那么我们将单就情感与心灵的关系而言，给情感下这样的定义。

情感的总定义

被称为一种心灵的被动性的情感是一个混乱的观念，通过这种观念心灵肯定涉及到这种情感的身体或身体的某一部分，对涉及到这种情感的身体或身体的某一部分的存在的肯定具有比以前较大或较小的力量，而且由于有了这种观念的存在，心灵就被决定更多地思想这个事物，而不去思想其他事物。

说明首先，我说，心灵的主动或被动的情感是一个混乱的观念。因为我曾经证明，只要有了不充分的或混乱的观念，心灵就是被动的。其次，我又说，通过这种观念，心灵肯定涉及这种情感的身体或身体的某一部分，对涉及这种情感的身体或身体的某一部分的存在的肯定具有比以前较大或较小的力量。因为我们所具有的一切关于身体的观念，表示我们身体的现实状态，而不表示外界物体的性质。但是，这个构成情感实质的观念，必然要表示或表明身体的状态，或身体某一部分的状态。身体或身体任何一部分之所以具有这种状态，是由于身体的活动力量或存在力量被增强或减弱、被助长或限制。但必须注意，我所说的具有比以前较大或较小的存在力量，我的意思并不是说心灵把身体的现在状态与过去状态相比较，而是说构成情感的实质的观念肯定身体的某种情状，实际上，它包含了比以前较多或较少的实在性。

因为心灵的本质存在于这样的事实：它肯定它自己身体的真实存在，并且因为我们理解所谓完满是事物的本质，由此可知，当心灵肯定其身体或身体的某一部分的某种东西具有比以前较大或较小的实在性时，那么心灵就达到了一个较大或较小的完满性。

所以，当我说心灵的思想力量被增强或减弱时，我不过是在说心灵已经形成了关于身体或身体的某一部分的观念，这一观念比它已经肯定了的其身体的观念包含了更多或更少的实在性。因为观念的优越性和思想的真实力量，是通过对象的优越性被衡量的。最后，我已经补充说明了是什么东西决定了心灵思考这个事物而不去思考其他的事物。然后，除了在这个定义的前一部分解释了快乐和痛苦的本质之外，我也说明了欲望的本质。

Part Ⅳ　On Human Bondage or the Strength of the Emotions

Preface

Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage；for,when a man is a prey to his emotions,he is not his own master,but lies at the mercy of fortune；so much so,that he is often compelled,while seeing that which is better for him,to follow that which is worse.Why this is so,and what is good or evil in the emo-tions,I propose to show in this part of my treatise.But,before I begin,it would be well to make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection,good and evil.

When a man has purposed to make a given thing,and has brought it to perfection,his work will be pronounced perfect,not only by himself,but by everyone who rightly knows,or thinks that he knows,the intention and aim of its author.For instance,sup-pose anyone sees a work（which I assume to be not yet completed），and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house,he will call the work imperfect；he will,on the other hand,call it perfect,as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end,which its author had purposed for it.But if a man sees a work,the like where-of he has never seen before,and if he knows not the intention of the artificer,he plainly cannot know,whether that work be perfect or imperfect.Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.

But,after men began to form general ideas,to think out types of houses,build-ings,towers,and to prefer certain types to others,it came about,that each man called perfect that which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in ques-tion,and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type,even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,which,indeed,are not made with human hands,perfect or imperfect；for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural,no less than of things artificial,and such ideas they hold as types,be-lieving that nature（who they think does nothing without an object）has them in view,and has set them as types before herself.Therefore,when they behold something in na-ture,which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question,they say that nature has fallen short or has blundered,and has left her work incomplete.Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices,than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.

Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I.，that nature does not work with an end in view.For the eternal and infinite being,which we call God or Nature,acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists.For we have shown,that by the same necessity of its nature,whereby it exists,it likewise works.The reason or cause why God or Na-ture exists,and the reason why he acts,are one and the same.Therefore,as he does not exist for the sake of an end,so neither does he act for the sake of an end；of his ex-istence and of his action there is neither origin nor end.Wherefore,a cause which is called final is nothing else but human desire,in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of anything.For example,when we say that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house,we mean nothing more than that a man,conceiving the conveniences of household life,had a desire to build a house.Wherefore,the being inhabited,in so far as it is regarded as a final cause,is nothing else but this particular desire,which is really the efficient cause；it is regarded as the primary cause,because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires.They are,as I have often said already,conscious of their own actions and appetites,but ignorant of the causes whereby they are deter-mined to any particular desire.Therefore,the common saying that nature sometimes falls short,or blunders,and produces things which are imperfect,I set down among the glosses treated of in the Appendix to Part I.

Perfection and imperfection,then,are in reality merely modes of thinking,or no-tions which we form from a comparison among one another of individuals of the same species；hence I said above,that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.For we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one genus,which is called the highest genus,namely,to the category of being,whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.Thus,in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category,and comparing them one with another,find that some possess more of being or reality than others,we,to this extent,say,that some are more perfect than others.Again,in so far as we attribute to them anything implying negation-as term,end,infirmity,etc.，-we,to this extent,call them imperfect,because they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call perfect,not because they have any intrinsic deficiency,or be-cause nature has blundered.For nothing lies within the scope of a thing s nature,save that which follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause,and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.

As for the terms good and bad,they indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves,but are merely modes of thinking,or notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another.Thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good,bad,and indifferent.For instance,music is good for him that is melanchol-y,bad for him that mourns；for him that is deaf,it is neither good nor bad.Never the-less,though this be so,the terms should still be retained.For,inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human nature which we may hold in view,it will be useful for us to retain the terms in question,in the sense I have indicated.

In what follows,then,I shall mean by“good”that,which we certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type of human nature,which we have set be-fore ourselves；by“bad，”that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in ap-proaching the said type.Again,we shall say that men are more perfect,or more imper-fect,in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type.For it must be specially remarked that,when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a greater perfec-tion,or vice versa,I do not mean that he is changed from one essence or reality to an-other；for instance,a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man,as by being changed into an insect.What I mean is,that we conceive the thing s power of action,in so far as this is understood by its nature,to be increased or dimin-ished.Lastly,by perfection in general I shall,as I have said,mean reality-in other words,each thing s essence,in so far as it exists,and operates in a particular manner,and without paying any regard to its duration.For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,because it has passed a longer time in existence.The duration of things cannot be determined by their essence,for the essence of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence；but everything,whether it be more perfect or less perfect,will al-ways be able to persist in existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist；wherefore,in this respect,all things are equal.

Definitions

1.By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.

2.By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in the at-tainment of any good.

3.Particular things I call contingent in so far as,while regarding their essence on-ly,we find nothing therein,which necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.

4.Particular things I call possible in so far as,while regarding the causes whereby they must be produced,we know not,whether such causes be determined for producing them.

5.By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different directions,though they are of the same kind,such as luxury and avarice,which are both species of love,and are contraries,not by nature,but by accident.

6.What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing,future,present,and past,I ex-plained in Part 3，Prop.18，notes 1.and 2.，which see.

（But I should here also remark,that we can only distinctly conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit；that is,all objects distant from us more than two hundred feet,or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive,seem to be an equal distance from us,and all in the same plane；so also objects,whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive,seem to be all equally distant from the present,and are set down,as it were,to the same moment of time.）

7.By an end,for the sake of which we do something,I mean a desire.

8.By virtue and power I mean the same thing；that is,virtue,in so far as it is re-ferred to man,is a man s nature or essence,in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.

Axiom

There is no individual thing in nature,than which there is not another more power-ful and strong.Whatsoever thing be given,there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.

Propositions

PROP.1.No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true,in virtue of its being true.

Proof.-Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve,nor have they any positive quality on account of which they are called false；contrariwise,in so far as they are referred to God,they are true.Wherefore,if the posi-tive quality possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is true,in virtue of its being true,a true idea would then be removed by itself,which is absurd.

PROP.2.We are only passive,in so far as we are part of nature,which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.

Proof.-We are said to be passive,when something arises in us,whereof we are only a partial cause,that is,something which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature.We are passive therefore,in so far as we are a part of nature,which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.

PROP.3.The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited,and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

Proof.-This is evident from the axiom of this part.For,when man is given,there is something else-say A-more powerful；when A is given,there is something else-say B-more powerful than A,and so on to infinity；thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other thing,and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

PROP.4.It is impossible,that man should not be apart of Nature,or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause.

Proof.-The power,whereby each particular thing,and consequently man,pre-serves his being,is the power of God or of Nature；not in so far as it is infinite,but in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence.Thus the power of man,in so far as it is explained through his own actual essence,is a part of the infinite power of God or Nature,in other words,of the essence thereof.This was our first point.Again,if it were possible,that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through the nature of man,it would follow that he would not be able to die,but would always necessarily exist；this would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite；namely,either of man s power only,inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all changes which could spring from ex-ternal causes；or of the infinite power of Nature,whereby all individual things would be so ordered,that man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as ten-ded towards his own preservation.But the first alternative is absurd.Therefore,if it be possible,that man should not be capable of undergoing any changes,save such as can be explained solely through his own nature,and consequently that he must always（as we have shown）necessarily exist；such a result must follow from the infinite power of God,and consequently from the necessity of the divine nature,in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given man,the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must be deducible.It would therefore follow that man is infinite,which is absurd.It is,therefore,impossible,that man should not un-dergo any changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause.

Corollary.-Hence it follows,that man is necessarily always a prey to his pas-sions,that he follows and obeys the general order of nature,and that he accommodates himself thereto,as much as the nature of things demands.

PROP.5.The power and increase of every passion,and its persistence in existing are not defined by the power,whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing,but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.

Proof.-The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone,that is,the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power,whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing,but must necessarily be defined by the power of an ex-ternal cause compared with our own.

PROP.6.The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the rest of a man s ac-tivities or power,so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him.

Proof.-The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own；therefore it can over-come a man s power.

PROP.7.An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion con-trary thereto,and with more power for controlling emotion.

Proof.-Emotion,in so far as it is referred to the mind,is an idea,whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence than before.When,there-fore,the mind is assailed by any emotion,the body is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished.Now this modifica-tion of the body receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being；which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause,in virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to and stronger than itself；wherefore the mind is affected by the idea of a modification contrary to,and stronger than the former modification,in oth-er words,the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and stronger than the for-mer emotion,which will exclude or destroy the existence of the former emotion；thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion.

Corollary.-An emotion,in so far as it is referred to the mind,can only be con-trolled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of the body contrary to,and stron-ger than,that which we are undergoing.For the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to,and stronger than,itself,in other words,only by an idea of a modification of the body contrary to,and stronger than,the modification which we undergo.

PROP.8.The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain,in so far as we are conscious thereof.

Proof.-We call a thing good or evil,when it is of service or the reverse in preser-ving our being,that is,when it increases or diminishes,helps or hinders,our power of activity.Thus,in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain,we call it good or evil；wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain,which necessarily follows from that pleasurable or painful emo-tion.But this idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body；that is,there is no real distinction between this idea and the emotion or idea of the mod-ification of the body,save in conception only.Therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotion,in so far as we are conscious thereof.

PROP.9.An emotion,whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time,is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us.

Proof.-Imagination or conception is the idea,by which the mind regards a thing as present,but which indicates the disposition of the body rather than the nature of the external thing.An emotion is therefore an imagination,in so far as it indicates the dis-position of the body.But an imagination is stronger,so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence of the external object；wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more intense,when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time,than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us.

Corollary.-The image of something past or future,that is,of a thing which we re-gard as in relation to time past or time future,to the exclusion of time present,is,when other conditions are equal,weaker than the image of something present；consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is less intense,other conditions being e-qual,than an emotion felt towards something present.

PROP.10.Towards something future,which we conceive as close at hand,we are affected more intensely,than if we conceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval；so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have not long passed away we are affected more intensely,than if we conceive that it has long passed away.

Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand,or not long passed away,we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object less,than if its period of fu-ture existence were more distant from the present,or if it had long passed away；there-fore we are,so far,more intensely affected towards it.

PROP.11.An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary is,when oth-er conditions are equal,more intense,than an emotion towards that which impossible,or contingent,or non-necessary.

Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary,we,to that extent,affirm its existence；on the other hand we deny a thing s existence,in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary；wherefore an emotion towards that which is necessary is,other condi-tions being equal,more intense than an emotion towards that which is non-necessary.

PROP.12.An emotion towards a thing,which we know not to exist at the present time,and which we conceive as possible,is more intense,other conditions being e-qual,than an emotion towards a thing contingent.

Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent,we are affected by the con-ception of some further thing,which would assert the existence of the former；but,on the other hand,we conceive certain things,which exclude its present existence.But,in so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future,we thereby conceive things which assert its existence,that is,things which promote hope or fear；wherefore an e-motion towards something possible is more vehement.

Corollary.-An emotion towards a thing,which we know not to exist in the pres-ent,and which we conceive as contingent,is far fainter,than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.

Proof.-Emotion towards a thing,which we conceive to exist,is more intense than it would be,if we conceived the thing as future,and is much more vehement,than if the future time be conceived as far distant from the present.Therefore an emotion to-wards a thing,whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present,is far fainter,than if we conceive the thing as present；it is,nevertheless,more in-tense,than if we conceived the thing as contingent,wherefore an emotion towards a thing,which we regard as contingent,win be far fainter,than if we conceived the thing to be present with us.

PROP.13.Emotion towards a thing contingent,which we know not to exist in the present,is,other conditions being equal,fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.

Proof.-In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent,we are not affected by the image of any other thing,which asserts the existence of the said thing,but,on the other hand,we conceive certain things excluding its present existence.But,in so far as we conceive it in relation to time past,we are assumed to conceive something,which re-calls the thing to memory,or excites the image thereof,which is so far the same as re-garding it as present.Therefore an emotion towards a thing contingent,which we know does not exist in the present,is fainter,other conditions being equal,than an emotion towards a thing past.

PROP.14.A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true,but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion.

Proof.-An emotion is an idea,whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existing than before；therefore it has no positive quality,which can be de-stroyed by the presence of what is true；consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot,by virtue of being true,restrain any emotion.But,in so far as such knowledge is an emotion if it have more strength for restraining emotion,it will to that extent be a-ble to restrain the given emotion.

PROP.15.Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed.

Proof.-From the true knowledge of good and evil,in so far as it is an emotion,necessarily arises desire,the strength of which is proportioned to the strength of the e-motion wherefrom it arises.But because this Desire arises from the fact that we under-stand something truly,it follows in us insofar as we act,and must therefore be under-stood through our essence only；consequently its force and increase can be defined solely by human power.Again,the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger,in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement；wherefore their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes,which,when compared with our own power,indefinitely surpass it；hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more vehement,than the desire which arises from a true knowl-edge of good and evil,and may,consequently,control or quench it.

PROP.16.Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,in so far as such knowledge regards what is future,may be more easily controlled or quenched,than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment.

Proof.-Emotion towards a thing,which we conceive as future,is fainter than e-motion towards a thing that is present.But desire,which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil,though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment,can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire.Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge,when concerned with the future,can be more easily controlled or quenched.

PROP.17.Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil,in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent,can be controlled far more easily still,than desire for things that are present.

Proof.-This Prop.is proved in the same way as the last Prop.from Part 4.12.Coroll.

PROP.18.Desire arising from pleasure is,other conditions being equal,stronger than desire arising from pain.

Proof.-Desire is the essence of a man,that is,the endeavour whereby a man en-deavours to persist in his own being.Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is,by the fact of pleasure being felt,increased or helped；on the contrary,desire arising from pain is,by the fact of pain being felt,diminished or hindered；hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the power of an ex-ternal cause,whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only.Thus the former is the stronger of the two.

PROP.19.Every man,by the laws of his nature,necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.

Proof.-The knowledge of good and evil is the emotion of pleasure or pain,in so far as we are conscious thereof；therefore,every man necessarily desires what he thinks good,and shrinks from what he thinks bad.Now this appetite is nothing else but man s nature or essence.Therefore,every man,solely by the laws of his nature,desires the one,and shrinks from the other，＆c.

PROP.20.The more every man endeavours,and is able to seek what is useful to him-in other words,to preserve his own being-the more is he endowed with virtue；on the contrary,in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him,that is,to preserve his own being,he is wanting in power.

Proof.-Virtue is human power,which is defined solely by man s essence,that is,which is defined solely by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being.Wherefore,the more a man endeavours,and is able to preserve his own being,the more is he endowed with virtue,and,consequently,in so far as a man neglects to preserve his own being,he is wanting in power.

PROP.21.No one can desire to be blessed,to act rightly,and to live rightly,without at the same time wishing to be,to act,and to live-in other words,to actually exist.

Proof.-The proof of this proposition,or rather the proposition itself,is self-evi-dent,and is also plain from the definition of desire.For the desire of living,acting，blessedly or rightly,is the essence of man-that is,the endeavour made by everyone to preserve his own being.Therefore,no one can desire to be blessed,to act rightly,and to live rightly,without at the same time wishing to actually exist..

PROP.22.No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavour to preserve one s own being.

Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing；therefore,if any virtue could be conceived as prior thereto,the essence of a thing would have to be con-ceived as prior to itself,which is obviously absurd.Therefore,no virtue，＆c.

Corollary.-The effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation of vir-tue.For prior to this principle nothing can be conceived,and without it no virtue can be conceived.

PROP.23.Man,in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas,cannot be absolutely said to act in obedience to virtue；he can on-ly be so described,in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.

Proof.-In so far as a man is determined to an action through having inadequate i-deas,he is passive,that is,he does something,which cannot be perceived solely through his essence,that is,which does not follow from his virtue.But,in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands,he is active；that is,he does some-thing,which is perceived through his essence alone,or which adequately follows from his virtue.

PROP.24.To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act,to live,or to preserve one s being in accordance with the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to one s self.

Proof.-To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but to act according to the laws of one s own nature.But we only act,in so far as we understand；therefore to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,to live,or to preserve one s being in obedience to reason,and that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us.

PROP.25.No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else.

Proof.-The endeavour,wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its being,is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself；from this alone,and not from the es-sence of anything else,it necessarily follows that everyone endeavours to preserve his being.Moreover,this proposition is plain from Part 4.22.Coroll.，for if a man should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,which,by the foregoing corollary,is absurd.Therefore no one，＆c.

PROP.26.Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand；neither does the mind,in so far as it makes use of reason,judge anything to be useful to it,save such things as are conducive to understanding.

Proof.-The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but the essence of the thing in question,which,in so far as it exists such as it is,is conceived to have force for con-tinuing in existence and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature.But the essence of reason is nought else but our mind,in so far as it clearly and distinct-ly understands；therefore whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand.Again,since this effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours,in so far as it reasons,to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding；this effort at understanding is the first and single basis of virtue,nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior object；on the other hand,the mind,in so far as it reasons,will not be able to conceive any good for itself,save such things as are conducive to understanding.

PROP.27.We know nothing to be certainly good or evil,save such things as real-ly conduce to understanding,or such as are able to hinder us from understanding.

Proof.-The mind,in so far as it reasons,desires nothing beyond understanding,and judges nothing to be useful to itself,save such things as conduce to understanding.But the mind cannot possess certainty concerning anything,except in so far as it has ad-equate ideas,or in so far as it reasons.Therefore we know nothing to be good or evil save such things as really conduce，＆c.

PROP.28.The mind s highest good is the knowledge of God,and the mind s high-est virtue is to know God.

Proof.-The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God,that is,than a Being absolutely infinite,and without which nothing can either be or be con-ceived；therefore,the mind s highest utility or good is the knowledge of God.Again,the mind is active,only in so far as it understands,and only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously.The mind s absolute virtue is therefore to under-stand.Now,as we have already shown,the highest that the mind can understand is God；therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God.

PROP.29.No individual thing,which is entirely different from our own nature,can help or check our power of activity,and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm,unless it has something in common with our nature.

Proof.-The power of every individual thing,and consequently the power of man,whereby he exists and operates,can only be determined by an individual thing,whose nature must be understood through the same nature as that,through which human nature is conceived.Therefore our power of activity,however it be conceived,can be deter-mined and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual thing,which has something in common with us,but not by the power of anything,of which the nature is entirely different from our own；and since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain,that is,which increases or diminishes,helps or hinders,our power of activity；therefore,that which is entirely different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad.

PROP.30.A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in com-mon with our nature,but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature.

Proof.-We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain,that is,when it dimini-shes or checks our power of action.Therefore,if anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in common with our nature,it would be able itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature,which is absurd.Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that quality which it has in common with us,but,on the other hand,in so far as it is bad for us,that is,in so far as it can diminish or check our pow-er of action,it is contrary to our nature.

PROP.31.In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,it is necessarily good.

Proof.-In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,it cannot be bad for us.It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent.If it be assumed that it be nei-ther good nor bad,nothing will follow from its nature,which tends to the preservation of our nature,that is,which tends to the preservation of the thing itself；but this is ab-surd；therefore,in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,it is necessarily good.

Corollary.-Hence it follows,that,in Proportion as a thing is in harmony with our nature,so is it more useful or better for us,and vice versa,in Proportion as a thing is more useful for us,so is it more in harmony with our nature.For,in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature,it will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto.If different,it can neither be good nor bad；if contrary,it will be contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature,that is,contrary to what is good-in short,bad.Noth-ing,therefore,can be good,except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature；and hence a thing is useful,in Proportion as it is in harmony with our nature,and vice versa.

PROP.32.In so far as men are a prey to passion,they cannot,in that respect,be said to be naturally in harmony.

Proof.-Things,which are said to be in harmony naturally,are understood to a-gree in power,not in want of power or negation,and consequently not in passion；wherefore men,in so far as they are a prey to their passions,cannot be said to be natu-rally in harmony.

PROP.33.Men can differ in nature,in so far as they are assailed by those emo-tions,which are passions,or passive states；and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant.

Proof.-The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature,but it must be defined by the power,that is,by the nature of ex-ternal causes in comparison with our own；hence it follows,that there are as many,kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected,and that men may be differently affected by one and the same object,and to this extent differ in nature；lastly,that one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object,and may therefore be variable and inconstant.

PROP.34.In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions,they can be contrary one to another.

Proof.-A man,for instance Peter,can be the cause of Paul s feeling pain,be-cause he（Peter）possesses something similar to that which Paul hates,or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also loves,or for other causes；it may therefore happen that Paul should hate Peter,consequently it may easily happen also,that Peter should hate Paul in return,and that each should endeavour to do the other an injury,that is,that they should be contrary one to another.But the emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state；hence men,in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions,can be contrary one to another.

PROP.35.In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,do they always nec-essarily agree in nature.

Proof.-In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions,they can be different in nature,and at variance one with another.But,men are only said to be ac-tive,in so far as they act in obedience to reason；therefore,whatsoever follows from hu-man nature in so far as it is defined by reason must be understood solely through human nature as its proximate cause.But,since every man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad；and fur-ther,since that which we,in accordance with reason,deem good or bad,necessarily is good or bad；it follows that men,in so far as they live in obedience to reason,necessa-rily do only such things as are necessarily good for human nature,and consequently for each individual man；in other words,such things as are in harmony with each man s na-ture.Therefore,men in so far as they live in obedience to reason,necessarily live al-ways in harmony one with another.

Corollary I.-There is no individual thing in nature,which is more useful to man,than a man who lives in obedience to reason.For that thing is to man most useful,which is most in harmony with his nature；that is,obviously,man.But man acts abso-lutely according to the laws of his nature,when he lives in obedience to reason,and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of another man；where-fore among individual things nothing is more useful to man,than a man who lives in o-bedience to reason.

Corollary II.-As every man seeks most that which is useful to him,so are men most useful one to another.For the more a man seeks what is useful to him and endeav-ours to preserve himself,the more is he endowed with virtue,or,what is the same thing,the more is he endowed with power to act according to the laws of his own nature,that is to live in obedience to reason.But men are most in natural harmony,when they live in obedience to reason；therefore men will be most useful one to another,when each seeks most that which is useful to him.

PROP.36.The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all,and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.

Proof.-To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason,and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand；therefore the highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God；that is a good which is common to all and can be possessed by all men equally,in so far as they are of the same nature.

PROP.37.The good which every man,who follows after virtue,desires for him-self he will also desire for other men,and so much the more,in Proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God.

Proof.-Men,in so far as they live in obedience to reason,are most useful to their fellow men；therefore,we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring a-bout that men should live in obedience to reason.But the good which every man,in so far as he is guided by reason,or,in other words,follows after virtue,desires for him-self,is to understand；wherefore the good,which each follower of virtue seeks for him-self,he will desire also for others.Again,desire,in so far as it is referred to the mind,is the very essence of the mind；now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge,which involves the knowledge of God,and without it,can neither be,nor be conceived；therefore,in Proportion as the mind s essence involves a greater knowledge of God,so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue,that other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself.

Another Proof.-The good,which a man desires for himself and loves,he will love more constantly,if he sees that others love it also；he will therefore endeavour that oth-ers should love it also；and as the good in question is common to all,and therefore all can rejoice therein,he will endeavour,for the same reason,to bring about that all should rejoice therein,and this he will do the more,in Proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.

PROP.38.Whatsoever disposes the human body,so as to render it capable of be-ing affected in an increased number of ways,or of affecting external bodies in an in-creased number of ways,is useful to man；and is so,in Proportion as the body is there-by rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways；contrariwise,whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man.

Proof.-Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases also the mind s capability of perception；therefore,whatsoever thus disposes the body,and thus renders it capable,is necessarily good or useful；and is so in Proportion to the extent to which it can render the body capable；contrariwise,it is hurtful,if it renders the body in this respect less capable.

PROP.39.Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the Proportion of motion and rest,which the parts of the human body mutually possess,is good；contrariwise,whatsoever causes a change in such Proportion is bad.

Proof.-The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation.But that which constitutes the specific reality of a human body is,that its parts communicate their several motions one to another in a certain fixed Proportion.Therefore,whatsoever brings about the preservation of the Proportion between motion and rest,which the parts of the human body mutually possess,preserves the specific reality of the human body and consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in many ways；consequently it is good.Again,whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid Proportion causes the human body to assume an-other specific character,in other words,to be destroyed,and consequently totally inca-pable of being affected in an increased numbers of ways；therefore it is bad.

PROP.40.Whatsoever conduces to man s social life,or causes men to live togeth-er in harmony,is useful,whereas whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad.

Proof.-For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes them to live according to reason,and is therefore good,and（for the same reason）whatsoever brings about discord is bad.

PROP.41.Pleasure in itself is not bad but good；contrariwise,pain in itself is bad.

Proof.-Pleasure is emotion,whereby the body s power of activity,is increased or helped；pain is emotion,whereby the body s power of activity is diminished or checked；therefore pleasure in itself is good，＆c.

PROP.42.Mirth cannot be excessive,but is always good；contrariwise,Melan-choly is always bad.

Proof.-Mirth is pleasure,which,in so far as it is referred to the body,consists in all parts of the body being affected equally；that is,the body s power of activity,is in-creased or aided in such a manner,that the several parts maintain their former Propor-tion of motion and rest；therefore Mirth is always good,and cannot be excessive.But Melancholy is pain,which,in so far as it is referred to the body,consists in the abso-lute decrease or hindrance of the body s power of activity；therefore it is always bad.

PROP.43.Stimulation may be excessive and bad；on the other hand,grief may be good,in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad.

Proof.-Localized pleasure or stimulation is pleasure,which,in so far as it is re-ferred to the body,consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the rest；the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body,and may remain obstinately fixed therein,thus rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways；therefore it may,be bad.Again,grief,which is pain,cannot as such be good.But,as its force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own,we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion；we can,therefore,conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation,and pre-venting its becoming excessive,and hindering the body s capabilities；thus,to this ex-tent,it will be good.

PROP.44.Love and desire may be excessive.

Proof.-Love is pleasure,accompanied by the idea of an external cause；therefore stimulation,accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love；hence love maybe ex-cessive.Again,the strength of desire varies in Proportion to the emotion from which it arises.Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men s actions；so,therefore,can desire,which arises from the same emotion,overcome all other desires,and become ex-cessive,as we showed in the last Proposition concerning stimulation.

PROP.45.Hatred can never be good.

Proof.-When we hate a man,we endeavour to destroy him,that is,we endeavour to do something that is bad.Therefore，＆c.

Corollary 1.-Envy,derision,contempt,anger,revenge,and other emotions at-tributable to hatred,or arising therefrom,are bad.

Corollary 2.-Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base,and in a State unjust.

PROP.46.He,who lives under the guidance of reason,endeavours,as far as possible,to render back love,or kindness,for other men s hatred,anger,or contempt towards him.

Proof.-All emotions of hatred are bad；therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour,as far as possible,to avoid being assailed by such emotions；consequently,he will also endeavour to prevent others being so assailed.But hatred is increased by being reciprocated,and can be quenched by love,so that hatred may pass into love；therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love,that is,with kindness.

PROP.47.Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good.

Proof.-Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain.For fear is pain,and hope cannot exist without fear；therefore these emotions cannot be good in themselves,but only in so far as they can restrain excessive pleasure.

PROP.48.The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are always bad.

Proof.-These emotions are repugnant to reason；and are therefore bad.

PROP.49.Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud.

Proof.-If we see that any one rates us too highly,for love s sake,we are apt to become elated,or to be Pleasurably affected；the good which we hear of ourselves we readily believe and therefore,for love s sake,rate ourselves too highly；in other words，we are apt to become proud.

PROP.50.Pity,in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,is in itself bad and useless.

Proof.-Pity is a pain,and therefore is in itself bad.The good effect which fol-lows,namely,our endeavour to free the object of our pity from misery,is an action which we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason；only at the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action,which we know for certain to be good；thus,in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,pity in itself is useless and bad.

PROP.51.Approval is not repugnant to reason,but can agree therewith and arise therefrom.

Proof.-Approval is love towards one who has done good to another；therefore it may be referred to the mind,in so far as the latter is active,that is,in so far as it un-derstands；therefore,it is in agreement with reason，＆c.

Another Proof.-He,who lives under the guidance of reason,desires for others the good which he seeks for himself；wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is aided；in other words,he will feel pleasure accompa-nied by the idea of the benefactor.Therefore he approves of him.

PROP.52.Self-approval may arise from reason,and that which arises from reason is the highest possible.

Proof.-Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man s contemplation of himself and his own power of action.But a man s true power of action or virtue is reason herself,as the said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her；therefore self-approval arises from reason.Again,when a man is contemplating himself,he only perceives clearly and dis-tinctly or adequately,such things as follow from his power of action,that is,from his power of understanding；therefore in such contemplation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise.

PROP.53.Humility is not a virtue,or does not arise from reason.

Proof.-Humility is pain arising from a man s contemplation of his own infirmities.But,in so far as a man knows himself by true reason,he is assumed to understand his essence,that is,his power.Wherefore,if a man in self-contemplation perceives any in-firmity in himself,it is not by virtue of his understanding himself,but by virtue of his power of activity being checked.But,if we assume that a man perceives his own infir-mity by virtue of understanding something stronger than himself,by the knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity,this is the same as saying that we con-ceive that a man understands himself distinctly,because his power of activity is aided.Wherefore humility,or the pain which arises from a man s contemplation of his own infir-mity,does not arise from the contemplation or reason,and is not a virtue but a passion.

PROP.54.Repentance is not a virtue,or does not arise from reason；but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm.

Proof.-The first part of this Proposition is proved like the foregoing one.The sec-ond part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in question.For the man al-lows himself to be overcome,first,by evil desires；secondly,by pain.

PROP.55.Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self.

Proof.-This is evident from Def.of the Emotions,xxviii.and xxix.

PROP.56.Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of mind.

Proof.-The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation under the guidance of rea-son.He,therefore,who is ignorant of himself,is ignorant of the foundation of all vir-tues,and consequently of all virtues.Again,to act virtuously is merely,to act under the guidance of reason；now he,that acts under the guidance of reason,must necessari-ly know that he so acts.Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself,and conse-quently of all virtues,acts least in obedience to virtue in other words,is extremely weak-minded.Thus extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of mind.

Corollary.-Hence it most clearly follows,that the proud and the dejected special-ly fall a prey to the emotions.

PROP.57.The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites,but hates the company of the high-minded.

Proof.-Pride is pleasure arising from a man s overestimation of himself；this esti-mation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the means in his power；he will therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites（whose character is too well known to need definition here），and will avoid the company of high-minded men,who value him according to his deserts.

PROP.58.Honour is not repugnant to reason,but may arise therefrom.

Proof.-This is evident from Def.of the Emotions，30.

PROP.59.To all the actions,whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive,we can be determined without emotion by reason.

Proof.-To act rationally is nothing else but to perform those actions,which follow from the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone.But pain is bad,in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action；wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action,which we should be unable to perform under the guidance of reason.A-gain,pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man s capability for action；therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action,which we could not per-form under the guidance of reason.Lastly,pleasure,in so far as it is good,is in harmo-ny with reason（for it consists in the fact that a man s capability for action is increased or aided）；nor is the mind passive therein,except in so far as a man s power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions.

Wherefore,if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a state of per-fection,that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions,he will be equally,nay more,capable of those actions,to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive.But all emotions are attributable to pleasure,to pain,or to desire；and desire is nothing else but the attempt to act；therefore,to all actions，＆c.

Another Proof.-A given action is called bad,in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.But no action,considered in itself alone,is ei-ther good or bad,one and the same action being sometimes good,sometimes bad；wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad,or arises from some evil emotion,we may be led by reason.

PROP.60.Desire arising from a pleasure or pain,that is not attributable to the whole body,but only to one or certain parts thereof,is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.

Proof.-Let it be assumed,for instance,that A,a part of a body,is so strength-ened by some external cause,that it prevails over the remaining parts.This part will not endeavour to do away with its own powers,in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office；for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own powers,which is absurd.The said part,and,consequently,the mind also,will endeavour to preserve its condition.Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole.If it be assumed,on the other hand,that the part,A，be checked so that the remaining parts prevail,it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to a man as a whole.

PROP.61.Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.

Proof.-Desire considered absolutely is the actual essence of man,insofar as it is conceived to be determined in any way to doing something.Hence desire,which arises from reason,that is,which is engendered in us in so far as we act,is the actual essence or nature of man,in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are ade-quately conceived through man s essence only.Now,if such desire could be excessive,human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself,or would be able to do more than it can,a manifest contradiction.Therefore,such desire cannot be ex-cessive.

PROP.62.In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason,it is affected equally,whether the idea be of a thing future,past,or present.

Proof.-Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason,it conceives under the same form of eternity or necessity,and is therefore affected with the same cer-titude.Wherefore,whether the thing be present,past,or future,the mind conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same certitude；and whether the idea be of something,present,past,or future,it will in all cases be equally true；that is,it will always possess the same properties of an adequate idea；therefore,in so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason,it is affected in the same manner,whether the idea be of a thing future,past,or present.

PROP.63.He who is led by fear,and does good in order to escape evil,is not led by reason.

Proof.-All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active,or in other words to reason,are emotions of pleasure and desire；therefore,he who is led by fear,and does good in order to escape evil,is not led by reason.

Corollary.-Under desire which springs from reason,we seek good directly,and shun evil indirectly.

Proof.-Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emo-tion,wherein the mind is not passive,in other words,from a pleasure which cannot be excessive,and not from pain；wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good,not of evil；hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by impli-cation shun evil.

PROP.64.The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

Proof.-The knowledge of evil is pain,in so far as we are conscious thereof.Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection and therefore cannot be understood through man s nature；therefore it is a passive state which depends on inadequate ideas；conse-quently the knowledge thereof,namely,the knowledge of evil,is inadequate.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that,if the human mind possessed only adequate ide-as,it would form no conception of evil.

PROP.65.Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

Proof.-A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an e-vil；for we apply the terms good and bad to things,in so far as we compare them one with another；therefore,evil is in reality a lesser good；hence under the guidance of rea-son we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil.

Corollary.-We may,under the guidance of reason,follow a lesser evil as a grea-ter good,and pass over a lesser good which is the cause of a greater evil.For the evil which is here called lesser is really good,and the good which is here called lesser,on the other hand,is evil.So we want the former and pass over the latter.

PROP.66.We may,under the guidance of reason,seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,and we may seek-a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future.

Proof.-If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future,it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards what is present；where-fore,looking merely to reason,as in this Proposition we are assumed to do,there is no difference,whether the greater good or evil be assumed as present,or assumed as fu-ture；hence we may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present.

Corollary.-We may,under the guidance of reason,seek a lesser evil in the pres-ent,because it is the cause of a greater good in the future,and we may shun a lesser good in the present,because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future.This Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the Corollary to Part 4.65.is related to the said Part.65.

PROP.67.A free man thinks of death least of all things；and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.

Proof.-A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason,who is not led by fear,but who directly desires that which is good,in other words,who strives to act,to live,and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage；where-fore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death,but his wisdom is a meditation of life.

PROP.68.If men were born free,they would,so long as they remained free,form no conception of good and evil.

Proof.-I call free him who is led solely by reason；he,therefore,who is born free,and who remains free,has only adequate ideas；therefore he has no conception of evil,or consequently（good and evil being correlative）of good.

PROP.69.The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them.

Proof.-Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself,and possessing more power in restraining emotion.But blind daring and fear are emo-tions,which can be conceived as equally great；Therefore,an equally great virtue of the mind,or strength of character is required to restrain daring as to restrain fear,that is,a free man avoids dangers by the same virtue of the mind by which he tries to overcome them.

Corollary.-The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat；or,a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind,whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.

PROP.70.The free man,who lives among the ignorant,strives,as far as he can,to avoid receiving favours from them.

Proof.-Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition；wherefore an ignorant man,who has conferred a benefit on another,puts his own estimate upon it,and,if it appears to be estimated less highly by the receiver,will feel pain.But the free man only,desires to join other men to him in friendship,not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance.Therefore the free man,lest he should become hateful to the ignorant,or follow their desires rather than reason,will endeavour,as far as he can,to avoid receiving their favours.

PROP.71.Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another.

Proof.-Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship,only such men endeavour,with mutual zeal of love,to confer benefits on each other,and,therefore,only they are thoroughly grateful one to another.

PROP.72.The free man never acts fraudulently,but always in good faith.

Proof.-If a free man,insofar as he is free,did anything by deception,he would do it from the dictate of reason（for so far only do we call him free）.And so it would be a virtue to act deceptively,and hence,everyone would be better advised to act decep-tively to preserve his being,that is,men would be better advised to agree only in words,and be contrary to one another in fact.But this is absurd.Therefore,the free man never acts fraudulently,but always in good faith.

PROP.73.The man,who is guided by reason,is more free in a State,where he lives under a general system of law,than in solitude,where he is independent.

Proof.-The man,who is guided by reason,does not obey through fear；but,in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason,that is,in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,he desires to order his life according to the general good,and,consequently,to live according to the laws of his country.Therefore the free man,in order to enjoy greater freedom,desires to possess the general rights of citizenship.

Appendix

What I have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been ar-ranged,so as to admit of being seen at one view,but I have demonstrated them at one place or another,as I could more easily deduce one from another.So I have undertaken to collect them here and bring them under main headings.

1.All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature,that they can be understood either through it alone,as their proximate cause,or by virtue of our being a part of nature,which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.

2.Desires,which follow from our nature in such a manner,that they can be un-derstood through it alone,are those which are referred to the mind,in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas；the remaining desires are only referred to the mind,in so far as it conceives things inadequately,and their force and increase are gen-erally defined not by the power of man,but by the others；wherefore the former are rightly called actions,the latter passions,for the former always indicate our power,the latter,on the other hand,show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.

3.Our actions,that is,those desires which are defined by man s power or reason,are always good.The rest may be either good or bad.

4.Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding,or reason,as far as we can,and in this alone man s highest happiness or blessedness consists,in-deed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit,which arises from the in-tuitive knowledge of God；now,to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to un-derstand God,God s attributes,and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature.Wherefore of a man,who is led by reason,the ultimate aim or highest desire,by which he strives to moderate all the others,is that whereby he is brought to the ade-quate conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence.

5.Therefore,without intelligence there is not rational life；and things are only good,in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the intellectual life,which is defined by intelligence.Contrariwise,whatsoever things hinder man s perfecting of his reason,and capability to enjoy the rational life,are alone called evil.

6.As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good,no evil can befall man except through external causes；namely,by virtue of man being a part of uni-versal nature,whose laws human nature is compelled to obey,and to conform to in al-most infinite ways.

7.It is impossible,that man should not be a part of nature,or that he should not follow her general order；but if he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in har-mony with his own,his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,whereas,if he be thrown among such as are but very little in harmony with his nature,he will hard-ly be able to accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.

8.Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil,or to be capable of injuring our facul-ty for existing and enjoying the rational life,we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us；on the other hand,whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being,and enabling us to enjoy the rational life,we may appropriate to our use and employ as we think best.Everyone without exception may,by sovereign right of nature,do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.

9.Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing than other individuals of the same species；therefore for man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who is led by reason.Further,as we know not anything among individual things which is more excellent than a man led by reason,no man can better display the power of his skill and disposition,than in so training men,that they come at last to live under the dominion of their own reason.

10.In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred,one towards an-other,they are contrary to one another,and consequently are the more to be feared,as they can do more than other individuals in nature.

11.Yet minds are not conquered by force,but by love and high-mindedness.

12.It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life,to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity,and generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.

13.But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.For men are diverse（see-ing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few），yet are they are generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy.So it requires a singular power of mind to bear with each one according to his understanding,and to restrain one s self from imitating the emotions of others.But those who carp at mankind,and are more skilled in railing at vice than in instilling virtue,and who break rather than strengthen men s dispositions,are hurtful both to themselves and others.Thus many from too great impatience of spirit,or from misguided religious zeal,have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men；as boys or youths,who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents,will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their fa-ther；suffering any burden to be put upon them,so long as they may spite their parents.

14.Therefore,although men are generally governed in everything by their own lusts,yet their association in common brings many more advantages than drawbacks.Wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us,and to strive to pro-mote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and friendship.

15.Those things,which beget harmony,are such as are attributable to justice,eq-uity,and honourable living.For men brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous,but also what is reckoned disgraceful,or that a man should slight the received customs of their society.For winning love those qualities are especially necessary,which have re-gard to religion and piety.

16.Further,harmony is often the result of fear；but such harmony is insecure.Further,fear arises from infirmity of spirit,and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason；the same is true of compassion,though this latter seems to bear a certain resem-blance to piety.

17.Men are also gained over by liberality,especially those who do not have the means of acquiring the things they require to sustain life.However,to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any private person.For the rich-es of any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.Again,an individual man s resources of character are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends.Hence providing for the poor is a duty,which falls on the State as a whole,and has regard only to the general advantage.

18.In accepting favors and returning thanks an altogether different care must be taken.

19.Again,meretricious love,that is,the lust of generation arising from bodily beauty,and generally every sort of love,which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,readily passes into hate；unless indeed,what is worse,it is a species of mad-ness；and then it promotes discord rather than harmony.

20.As concerning marriage,it is certain that this is in harmony with reason,if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by bodily beauty,but also by the de-sire to beget children and to train them up wisely；and moreover,if the love of both,of the man and of the woman,is not caused by bodily beauty only,but also by freedom of soul.

21.Furthermore,flattery begets harmony；but only by means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery.No one ise more readily taken with flattery than the proud,who wish to be first,but are not.

22.There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and religion.Although abasement is the opposite to pride,yet is he that abases himself most akin to the proud.

23.Shame also brings about harmony,but only in such matters as cannot be hid.Further,as shame is a species of pain,it does not concern the exercise of reason.

24.The remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed to justice,equity,honour,piety,and religion；and,although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity,yet is life but lawless,where every man may pass judgment on another s deeds,and vindicate his own or other men s rights.

25.Courtesy,that is,the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason,is attributable to piety.But,if it spring from emotion,it is ambition,or the desire where-by,men,under the false cloak of piety,generally stir up discords and seditions.For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word or in deed,so that they may together enjoy the highest good,he,I say,will before all things strive to win them over with love；not to draw them into admiration,so that a system may be called after his name,nor to give any cause for envy.Further,in his conversation he will shrink from talking of men s faults,and will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity；but he will dwell at length on human virtue or power,and the way whereby it may be perfected.Thus will men be stirred not by fear,nor by aversion,but only by the emotion of joy,to endeav-our,so far as in them lies,to live in obedience to reason.

26.Besides men,we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice,and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellow-ship；therefore,whatsoever there be in nature besides man,a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve,but to preserve or destroy according to its various capa-bilities,and to adapt to our use as best we may.

27.The advantage which we derive from things external to us,besides the experi-ence and knowledge which we acquire from observing them,and from recombining their elements in different forms,is principally the preservation of the body；from this point of view,those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the body,that all its parts may rightly fulfil their functions.For,in Proportion as the body is capable of being affected in a greater variety of ways,and of affecting external bodies in a great number of ways,so much the more is the mind capable of thinking.But there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature；wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.For the human body is composed of very many parts of different nature,which stand in continual need of varied nourishment,so that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything that can follow from its own nature,and consequently that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many percep-tions.

28.Now for providing these nourishments the strength of each individual would hardly suffice,if men did not lend one another mutual aid.But money has furnished us with a token for everything；hence it is with the notion of money,that the mind of the multitude is chiefly engrossed；nay,it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure,which is not accompanied with the idea of money as cause.

29.This result is the fault only of those,who seek money,not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants,but because they have learned the art of making money and pride themselves on it very much.Certainly they nourish their bodies,according to custom,but scantily,believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of their body.But they who know the true use of money,and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs live content with little.

30.As,therefore,those things are good which assist the various parts of the body,and enable them to perform their functions；and as pleasure consists in an increase of,or aid to,man s power,in so far as he is composed of mind and body；it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us pleasure,and that their power of action is not tempered to suit our advantage,and,lastly,that pleasure is generally referred to one part of the body more than to the other parts；therefore most emotions of pleasure（unless reason and watchful-ness be at hand），and consequently the desires arising therefrom,may become exces-sive.Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present,nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid.

31.Superstition,on the other hand,seems to account as good all that brings pain,and as bad all that brings pleasure.However,as we said above,none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble.For the greater the pleasure whereby we are af-fected,the greater is the perfection whereto we pass,and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature；no pleasure can ever be evil,which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage.But contrariwise he,who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil,is not guided by reason.

32.But human power is extremely limited,and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes；we have not,therefore,an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us.Nevertheless,we shall bear calmly those things which happen to us contrary to what the principle of our advantage demands,if we are con-scious that we have done our duty,that the power we have could not have extended itself to the point where we could have avoided those things,and that we are a part of the whole of nature,whose order we follow.If we understand this clearly and distinctly,that part of us which is defined by under standing,that is,the better part of us,will be entirely satisfied with this,and will strive to persevere in that satisfaction.For insofar as we understand,we can want nothing except what is necessary,nor absolutely be satis-fied with anything except what is true.Hence,insofar as we understand these things rightly,the striving of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of nature.

第四部分　论人的奴役或情感的力量

序言

我把人在调节和控制情感上的软弱无力称为奴役。因为当一个人成为情感的牺牲品时，他就不再是自己的主宰，而是受到命运的牵制。在这种情形之下，虽然他明白什么对他更好，却常常被迫向更坏的地方去。这到底是什么原因，情感的善与恶是什么，就是本部分论述中所要阐明的。但是，在开始讨论之前，我有必要在序言中对完满与不完满、善与恶加以简要的考察。

当一个人计划做一件事情，并且已经完成这件事情的时候，他的工作就被称为是完满的。不仅他自己，而且只要任何人确实知道，或者相信自己知道做这件事情的人的意图和目的，都会这样认为。比如，任何人看到一项工程（假定这项工程尚未完成），并知道主持这项工作的人的目的是建一所房子时，他就会说这项工程不完满或尚未完成。反之，一旦他看到这所房子已经按照主持者的计划建设完工，他就会说这项工程是完满的。但是如果一个人看到一个从来没有见过的工程，也不知道那工程师的意图，那么他就无从知道这项工程是完满还是不完满的了。这似乎就是完满和不完满两个名词的原义。

但是后来，人们逐渐形成一般的观念，想出房屋、楼宇、城堡等类型，并且偏好某些类型而讨厌其他类型。由此每个人都称某个事物是完满的，只要这一事物符合他对于那类事物所形成的一般观念。如果这一事物并不十分符合他对于事物构成所预想的类型，他就会称这一事物是不完满的——即使按照其制造者的想法，这一事物是已经完满地完成了的。这似乎就是完满和不完满两个概念，为什么会常常被应用于确实未经人手制造的自然现象中的唯一原因。因为人对于自然和人为的事物，都习惯于构成一般的观念，而且将这种观念认定为事物的类型，相信自然（他们相信自然中的任何事物都是有目的的）本身就存在这样的一般观念，并把它们提出来作为事物的类型。因此，当人们看见一件自然事物不完全符合他们对于事物构成所预想的类型时，他们就会认为自然本身存在缺陷或错误，致使其工程没有完成。由此我们看到，人们习惯于将完满和不完满的概念应用到自然现象当中，是由于他们的成见，而不是基于他们对自然事物的真知。

在本书第一部分的附录里，我们已经指出自然的运动并没有一个被期待的目标，因为我们所称为神或自然的这个永恒无限的本质，它的行动都基于它所赖以存在的必然性。因为我们已经指出，神的运动就像神的存在一样，都基于同样的本性的必然性。那么神或自然之所以行动的原因或理由，与它之所以存在的原因或理由是一样的。因此，既然神不是为了寻求目的而存在的，所以神也不会为了寻求目的而行动，其存在和行动既没有起因也没有目的。因此就此欲望被认为是任何事物的起因或理由而言，所谓目的因不是别的，而是人的欲望。比如，当我们说提供给人居住是这所或那所房子的目的因时，我们的意思只是说，一个人想象着家庭生活的便利，有了建筑一所房子的欲望而已。所以就造一所房子来居住被认为是目的因而言，只是一个个别欲望，这个欲望实际上是建筑房子的动力因。至于这个致动因之所以被认为是第一因，是由于人们通常总是不知道他们的欲望的原因。因为正如我常常说过的那样，他们虽然意识到自己的行为和欲望，但是却不知道决定他们追求任何个别欲望的原因。因此，所谓自然有时似乎有缺陷或者过错，并且创造出不完满的事物之类的俗谚，应该列入第一部分附录里所提到的那些想象之中。

由此，完满和不完满事实上只不过是思想的样式，或者只是我们将同种类的个别事物相互比较而形成的概念。所以，我在前面的论述中把实在性和完满性理解为相同的东西。因为我们习惯于将自然中的一切个别事物，归入一个类概念下，这个类概念被称为最高级的类概念，也就是存在这个范畴。这一范畴绝对地包括自然中一切个别事物。这样，只要我们将自然中的个体归入这个类概念之下，将它们相互比较，发现其中的一些事物比另一些事物具有更多的实在性。我们就此认为一些事物比另一些事物更完满。再者，只要我们对那些事物加上一些有否定意味的东西——如期限、终结、虚弱等等，我们就说它们是不完满的。因为它们对我们心灵的影响，没有我们称为完满的事物那样强烈。但这并不是因为它们本质上有什么缺陷，也不是因为自然犯了什么错误。因为没有不从动力因的本性的必然性出发，而可以构成任何事物的本性的，而且无论任何事物，只要是从动力因的本性的必然性推出的，就必然会发生。

就善与恶这两个名词而言，也并不表示事物本身的肯定性质，而仅仅是思想的样式，或者是我们比较事物而形成的概念而已。因而同一事物可以同时既是善的，又是恶的，或者是中立的。比如，音乐对于愁闷的人是善的，对于哀痛的人是恶的，而对于失聪的人来说则是不善不恶的。事实虽然如此，但是对于这些名词，我们仍然必须保留。因为既然我们想要为自己构成一个人的观念，作为人的本性的类型，那么在我上面已经指出的意义上，保留这些名词对我们是有用处的。

因此下文里的所谓善，是指我们所确知的任何可以成为一种更加接近我们所确立的人性类型的手段的事物。所谓恶，则指我们所确知的阻碍我们达到这个类型的一切事物。再者，我们判断人的完满或不完满，是以他们接近这个类型的程度为尺度的。因此必须特别注意的是，当我说一个人从较小的完满过渡到较大的完满，或者从较大的完满过渡到较小的完满时，我的意思并不是认为他从一种本质或实在，转变成另一种本质或实在。比如，一匹马无论变成人，还是变成昆虫，它的本质都是同样遭到毁灭了。我的意思是，这种说法是就被理解为事物本性的行动能力的增加或减少而言的。最后，一般而言，正如我前面所说，完满性就是实在性。换句话说，完满性就是任何事物的本质，只要事物按一定的方式存在与行动，便不用管它存在时间的长短。因为，没有一个事物是因为曾经较长时间地存在，就可以说更完满。事物存在的持续时间，不是由它的本质所决定的，因为事物的本质不包含固定、明确的存在周期。任何事物，无论其完满的程度如何，总是永远具有该事物开始存在时同样的力量以保持其存在。所以，就此而言，所有事物都是平等的。

定义

一、所谓善，是指我们所确知的对我们有用的东西。

二、所谓恶，是指我们所确知的阻碍我们得到任何善的东西。

三、我将个别事物称为偶然的，指的是：当我们仅仅考察它的本质时，我们发现，没有任何东西必然肯定它的存在，或者必然排斥它的存在。

四、我将个别事物称为可能的，指的是：当我们考察这些事物必定产生的原因时，我们并不知道这些原因是不是被决定而产生这些事物的。

五、所谓矛盾的情感，是指虽然同属于一类，却将一个人吸引到不同方向去的情感。像奢侈与贪婪这样的情感，都属于爱的种类，根据本性两者并不是相反，而只是偶然地相反。

六、对于将来、现在和过去事物的情感，我已经在第三部分命题十八注释一和注释二中加以说明，请参考。

（但这里必须注意的是，正如对于时间的距离一样，我们对于空间的距离也只有在一定限度内才能清楚地想象。这就是说，一切事物只要与我们的距离超出二百英尺以上，或者与我们所在地的距离超出所能清晰想象的程度之外，那么它们与我们的距离似乎就是相等的，并且在相同的平面上。因此一切事物，只要它们存在的时间离现在很遥远，超出了我们所能清晰想象的程度，那么我们就会认为它们与现在的距离似乎就是相等的，并把它们当作是在一个相同的时间之中。）

七、所谓目的，为了这个目的我们有所作为，就是指欲望。

八、所谓品德与力量，我理解为同样的东西。换句话说，品德就其涉及人而言，是指人的本质或本性，或人所具有的可以实现某些只能通过其本性的法则才被理解的行为的力量。

公理

任何个别事物就其本性而言都会被其他更强有力的事物所超越。对任何一个事物而言，都有另外一个更强大的事物可以将它消灭。

命题

命题一：一个错误的观念所包含的肯定性质，并非是仅仅由于纯粹的真观念的出现就能被消除的。

证明错误只是在于知识的缺陷，这种知识的缺陷包含在不充分的观念之中，而不充分的观念并不具有任何肯定性质，据此它被称为错误。反之，就这些观念与神相联系而言，它们就是真观念。所以，如果一个错误观念所包含的肯定性质，仅仅由于纯粹的真观念的出现就可以被消除，那么真观念将会自己消除自己，这是荒谬的。

命题二：只要我们是自然的一部分，是自然中不能离开其他事物而通过自身来认识的一部分，我们就只是被动的。

证明当某件事情在我们之中发生，而我们仅仅是这件事情的部分原因，换句话说，它不能单独从我们自己本性的法则里推导出来，那么我们就被认为是被动的。所以只要我们是自然的一部分，是自然中不能离开其他事物而通过自身来认识的一部分，我们就是被动的。

命题三：人借以保持其存在的力量是有限的，并且无限地被外部原因的力量所超越。

证明从第四部分的公理来看，这是很清楚的。因为，如果有人存在，就会有其他更有力的事物——比如甲——存在。如果甲存在，也会有比甲更有力的事物——比如乙——存在。以此类推，直至无穷。因此，人的力量总是为其他事物的力量所限制，而且无限地被外部原因的力量所超越。

命题四：一个人不是自然的一部分，或者他只能体验那些仅从其自身本性就可以理解的变化，而且他就是这些变化的充分原因，这是不可能的。

证明包括人在内的每个个别事物用来保持其存在的力量，是神或自然的力量。这并非就这种力量是无限的而言的，而是就这种力量可以通过人的真实本质而得到说明而言的。因而，只要可以通过自己的真实本质得到说明，人的力量就是神或自然的无限力量的一部分，换句话说，就是神或自然的本质的一部分。这是我们的第一个论点。再者，如果一个人只能体验那些仅从其自身本性即可理解的变化，那么就会推出，他不会死亡，而会永远必然存在。这个必然存在所赖以产生的原因，其力量不是有限的，就是无限的。换句话说，他之所以能必然存在的原因，要么仅仅出于他自己的力量，排除了一切其他来自外在原因而产生的变化；要么就出于自然的无限力量，凭借这种力量一切个别事物得到安排，使得人除了像这样趋向于自我保存之外，不可能被动地体验任何变化。但前一个选择是荒谬的。因此，如果一个人只体验那些仅从其自身本性就可以理解的变化是可能的话，那么，（正如我们已经指出的那样）他将永远必然存在，这样一个结果必然是由神的无限力量推出来的，因此也是由神的本性的必然性推出来的——只要神的本性被认为受到任何一个人的观念的影响。而整个自然的秩序，就自然通过思想与广延的属性而得到理解而言，也必定可以从这里推出来。由此应当推出人是无限的，而这是荒谬的。所以，除非是以他自己为充分原因，否则一个人不会被动地体验任何变化，这是不可能的。

推论由此可以推知，人必然永远受到感情的折磨，遵循并服从自然的普遍秩序，并且尽可能使自己适应事物的本性的要求。

命题五：任何感情的力量和增长以及感情的存在的保持，不是由我们努力保持存在的力量所决定的，而是由外在原因的力量与我们自己的力量相比较所决定的。

证明感情的本质不能仅仅通过我们的本质去解释。这就是说，感情的力量不是由我们努力保持存在的力量所决定的，而是必然由外在原因的力量与我们自己的力量相比较所决定的。

命题六：人的任何一种激情或情感的力量可以胜过他的一切其他行为或力量，使得他难以抑制地被这一情感所束缚。

证明任何感情的力量和增长以及感情的存在的保持，是由外在原因的力量与我们自己的力量相比较所决定的。所以它可以胜过人的力量。

命题七：一种情感只有通过另外一种与之相反、更有控制力的情感才能被控制或消灭。

证明一种情感，只要它与心灵相联系，就是心灵借此确认其身体比以前的存在力量更强或更弱的一个观念。所以，当心灵受到任何情感的刺激时，身体就会同时受到一种情状的影响，其活动力量也随之有所增减。既然这种身体的情状从这一原因中得到一种保持自身存在的力量，那么除非有其他的身体原因以一种相反并且更强烈的情感影响身体，是不可能被控制或消灭的。由此，心灵就被一种相反并且更强烈的情状的观念所影响。换句话说，心灵将会受到一种与前一种相反并且更强烈的情感的影响，而这更强烈的情感可以排斥或消灭前一种情感的存在。因此，一种情感，只有通过一种与之相反的更强烈的情感，才能被控制或消灭。

推论一种情感，只要它与心灵相联系，就只能通过一个与我们被动地体验着的情感相反的、更强烈的身体的情状的观念，才能得以控制或消灭。因为我们被动地体验着的情感，只有通过一个相反而更强烈的情感，才能被控制或消灭。换句话说，这种情感，只有通过一个相反的、更强烈的身体的情状的观念，才能被控制或消灭。

命题八：善与恶的知识不是其他东西，只是我们所意识到的快乐与痛苦的情感。

证明所谓善或恶，是指对于我们存在的有益或有所妨碍的东西，换句话说，是指对于我们的活动力量有所增加或减少，有所帮助或阻碍的东西。因此，只要我们感觉到任何事物使我们快乐或痛苦，我们就称其为善或恶。所以，善与恶不是其他东西，只是由快乐与痛苦的情感必然推出来的快乐与痛苦的观念而已。而这种观念与情感的结合，是同心灵与身体结合的方式相一致的。这就是说，这种观念与情感的区别，或者与身体情状的观念的区别，其实仅仅是概念上的区别。因此，善与恶的知识不是其他东西，只是我们所意识到的情感。

命题九：如果我们设想一种情感的原因就在面前，那么这种情感比起我们设想一个原因不在面前的情感，要更加强烈。

证明想象或概念是一种观念，凭借它心灵将一个事物当做就在面前。但是这种观念表示人的身体的性情，要胜过表示外界事物的本性。所以就想象表示人的身体的性情而言，情感只是一种想象。但是只要我们不设想其他事物来排斥当前存在的外界对象，一个想象将会更加强烈。因此，当我们设想一种情感的原因就在我们面前时，这种情感比起我们设想一个原因不在我们前面的情感，也会更加强烈。

推论一个过去或将来事物的意象，换句话说，当我们想象着一个事物在时间上涉及将来或过去，而将其排除在现在之外时，如果其他情形完全相等，这一事物就要比对于当前事物的意象更薄弱。因而，如果其他情形完全相等，对于将来或过去事物的情感比起对于现在事物的情感，就会更加薄弱。

命题十：一个我们设想即将到来的未来的事物，比起我们设想该事物发生的时间与现在相距很远，那就能够更加强烈地影响我们。因此，一个刚刚消失的事物的记忆，比起我们设想已经消失很久的该事物，也同样能够更强烈地影响我们。

证明只要我们设想一个事物即将到来或者刚刚消失，那么我们所设想的能够排斥该事物存在的事物，就少于把该事物设想为与现在相距遥远的将来或过去排斥其的事物。因此，我们也就受到该事物更为强烈的影响。

命题十一：在其他条件都相等的情况下，一个我们设想必然存在的事物所引起的情感，比起一个或不可能、或偶然、或无必然的事物所引起的，要更加强烈。

证明只要我们设想一个事物是必然的，那么我们就肯定它的存在。反之，只要我们不认为它是必然的，我们就会否认其存在。因此，在其他条件都相等的情况下，一个我们设想必然存在的事物所引起的情感，比起一个或不可能、或偶然、或非必然的事物所引起的，要更加强烈。

命题十二：在其他条件都相等的情况下，一个我们知道现在并不存在，但我们设想可能存在的事物所引起的情感，比起一个偶然的事物所引起的感情，要更加强烈。

证明只要我们设想一个事物是偶然的，就会有其他可以确定该事物存在的某些事物的概念可以影响我们；而另一方面，我们还会设想一些其他事物来排斥该事物现在的存在。但是，只要我们设想一个将来可能存在的事物，那么我们就会设想一些确定该事物存在的事物。这就是说，我们就会设想一些引起希望或恐惧的事物。因此，一个可能的事物所引起的情感，要更加强烈。

推论一个我们知道现在不存在，而我们认为是偶然的事物所引起的感情，比起我们设想该事物就在面前时所引起的情感，要微弱得多。

证明我们设想现在存在的事物，要比我们设想还在将来的事物所引起的情感更加强烈，而且比起我们设想距离现在特别遥远的将来事物所引起的情感，就尤其要强烈了。因此，我们认为长时间内不会存在的事物所引起的感情，比起我们设想就在面前的事物所引起的情感，要微弱得多。不过，未来事物比偶然事物所引起的情感，还是要更加强烈一些。所以，偶然事物所引起的情感，比起我们设想就在面前的事物所引起的情感，要微弱得多。

命题十三：在其他条件都相等的情况下，一个我们知道现在不存在的偶然事物所引起的感情，比起一个过去的事物所引起的情感，要更加微弱。

证明只要我们认为一个事物是偶然的，我们就不会被其他确定该事物存在的任何其他事物的意象所影响，而另一方面，我们还会设想一些其他事物来排斥该事物现在的存在。但是，只要我们设想该事物与过去的时间相联系，则假定我们设想了某些令人回到记忆之中、或者唤起该事物的意象的事物，从而能够让我们将该事物当作就在面前来认识。所以，在其他条件都相等的情况下，一个我们知道现在不存在的偶然事物所引起的感情，比起一个过去的事物所引起的情感，要更加微弱。

命题十四：就善与恶的真知识仅仅作为真知识而言，决不可能控制情感，而只有当它被理解为一种情感时，才能控制情感。

证明一种情感是一个观念，借此心灵确定其身体比以前的存在力量更强或更弱。所以这种情感所包含的肯定性质，不只是凭借真知识的出现，就能被取消的。因此，对于善与恶的真知识，就其仅仅是真知识而言，并不能控制情感。但是，只要真知识作为一种情感，如果比它所要控制的情感更加强烈的话，就能控制这种情感。

命题十五：由善与恶的真知识而产生的欲望，可能被很多其他由刺激我们的情感而产生的欲望所压制或控制。

证明从善与恶的真知识出发——就这种真知识作为一种情感而言，必然会产生欲望，而且欲望的力量和由它而产生的情感的力量是成比例的。但是这种欲望的产生，在于我们对某事有了真实的认识这一事实，在我们行动的情况下，它是我们主动产生出来的。所以这种欲望必须仅仅通过我们的本质来理解，其力量和增幅，完全是由人的力量所决定的。再者，刺激我们的情感越强烈，所产生的欲望也就越强烈。因此这种欲望的力量和增幅，必定仅仅由外在原因的力量所决定。这种基于外在原因的力量，如果与我们自己的力量相比较，则无限地超过我们自己的力量。因此，从这样的情感所产生的欲望，比起从善与恶的真知识而产生的欲望，可能更加强烈，因而前者可以压制或控制后者。

命题十六：由善与恶的知识所引起的欲望，就这种知识是和将来相联系而言，更容易被当前令人愉快的东西所引起的欲望所压制或控制。

证明我们设想在将来存在的事物所引起的情感，比起就在当下的事物所引起的情感，更加微弱。但由善与恶的真知识所引起的欲望，即使这种知识所关涉的事物在当下是善的，也可能被任性而为的欲望所压制或控制。由这种知识所引起的欲望，当它与将来相联系时，更容易被压制或控制。

命题十七：由善与恶的真知识所引起的欲望，就这种知识和偶然事物相联系而言，更容易被当前事物所引起的欲望所压制或控制。

证明这一命题可以根据第四部分命题十二的推论，和前命题一样加以证明。

命题十八：如果其他条件相等，由快乐而产生的欲望，比起由痛苦而产生的欲望，要更加强烈。

证明欲望是人的本质，换句话说，也就是人竭力保持其存在的努力。因此，凡是由快乐而产生的欲望，就是通过感受快乐的事实而有所长进或有所助益。反之，凡是由痛苦而产生的欲望，就是通过感受痛苦的事实而遭受到的贬低或阻碍。所以由快乐而产生的欲望的力量，必定同时受人的力量和外界原因的力量所决定，但是由痛苦而产生的欲望的力量，则仅仅由人的力量所决定。因此前者比后者更加强烈。

命题十九：依据其自身本性的法则，每个人都必然追求他认为是善的东西，而逃避他认为是恶的东西。

证明善与恶的知识就是我们所意识到的快乐和痛苦的情感。所以每个人必然追求他认为是善的东西，逃避他认为是恶的东西。既然这种欲望不是其他东西，而只是人的本性或本质，所以仅仅依据其自身本性的法则，每个人都必然追求他认为是善的东西，逃避他认为是恶的东西。

命题二十：一个人越努力，并且越能够寻求对他有益的东西——换句话说，保持他自己的存在，那么他就越具有德行；相反，如果一个人忽视寻求对他有益的东西，就是说忽视保持他自己的存在，那么他就是能力不足的。

证明德行是人的力量，这种力量只由人的本性所决定，换句话说，只被人竭力保持其存在的努力所决定。所以一个人越努力并且越能够保持他的存在，他就越具有德行，因此，只要他忽视保持他自己的存在，他就是能力不足的。

命题二十一：没有人可以在追求快乐、正当的行为和正当的生活时，不同时追求存在、行为和生活——换句话说，也就是追求真实的存在。

证明这个命题的证明，或不如说这个命题本身是自明的，而且从欲望的定义来看，这也是自明的。因为，无论是要求正当的行为还是要求快乐的生活，欲望都是人的本质——换句话说，都是人竭力保持他自己存在的努力。因此，没有一个人可以在追求快乐、正当行为和正当生活的同时，不追求真实的存在。

命题二十二：我们不能设想任何先于保持自我存在的努力的德行。

证明自我保存的努力是一个事物的本质。因此，如果我们能够设想一个先于自我保存的努力的德行，那么我们应当可以设想事物的本质先于事物本身。这显然是荒谬的。所以我们不能设想任何先于保存自我的努力的德行。

推论自我保存的努力是德行的首要的和唯一的基础。因为先于这个原则，我们不能设想其他任何基础；而没有这个原则，我们又不能设想任何德行。

命题二十三：一个人只要是由其不充分的观念所决定而有所行动，就不能说完全是遵照德行而行动的。只有当他的行为是被他的理解所决定时，才可以这样说。

证明只要一个人因为有了不充分的观念，被决定去做出某个行为，他就是被动的。换句话说，他做了某件事，而这件事不能单独地通过他的本质被认识，就是说这件事不是由他的德行推出来的。但只要他的行为是由他的理解所决定的，他就是主动的。换句话说，他做了某件事，这件事可以单独地通过他的本质得到理解，或者是充分地由他的德行推出来。

命题二十四：绝对遵照德行而行动，在我们这里不是别的，而是在寻求有利于自己的东西的基础上，以理性为指导去行动、生活、保持自我的存在。

证明绝对遵照德行而行动，不是别的，只是依据我们自身本性的法则而行动。但只有当我们能理解时，我们才能主动。所以遵照德行而行动不是别的，就是以理性为指导去行动、生活、保持自己的存在，而且这样做是建立在寻求有利于自己的东西的基础之上的。

命题二十五：没有人努力保持他自己的存在，是为了追求其他东西。

证明任何事物竭力保持自己存在的努力，都只是由该事物自身的本质所决定的，这种努力必然是由其本质独自推导出来，而不是由其他事物的本质推出来的。此外，这个命题如果根据第四部分命题二十二推论来看，也是很清楚的。因为，如果一个人努力保持他自己的存在，而他的目的是为了其他东西，那么这个东西将成为他德行的首要基础，但这是荒谬的。所以没有一个人努力保持他自己的存在，目的是为了其他东西。

命题二十六：一切依照理性所作的努力，除了是理解之外，不是其他任何东西。同样，只要心灵运用理性，那么依照它的判断，就只承认那些能够促进理解的东西是有用的东西。

证明自我保存的努力不是别的，就是一个事物的本质自身。只要这一事物已然存在，就被认为有力量保持其存在，并且做那些由其本性所必然推导出来的事情。但是就心灵能清晰明了地理解而言，理性的本质除了是心灵之外，不会是其他任何东西。因此，一切依照理性的努力除了是理解之外，不是其他任何东西。再者，既然这种运用理性来思考的心灵保持其存在的努力不是其他任何东西，就只是理解的努力。这种理解的努力是德行的首要和唯一的基础，并且我们努力理解事物，并不是为了任何进一步的目的。另一方面，就心灵运用理性来思考而言，除了认为能够促进理解的东西是善的之外，不能设想任何其他善的事物。

命题二十七：除了真正能够促进理解或妨碍我们理解的东西之外，我们无法确定知道任何善的或恶的事物。

证明运用理性来思考的心灵除了追求理解之外，没有其他欲望，并且除了认为能够促进理解的东西是有用的之外，也不承认其他有用的东西。但是，只有当心灵具有充分的观念，或者能运用理性来思考时，才具有关于事物的确定性。所以除了真正能够促进理解或妨碍我们理解的东西之外，我们无法确定知道任何善的或恶的事物。

命题二十八：心灵的最高的善是关于神的知识，心灵的最高的德行是认识神。

证明心灵所能理解的最高的东西就是神，也就是绝对无限的存在。没有神就既没有东西可以存在，也没有东西可以被理解。因此，心灵的最高效用或最高的善就是关于神的知识。再者，仅仅就其能理解而言，心灵才是主动的；并且仅仅就其能理解而言，我们才可以无条件地说，心灵是绝对遵照德行而行动的。心灵的绝对德行就是理解。而我们已经证明，心灵所能理解的最高的东西就是神，所以心灵的最高的德行就是理解神或认识神。

命题二十九：凡是本性与我们完全不同的个别事物，既不能增进也不能控制我们的活动能力。凡是与我们的本性没有任何共同点的东西，对于我们就既不可能是善的，也不可能是恶的。

证明每个个别事物的力量，也就是人借以存在和行动的力量，只能被另外一个个别事物所决定，这个个别事物的本性必须通过与理解人的本性所依据的相同属性来理解。因此，无论怎样理解，我们的活动能力，都可以被任何一个和我们具有相同本性的个别事物的力量所决定，因而得到它的帮助或受到它的阻碍，而不能被一个本性和我们完全不同的事物的力量所决定。而且既然我们将一个事物称为善的或恶的，是由于该事物是快乐或痛苦的原因——换句话说，是由于该事物增强或减弱、助长或阻碍我们的活动能力；因此，一个性质与我们完全不同的事物，对于我们既不可能是善的，也不可能是恶的。

命题三十：一个事物不可能通过它与我们的本性的相同点，对我们是恶的；而只有当它与我们的本性相反时，才可能对我们是恶的。

证明如果一个事物是引起痛苦的原因，换句话说，当它减弱或阻碍我们的活动能力时，我们就说它是恶的。因此，如果一个事物通过它与我们本性的相同点，对我们是恶的，那么它将会减弱或阻碍它与我们本性的相同点，这是荒谬的。所以，一个事物不可能通过它与我们的相同点，对我们是恶的。反之，只会因为它与我们的本性相反，才可能对我们是恶的，换句话说，才能减弱或阻碍我们的活动能力。

命题三十一：凡是符合我们本性的事物必然是善的。

证明任何符合我们本性的事物不可能对我们是恶的。所以该事物必然要么是善的，要么是不善不恶的。如果假定该事物是不善不恶的，那么从其本性中是推不出任何有利于保持我们本性的东西的，换句话说，推不出任何有利于保持其自身本性的东西。但这是荒谬的。所以，只要一个事物符合我们的本性，该事物必然是善的。

推论由此推知，一个事物越符合我们的本性，就对我们越有好处，换句话说，对我们越是善的。反之，一个事物对我们越有好处，该事物与我们的本性就越一致。因为，如果一个事物与我们的本性不符合，那么该事物不是必然与我们的本性不同，就是与我们的本性相反。如果与我们的本性不同，那么它对我们就既不善也不恶。而如果与我们的本性相反，那么它就会与本性和我们符合的事物相反，就是说与善是相反的——简言之，就是恶的。因此，只有与我们的本性相符合的事物，才是善的。而且一个事物越符合我们的本性，就对我们越有好处；反之，对我们越有好处，就越符合我们的本性。

命题三十二：就人是受情欲控制的而言，他们不能说是在本性上相符合的。

证明被认为是与本性相符合的事物，是被理解为根据力量相符合的，而不是根据软弱无力或否定性相符合的，因而也就不是根据情欲相符合的。所以就人是受情欲的控制而言，他们不能说是在本性上相符合的。

命题三十三：只要人们被情欲或被动的情感所刺激，他们彼此之间的本性就会不同。在此情况下，同一个人的本性也会是不稳定的、变化无常的。

证明情感的本性或本质不是单独通过我们的本性或本质所能说明的，而必须通过外界原因的力量——也就是外界原因的本性与我们的本性相比较来决定。由此推知，有多少种事物影响我们的情感，每一种情感就会有多少种。而且人们在不同的情况下受到同一对象的影响，其本性也就会有所不同。最后，同一个人，可以在各种不同的情况下受到同一对象的影响，所以这个人的本性也会是不稳定的、变化无常的。

命题三十四：只要人们为情欲所刺激，他们就会彼此反对。

证明一个人，比如说彼得，可以成为使保罗痛苦的原因，因为他拥有某个事物，与保罗所恨的东西有相似之处，或因为他独自拥有某个事物，而该事物又同时是保罗所喜爱的，或由于其他原因。由此，就可能发生保罗憎恨彼得的情况，从而也就容易发生彼得也反过来憎恨保罗的情况。这样他们就会竭力相互伤害，也就是彼此反对。而痛苦永远是一种情欲或被动的情感，所以只要人们为情欲所刺激，他们就会彼此反对。

命题三十五：只有遵照理性的指导去生活，人们的本性才会必然地永远相符合。

证明人们只要受到情欲的刺激，他们在本性上就会不同，并且会彼此反对。但人们只有遵照理性的指导去生活，才可以说是主动的。因此，只要是从由理性所决定的人性发出的行为，必须仅仅通过人的本性作为其近因来加以理解。既然每个人都根据他自己的本性的法则，追求他认为是善的，竭力避免他认为是恶的，而且还遵照理性的指导来确定善或恶、必然是善的或是恶的东西；因此可以推知，人们只有遵照理性的指导去生活，才必然会做出有益于人性和每个个别人的事情，换句话说，才可以做出符合每个人的本性的事情。所以，只有遵照理性的指导去生活，人们的本性才会必然地永远相符合。

推论一没有任何个别事物，在本性上比遵照理性的指导去生活的人更有益于人。因为对人最有益的就是本性与他相符合的，这很明显就是人。但是只有当一个人遵照理性去生活，他才可以说是绝对地依据其本性的法则而行动的，而且也只有这样，他才能永远必然地与其他人的本性相符合。所以，没有任何个别事物比遵照理性的指导去生活的人更有益于人。

推论二当每个人越能寻求他自己的利益时，人们彼此之间就是最有益的。

因为每个人越能寻求他自己的利益，并竭力保持他自己的存在，他就越具有德行，或者说，他将越具有力量依据其本性的法则而行动，也就是遵照理性的指导去生活。但是只有当人们遵照理性的指导去生活时，他们在本性上才是最能一致的。所以，当每个人最能寻求他自己的利益时，人们彼此之间就是最有益的。

命题三十六：那些遵照德行的人的最高的善，是所有人共有的，因此也是所有人平等分享的。

证明合乎德行地行动，就是遵照理性的指导去行动。而且我们遵照理性而做的所有努力，都是为了寻求理解。因此，那些遵照德行的人的最高的善就在于理解神。所谓最高的善，就是所有人所共有的善。就他们都具有相同的本性而言，这种善也是所有人所平等拥有的。

命题三十七：每个遵循德行的人，都愿意为其他人去追求他为自己所追求的善。而且他关于神的知识拥有得越多，他为其他人追求这种善的愿望也将越大。

证明只要人遵照理性的指导去生活，人们彼此之间就是最有益的。因此，我们会遵照理性的指导，同时必然竭力使其他人也遵照理性的指导。但每个遵照理性指引的人，换句话说，每个遵循德行的人，他为自己所追求的善是理解；因此每个遵循德行的人既为他自己追求善，也愿意为其他人追求这种善。再者，就其与心灵相联系而言，欲望就是心灵的本质。既然心灵的本质由包括关于神的知识在内的知识构成，如果没有对神的知识，心灵的本质就既不可能存在，也不可能被认识。因此，心灵的本质所包含的关于神的知识越多，遵循德行为自己追求善的人、同时也努力为其他人追求这种善的愿望也就越大。

另证一个人为他自己追求的善或他所爱的善，如果他看到别人也爱它，那么他对它的爱，将会更加持久。所以他将努力使别人也同样爱它。而且因为这种善是所有人共有的善，因而所有人都能享有。出于同样的原因，他将努力使所有人都能享有它。并且他自己越是享受这种善，他就越努力使所有人都能享受它。

命题三十八：凡是能支配人的身体，使身体能够接受多方面的影响，或者使身体能够多方面地影响外界物体的事物，就是对人有益的事物。一个事物越能使身体接受多方面的影响，或影响外界物体，那么该事物就越是有益的。反之，越不能使身体接受外物的影响或影响外界事物的东西，对人都是有害的。

证明身体的接受力越强，心灵能够认知事物的能力也将越强。因此，凡是这样支配人的身体，使身体能够接受多方面影响的事物，必然是善的或有益的。而且越能使身体接受多方面影响的事物，就越是有益的。反之，如果一个事物使身体更不能接受外界事物的影响，那么该事物就是有害的。

命题三十九：凡是能保持人的身体各个部分相互之间动静比例的事物，就是善的。反之，导致人的身体各个部分相互之间的动静比例发生改变的事物，就是恶的。

证明人的身体需要许多其他物体来保存自己。但是构成身体的明确实在性的，是身体的各个部分以某种固定的比例相互传达其运动。因此，凡是能保持人的身体各个部分相互之间动静比例的事物，就可以保持身体的明确实在性，因此也就能够使身体接受多方面的影响，并且多方面地影响外界物体，就是善的。再者，凡是导致人的身体各个部分相互之间的动静比例发生改变的事物，就使得人的身体具有另外一种特征，换句话说，就是可以毁坏人的身体，因而使身体完全不能接受多方面的影响，所以就是恶的。

命题四十：凡是有利于人们的社会生活，或者使人们融洽地共同生活的东西，就是有益的。反之，凡是导致国家出现混乱的东西，就是有害的。

证明凡是使人们融洽地共同生活，同时也可以让他们依据理性去生活的东西，就是善的。反之（因为相同的原因），凡是导致混乱的东西，就是恶的。

命题四十一：快乐在本质上不是恶的，而是善的。反之，痛苦在本质上就是恶的。

证明快乐是增进或有助于身体活动能力的情感。相反，痛苦则是减弱或妨碍身体活动能力的情感，所以快乐在本质上是善的，而痛苦在本质上是恶的。

命题四十二：欢乐不可能是过度的，而永远是善的。反之，忧郁就永远是恶的。

证明欢乐是一种快乐，就其与身体相联系而言，它由身体所有各个部分相等地感受到的快乐所组成。换句话说，身体的活动能力因这种方式而有所增进或助长，因而各个部分相互之间维持与之前相同的动静比例，所以欢乐永远是善的，而不可能是过度的。但忧郁则是一种痛苦，就其与身体相联系而言，痛苦在于身体的活动能力绝对地有所减弱或阻碍，所以永远是恶的。

命题四十三：兴奋可以是过度的和恶的。另一方面，就兴奋或快乐是恶的而言，悲痛则可以是善的。

证明局部的快乐或兴奋是一种快乐，就其与身体相联系而言，它是指身体的某一部分或某些部分，比其他部分感受到更多的快乐。这种情感的力量可以很大，以至于超过身体的活动，并且可以顽固地纠缠身体，因而阻碍身体的能力，使其不能接受多方面的影响。所以兴奋可以是恶的。而悲痛乃是一种痛苦，仅仅就其本身而论，就不能是善的。但既然痛苦的力量及其增长是由外在原因的力量与我们的力量相比较所决定的，所以我们可以设想这个情感的力量具有无限的等级和无限的种类。因此就其妨碍身体的接受能力而言，我们可以设想悲痛的情感可以抑制兴奋，防止它变得过度。因此在这种情形下，悲痛可以是善的。

命题四十四：爱情与欲望可以是过度的。

证明爱情是伴随着一个外在原因的观念的快乐。因此，由一个外在原因的观念所伴随着的兴奋就是爱情。所以爱情可以是过度的。再者，欲望的力量，是和引起这种欲望的情感力量成比例的。既然一种情感可以胜过人的所有其他活动，那么出自这种情感的欲望，也可以随之胜过所有其他欲望，因此欲望也可以是过度的，正如前一命题证明兴奋可以是过度的一样。

命题四十五：恨永远不可能是善的。

证明当我们憎恨一个人时，我们总是竭力要消灭他，换句话说，我们就是竭力要去做一件恶事。所以恨永远不可能是善的。

推论一嫉妒、嘲笑、轻蔑、愤怒、报复，以及其他与恨有关或引起恨的情感，都是恶的。

推论二一切由恨所引起的欲望都是卑鄙的，而且在国家中是不公正的。

命题四十六：遵循理性的指导去生活的人，会尽其可能地用仁爱或善意来报答别人对他的憎恨、愤怒或轻蔑。

证明一切由恨引起的情感都是恶的。因此，凡是遵循理性的指导去生活的人，将会尽其可能地努力避免自己被恨的情感所刺激，从而他也会努力阻止他人受到这样的刺激。恨会因为彼此憎恨而增加，并且能够被爱所平息，所以恨可以转变为爱。因此，遵循理性的指导去生活的人，将会努力用爱或善意报答别人对他的憎恨。

命题四十七：希望与恐惧的情感本身不可能是善的。

证明希望与恐惧的情感不可能离开痛苦而存在。因为恐惧是一种痛苦，而希望不可能离开恐惧而存在。所以这些情感本身不可能是善的，只有就它们能限制过度的快乐而言，才可说是善的。

命题四十八：过誉与轻蔑的情感，永远是恶的。

证明这两种情感都与理性不一致，所以是恶的。

命题四十九：过誉容易导致其对象变得骄傲。

证明如果我们看到，有人因为爱的缘故而对我们评价过高，我们就容易变得得意洋洋，换句话说，容易感到快乐。我们就容易相信所听到的他人赞誉我们的善。因此，由于爱的缘故，我们会自视过高，换句话说，我们容易变得骄傲。

命题五十：对于一个遵循理性的指导去生活的人来说，怜悯本身是恶的，也是无益的。

证明怜悯是一种痛苦，所以本身就是恶的。由怜悯而产生的善——也就是努力解除我们所怜悯的人的痛苦的欲望，是仅仅出于理性的命令的一种行为。只有纯粹出于理性的命令的行为，我们才确切地知道是善的行为。所以怜悯对于一个遵循理性的指导去生活的人来说，本身是恶的，也是无益的。

命题五十一：赞许并不违背理性，而是可以符合理性的，并且是可以从理性中产生出来的。

证明赞许是对于曾做过有利于他人的事情的人的爱。所以赞许可以和主动的心灵相联系，换句话说，可以和理解的心灵相联系，所以赞许是可以和理性相符合的。

另证一个遵循理性的指导去生活的人，他愿意为别人去追求他为自己所追求的善。所以如果他看到一个人对他的同伴做善事，他自己做善事的努力就会增强。换句话说，他将感到快乐，这种快乐将伴随着那个施善者的观念。因此，他将对那个人表示赞许。

命题五十二：自我赞许可以起于理性，而且起于理性的自我赞许，才是最大可能的赞许。

证明自我赞许是由于一个人思考他自己和他的活动能力而引起的快乐。但是人的真正活动能力或德行就是理性本身，理性就是这个人所能清晰明了地思考的对象。所以自我赞许起于理性。再者，当一个人思考他自己的时候，他只能清楚、明晰或充分地感知从他自己的活动能力——也就是从他的理解能力中推出来的东西。因此，最大可能的自我赞许只能起于理性的思考。

命题五十三：谦卑不是一种德行，换句话说，谦卑不是起于理性。

证明谦卑是由于一个人思考他自己的弱点而引起的痛苦。但是，就人能够用真正的理性来理解他自己而言，我们假定他能够了解他的本质，也就是他的力量。因此，如果一个人在自省时，他觉察到自己的弱点，那么这并不是由于他可以理解自身，而是由于他的活动能力受到阻碍。但是，如果我们假定一个人认识到他的弱点，是由于他知道一个比他自己更有力量的存在，根据这个存在的知识，他决定他自己的活动力量。在这种情形下，我们实际上是在说，他能够明晰地认识他自己，因为他的活动能力有所增加。因此，谦卑或痛苦是起于人考察到自身的弱点，而不是起于理性或真理的考察；所以谦卑不是一种德行，而是一种强烈的感情。

命题五十四：后悔不是一种德行，也不是起于理性。反之，一个后悔他所做事情的人是加倍可怜或懦弱的。

证明证明这一命题的前部分与证明前命题相同。至于这一命题的第二部分，根据后悔的定义就可以得到证明。因为一个后悔其行为的人，首先被恶的欲望所征服，其次还被痛苦的情感所压制。

命题五十五：极端的骄傲或极端的自卑，都表示对于自我的极端无知。

证明这一命题根据情感的定义第二十八与第二十九，是很清楚的。

命题五十六：极端的骄傲或极端的自卑，都表示心灵的极端虚弱。

证明德行的首要基础是在理性的指导下自我保存。因此一个不知道自己的人，是不知道一切德行的基础的，因而也是不知道任何德行的。再者，合乎德行地行动，也就是遵循理性的指导而行动。而一个遵循理性而行动的人，也必定知道自己是遵循理性而行动。所以一个极端不了解自己的人，也就是极端不了解一切德行的人，最不能遵循德行而行动的人，换句话说，心灵也就极端虚弱。因此，极端的骄傲或极端的自卑，都表示心灵的极端虚弱。

推论由此可以极其清楚地推知，骄傲与自卑的人尤其容易受到情感的控制。

命题五十七：骄傲的人喜欢与奉承者或谄媚者为伍，而讨厌与高尚者在一起。

证明骄傲是由于自视太高而引起的快乐。骄傲的人，将会竭尽全力来培养这种过高的评价，所以他就会喜欢与奉承者或谄媚者（这里无须对这些人下定义，因为他们是尽人皆知的）为伍，而避免与那些对他作出适当评价的高尚的人在一起。

命题五十八：荣誉并不违背理性，而可以起于理性。

证明这一命题根据情感的定义第三十条，是很清楚的。

命题五十九：由被动的情感所决定而使我们产生的一切行为，也可以由理性而不是情感所决定。

证明遵循理性的行为不是别的，就是由我们本性的必然性推导出来的行为。但痛苦就其减弱或控制这种活动能力而言，是恶的。因此我们可以不被痛苦这种情感所决定，去做在理性的指导下所不能允许的任何行为。再者，快乐仅仅就其妨碍一个人的活动能力而言，也是恶的。所以在此情形下，我们也可以不被它所决定，去做在理性的指导下所不能允许的任何行为。最后，就快乐是善的而言，快乐与理性是和谐一致的（因为这种快乐包含的事实是，一个人的活动能力得到增强与帮助），而且只有在人的活动能力没有增强到可以为他自己及其行为提供一个充分概念的情形下，快乐才是被动的情感。

因此，如果一个人被快乐的情感所影响，从而达到这样一种完满的状态——获得一个关于他自己及其行为的充分概念，那么他将可以同样依照理性去做那些由被动的情感所决定而做出的事情，而且可以做得更好。但一切情感都可归于快乐、痛苦或欲望，而欲望不是别的，就是努力地行动。因此，凡是由被动的情感所决定而使我们产生的一切行为，也可以由理性而不是情感所决定。

另证任何行为，只要是起于恨或其他恶的情感对我们的影响，就可以说是恶的。但仅仅就任何行为本身来看，是没有善恶的。同一行为可以有时是善的，有时又是恶的。因此，我们也可以通过理性的指导，将有时是恶的或起于恶的情感的行为转变成善的行为。

命题六十：一种起于快乐或痛苦的欲望，其快乐或痛苦只与身体的某个部分或某些部分相联系，而不是与整个身体的所有部分相联系，它是不能顾及到整个人的利益的。

证明假定身体的某一部分——比如说甲，由于某个外在原因的力量而有所增强，因而胜过其他部分，那么这一部分将不会努力消除其自身的力量，从而使身体的其他部分得以各尽其能。因为这样的话，这一部分将会有消除其自身力量的能力，这是荒谬的。因此，身体的这一部分将努力保持其状态，心灵也同样如此。所以起于上述这种快乐情感的欲望，是不能顾及到整个人的利益的。另一方面，如果身体的甲部分受到了控制，使得其他部分占了上风，也可以用同样的方法证明，起于痛苦的欲望也是不能顾及到整个人的利益的。

命题六十一：起于理性的欲望，不可能过度。

证明就人的本质是被决定以任何方式去做某种事情而言，欲望就是人的本质。因此一个起于理性的欲望，换句话说，一个由我们主动造成的欲望，就是人的真实本质或本性。因为人的本质是被决定而去做某种事情，而这种行为可以仅仅从人的本质加以充分理解。如果这种欲望可能过度，那么人的本性自身将会有超出其自身的可能，换句话说，它将有超出它自身能力的可能，这显然是自相矛盾的，所以这种欲望不可能过度。

命题六十二：只要心灵在理性的指导下去理解一个事物，无论所获得的观念是关于将来、过去还是现在事物的观念，心灵的感受都是相等的。

证明凡是心灵依据理性的指导去理解事物，它都是依据同样的永恒性或必然性的形式去理解的，因而它会感受到同样的确定性。所以无论它所获得的观念是关于将来、过去或现在事物的观念，心灵都是通过同样的必然性去理解的，因而它也得到同样的确定性。而且无论它所获得的观念是关于将来、过去或现在的事物的观念，它们都会是同样的真观念，换句话说，都会永远具有与充分观念相同的特质。因此，只要心灵依据理性的指导来理解一个事物，无论所获得的观念是关于将来、过去还是现在事物的观念，心灵的感受都是相等的。

命题六十三：受恐惧的支配去做善事，以便逃避恶的人，并不是受理性的引导。

证明所有归属于心灵的主动的情感，换句话说，与理性相联系的情感，只有快乐与欲望两种情感。所以，受恐惧的支配去做善事，以便逃避恶的人，并不是受理性的引导。

推论在起于理性的欲望基础上，我们直接地寻求善，而间接地避免恶。

证明因为凡是起于理性的欲望，决不可能起于痛苦，而只能起于快乐的情感。而快乐的情感不是被动的情感，换句话说，不可能过度。所以这种欲望是起于对于善的知识，而不是起于对于恶的知识。因此我们遵循理性的指导，直接地寻求善，而间接地避免恶。

命题六十四：关于恶的知识是一种不充分的知识。

证明关于恶的知识，就是我们所意识到的痛苦。既然痛苦是向不太完满的过渡，因此不可能从人的本性自身得到理解。所以痛苦是建立在不充分的观念之上的被动的情感。因此关于痛苦的知识，也就是关于恶的知识，是不充分的。

推论由此推知，如果人的心灵只具有充分的观念，它将不会形成恶的概念。

命题六十五：在理性的指导下，我们会在两种善当中选择更大的善，而在两种恶当中选择更小的恶。

证明如果一种善，它妨碍我们享受更大的善，那么这种善实际上也就是恶。因为我们肯定事物是善的或是恶的，是就我们将它们相互比较而言的。根据同样的理由，一种较小的恶，实际上就是善。所以依据理性的指导，我们只是追求更大的善与更小的恶。

推论在理性的指导下，为了一种更大的善，我们宁可追随更小的恶；并且宁可忽略更小的善——如果它是一个更大的恶的原因。因为这里所谓更小的恶，实际上是善，而这里所谓更小的善，实际上是恶。所以我们想要前者，忽略后者。

命题六十六：在理性的指导下，我们宁可追求将来更大的善而不是现在更小的善。也宁可追求现在更小的恶而不是将来更大的恶。

证明如果心灵能够对一个将来的事物有充分的认识，那么它对于将来事物的感受与对于现在的事物是相同的。因为，仅仅就理性本身来看，正如本命题所假定的那样，无论更大的善或更大的恶是在将来还是在现在，都是一样的。所以我们宁可追求将来更大的善而不是现在更小的善。

推论在理性的指导下，我们将追求一个将来会成为更大的善的原因而现在是更小的恶，也会避开将来会成为更大的恶的原因而现在是更小的善。这一推论与上述命题的关系，正如第四部分命题六十五的推论与命题六十五的关系。

命题六十七：自由的人最不会想到的就是死亡。而且他的智慧不是死亡的冥想，而是生活的沉思。

证明自由的人，是依据理性的指导而生活的人，他不受恐惧的情感所支配，而是直接地追求善，换句话说，他努力以寻求自身的真正利益为基础去行动、生活，并保持自己的存在。所以这样的人最不会想到的就是死亡，而他的智慧则是生活的沉思。

命题六十八：如果人们生来就是自由的，只要他们仍然是自由的，就不会形成善与恶的概念。

证明我认为仅仅依照理性的指导的人是自由的。所以一个生而自由并且始终保持其自由的人，只会具有充分的观念，因此他将不会有恶的概念，也不会有善的观念（善与恶是相联系的观念）。

命题六十九：自由的人的德行，在避免危险和征服危险两个方面，有同样伟大的表现。

证明一个情感只能通过一个相反的、更强的情感才能得以控制或消除。但盲目的勇敢或恐惧可以认为是力量同等强大的情感。所以抑制勇敢与抑制恐惧所需要的心灵德行或人格力量是同等强大的，换句话说，自由的人避免危险和征服危险都要凭借同等的心灵德行。

推论因此在一个自由的人那里，适时的逃避与战斗一样需要同样的胆识。或者说，自由的人选择战斗或选择逃避，都需要具有同样的勇气或沉着。

命题七十：一个生活在无知人群中的自由的人，会尽其所能地避免接受他们的恩惠。

证明每个人都根据他自己的情感来判断什么是善的。所以一个无知的人施惠于其他人，就会对此作出自己的评价，如果受惠的人对此似乎评价不高，那么他将会感到痛苦。但自由的人仅仅希望与他人建立友谊，而不愿以施惠者对其所施恩惠的评价作为依据，来报答他人的恩惠。他只由理性的自由裁决来指导他自己以及别人，而且只做他自己所知道的最重要的事情。所以一个自由的人，为了避免引起无知者的憎恨，或追随无知者的要求超过理性，将会尽其所能地避免接受他们的恩惠。

命题七十一：只有自由的人彼此之间才会有绝对的感恩。

证明只有自由的人彼此对于对方而言才是最有益的，他们之间才有最紧密的友谊联系，也只有这样的人才会努力以同样热烈的爱彼此馈赠。因此，只有自由的人彼此之间才会有绝对的感恩。

命题七十二：自由的人从来不做欺骗的事，而是永远诚实的。

证明如果一个自由的人做出任何欺骗的事，就他是自由的人而言，他是遵循理性的命令（因为只有遵循理性的指导，他才可以说是自由的）做出这种事情的。这样，做欺骗人的事情将是一种德行，因此做欺骗人的事情，将对人保持自己的存在更加有益。这就是说，人与人之间只是在言语上保持一致，而在事实上却相互反对，这样对人类更为有益。但是这是荒谬的。所以自由人绝不做欺骗的事，而他的行为永远是正直的。

命题七十三：一个遵循理性指导的人，在普遍的法令制度的指导下在国家中生活，要比他在孤独中生活，只服从于自己，更加自由。

证明一个遵循理性指导的人，他的服从并非是受恐惧的支配。但就他遵循理性的规定，努力保持其存在而言——换句话说，就他努力去过自由的生活而言，他愿意根据普遍利益安排自己的生活，因而也愿意遵照其国家的法令去生活。因此，一个遵循理性指导的人，为了享受更大的自由，愿意维持普遍的公民权利。

附录

我在这一部分已经指出的关于正当的生活方式的内容，并没有按照顺序排列，使得它们一目了然。但为了更容易彼此推论，我已经将它们分散在不同的命题中予以证明了。因此我在这里将它们概括总结为如下要点。

一、我们的所有努力或欲望，都是由我们本性的必然性推出来的。因此，要么只需要把人的本性当作它们的最近因，就能够理解它们；要么就根据我们的存在是自然的一个部分来认识它们，作为自然的一个部分，则不能离开其他个体，仅仅从其自身得到充分的认识。

二、只要心灵被认为是由充分观念所构成的，由我们的本性推导出来，可以单独从人的本性自身加以理解的欲望，就是与心灵相联系的欲望。其他的欲望则只是和未能充分理解事物的心灵相联系，因此这种欲望的力量及其增减通常都不是由人的力量所决定，而是由外界事物的力量所决定的。所以前一种欲望可以恰当地称为主动的行为，而后一种欲望则只能称为被动的情感。因为前者总是表示人的力量，相反，后者仅表示人的弱点和不完整的知识。

三、主动的行为，就是由人的力量或理性所决定的欲望，永远是善的；其他的欲望则可能是既善又恶的。

四、因此，在生活中对于我们最有益的事情，莫过于尽量完善我们的理智或理性。只要我们能够完善理智或理性，人的最高快乐或幸福就包含在其中。确实，幸福不是其他任何东西，而只是由于对神有直观知识而引起的精神的满足。而所谓完善理智也不过就是理解神、理解由神的本性的必然性推出来的神的属性与行为。因此，遵循理性指导的人用以努力节制所有其他欲望的最终目的或最高欲望，就是能够指导他充分地理解他自己，并且理解在他的理智范围内的所有事物的欲望。

五、因此，没有理智不可能存在理性的生活。而且事物之所以是善的，仅仅在于该事物能促进人们享受一种由理智所决定的理性的生活。反之，凡是阻碍人的理性趋于完善，并阻碍人享受理性的生活的事物，就只能被称为恶的。

六、因为一切以人的本性为动力因的事物都必然是善的，所以只有起于外在原因的事物才可能对人是恶的。也就是说，就人是整个自然的一部分，人的本性被迫服从自然的规律、被迫在几乎是无限多的情形下顺应自然而言，才会产生恶的行为。

七、人不是自然的一部分，或者不遵循自然的普遍法则，是不可能的事情。但是如果他能够置身于与他的本性相符合的个体之中，他的活动能力将因此而得到促进与培养。反之，如果他置身于与他的本性非常不符合的个体之中，要是他自己不经过非常大的改变，将很难适应他们。

八、任何存在于自然中的事物，只要我们认为该事物是恶的，或认为它有损于我们保持并享受理性生活的能力，我们就会努力用对我们来说最安全的方法消除该事物。反之，任何我们认为是善的，或认为有益于保持我们的存在并享受理性生活的事物，我们都会设法采取我们认为最适当的方法去使用它们。每个人毫无例外地都会依据至高无上的自然权利，去做他认为将增进其自身利益的事情。

九、与一个事物的本性最符合的，除了相同种类的其他个体之外，再没有别的东西了。因此，对于人保持其存在和享受理性生活最有益的，除了遵循理性指导的人之外，也没有什么东西了。此外，既然我们知道，没有任何个别事物，比遵循理性指导的人更加卓越；因此，除了教育人们最终都在他们自身的理性支配下生活之外，一个人不可能更好地展示他的技巧和才能。

十、只要人们相互之间都被嫉妒或任何一种恨的情感所影响，他们就会彼此反对，因而也会更加畏惧，因为他们都比自然中的其他个体更有力量。

十一、然而心灵不是武力所能征服，而是被爱或意志力所征服的。

十二、对人们最有益的事情，莫过于使人们的生活方式相互联系，并紧密地结合起来，使他们成为一个团结一致的整体。通常来说，做任何可以增进友谊的事情，对人都是有益的。

十三、但要达到这个目的，需要有技巧和警觉性。因为人是变化无常的（因为遵循理性而生活的人，还是很少的），而且通常都心存嫉妒，更倾向于复仇而不是同情。因此，从每个人的认识出发而宽容他们，还要防止自己去模仿他们的情感，这需要一种非凡的心灵力量。反之，那些只知道对人们吹毛求疵，只知道咒骂人们的罪恶而不是逐渐地传授德行，只知道破坏而不是稳定人的性情的人，对人对己都是有害的。所以，有很多人由于过分急躁，或者因为被误导的宗教热情，宁愿过着禽兽般的生活而不是人的生活。正如很多年轻人，他们不能平和地忍受父母的责骂，就征召入伍，甘愿忍受战争的困苦和专制的命令，却不愿意享受家庭的舒适、听从父亲的告诫。他们宁愿忍受任何强加的负担，只是为了可以报复他们的父母。

十四、因此，尽管人的所有行为普遍受到情欲的支配，但他们团结一致，总是利大于弊的。所以我们最好有耐性地忍受他们可能对我们做的坏事，并努力促进任何有助于协调和友谊的东西。

十五、那些促成和谐的东西，就是可以归于正义、公平、可敬的生活等诸如此类的东西。因为不公平和邪恶的行为，以及被认为是可耻的行为，或者忽视公认的社会习惯的行为，都会令人感到不安。为了赢得敬爱，尤其必要的就是尊崇宗教及虔诚的行为。

十六、此外，和睦虽然常常是由恐惧造成的，但这种和睦是不可靠的。再进一步说，恐惧是起于心灵的软弱无力，对于理性没有什么益处。怜悯也是这样，虽然表面上它似乎与虔诚有某种类同之处。

十七、慷慨也可以赢得人心，特别是对那些确实没有办法维持生活需要的人。然而，对每个贫困的人提供资助，实在远远超出任何个人的能力和利益。因为任何个人的财产都不可能充分满足这一需求。再者，任何个人的财力都实在是有限的，不可能让所有人都成为他的朋友。因此，救济贫穷是整个国家所应负担的责任，也只能被当作公共的福利。

十八、接受恩惠与报答恩惠，必须采取一种特别谨慎的态度。

十九、再者，欺骗性的爱——也就是性欲，起因于肉体的美好。一般而言，任何不是因为心灵的自由，而是其他原因所引起的爱，都很容易转变成恨。确实，还有更糟糕的，是一种疯狂的爱。它促进的是分歧，而不是协调一致。

二十、至于结婚，当然是合乎理性的，只要这种结合不仅仅是出于喜好肉体的愿望，而且还出于生育并明智地教养子女的愿望。此外，相爱的双方还不仅是因为喜好肉体，而且也是因为心灵的自由而相爱的。

二十一、此外，谄媚可以导致和谐，但这种和谐是依靠奴性或背叛的可耻过错所造成的。因为只有骄傲的人才最容易被谄媚所愚弄，他们一心想出人头地，却没有什么过人之处。

二十二、自卑具有虔敬与信仰的假象。尽管自卑是骄傲的反面，但一个自卑的人却最接近骄傲的人。

二十三、羞耻也可以产生和谐，不过仅仅是就无法掩盖的事情而言的。此外，羞耻既然是一种痛苦，它也不涉及到理性的运用。

二十四、其余很多与人有关的痛苦情感，都直接和正义、公平、荣誉、虔敬和信仰相对。并且，尽管愤怒表面上看似公平，但是只有非法的社会才会允许每个人各自判断他人的行为，各自维护他自己和别人的权利。

二十五、所谓谦恭，换句话说，使人愉悦的欲望，如果是由理性所决定的，那么就与虔诚相联系。反之，如果是起于情感的谦恭，则是一种雄心或者是欲望。通过这种欲望，人们凭借虔敬的假象，通常会激起分歧和混乱。因为一个人要想在口头上或行动上去帮助别人，以便他们可以和他共同享受最高的善，那么他首先必须竭力赢得别人对他的敬爱，而不是博得他们的羡慕，标榜以他命名的体系，而不是制造任何遭人嫉妒的理由。此外，在他的谈话中，他将避免指责人们的过错，而是谨慎地、有节制地提及人的弱点。不过他会不断地谈论人的德行和力量，以及使它们得以完善的方法。因此，人们就会竭力遵循理性而生活，既不是由于恐惧，也不是由于厌恶，而仅仅是由于快乐的情感。

二十六、我们知道，除了人之外，世间没有其他个别事物，其心灵可以让我们感到喜悦；也没有任何其他个别事物，我们能够通过友谊或任何一种关系，与之结合在一起。所以，为了顾及到人类本身的利益，除了人之外的任何东西，都没有保持其存在的必要。不过是保存还是消灭它们，要根据其不同的性能，也要根据它是否适合我们的需要。

二十七、我们从我们之外的事物中所得到的利益，除了我们以不同的形式观察和改变事物所得到的经验和知识之外，主要就是身体的保存。从这一观点出发，那些能够供养或滋补身体，使身体所有部分都能适当地各尽其能的事物，就是对我们最有益的事物。因为，身体越能接受多方面的影响，或越能多方面地影响外界物体，心灵也就越具有思考的能力。不过，自然中这类事物似乎少之又少，因此为了身体所需要的营养起见，必须利用各种不同的养料。但人的身体是由许多不同性质的部分构成的，而各个部分都持续不断地需要各种不同的营养品，以便整个身体可以相等地做一切可以由其本性推导出来的事物，因而心灵也随之能够相等地把握很多事物。

二十八、要想得到这些营养品，如果人们不互相帮助，仅仅凭借一个人的力量，是无济于事的。而金钱为我们提供一种一切有用物品的兑换券。因此金钱的概念总是主要地吸引大众的心灵。不仅如此，如果没有金钱的观念伴随着作为快乐的原因，他们很难认识到任何一种快乐。

二十九、仅仅对于那些并非由于贫穷或生活的需要而追求金钱的人，这种结果才是一种过错。他们曾经学习聚敛财富的手段，并且为此感到自豪。他们虽然照常滋养自己的身体，却很吝啬。因为他们认为，如果对于身体的保存花费太多，他们的财产损失就会太大。但是，那些知道正确使用金钱，并知道根据他们的真正需要来确定财产额度的人，只需要少量的金钱，就可以过上满意的生活。

三十、因此，既然那些促进身体各个部分各尽其能的事物都是善的，就人由心灵与身体所构成而言，快乐在于对人的力量的增强或促进；由此可知，所有能够使人快乐的事物都是善的。但是，对这一目的不起作用，不能增进我们的快乐的事物，其活动能力也不以我们的利益为尺度。最后，既然快乐一般只是与身体的某个部分更有关系，那么由此产生的快乐（如果没有理性和警觉性的掌控），以及由此而产生的欲望，就会变得过度。不仅如此，情感还会让人认为现在令人愉快的事物是最重要的，因而我们对于将来的事物就不可能以同样的情感去评价。

三十一、与我们所认为的相反，迷信似乎认为所有使人痛苦的东西都是善的，而认为使人快乐的东西是恶的。不过，正如我们上面已经指出的，除了心存嫉妒的人之外，没有一个人会把我们的弱点或烦恼当作一种享受。因为我们所感到的快乐越大，我们所达到的完满性就越大，因而我们也就越能分享神性。而且只要真正考虑我们的利益由此控制而产生的快乐，这种快乐就不可能是恶的。反之，一个受恐惧支配、为了避免不幸才做善事的人，并不是遵循理性的指导的。

三十二、但是，人的力量是极其有限的，而且无限地被外界原因的力量所超越，因此我们并没有绝对的力量，能够使那些外界的事物都为我们所用。不过，只要我们意识到自己已经尽到职责，已经竭尽所能去避免这种不幸的事情发生，并且意识到我们是整个自然的一部分，我们必须遵循自然的法则，对于那些已经发生却与我们自己利益的要求大相径庭的事情，我们应该平静地接受。如果我们清晰明了地理解了这一点，那么我们由理智所决定的那一部分，也就是我们较高级的部分，就会得到充分的满足，而且将努力保持在这种满足之中。因为我们既然认识到，我们只能追求具有必然性的事物，那么我们就只有对真理才能完全满足。因此，只要我们对于这些事物有了恰当的认识，那么我们较高级部分的努力，将会与整个自然的法则和谐一致。

Part Ⅴ　On the Power of the Understanding,or of Human Freedom

Preface

At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics,which is concerned with the way leading to freedom.I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason,show-ing how far the reason can control the emotions,and what is the nature of Mental Free-dom or Blessedness；we shall then be able to see,how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected,nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended,as to be capable of the due performance of its functions.The latter question lies in the province of Medicine,the former in the province of Logic.Here,therefore,I repeat,I shall treat only of the power of the mind,or of reason；and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions,for their control and moderation.That we do not possess absolute dominion over them,I have already shown.Yet the Stoics have thought,that the emotions depended absolutely on our will,and that we could absolutely govern them.But these philosophers were compelled,by the protest of experience,not from their own principles,to confess,that no slight prac-tice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them；and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example（if I remember rightly）of two dogs,the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog.For by long training it could be brought about,that the house-dog should become accustomed to hunt,and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares.To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines.For he maintained,that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain,namely,to that part called the pineal gland,by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body,and also external objects,and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways.He asserted,that this gland is so suspen-ded in the midst of the brain,that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits；further,that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners,as the animal spirits can impinge thereon；and,again,that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland,as there are different external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it；whence it follows,that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position,wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another,the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits,driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were,when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.He further asserted,that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of the gland.For instance,whenev-er anyone desires to look at a remote object,the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate,whereas,if the person in question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil,the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,inasmuch as the motion of the gland,which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil,is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil,but with the wish to look at remote or very near ob-jects.Lastly,he maintained that,although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life,yet it can nevertheless become through ha-bituation associated with other thoughts.

He thence concludes,that there is no soul so weak,that it cannot,under proper direction,acquire absolute power over its passions.For passions as defined by him are“perceptions,or feelings,or emotions of the soul,which are particularly related to the soul,and which are produced,preserved,and strengthened by some motion of the spir-its”（see The Passions of the Soul 1，27）.But,seeing that we can join any motion of the gland,or consequently of the spirits,to any volition,the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers；if,therefore,we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend,and associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said decisions,we shall ac-quire an absolute dominion over our passions.

Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher（in so far as I gather it from his own words）；it is one which,had it been less ingenious,I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man.Indeed,I am lost in wonder,that a philosopher,who had stoutly asserted,that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident premisses,and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly per-ceive,and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscuri-ties through occult qualities,could maintain a hypothesis,beside which occult qualities are commonplace.What does he understand,I ask,by the union of the mind and the body？What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter？Truly I should like him to explain this union through its proximate cause.But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two,or of the mind itself,but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole uni-verse,that is to God.Further,I should much like to know,what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland,and with what force can it hold it suspended？For I am in ignorance,whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits,and whether the motions of the passions,which we have closely united with firm decisions,cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes；in which case it would follow that,although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger,and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way,which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away.In truth,as there is no common standard of volition and motion,so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body；consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other.We may also add,that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain,so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways,and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain.Lastly,I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom,inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false.Therefore,since the power of the mind,as I have shown above,is defined by the understanding only,we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the e-motions,which I believe all have had experience of,but do not accurately observe or distinctly see,and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions,which have regard to the mind s blessedness.

Axioms

1.If two contrary actions be started in the same subject,a change must necessarily take place,either in both,or in one of the two,and continue until they cease to be con-trary.

2.The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,in so far as its es-sence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause.

Propositions

PROP.1.Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind,so are the modifications of body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body.

Proof.-The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things,and vice versa the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of ideas.Wherefore,even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the body,so vice versa the order and connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner,in which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind.

PROP.2.If we remove a disturbance of the spirit,or emotion,from the thought of an external cause,and unite it to other thoughts then will the love or hatred towards that external cause,and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions,be destroyed.

Proof.-That,which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,is pleasure or pain,accompanied by the idea of an external cause；wherefore,when this cause is removed,the reality of love or hatred is removed with it；therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed.

PROP.3.An emotion,which is a passion,ceases to be a passion,as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.

Proof.-An emotion,which is a passion,is a confused idea.If,therefore,we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion,that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion,in so far as it is referred to the mind only,by reason；therefore,the emotion will cease to be a passion.

Corollary.-An emotion therefore becomes more under our control,and the mind is less passive in respect to it,in Proportion as it is more known to us.

PROP.4.There is no modification of the body,whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Proof.-Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived adequate-ly；therefore there is no modification of the body,whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that there is no emotion,whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.For an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body,and must therefore involve some clear and distinct conception.

PROP.5.An emotion towards a thing,which we conceive simply,and not as nec-essary,or as contingent,or as possible,is,other conditions being equal,greater than any other emotion.

Proof.-An emotion towards a thing,which we conceive to be free,is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary,and,consequently,still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible,or contingent.But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply,while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action；therefore,an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is,other conditions being equal,greater than one,which we feel to-wards what is necessary,possible,or contingent,and,consequently,it is the greatest of all.

PROP.6.The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject there-to,in so far as it understands all things as necessary.

Proof.The mind understands all things to be necessary and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes；therefore,it thus far brings it a-bout,that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom,and feels less emotion to-wards the things themselves.

PROP.7.Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason,if we take account of time,are stronger than those,which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.

Proof.-We do not regard a thing as absent,by reason of the emotion wherewith we conceive it,but by reason of the body,being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing.Wherefore,the emotion,which is referred to the thing which we regard as absent,is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man s activities and power,but is,on the contrary,of a nature to be in some sort controlled by the emo-tions,which exclude the existence of its external cause.But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common Properties of things,which we always regard as present（for there can be nothing to exclude their present existence），and which we always conceive in the same manner.Wherefore an emotion of this kind al-ways remains the same；and consequently emotions,which are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external causes,will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,until they are no longer contrary to it；to this extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful.

PROP.8.An emotion is stronger in Proportion to the number of simultaneous con-current causes whereby it is aroused.

Proof.-Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few；therefore,in Proportion to the increased number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused,an e-motion becomes stronger.

PROP.9.An emotion,which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself,is less hurtful,and we are less subject thereto and less affected towards each of its causes,than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause.

Proof.-An emotion is only bad or hurtful,in so far as it hinders the mind from be-ing able to think；therefore,an emotion,whereby the mind is determined to the contem-plation of several things at once,is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion,which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one,that it is unable to think of anything else；this was our first point.Again,as the mind s es-sence,in other words,its power,consists solely in thought,the mind is less passive in respect to an emotion,which causes it to think of several things at once,than in regard to an equally strong emotion,which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object；this was our second point.Lastly,this emotion,in so far as it is at-tributable to several causes,is less powerful in regard to each of them.

PROP.10.So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature,we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.

Proof.-The emotions,which are contrary to our nature,that is,which are bad,are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding.So long,therefore,as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature,the mind s power,whereby it en-deavours to understand things,is not impeded,and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another；consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the in-tellectual order.

PROP.11.In Proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects,so is it more frequent,or more often vivid,and occupies the mind more.

Proof.-In Proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more objects,so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered,all of which the mind contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion；therefore the emotion is more frequent,or is more often in full vigour,and occupies the mind more.

PROP.12.The mental images of things are more easily associated with the re-ferred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand,than with others.

Proof.-Things,which we clearly and distinctly understand,are either the com-mon Properties of things or deductions therefrom,and are consequently more often a-roused in us.Wherefore it may more readily happen,that we should contemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with something else,and conse-quently that the images of the said things should be more often associated with the ima-ges of these than with the images of something else.

PROP.13.A mental image is more vivid,in Proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images.

Proof.-In Proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of other ima-ges,so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused.

PROP.14.The mind can bring it about,that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to God s idea.

Proof.-There is no modification of the body,whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct conception；wherefore it can bring it about,that they should all be re-ferred to God s idea.

PROP.15.He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God,and so much the more in Proportion as he understands himself and his emo-tions.

Proof.-He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure,and this pleasure is accompanied by God s idea；therefore such an one loves God,and so much the more in Proportion as he more understands himself and his emo-tions.

PROP.16.This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind.

Proof.-For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body and is fos-tered by them all；therefore,it must hold the chief place in the mind.

PROP.17.God is without passions,neither is he affected by any emotion of pleas-ure or pain.

Proof.-All ideas,in so far as they are referred to God,are true,that is adequate；and therefore God is without passions.Again,God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection；therefore he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Corollary.-Strictly speaking,God does not love or hate anyone.For God is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain,consequently he does not love or hate any-one.

PROP.18.No one can hate God.

Proof.-God s idea which is in us is adequate and perfect；wherefore,in so far as we contemplate God,we are active；consequently there can be no pain accompanied by God s idea,in other words,no one can hate God.

Corollary.-Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.

PROP.19.He,who loves God,cannot endeavour that God should love him in re-turn.

Proof.-For,if a man should so endeavour,he would desire that God,whom he loves,should not be God,and consequently he would desire to feel pain；which is ab-surd.Therefore,he who loves God，＆c.

PROP.20.This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jeal-ousy；contrariwise,it is the more fostered,in Proportion as we conceive a greater num-ber of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love.

Proof.-This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason,it is common to all men,and we desire that all should rejoice there-in；therefore,it cannot be stained by the emotion envy nor by,the emotion of jealous-y，；but,contrariwise,it must needs be the more fostered,in Proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein.

Note.-We can in the same way,show,that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love,whereby this love can be destroyed；therefore we may conclude,that this love towards God is the most constant of all the emotions,and that,in so far as it is re-ferred to the body,it cannot be destroyed,unless the body be destroyed also.As to its nature,in so far as it is referred to the mind only,we shall presently inquire.

I have through all the remedies against the emotions,or all that the mind,consid-ered in itself alone,can do against them.Whence it appears that the mind s power over the emotions consists：

1.In the actual knowledge of the emotions.

2.In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause,which we conceive confusedly.

3.In the fact,that,in respect to time,the emotions referred to things,which we distinctly understand,surpass those referred to what we conceive in a confused and frag-mentary manner.

4.In the number of causes whereby those modifications,are fostered,which have regard to the common Properties of things or to God.

5.Lastly,in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate,one with another,its own emotions.

But,in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better under-stood,it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by us strong,when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of another,and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same emotion；or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than by another.For the strength of every emotion is defined by a com-parison of our own power with the power of an external cause.Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only,and its infirmity or passion is defined by the priva-tion of knowledge only；it therefore follows,that that mind is most passive,whose grea-test part is made up of inadequate ideas,so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities；on the other hand,that mind is most active,whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas,so that,although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind,it may yet be more easily characterized by i-deas attributable to human virtue,than by ideas which tell of human infirmity.Again,it must be observed,that spiritual unhealthiness；and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,and which we can never become masters of.For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything,unless he loves it；neither do wrongs,suspicions,enmities,arise,except in regard to things whereof no one can be really master.

We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge,and especially that third kind of knowledge,founded on the actual knowledge of God,pos-sesses over the emotions；if it does not absolutely destroy them,in so far as they are passions；at any rate,it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind.Further,it begets a love towards a thing immutable and eternal,whereof we may really enter into possession；neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love；but it may grow from strength to strength,and may engross the greater part of the mind,and deeply penetrate it.

And now I have finished with all that concerns this present life；for,as I said in the beginning of this note,I have briefly described all the remedies against the emo-tions.And this everyone may readily have seen for himself,if he has attended to what is advanced in the present note,and also to the definitions of the mind and its emotions,and,lastly,to Propositions 1.and 3.of Part 3.It is now,therefore,time to pass on to those matters,which appertain to the duration of the mind,without relation to the body.

PROP.21.The mind can only imagine anything,or remember what is past,while the body endures.

Proof.-The mind does not express the actual existence of its body,nor does it i-magine the modifications of the body as actual,except while the body endures；and,consequently,it does not imagine any body as actually existing,except while its own body endures.Thus it cannot imagine anything,or remember things past,except while the body endures.

PROP.22.Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity.

Proof.-God is the cause,not only of the existence of this or that human body,but also of its essence.This essence,therefore,must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God,and be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity；and this con-ception must necessarily exist in God.

PROP.23.The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body,but there remains of it something which is eternal.

Proof.-There is necessarily in God a concept or idea,which expresses the essence of the human body,which,therefore,is necessarily something appertaining to the es-sence of the human mind.But we have not assigned to the human mind any,duration,definable by time,except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body,which is explained through duration,and may be defined by time-that is,we do not assign to it duration,except while the body endures.Yet,as there is something,not-withstanding,which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God；this something,which appertains to the essence of the mind,will necessarily be eternal.

PROP.24.The more we understand particular things,the more do we understand God.

Proof.-This is evident from 1.25.Coroll.

PROP.25.The highest endeavour of the mind,and the highest virtue is to under-stand things by the third kind of knowledge.

Proof.-The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain at-tributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things；and,in Proportion as we understand things more in this way,we better understand God；therefore the highest virtue of the mind,that is the power,or nature,or highest endeavour of the mind,is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

PROP.26.In Proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge,it desires more to understand things by that kind.

Proof.-This is evident.For,in so far as we conceive the mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge,we,to that extent,conceive it as deter-mined thus to conceive things；and consequently,the mind desires so to do,in Propor-tion as it is more capable thereof.

PROP.27.The greatest satisfaction of mind there can be arises from this third kind of knowledge.

Proof.-The highest virtue of the mind is to know God,or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge,and this virtue is greater in Proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge；consequently,he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection,and is therefore affected by the highest pleasure,such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue；thus,from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence.

PROP.28.The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first,but from the second kind of knowledge.

Proof.-This Proposition is self-evident.For whatsoever we understand clearly and distinct we understand either through itself,or through that which is conceived through itself；that is,ideas which are clear and distinct in us,or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary,and confused,and are referred to knowledge of the first kind,but must follow from adequate ideas,or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge；therefore,the desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first,but from the second kind.

PROP.29.Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity,it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body,but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

Proof.-In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body,it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time,and to that extent only,has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time.But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration.Therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity,but it possesses such power,because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity,and also because it is of the na-ture of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity,for be-sides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind.Therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind s conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

PROP.30.Our mind,in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of e-ternity,has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God,and knows that it is in God,and is conceived through God.

Proof.-Eternity is the very essence of God,in so far as this involves necessary ex-istence.Therefore to conceive things under the form of eternity,is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through thp essence of God as real entities,or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of God；wherefore our mind,in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity,has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God,and knows，＆c.

PROP.31.The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind,as its formal cause,in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Proof.-The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity,except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity；that is,except in so far as it is eternal；therefore,in so far as it is eternal,it possesses the knowledge of God,which knowledge is necessarily adequate；hence the mind,in so far as it is eternal,is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God,in other words,of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge,whereof accordingly the mind,in so far as it is eternal,is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge.

PROP.32.Whatsoever we understand by the is accompanied by God s idea as cause.

Proof.-From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquies-cence,that is,pleasure,and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself,and consequently the idea also of God as cause.

Corollary.-From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of God.From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure accompanied by God s idea as cause,that is,the love of God；not in so far as we imagine him as present,but in so far as we understand him to be eternal；this is what I call the intellectual love of God.

PROP.33.The intellectual love of God,which arises from the third kind of knowl-edge,is eternal.

Proof.-The third kind of knowledge is eternal；therefore the love which arises therefrom is also necessarily eternal.

PROP.34.The mind is,only while the body endures,subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions.

Proof.-Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as pres-ent；yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the na-ture of the external thing.Therefore emotion is imagination,in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body；therefore the mind is,only while the body endures,subject to emotions which are attributable to passions.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal.

PROP.35.God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

Proof.-God is absolutely infinite,that is,the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection；and such rejoicing is accompanied by the idea of himself,that is,the idea of his own cause；now this is what we have described as intellectual love.

PROP.36.The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself,not in so far as he is infinite,but in so far as he can be ex-plained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity；in other words,the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.

Proof.-This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the mind；it is it-self,indeed,an activity whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by God s idea as cause；that is,an activity whereby God,in so far as he can be explained through the human mind,regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself；therefore,this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that God,in so far as he loves himself,loves man,and,consequently,that the love of God towards men,and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical.

Note.-From what has been said we clearly understand,wherein our salvation,or blessedness,or freedom,consists；namely,in the constant and eternal love towards God,or in God s love towards men.This love or blessedness is,in the Bible,called Glory and not undeservedly.For whether this love be referred to God or to the mind,it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit,which is not really distinguished from glo-ry.In so far as it is referred to God,it is pleasure,if we may still use that term,accom-panied by the idea of itself,and,in so far as it is referred to the mind,it is the same.

Again,since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge,whereof the be-ginning and the foundation is God,it becomes clear to us,in what manner and way our mind,as to its essence and existence,follows from the divine nature and constantly de-pends on God.I have thought it worth while here to call attention to this,in order to show by this example how the knowledge of particular things,which I have called intui-tive or of the third kind,is potent,and more powerful than the universal knowledge,which I have styled knowledge of the second kind.For,although in Part I showed in general terms,that all things（and consequently,also,the human mind）depend as to their essence and existence on God,yet that demonstration,though legitimate and placed beyond the chances of doubt,does not affect our mind so much,as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing,which we say depends on God.

PROP.37.There is nothing in nature,which is contrary to this intellectual love,or which can take it away.

Proof.-This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind,in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of God as an eternal truth.If,therefore,there should be anything which would be contrary to this love,that thing would be con-trary to that which is true；consequently,that,which should be able to take away this love,would cause that which is true to be false；an obvious absurdity.Therefore there is nothing in nature which，＆c.

PROP.38.In Proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge,it is less subject to those emotions which are evil,and stands in less fear of death.

Proof.-The mind s essence consists in knowledge；therefore,in Proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge,the greater will be the part of it that endures,and,consequently,the greater will be the part that is not touched by the emotions,which are contrary to our nature,or in other words,evil.Thus,in Proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge,the greater will be the part of it,that remains unimpaired,and,conse-quently,less subject to emotions，＆c.

PROP.39.He,who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities,possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.

Proof.-He,who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities,is least agitated by those emotions which are evil that is,by those emotions which are con-trary to our nature；therefore,he possesses the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,and,consequently,of bringing it about,that all the modifications of the body should be referred to God s idea；whence it will come to pass that he will be affected with love towards God,which must occupy or constitute the chief part of the mind；therefore,such a man will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal.

PROP.40.In Proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection,so is it more active,and less passive；and,vice versa,in Proportion as it is more active,so is it more perfect.

Proof.-In Proportion as each thing is more perfect,it possesses more of reality,and,consequently,it is to that extent more active and less passive.This demonstration may be reversed,and thus prove that,in Proportion as a thing is more active,so is it more perfect.

Corollary.-Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures,be it great or small,is more perfect than the rest.For the eternal part of the mind the understanding,through which alone we are said to act；the part which we have shown to perish is the i-magination,through which only we are said to be passive；therefore,the former,be it great or small,is more perfect than the latter.

PROP.41.Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal,we should still con-sider as of primary importance piety and religion,and generally all things which,in Part IV.，we showed to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness.

Proof.-The first and only,foundation of virtue,or the rule of right living is see-king one s own true interest.Now,while we determined what reason prescribes as use-ful,we took no account of the mind s eternity,which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part.Although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal,we nev-ertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high-mindedness are of pri-mary importance.Therefore,even if we were still ignorant of this doctrine,we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place.

PROP.42.Blessedness is not the reward of virtue,but virtue itself；neither do we rejoice therein,because we control our lusts,but,contrariwise,because we rejoice therein,we are able to control our lusts.

Proof.-Blessedness consists in love towards God,which love springs from the third kind of knowledge；therefore this love must be referred to the mind,in so far as the latter is active；therefore it is virtue itself.This was our first point.Again,in Pro-portion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness,so does it the more understand；that is,so much the more power has it over the emotions,and so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil；therefore,in Proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness,so has it the power of controlling lusts.And,since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding,it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness,because he has controlled his lusts,but,contrariwise,his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself.

Note.-I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind s power over the emotions and the mind s freedom.Whence it appears,how potent is the wise man,and how much he surpasses the ignorant man,who is driven only by his lusts.For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining,the true acquiescence of his spirit,but moreover lives,as it were unwitting of himself,and of God,and of things,and as soon as he ceases to suffer,ceases also to be.Whereas the wise man,in so far as he is regarded as such,is scarcely at all dis-turbed in spirit,but,being conscious of himself,and of God,and of things,by a cer-tain eternal necessity,never ceases to be,but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit.If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard,it may nevertheless be discovered.Needs must it be hard,since it is so seldom found.How would it be possible,if salvation were ready to our hand,and could without great labour be found,that it should be by almost all men neglected？But all things ex-cellent are as difficult as they are rare.

第五部分　论理智的力量或人的自由

序言

最后，我要进入到伦理学的另一个部分，它将涉及达到自由的途径。所以，我将在这一部分中，讨论理性的力量，指出理性如何能够控制感情，并且指出什么是心灵的自由或幸福的本质。由此我们将可以看出，比起愚昧的人，智者是多么有力量。至于使用什么方法和手段来完善理智，采取什么技能来保养身体，以使它能适当地发挥作用，这些就不是本部分所要讨论的内容了。因为后者属于医学，前者属于逻辑学。因此，这里我要重申，我所要讨论的只限于心灵或理性的力量，并且我将主要说明理性控制、调节情感的力量与性质。因为我们已经说过，我们并不能绝对地控制感情。斯多葛学派的学者曾经思考过这个问题，认为情感绝对地依赖我们的意志，认为我们能够绝对地控制情感。但是，这些说法虽然不违背他们的原则，却违背了经验事实。于是他们不得不承认，要想控制和调节情感，需要艰苦的训练与奋斗。有人曾经用两只狗的例子来说明（如果我没有记错的话）。这两只狗，一只是家犬，另一只是猎犬。经过长期的训练，最后可以使家犬习惯去打猎，而猎犬却不会再跟在兔子后面追赶了。笛卡尔对斯多葛学派的这种意见也没有异议。因为他认为灵魂或心灵与大脑的某一部分，也就是所谓松果腺这一部分，有极其密切的联系。心灵凭借它的帮助能够感知身体内部所激起的一切运动和外界的对象，而且心灵仅仅凭借意志的一个简单举动，就能以各种不同的方式运动。他断言，这种腺是悬置在大脑中心部位的，以至于它受到生命精神最轻微的运动影响，也会产生运动。此外，他还认为，生命精神触动这种松果腺的方式不同，这种腺悬置在大脑中心的状态就会随之不同。再者，印记在松果腺上的不同符号，与刺激生命精神触动松果腺的外界对象的数目是相等的。由此可知，心灵的意志是可以推动松果腺做出种种不同状态的运动，如果它此后令松果腺在某种状态下悬置，与此前被生命精神所驱使而以某种方式悬置时的状态一样，那么松果腺也就可以促使与决定那些生命精神，使它们与此前被同样地悬置着的松果腺反作用于它们时呈现同样的状态。此外，他还断言，心灵的每一个意愿都天然地与松果腺的某一种运动相联系。比如，一个人如果希望看到一个远距离的物体，这个意愿就会使他的瞳孔放大。但是如果那个人只是想要放大瞳孔，这个意愿却不会产生所期望的结果。这是因为驱使生命精神影响视觉神经做某种运动，从而使得瞳孔放大或缩小的松果腺，实际上还没有与放大或缩小瞳孔的意愿联系起来，而只是与要看远距离或近距离的东西的意愿联系起来。最后，他认为，尽管松果腺的每一个运动似乎与我们有生以来所有思想中的每个思想都有联系，但由于习惯的原因，也可以与其他思想相联系。

由此，他得出结论：不可能有任何心灵会如此软弱，以至于经过适当的指导仍然不能获得控制自己情感的绝对力量。因为根据他的定义，情感是“心灵的知觉、感觉或忧虑，与心灵有特殊的联系，由精神的某种运动所产生、保持和加强”（参见：笛卡尔《心灵的情感》第一部分第二十七节）。但是，因为我们能够使松果腺的任何一种运动和生命精神的运动，与任何意愿相结合，意志的决心完全取决于我们自己的力量；那么，只要我们依据指导我们行为的可靠而坚定的抉择来决定我们的意志，把我们所愿意具有的那些情感与这些决心结合起来，就会获得控制我们情感的绝对主权了。

以上就是这位杰出的哲学家的见解（就我从他本人的文字中所搜集的来看），如果不是如此有独创性的话，我几乎不敢相信这是一位如此伟大的人物说出来的。的确，我感到匪夷所思：一个哲学家，他曾坚决宣称，除了依据自明的前提之外决不妄下结论，除了清晰明了地感知到的事物之外，决不妄下断言，并且屡次指责经院哲学家企图通过玄思解释隐晦事物，但他竟会提出一个比任何玄思还要神秘的假设。我要问，他所了解的心灵与身体的结合究竟是什么意思呢？他对于与某种物质的某个确定粒子最密切地结合在一起的思想，究竟有什么样的清晰明了的概念呢？我的确很希望他能够根据它的最近因来解释这种结合。但是他把心灵与身体的概念作了如此截然不同的区别，以至于无论是对于两者的结合，还是对于心灵自身，都不能指出任何个别的原因，而不得不追溯到整个宇宙的原因，也就是追溯到上帝那里。此外，我也很愿意知道，心灵究竟能给予这松果腺多大程度的运动，究竟要用多大的力量才能使松果腺悬置在那里。因为我不知道松果腺被心灵所激动比起被生命精神所激动，究竟更快还是更慢。我也不知道，我们那些和坚定的抉择结合在一起的感情运动，是否不能由于身体方面的原因而重新分开。如果不能的话，我们就可以推知，即使心灵打算去面对某种危险，并且把勇敢的动作和这种抉择结合起来，但是当危险就在眼前时，以某种方式悬置着的松果腺仍然会使心灵除了逃跑之外，不做他想。确实，意志与运动之间既然并没有什么共同标准，心灵的力量与身体的力量之间，当然也就没有什么比较的可能性。因此，身体的力量绝不能为心灵的力量所决定。我们还可以补充说，我们也找不到松果腺在大脑中心所要处的适当位置，以便它可以很容易地以种种不同的方式开始运动，而且也并不是所有的神经都一直伸展到脑腔里面的。最后，我对笛卡尔关于意志和意志自由的一切说法，都忽略不提了。因为我已经充分证明其逻辑前提是错误的。因此，心灵的力量既然像我上面所指出的那样，只是由理智所决定的，所以我们将只从心灵的知识来确定医治感情的药方。我相信每个人对这种药方都曾经有过体验，只是缺乏精确的观察和清楚的认识而已。以此为基础，我们将仅仅从心灵的知识里推出一切和心灵的幸福有关的东西。

公理

一、如果在同一个主体当中，激起两个相反的行为，那么它们将必然发生变化。要么两个都变化，要么只是其中一个发生变化，并且一直到二者不再彼此反对为止。

二、一种结果的力量由其原因的力量所决定的，是就其本质是由其原因的本质所解释或决定的而言。

命题

命题一：正如思想和事物的观念在心灵中是有序的和互相联系的那样，身体的情状或事物的意象在身体中也以同样的方式排列和联系着。

证明观念的次序和联系与事物的次序和联系是相同的，反之亦然，事物的次序和联系与观念的次序和联系也是相同的。因此，正如观念的次序和联系在心灵中依据身体的情状的次序和联系发生一样，身体情状的次序和联系也同样遵照心灵中思想和事物的观念的次序和联系发生。

命题二：如果我们将精神或情感与一个外在原因的思想分开，而把它与另外一个思想结合起来，那么对于这一外在原因的爱或恨，以及由这些情感所引起的心灵的起伏，就将随之而消灭。

证明构成爱或恨的实在性的东西，是伴随着一个外在原因的观念而引起的快乐或痛苦。因此，如果消除了这个外在原因的观念，那么爱或恨的实在性也就随之消除了。所以这些情感和由这些情感所引起的任何其他情感也将随之消灭。

命题三：一个被动的情感，只要当我们对它形成清晰明了的观念时，它就立即不再是一个被动的情感了。

证明一个被动的情感是一个混乱的观念。因此，如果我们对情感形成清晰明了的观念，那么，就情感仅仅与心灵相联系而言，这个观念与情感只会在理智中可以被区别。因此，这个情感也将不再是被动的情感。

推论因此，我们对于情感了解得越多，我们就越能控制情感，而心灵所感受到的情感的痛苦也就越少。

命题四：对于身体的任何情状，我们都能够形成某种清晰明了的概念。

证明凡是一切事物所共同具有的特质，只能被充分地理解。因此对于身体的任何情状，我们都能够形成某种清晰明了的概念。

推论由此可知，我们对任何情感都不能形成一个清晰明了的概念。因为一个情感是身体的一个情状的观念，而且必定包含某种清晰明了的概念。

命题五：一个关于某事物的情感，我们既不认为该事物是必然的，也不认为是可能的或偶然的，而只是单纯地想象它，那么，只要其他条件相等，关于该事物的情感就要超过任何其他情感。

证明对于一个我们认为是自由的事物的情感，要超过一个我们认为是必然的事物的情感，因而它也会超过一个我们想象为可能的或偶然的事物的情感。而设想一个事物是自由的，无非是单纯地想象这一事物，而对于决定它行为的原因则一无所知。所以，对于我们单纯地想象着的一个事物的情感，如果其他条件相等，就要超过对于一个我们设想为必然的、可能的或偶然的事物的情感。因此，这种情感将会超过所有其他情感。

命题六：心灵越是将一切事物都理解为必然的，那它控制情感的力量就会越大，而受到情感的控制就会越少。

证明心灵认为一切事物都是必然的，并且其存在与行为都是由无限的因果联系所决定的。因此，心灵可以更少地受到这些事物所引起的情感的控制，而且也可以更少地受到这些事物本身的影响。

命题七：凡是由理性所引起的情感，如果我们把时间计算在内，要比那些与我们认为不在面前的个别事物有关的情感，具有更大的力量。

证明我们认为一个事物不在面前，并不是由于我们借以想象该事物的情感的原因，而是由于身体受到另外一种情感的影响，而这种情感排斥该事物存在的原因。所以，那些与我们认为不在面前的事物有关的情感，就其性质而言，并不能克服人的其他行为和力量，反而在某种情形之下它可以受到那些排斥其外在原因存在的情感的控制。但是，起于理性的情感必然地与事物的共同特质有关，而事物的共同特质，我们永远认为就在面前（因为没有任何排斥其当前存在的东西），而且，我们永远是以同样的方式去认识它们的。因此这种情感永远是相同的。所以，凡是与此相反，并且还没有由其外在原因所维持的情感，将力求不断地适应这种起于理性的情感，直到不再和它相反为止。在此情形下，起于理性的情感，具有更大的力量。

命题八：同时聚合起来从而引起一种情感的原因越多，这种情感的力量就越强大。

证明同时出现的原因很多，要比原因很少更加有力。所以，同时引起一种情感的原因越多，这种情感的力量也就越大。

命题九：一种与很多不同的原因相联系的情感，心灵同时审视这个情感本身以及这些不同的原因，要比只与较少的原因或一个原因相关联的同样有力的情感，害处要少。而我们所感受到的痛苦也更少，受到每一原因的影响也更少。

证明一种情感，只有当它妨碍心灵的思想时，才可以说是恶的或有害的。所以，如果一种情感能引起心灵同时沉思若干事物，比起另外一个同样有力的情感独占心灵，使它只能沉思少数事物或一个事物，而不能思想其他任何事物，当然害处更少。这是我们的第一个论点。再者，心灵的本质，换句话说，心灵的力量，纯粹是由思想所构成的。因此，心灵对于一个引起它同时沉思若干事物的情感，比起对于一个同样有力、但只能独占它而沉思少数事物或单一事物的情感，感受到的痛苦当然会更少。这是第二点。最后，这样的情感，就其同时与许多外在原因相联系而言，它从每个原因中所感受到的力量就会更少。

命题十：只要我们不被违背我们本性的情感所刺激，我们就有力量依据理智的秩序，来安排或联合身体的情状。

证明违背我们本性的情感，也就是恶的情感，而它之所以是恶的，就在于它对心灵的理解力有所妨碍。所以只要我们不被违背我们本性的情感所刺激，心灵努力理解事物的力量就不会受到阻碍，因此仍然具有形成清晰明了的观念的力量，以及从这一观念推出其他观念的力量。我们也因此具有依据理智的秩序来安排或联合身体情状的力量。

命题十一：一个意象所涉及到的对象越多，就越充分或越活跃，而且越能占据心灵。

证明一个意象或一种情感所涉及到的事物越多，能刺激或培养这一意象或情感的原因也就越多。所有这些原因，心灵都要根据该情感而同时审视。因此，这种情感就会越充分，或越充满活力，而且越能占据心灵。

命题十二：事物的意象与我们所清晰明了认识的事物的意象相联系，要比和其他意象相联系更加容易。

证明我们所能清晰明了地认识的事物，要么是事物的共同特质，要么是由事物的共同特质推出的东西，因而常常在我们的心中被唤起。所以我们审视其他事物时，与这些事物相结合要比与其他什么东西相结合更为容易；相应地，也更容易把它们的意象与这些能够清晰明了地认识事物的意象联系在一起。

命题十三：与一个意象相联系的其他意象越多，这一意象就越是活跃。

证明因为与一个意象相联系的其他意象越多，能激起这一意象的原因也就越多。

命题十四：心灵能使身体的一切情状或事物的意象都与神的观念相联系。

证明没有任何身体的情状，心灵不能形成对其某种清晰明了的概念。因此，心灵能使身体的一切情状都与神的观念相联系。

命题十五：凡是清晰明了地了解自己及其感情的人，是敬爱神的，而且他越能了解自己和自己的感情，他就越敬爱神。

证明清晰明了地理解自己及其感情的人，会感到快乐，而他的快乐是伴随着神的观念的。因此他就会敬爱神。并且，他越是了解自己和他的情感，就会越敬爱神。

命题十六：这种对神的敬爱，必定在心灵中占据首要的地位。

证明因为这种爱是和身体的所有情状相联系的，并且身体的所有情状，都培养这种爱。所以对神的这种敬爱必定在心灵中占据首要的地位。

命题十七：神不会有被动的情感，它既不会由于任何快乐的情感，也不会由于任何痛苦的情感而受到影响。

证明一切与神相联系的观念都是真的，换句话说，都是充分的。因此，神不会有被动的情感。再者，神既不会变得更加完满，也不会变得不太完满。因此，神不会被任何快乐或痛苦的情感所影响。

推论严格来说，神不爱人也不恨人。因为，神不会被任何快乐或痛苦的情感所激动，所以神既不爱人，也不恨人。

命题十八：没有人会憎恨神。

证明神的观念在我们心中是充分的和完满的。因此，就我们能够沉思神而言，我们就是主动的。因而决不会有痛苦与神的观念相伴随。换句话说，没有人会憎恨神。

推论对神的爱决不会转变成恨。

命题十九：凡是爱神的人，不可能指望神会爱他作为回报。

证明因为，如果一个人指望神会爱他作为回报，那么他将希望他所爱的神不是神。因此他将希望痛苦的感觉，这是荒谬的。所以凡是爱神的人，不可能指望神会爱他作为回报。

命题二十：这种对神的爱不可能被羡慕或嫉妒的情感所玷污。反之，当我们认识到通过相同的对神的敬爱这一纽带，与我们相联系的人越多，我们对神的敬爱就越会增加。

证明对神的爱是我们依据理性的命令所能追求的至善。这种至善是所有人共有的。而且我们也愿意所有人都能享受这种至善。因此，对神的爱既不可能被羡慕的情感所玷污，也不可能被嫉妒的情感所玷污。反之，当我们认识到因为敬爱神而感到愉快的人越多，那么我们对神的敬爱也就越会增加。

注释我们还可以按照同一方式证明，不存在与敬爱神的情感直接相反、并且能消灭它的情感。因此我们可以得出结论：对神的爱是一切情感中最持久的。而且就这种情感与身体相联系而论，只有身体消灭后，它才能随之同时消灭。就这种情感仅仅与心灵相联系而言，其性质是怎样的，我们不久就会追究。

以上，我已经将所有克制情感的良方，或心灵本身所能克制情感的力量一一说明。从这里我们可以看出心灵克制情感的力量在于：

一、对于情感的真正知识。

二、心灵使情感与我们混乱地想象到的关于情感的外界原因的思想彼此分离。

三、与我们清楚理解的事物相联系的情感的时间，超过了与我们以混乱、不完整的方式所认识的事物相联系的情感的时间。

四、大量培养情感的原因。通过这些原因，情感能与事物的共同特质或神相联系。

五、最后，心灵能够有次序地安排好它自己的情感，并将这些情感彼此联系起来。

不过，为了对心灵克制情感的力量有更好的理解，首先可以从以下事实看出来。当我们比较这个人的情感与另一个人的情感，并发现这个人比另一个人更多地受到同一种情感的困扰时，或者当我们比较同一个人的各种情感，而发现其中某种情感比另一种情感更能影响或刺激他时，我们称这种情感是强烈的。因为每一种情感的力量都是通过比较这种情感的外因的力量与我们自己的力量来决定的。心灵的力量既然仅仅由知识所决定，而心灵的虚弱或被动又仅仅是由知识的缺陷所决定的，由此可以推知，那些基本上是由不充分的观念所构成的心灵是最被动的，因此要辨别这种心灵的特征，最好是根据其被动的地方，而不是主动的地方。反之，那些基本是由充分观念所构成的心灵则是最主动的。因此，即使仍然包含与前者同样多的不充分的观念，要认识这种心灵，也最好通过属于人类德行的充分观念，而不是通过那些反映人类弱点的不充分的观念。再者，还必须注意，精神上的病态和不幸通常都可以追溯到对某种东西的爱恋，而这个东西既是变化无常的，也是我们永远不可能控制的。因为，如果不是爱恋它的话，没有人会因为任何东西而担心或焦虑。一切过失、猜疑、敌意，都是源于人爱恋那些不可能真正控制的东西。

这样，我们就很容易认识到，清晰明了的知识，特别是那种建立在对神的知识基础上的第三种知识，对克制我们的情感所具有的力量了。就情感作为被动的情感而言，如果这种知识不能把它们绝对地加以消灭，至少也能使这种情感只占据心灵的极小部分。此外，这种知识还能产生一种对于永恒不变、而我们又能真正分享的事物的爱。这种爱因此不可能被普通的爱所包含的缺点所玷污，反而还会越来越强大地发展起来，占据着心灵的绝大部分，并且深深地渗透在心灵之中。

至此，我已经结束了关于现世生活的所有谈论了。因为，正如我在此注释的开头所说，我已经简要地描述了心灵克制情感的所有药方。关于这一点，凡是注意到我在此注释中所说的话，以及心灵及其情感的定义，最后注意到第三部分命题一和命题三的人，就很容易明白。所以，现在是讨论没有和身体相联系的心灵之绵延的时候了。

命题二十一：只有当身体存在时，心灵才能想象任何事物，或回忆过去的事物。

证明只有当身体存在时，心灵才能表示其身体的真实存在，并将身体的情状当作真实的东西来想象。因此，只有当自己的身体存在时，心灵才能想象一个身体，把它当作真实的存在。所以只有当身体存在时，心灵才能想象任何事物，或回忆过去的事物。

命题二十二：不过，在神之中必然存在一个观念，它在永恒的形式下表达这个人或那个人身体的本质。

证明神不仅是这个人或那个人身体存在的原因，而且也是他的本质的原因。因此，这种本质必须通过神的本质才能被认识，并且必须通过某种永恒的必然性才能被认识。而这种概念必然存在于神之中。

命题二十三：人的心灵不会绝对地随着身体的消灭而消灭，它的某种永恒的东西仍然留存。

证明在神之中必然有一个概念或观念表示人的身体的本质，而这个概念或观念必然是某种属于人类心灵的本质的东西。但是，只有当心灵表示身体的真实存在时，我们才能说心灵可以受时间限制的绵延，因为身体可以用绵延来说明，并且可以受时间限制。换句话说，只有当身体存在时，我们才能说心灵有绵延。而心灵中既然有某种东西，只有通过神的绝对本质按照某种永恒的必然性才能被认识，那么这种属于心灵的本质的东西，必然是永恒的。

命题二十四：我们对个别事物理解得越多，我们对神的理解也越多。

证明从第一部分命题二十五的推论来看，这一命题是很清楚的。

命题二十五：心灵的最高努力和心灵的最高德行，都在于依据第三种知识来理解事物。

证明第三种知识是通过对神的某一属性的充分观念而获得的对于事物本质的充分知识。如果我们越能依据这种知识来理解事物，那么我们就越能理解神。因此，这就是心灵的最高德行，换句话说，心灵的力量或本性或心灵的最高努力就在于依据第三种知识来理解事物。

命题二十六：心灵越善于依据第三种知识来理解事物，那么它就越愿意依据第三种知识来理解事物。

证明这是很清楚的。因为，只要我们认为心灵能依据第三种知识来理解事物，在此情形下，我们就认为它是被决定了要这样来理解事物的。因此心灵越善于依据第三种知识来理解事物，那么它就越愿意这样来理解事物。

命题二十七：从第三种知识可以产生心灵的最高满足。

证明心灵的最高德行在于知识，或在于依据第三种知识来理解事物。心灵越善于依据这种知识来理解事物，心灵的这种德行将越大。因而，谁能够依据这种知识来理解事物，谁就能够走向最高的人的完满。因此他就会感到最大的快乐，这种快乐是由他自己和他自己的德行的观念所伴随的情感。所以，从这种知识可以产生心灵的最高满足。

命题二十八：依据第三种知识来理解事物的努力或欲望不可能起于第一种知识，而是起于第二种知识。

证明这一命题是自明的。因为，凡是我们所清晰明了地理解的事物，我们不是从该事物自身去理解，或者从另外一个通过自身而被认识的东西去理解它。换句话说，我们心中清晰明了的观念，或者属于第三种知识的观念，不可能从属于第一种知识的混乱的、不完整的观念推导出来，而是从充分的观念，或从第二及第三种知识推导出来的。所以，依据第三种知识来理解事物的欲望，不可能起于第一种知识，而是起于第二种知识。

命题二十九：心灵在永恒的形式下能理解一切事物，它之所以能理解它们，并不是因为它认识到了身体现在的真实存在，而是因为它是在永恒的形式下认识身体的本质的。

证明只有当心灵认识到其身体现在的存在时，它才能认识可以由时间决定的绵延。而且也只有这样，心灵才有根据时间关系来认识事物的能力。但永恒是不能用绵延来说明的。所以在此意义上，心灵是没有在永恒的形式下认识事物的能力的。心灵之所以有这种能力，是因为理性的本性就在于在永恒的形式下认识事物，而且也因为在永恒的形式下认识身体的本质也属于心灵的本性。除了这两点之外，没有其他东西属于心灵的本质。所以，只有当心灵在永恒的形式下认识身体的本质时，这种在永恒的形式下认识事物的能力才属于心灵。

命题三十：我们的心灵只要能在永恒的形式下认识它自身和它的身体，就必然具有神的知识，并且知道它是在神之内的，可以通过神而被认识的。

证明就永恒包含着必然存在而言，永恒就是神的本质。所以，在永恒的形式下认识事物就是通过把神的本质当作真实存在去认识事物，或者是通过神的本质包含存在去认识事物。所以，我们的心灵只要能在永恒的形式下去认识它自身和它的身体，就必然具有神的知识，并且知道它是在神之内的，可以通过神而被认识。

命题三十一：就心灵本身是永恒的而言，第三种知识依赖心灵作为它的形式因。

证明只有就心灵在永恒的形式下认识它自己的身体而言，换句话说，仅就心灵是永恒的而言，心灵才能在永恒形式下认识事物。因而，仅就心灵是永恒的而言，它才拥有神的知识，而这种知识必然是充分的，因此，就心灵是永恒的来说，它有能力认识一切出自神的知识的所有事物，这就是说，心灵有能力根据第三种知识认识事物。因此就心灵是永恒的说来，它是这种知识的充分原因或形式因。

命题三十二：无论我们所理解的什么，它都是由把神的观念作为原因伴随而来。

证明从这种知识中可以产生心灵的最高满足，换句话说，可以产生快乐，而这种快乐是由心灵自身的观念伴随而来，因此，神的观念也是这种快乐的原因。

推论从第三种知识中必然产生对神的理智的爱。因为从这种知识可以产生伴随着神的观念而来的、以神的观念为原因的快乐，也就是说产生对神的爱。这并不是就我们想象着神如在眼前而言，而是就我们理解神是永恒的而言。这就是我所谓的对神的理智的爱。

命题三十三：从第三种知识中产生的对神的理智的爱是永恒的。

证明第三种知识是永恒的，所以，从这种知识中产生的爱也必然是永恒的。

命题三十四：只有当身体永存时，心灵才会受到那些被动情感的牵制。

证明想象是心灵默想某个事物如在眼前时的一种观念。但这种观念表示人的身体的当前的状况胜过外界事物的性质。所以，情感是表示身体当前状况的一种想象，只有当身体永存时，心灵才会受到被动情感的牵制。

推论由此可知，除了理智的爱以外，没有其他爱是永恒的。

命题三十五：神以无限的理智的爱，爱它自身。

证明神是绝对无限的，这就是说，神的本性享受着它自身的无限完满性。这样的享受是由它自身的观念所伴随着的，或换句话说，是由它自身观念的原因伴随着的。这就是我们已经描述过的理智的爱。

命题三十六：心灵对神的理智的爱，就是神借以爱它自身的爱，这不是就神是无限的而言，而是就在永恒的形式下神能够通过人的心灵的本质被体现而言，这就是说，心灵对神的理智的爱，是神借以爱它自身的无限的爱的一部分。

证明这种心灵的爱一定被当作是心灵的活动。这种心灵自己观察自己的活动是伴随着神的观念并把神的观念当作原因而来的。这就是说，就神能够通过人的心灵被体现，由于神自己的观念他可以观察自己而言，心灵的爱是一种活动。因此，这种心灵的爱是神借以爱其自身的无限的爱的一部分。

推论由此推知，只要神爱其自身，那么无异于说神爱人，因此，神对人的爱，与心灵对神的理智的爱是同样的。

注释综上所述，我们可以清晰地了解我们的拯救、幸福或自由之所在了，它们存在于我们对神的不变的永恒的爱，或神对人的爱中。在《圣经》中，这种爱或幸福被叫做光荣是很恰当的。因为无论这种爱是出自神或是出自心灵，它都可以恰当地被称为精神的满足，而这一称谓与光荣并没有真正的区别。因为就爱出自神而言，如果这里我们还可以用“快乐”这一术语，那么这种爱就是由神自己的观念所伴随着的快乐。而就爱出自心灵而言，爱也就是由神自己的观念所伴随着的快乐。

再者，心灵的本质既然完全由以神为本源与基础的知识所构成，那么我们可以明白地看出，我们心灵的本质和存在在什么方式和什么途径下出自神性，而且不变地依赖神。我想我们值得在这里提到这一点，以便借这个例子来解释，一些特殊事物的直觉知识或者所谓的第三种知识是如何有效，并且比那些常识——我所谓的第二种知识如何更强而有力。因为，虽然在第一部分里，我曾经概括说明了一些术语，说明了所有事物（当然，人的心灵也包括在内）的本质和存在都依存于神，那些证明虽然合理也无可置疑，但还是不能如此地感动我们的心灵，如同这同样的结论来源于神的一些个别事物的本质那样。

命题三十七：在自然中没有违反这种理智的爱的事物，也没有能够取消这种理智的爱的事物。

证明就理智的爱通过神的本性而被当作永恒的真理而言，这种理智的爱必然源于心灵的本性。因而，如果有任何事物违反这种理智的爱，那么该事物就会违背真理，这样那些会否定这种理智的爱的事物，将会使真理变成谬误。这显然是一个谬论。所以，在自然中没有违反这种理智的爱的事物。

命题三十八：心灵凭借第二和第三种知识所理解的事物越多，它遭受的有害情感的损害就将越少，它就将越不怕死。

证明心灵的本质是由知识所构成的。所以心灵凭借第二和第三种知识所理解的事物越多，那么心灵中永存的部分就越大，因此，不能被那种与我们本性相反的情感感动的部分越大，被有害的情感损害的部分也将越大。所以心灵凭借第二和第三种知识所理解的事物越多，那么它保持完整不受损害的部分也就越大，而遭受有害情感的损害也将越少。

命题三十九：一个拥有有能力行使最大限量行为的身体的人，都拥有一颗大部分都是永恒的心灵。

证明一个拥有有能力行使最大限量行为的身体的人，极少被那些有害的情感所激动，换句话说，极少被违反人们本性的情感所激动，所以他拥有依照理智的规则安排和联系身体的情状的能力，继而将有能力使身体的所有情状都与神的观念相联系。因此，他将感到对神的爱，这种对神的爱，一定占据心灵或构成心灵首要的部分。所以，这样一个人将具有一个大部分是永恒的心灵。

命题四十：事物拥有的完满越多，它也就越主动，事物拥有的完满越少，它也就越被动；反之亦然，事物越主动，它也就越完满。

证明事物越完满，它也就越真实。因此，一个事物主动越多，被动就越少。这个证明也可以被颠倒过来，因此就是，事物越主动，它也就越完满。

推论由此可知，心灵中永存的部分，无论大或小，一定比其他部分更完满。因为心灵中永恒的部分是理智，只有通过理智，我们才可以说是主动的。我们已经指出的心灵中毁灭的部分是想像力，只有通过想像力，我们才可以说是被动的。所以，心灵中永存的部分，无论大或小，都比剩下的那一部分更完满。

命题四十一：即使我们过去不知道我们的心灵是永恒的，我们也应该特别重视虔诚与信仰，以及一切我们在第四部分所指出来的有关勇气与高尚品德的诸德行。

证明首要的唯一的道德基础或正确的生活方式就在于寻求自己真正的利益，但现在，当我们决定什么理性是有用的时候，我们并没有考虑到，直到第五部分我们才开始认识的心灵的永恒性。虽然那时我们还不知道心灵是永恒的，但是我们也已经特别注意勇气与高尚品德本质的重要性了。所以，即使我们仍然不知道心灵的永恒性，我们也应该首先对理性的认识予以关注。

命题四十二：幸福不是德行的报酬，而是德行自身；并不是因为我们克制了自己的贪婪，我们才享有幸福。相反，是因为我们享有幸福，所以我们才能克制我们的贪婪。

证明幸福在于对神的爱，这种爱源于第三种知识，因而这种爱必定与主动的心灵有关。所以，幸福就是德行自身。这是我们要证明的第一点。再者，心灵越是能享受这种神圣的爱或幸福，它也就越能理解，换句话说，心灵控制感情的力量也将越强，而且心灵受有害情感的损害也将越小。所以心灵越享受这种神圣的爱或幸福，它也才越具有控制贪婪的力量，而既然人类控制情感的力量只在于理智，所以没有人会因为他能够控制自己的情感而享受到幸福。反之，他控制贪婪的力量源于幸福自身。

注释现在，我已经将我要说的所有关于心灵克制情感的力量，以及关于心灵的自由说完了。由此可见，明智的人是如何地强而有力，如何地高超于那个仅仅为贪婪所驱使的无知的人了。因为无知的人不仅在许多情况下只被外因所困扰，从来没有得到过真正的灵魂的满足，而且他似乎并不知道他自己，不知道神，也不知道其他事物的生活。当他一旦停止承受时，他也就停止了存在。反之，一个真正被看作明智的人，他的灵魂几乎是不会受到扰乱的，而且按照某种永恒的必然性，他能认识自身，认识神，也能认识其他事物。他决不会停止存在，而且永远能拥有真正的灵魂的满足。如果我所指出的足以达到这一目的的道路看起来过于艰难，但是这条道路仍然可以被发现。既然这条道路很少被人发现，那足以表明这条道路是很艰难的。因为如果解救的事情易如反掌，可以不劳而获，那又怎么被所有的人忽视呢？但是一切杰出事物之难得，正与其稀有一样。