金融、发展和改革：汉、英

沈联涛 著

中信出版社

图书在版编目（CIP）数据

金融、发展和改革：汉、英/沈联涛主编.—北京：中信出版社,2014.3

ISBN 978-7-5086-4415-8

Ⅰ.①金…Ⅱ.①沈…Ⅲ.①开发银行—中国—文集—汉、英 Ⅳ.①F832.3-53

中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字（2014）第020403号

Government and the American Economy：A New History by Price V.Fishback，Douglass C.North

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金融、发展和改革

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序

在国家开发银行成立20周年之际，由沈联涛先生主编、汇集开行国际顾问智慧和心血的《金融、发展和改革》一书即将付梓出版。阅读各位老朋友的一篇篇文章，回首开行20年来的改革发展历程，特别是与各位国际顾问的每一次深入交流探讨，我感慨万千，心绪难以平静。

1998年4月，亚洲金融危机肆虐之时，我从央行调任开行行长。当时的开行可谓内外交困，一方面自身不良资产高达40%，一方面受亚洲金融危机影响，中国遭遇改革开放以来的第一次通货紧缩，开行发展面临巨大挑战。作为政策性银行，开行应该怎么办，如何发挥自身作用，处理好支持经济增长与防范金融风险的关系，成为摆在我面前的重大抉择。经过慎重考虑并请示朱镕基总理同意，开行决定成立国际顾问委员会，并十分荣幸地邀请到国际政界、学界和业界翘楚，也是我的良师益友，担任开行国际顾问，为开行的改革发展出谋划策。

开行国际顾问委员会1999年成立以来，每年召开一次会议。顾问会议议题广泛、内容充实、探讨深入，通过思想交流、观点碰撞、经验分享，顾问们的真知灼见丰富了开行人的知识储备，拓展了开行人的国际视野，为开行改革发展提供了战略支撑。顾问们的穿针引线，也增进了国际社会对开行乃至对中国的了解，为开行国际化发展创造了有利条件。

如今，国际顾问委员会已伴随开行走过了15年，开行也将迎来成立20周年。在包括国际顾问等各界人士的帮助下，在开行人的努力下，开行已经发展成为中国中长期投融资的主力银行和全球最大的开发性金融机构，在基础设施、城镇化建设、社会民生和国际合作等领域发挥了不可替代的作用，取得了优良的经营业绩，资产规模超过8万亿元人民币，业务遍及全球100多个国家和地区，资产质量保持国际一流，不良贷款率连续近9年低于1%。开行取得的成就离不开各位国际顾问的关心、指导和帮助。对此，我和所有开行人都永远铭记在心！

特别感谢沈联涛先生和各位国际顾问，他们为编写这本书付出了大量心血。这本书的各篇文章分别由各位国际顾问和开行现任领导撰写，内容涵盖地缘政治、国际治理、金融改革和开行发展，既有对理论的探讨和思考，也有对实践的分析和总结，具有较高的史料价值、学术价值和很强的可读性。

虽然我已不在开行工作，但我会永远关心、支持开行的改革发展，希望开行的明天会更好，为国家发展和社会进步做出更大贡献。相信各位国际顾问也会一如既往地支持开行，关心中国的发展进步，我想这也正是这本书的意义所在。

陈元

二〇一四年二月十七日于北京

引言

沈联涛

国家开发银行成立于1994年，是中国三大政策性银行之一，主要负责为重大基础设施和产业建设项目提供中长期融资。开行不辱使命，特别在过去10年间，助力中国经济蓬勃迅猛发展。开行融资支持了国家重大基础设施项目的建设，其中包括三峡水利枢纽、上海浦东国际机场、北京奥运会场馆设施和上海世博会等工程。开行投资的项目遍布全国，涉及基础设施、基础产业、能源和交通等诸多领域，同时也助推老工业基地振兴。

1998年，陈元先生开始执掌国家开发银行。在其后的15年间，陈元先生全力推动开行向世界级开发性金融机构转变。开行以市场为导向，引导资源投向国家经济社会发展的重点领域。开行锐意进取，不断提高业务水平，向国际标准靠拢，尤其在资产质量管理方面。开行的风险管理取得长足进步，不良贷款率从1997年的40%降至2003年的不足1%。尽管2007～2009年的全球金融危机对中国经济产生不利影响，开行始终将其不良贷款率维持在这一水平。

2008年12月，国家开发银行正式开始商业化改制，陈元出任董事长。改制后的开行通过中长期投融资支持国家“保增长、扩内需、调结构”政策的实施，同时推进自身商业化改革，业务集中于六个方面，通过商业化运营为结构调整、普惠民生、现代化和全球化等国家重点领域提供支持：

1.贯彻国家宏观经济政策，确保经济持续增长，提供以下四大类贷款：

·应对全球金融危机推出的经济刺激计划下中央政府批准的投资项目。

·扩大内需，如保障性安居工程、农村基础设施建设、医疗保健、文化教育、生态环境等。

·重大基础设施项目（包括南水北调、高铁、公路、核电站和上海世博会等）；重点行业和融资瓶颈领域（如煤、电、油、运、农业、电信业和公共基础设施）。

·环保节能项目以及中西部地区和东北老工业基地等区域发展项目。

2.促民生的基层金融贷款，包括支持“三农”、城乡规划、中小企业、低收入住房和助学贷款等。

3.融资支持国家“走出去”战略，包括为上合组织成员国、拉美和非洲提供贷款。

4.把开行建设成一流的债券银行。

5.推动经营业务的商业化运作和调整，以持续得到改善。

6.强化企业内部风险管理架构和全面风险管理实践。

截至改制后的第一年即2009年末，开行累计发行（本外币）债券超过5万亿元；其中人民币债券3.3万亿元，占中国银行间债券市场总发行量的25%。2009年，开行在香港成功发行30亿元人民币债券，成为中国境内首家推出以上海银行间同业拆放利率（Shibor）为基准的人民币浮息债券的银行。截至2009年末，开行总资产达4.5万亿元，净利润总额319亿元，不良贷款率仅为0.94%。

本着“控总量、保重点、调结构、防风险、促协同”的核心原则，开行在上述业务领域保持强劲增长，经营业绩连年攀升。据2012年财报显示，总资产越7万亿元大关，达7.52万亿元（1.21万亿美元）；不良贷款率连续8年低于1%；资本充足率接近11%；净利润增至630亿元。

过去10年（2003～2012年），开行累计向4000多个项目发放贷款16000多亿元。2012年，在银行业对能源、农业、水资源、电信和公共基础设施等国家重大领域的投资中，开行占39.3%。在民生领域，2012年开行保障性住房贷款占全国银行贷款的60%；创新的贷款模式惠及中小企业；累计有770万名学生获得开行的助学贷款。在环保领域，2012年开行绿色信贷和低碳融资达2490亿元，支持环境保护、节能减排等项目。

在大力拓展国际业务的过程中，开行继续加强与外国政府、企业和金融机构的合作，投资大型国际项目，支持基础设施、农业、能源和社会领域发展，帮助中国企业“走出去”。截至2012年末，开行外汇贷款余额2245亿美元，离岸人民币贷款余额726亿元。开行与全球101个国家和地区的638家银行建立代理行关系，推动国际业务的发展。

开行的成绩应编为案例加以研究：在发挥政策性银行优势的基础上，转向市场化的商业运作模式，服务于中国乃至全球经济发展的需要。开行今天的成就归功于卓越的领导，尤其是陈元先生的远见卓识和身体力行。掌舵开行15年后，2013年3月11日，陈元先生当选中国人民政治协商会议第十二届全国委员会副主席，4月15日卸任开行董事长一职。在开行国际顾问委员会第十四次会议上，陈元先生获得国际顾问委员会名誉主席的称号。

谨以本书献给陈元先生。本书记录了有幸与陈元先生共事的人们的所言所想，时间跨度从1988～1989年中国金融改革伊始、陈元先生担任中国人民银行副行长之时到其后执掌开行期间。我和国家开发银行董事长胡怀邦先生非常荣幸也十分感谢开行国际顾问会的委员们慷慨撰文，讲述陈元先生在中国金融转型中的作用。本书汇聚了17位世界级政治家、外交家和金融界思想领袖的真知灼见，既有他们对于中国最初的印象，也有对中国发展为世界第二大经济体的见证。

本书分为四个部分。第一部分介绍中国的开放。第二部分描述中国金融体制和机制的建设。第三部分强调全球增长伙伴的重要性。第四部分畅想打造国家开发银行的未来。

第一部分 中国的开放

这部分的四篇文章分别由亨利·基辛格博士、保罗·基廷阁下、保罗·沃尔克先生和弗雷德·伯格斯坦博士撰写。他们都是国家安全、领导力和金融领域的权威。

亨利·基辛格博士是诺贝尔和平奖得主，在1973年至1977年间担任美国国务卿。他所促成的1972年中美元首会晤，标志着中美关系的解冻，也为邓小平开放中国贸易和投资的历史性决定做了铺垫。

2013年4月，在北京召开的国家开发银行国际顾问委员会第十四次会议上，他就“中美关系”进行了特别发言。基辛格博士从一个恢宏的历史角度出发进行阐述：自20世纪70年代以来，80次访华让他亲历中国历史，中国也给他留下了持久的印象——中国具备成为一个世界大国的进取精神和所有条件。他一贯坚信，维护世界秩序的关键是中美两国的合作。现实验证了他这一坚定信念。

基辛格博士希望看到中美之间的这一共识能转化为具体政策，以实现共同目标，解决全球在能源、环境、核不扩散、网络和空间等方面的一系列问题。由于两国的历史和文化理念不同，这一过程存在很多挑战。美国认为所有问题都有解决方案，而中国则认为所有解决方案都会带来新的问题。但是，看到了中国的现状并结识了有如陈元这样的杰出领导人后，他对中国目前的政策措施非常乐观，认为这为中美两国时隔多年后重启真诚对话奠定了基础。届时，世界将会看到两个大国如何合作搭建新型国际秩序。

保罗·基廷阁下是澳大利亚的第24任总理（1991～1996年），是国家开发银行国际顾问委员会主席。

在其“亚洲新秩序”一文中，基廷先生从政治和历史的角度，对目前新型全球经济秩序进行了全面讨论。他哀叹于1991年冷战结束后全球领导力的缺失，世界经济因而没有进入良性运转行轨道。近年来，全球经济失衡和发达国家的危机使发达经济体的地位大大降低，美国的领导力更是严重受挫，而欧洲又被自己的货币联盟危机所绑架，因为这一联盟中的经济体千差万别。

中国和其他发展中国家在全球增长中贡献率约占四分之三，发达国家已然成为全球转型过程的推动力量。但是，基廷先生认为，依靠高投资和高出口的增长模式对中国来说是不可持续的，中国必须加紧建立一个解决国内问题的增长模式，包括增加国内消费和服务、提高收入并满足人口城镇化的需求。他认为中国和亚洲在改变全球经济运行方式中可以发挥重要作用，包括从传统的财政货币杠杆向更全面的宏观审慎管理系统的转变。

保罗·沃尔克博士在1979年至1987年期间担任美联储主席，是最德高望重的中央银行家和金融事务评论员之一，他撰写了“20世纪90年代前中国金融的发展”一文。

这是篇回忆录，回顾了多年来他与中国的关系及与陈元先生的交情。20世纪80年代，他见证了中国摆脱高度集中、政府主导的经济体制的过程，从生产率和生活水平低下到经历了史上最辉煌的持续增长期，到如今经济发展达到了高峰。1988年至1998年期间时任中国人民银行副行长，后成为开发性金融的掌舵人，陈元先生是这个奇迹故事不可或缺的人物。沃尔克先生追溯了政策思考、大型基础设施项目融资改革、中国金融市场转型，尤其是这些年来建立正确的机构以及机构改革的重要性。陈元还具备解决通常没有受到足够重视的问题的勇气，例如腐败和人才机构建设的重要性等。

弗雷德·伯格斯坦博士是彼得森国际经济研究所高级研究员和名誉所长，从2002年起担任国家开发银行国际顾问委员会委员。他撰写了“中国和世界经济的领袖”，为中国成功融入全球领导体系所必需的步骤提出建议。历史证明，新兴经济大国融入全球领导体系极具挑战性，但对于维护全球稳定乃至和平具有重要意义。虽然必要的系统调整可能会成功，但如果失败将会带来严重甚至是灾难性的后果。融入全球领导体系的任务给守成大国和新兴大国带来了艰巨的责任。要实现顺利的过渡，大国必须愿意与后来者分享领导权。后来者也必须愿意接受国际赋予的领导职责，认识到其行动的外部影响会反作用于国内经济，也要认识到跻身国际、世界一流的实力同时意味着责任。

2013年的世界经济秩序呈现多极化格局，至少有十多个经济体对全球经济表现举足轻重。这一多极队伍还在不断发展壮大，而多极化不断加深的趋势已经在世界经济秩序的体制中得到了体现，即二十国集团取代七国集团成为国际经济领导的主体。然而二十国集团过于庞大，难以有效运转，因此需要一个小型的“协调员的协调组织”来充当世界经济的非正式指导委员会。这个组织的理想构成是三大超级经济体：美国、欧盟和中国。

由于欧盟目前疲于应对金融危机，不适合担当重大国际角色，全球绝大多数经济事务的主要责任就不可避免地落在了中美两国肩上，无论这两国是否要给这一安排贴上“两国集团”的标签。一方面，在近年来，尤其是应对2007年至2009年的危机期间，中美两国在履行这类责任方面毁誉参半。另一方面，两国均未采取一些确保经济可持续复苏的必要措施。此外，在若干问题上，中国与其他二十国集团成员国（包括美国和欧盟成员）的合作似乎有所倒退甚至出现逆转。

有效建立和维护一个成功的世界经济秩序离不开中国的参与、创造和领导。关键的第一步就是从国家利益的界定出发，明确中国自身的体系目标和政策。第二步是就中国的想法认真开展国际大讨论，与其他主要国家集思广益，就新的安排和修订现有机制达成一致。这个过程注定是漫长又充满争议的，但其回报也是不可估量的，有助于定位中国在世界经济中的角色、世界经济在中国国内政策中的地位。

第二部分 中国金融体制和机制的建设

第二部分的四篇文章分别由伊瑟尔·森卓维克先生、沈联涛先生、黄记祖先生和翟健先生撰写。

伊瑟尔·森卓维克先生曾任纽约联储银行执行副总裁，他的文章讲述了关于“中国人民银行支付系统的建设”的个人参与经历。在20世纪80年代末和90年代初，世界银行资助了中国的支付系统开发建设项目。森卓维克先生是国际顾问专家组的成员，为项目提供了重要的指导意见。在此期间，他与陈元先生结下了长久的友谊。在这篇文章中，他从个人角度回忆了推动中国成为世界第二大经济体背后的变化。作为当时负责该项目的中国人民银行副行长，陈元先生对中国支付系统（全名为中国现代化支付系统，CNAPS）的设计和建设功不可没。项目有两个指导团队，国内顾问专家组和国际顾问专家组。森卓维克先生讲述了面对如此复杂的项目，陈元先生如何在双方之间有效突破语言障碍，并克服东西方的工作文化和思维差异；为了执行如此重要和大规模的项目，他又是如何确保支付系统的各个方面均得到了认真的研究，并确保重要的技术标准、会计结构、法律框架、处理程序和组织架构得到了恰当的协调。

沈联涛先生是前央行和金融市场监管官员，目前担任香港经纶国际经济研究院院长。他撰写的“陈元在中国现代化支付系统发展中的作用”是对森卓维克先生一文的内容补充。他通过详细介绍中国现代化支付系统（CNAPS）的发展过程向陈元先生致敬。该系统确实是中国金融系统最重要、最复杂和持续时间最长的基础设施项目。在国内和国际顾问专家的帮助下（其中森卓维克先生发挥了主导作用），陈元先生带领团队，制定了现代化、高价值支付系统的概念和蓝图，这一系统是对中国银行和会计程序以及金融监管和法律框架的彻底改造。项目在1994年进入国际招标阶段，从1996年开始建设，并在此后的10年内在全国推出。CNAPS的核心部分，即人行账目的大额支付系统（HVPS）于2005年上线。在2006年至2011年期间，HVPS的年度交易量增长了5倍，达到1355万亿元人民币。如果没有CNAPS，中国的金融发展，包括银行体系的商业化和货币政策的实施不会如此顺利。

黄记祖先生曾任星展银行的副首席执行官，目前是新加坡凯德置地集团的董事长。他在“开发性金融机构相对于商业银行的功能及定位”一文中分享了他的观点。黄先生基于其在星展银行33年的工作经验，介绍了开发性金融机构（DFI）在快速变化的中国经济与金融环境中可以发挥的作用。在金融行业开放的过程中，中国的商业银行将逐步退出传统的政策性贷款领域，从而将这一职责留给DFI，尤其是支持国家主导的各类开发项目及省市政府的基础设施项目。在他看来，作为中国最重要的DFI，国家开发银行应该利用自身的竞争力，提供长期融资、项目融资、投资银行和顾问服务，履行符合自身经济发展目标的政策性贷款职能。国开行已经在运用国际先进经营理念方面取得了长足进步，相信这对开行向国际一流银行转型至关重要。

翟健先生曾任荷兰国际集团（ING）亚太区首席执行官。他在“在华经营的外资保险企业：迎接挑战、促成变革”一文中分享了他的观点，对中国保险业的增长、发展路径以及外资保险公司在推动行业持续演化的过程中可发挥的作用做了深入分析。他认为，在2001年至2010年的10年间，中国的保险市场取得了飞速发展，形成了国内保险公司为主、外资保险公司为辅的格局。保险业的发展将继续受到财富增长的推动，未来对消费耐用品和住房保险的需求将继续上升，而人口老龄化将增加对医疗保险和储蓄计划的需求。因此，进一步开放市场，让外资险企帮助新兴的保险市场改善服务和提高效率，并将巨大的国民储蓄用于支持经济发展和基础设施建设十分重要。

第三部分 全球增长的合作伙伴

第三部分的五篇文章分别由雅各布·弗兰克尔博士、乌里·希克博士、浦伟士爵士、韦德颖爵士和行天丰雄博士撰写。五篇文章都显示了全球视角对开发性金融的重要性，尤其是考虑到中国对全球贸易和投资的重要性日益上升和其他国家的经验。

雅各布·弗兰克尔博士是以色列央行前行长，现任摩根大通国际主席。他对本书做出了宝贵贡献，所撰写的“国际环境及其对中国的影响”一文，对中国目前所处的国际经济环境、宏观经济形势、贸易和外部失衡的趋势、欧元区的困境以及深层次的失业和让就业雪上加霜的人口老龄化等问题进行了连贯缜密的分析。他传递的信息是，这些全球性问题不能用短视的政策来解决。我们需要着眼于长期的方式来处理政府与公民之间契约性质的变化。在探讨城镇化对发展的影响时，两个主要政策支柱分别是：（1）为进入城市的农村人口创造就业；（2）为城镇化进程中的各种活动提供融资，无论是中小企业还是大型基础设施。正是在长期投融资领域，也就是支持高效、节能环保的大型基础设施项目上，需要国开行发挥重要作用。

乌里·希克博士在1995年至1998年期间担任瑞士驻华大使，目前是多个跨国公司的董事长和董事。他在“公私合作和机构投资者之发展”一文中对二者的作用提供了重要见解，并分享了他与陈元先生合作成立私募基金的经历。1997年，瑞士政府和中国政府成立了第一个合资私募股权投资基金（PE）。私募可以调动私营部门的资源来支持在华的瑞士和中国中小企业发展。这一中外联盟的成功依赖于三个重要因素：（1）了解宏观经济周期和投资时机；（2）选择正确的行业；（3）在投资组合公司的管理中灌输专业、忠诚和正直的原则。为了确保长期可持续性，该基金只投资对具体行业和社会具有持久积极影响的项目，对娱乐或奢侈品等行业则敬而远之。根据中国政府的政策，基金为中国内陆中西部和西南地区的中小企业提供资源。

浦伟士爵士是汇丰银行控股集团的首任董事长，在汇丰工作了44年后于1998年荣退。他在“银行业的开放”一文中分享了他对中国开放银行业的回忆。听说陈元先生将从开行退休，浦伟士爵士特地致函陈元先生，回忆了20世纪80年代外资银行在中国开设分行的困难。后来，中国人民银行给汇丰颁发了几个分行牌照。如今，汇丰在中国已有100多家分行。在人行以及开行担任领导期间，陈元先生的高瞻远瞩和开放思维在中国经济和银行业的逐步开放中发挥了至关重要的作用。

韦德颖爵士是巴克莱资本的副董事长。他在关于“中英关系及国际化改革”的文章中分享了他的经验。他认为中国向国内消费驱动的经济转型必须对收入进行再分配，实现收入从国企向民营部门和家庭的转移，并填补国家养老金系统的资金缺口。因此，发展债券市场，尤其是香港人民币债券离岸市场，是支持中国经济扩张的长久之计，同时也符合人民币国际化的目标。除了依赖政府发行大规模全球基准利率债券外，开行也应当利用其主力政策性银行的地位，为期限较长的债券设定基准利率。与此同时，开行还必须履行社会职责。开行的众多成就还包括一如既往地支持中国经济的持续战略转型，推动产业升级、助力企业并购、支持战略新兴产业、文化产业和中小企业，并提供学生和住房贷款。由于意识到有效的公司治理和风险管理是稳健经营的关键，开行是具有社会责任感的金融机构典范，能为客户、员工和业务所在的社区创造明确的价值。

行天丰雄博士是日本国际货币研究所所长、三菱东京日联银行的高级顾问和日本前大藏省次官（副财长）。他的文章“国际金融危机、欧债危机和日本经济”对金融危机进行了综合分析，其中包含四个要点：（1）从泡沫产生到破灭的过程无一例外地伴随着信贷紧缩和需求骤减；（2）一场普通的金融危机迅速演变为全球危机，原因是当今世界金融交易的全球一体化程度已非常之高；（3）危机给不同市场带来的影响不同，取决于各个市场的具体结构和条件；（4）国际金融危机触发世界经济格局开始改变，全球权力也相应出现了转移。

亚洲，尤其是中国，将受到欧元危机的影响。虽然实体经济重心正在向亚洲转移，但亚洲依然极度依赖欧美金融市场媒介。因此，亚洲应当加强区域合作，强化金融机构和金融市场。

日本目前正在实行“消除通缩”的经济政策。但是，大胆的货币宽松政策、灵活的财政政策以及鼓励私营部门投资的增长战略可能还不够。如果日本经济想在2020年前实现基本财政收支平衡，企业和家庭必须消费，财政整顿必须继续，社会保障体系必须缩减，税收必须增加。

第四部分 打造国家开发银行的未来

最后，第四部分的四篇文章分别由胡怀邦博士、刘遵义教授、汉斯·瑞奇先生和已故的安浩德爵士撰写。这四篇文章为开行在充满未知数的未来如何定位的问题上提出了建议。

胡怀邦博士是国家开发银行董事长，基于在中央银行和银行监管部门工作的丰富经验撰写了“中国银行业的国际化发展”一文。文章回顾了中国银行业在国际化发展方面取得的成就，面临的机遇和挑战，以及中国银行业金融机构为推进国际化发展所作出的努力。自1917年中国银行在香港设立分行起，中国银行业在国际化经营方面已取得了长足进步。截至2012年，中国银行业的境外资产已达到1万亿美元，形成覆盖全球的网络布局，吸引外商来华投资，支持中国企业“走出去”。随着人民币在跨境投资和贸易中的使用不断扩大，金融业发展和改革“十二五”规划的稳步实施，中国银行业国际化的步伐将进一步加快。发达经济体增长乏力，复苏充满不确定性，同时全球金融监管趋严。在这样的背景下，中国银行业金融机构要积极稳妥实施国际化发展战略，加强创新，提高在国际上的话语权。对中国银行业在国际化发展中面临的机遇和挑战，胡董事长做出了客观准确和严谨务实的分析，并提出了切实可行的发展思路。

刘遵义教授是中投国际（香港）有限公司董事长和香港中文大学前校长，撰文题为“‘十二五’规划和人民币国际化的意义”，为“十二五”规划（2011年至2015年）和人民币国际化如何为开行带来巨大机遇提供了分析和实用的讨论。“十二五”规划承诺将经济增长模式从出口导向型转变为内需导向型，将战略从生产资料驱动型转变为技术和创新驱动型。这就需要对基础设施项目和保障房提供长期融资，而这正是国家开发银行的强项。

例如，为了推动技术和创新，开行可以为中国国家光纤网络和新技术商业化试点工厂的建设提供融资。随着人民币的国际化，开行可以利用境外人民币日益增加的供应和用途，进一步推进业务的国际化，例如为外国直接投资企业提供长期人民币贷款。刘先生呼吁开行保持其国有全资政策性银行的地位，利用比商业银行成本更低的长期固定利率资金，为社会经济发展项目提供长期融资。

汉斯·瑞奇先生是花旗集团全球市场公共部门主席，在他题为“国家开发银行与未来的金融格局”的文章中，瑞奇先生回顾了1994年3月开行成立前中国的银行体系状况。在陈元先生的领导下，开行的业绩超越了一家开发性金融机构的范畴。除了让这家背着不良贷款负担的银行扭亏为盈外，陈元先生对开行进行了组织机构和战略调整，包括建立卓越的风险管理体系、重新制定业务战略重点、推动中国资本市场的发展和银行业务的国际化，以及加强全球沟通，以吸收其他开发性金融机构的最佳实践。这一战略的成功使开行的资产增长了10倍，截至2010年已达到8000亿美元，盈利能力与增长并进，而不良贷款率则下跌至0.7%。开行成为了资本市场的创新者，例如首次发行资产证券化产品。对于开行未来的业务模式，瑞奇先生提供了三大选择：（1）将政策性银行业务与商业银行业务合并；（2）把国家开发银行打造为一家全能银行；（3）开行保持其公共部门融资机构的定位不变。无论其未来的最终决定是什么，开行都是一家财务稳健的银行，也是中国金融业的标杆，其优势和成就要归功于陈元。

安浩德爵士（已故）是知名经济学家和银行家，在1994年至2003年期间担任国际清算银行行长，还曾任国际货币基金组织执行董事。2005年至2010年期间担任开行国际顾问委员会委员。2012年9月安浩德爵士突然辞世，而此前他一直日程繁忙，无暇专门撰写一篇献给陈元先生的文章。作为次优方案，他曾提议将他在2009年10月关于亚洲和全球金融危机会议上的午宴演讲收录进这本纪念文集。演讲的题目是“改革全球金融架构”，会议由位于圣芭芭拉的旧金山联储主办。

其实，用这篇文章作为本书的结尾真是再恰当不过了。“全球金融架构”包括三个支柱：（1）支撑国际金融关系的基本经济模式；（2）用于管理这些关系的体制安排；（3）体系中的决策权如何在各个国家之间分配。这三个方面都在发生变化：（1）“二战”后由政府主导的国际金融关系的基本模式现在已转化为市场驱动的模式；（2）世界经济中新兴经济体的地位上升。这就要求新兴市场国家在国际金融关系中决策权的分配问题上获得更多的话语权。虽然这个要求是合理的，但对亚洲国家来说，更重要的是必须明确什么样的国际金融体系能够最好地满足它们中长期未来的需求。借用安浩德爵士2011年在题为“面向21世纪的金融体系”的佩尔·雅各布森讲座结束语，“……为设计一个全新、更稳固的金融体系……它应该是全球的、稳健的，为实体市场经济有效服务的。”

致谢

本纪念文集的付梓，与陈元副主席的远见卓识和领导是分不开的。编纂文集的构想始于2011年，我们花了很长一段时间对国际顾问诸多论文进行研究和梳理，整个过程得到了国家开发银行领导和国际顾问会的一致首肯。

无论是撰稿人、编辑，还是开行团队的成员，能够参与本书的编纂，都深感荣幸。衷心感谢胡怀邦董事长对本书给予的支持和鼓励并拨冗秉笔。感谢诸位顾问慷慨献文，他们的许多独到洞见和视角亦借本文集首次面世。

特别感谢所有为此双语著作日以继夜协调翻译、编辑和制作的开行同仁。特别感谢罗惠娟女士、陈爱玲女士、胡文静女士和黄颖女士在本书编排、编辑、研究等方面付出的无私辛劳。

国家开发银行在卓越的领导下，无论是在践行开发性金融，还是在促进发展和增长方面都取得了开创性成就，愿本书予以忠实见证。

第1章 中美关系[1]

亨利·基辛格

主席先生，各位尊敬的来宾：

首先，请允许我向陈主席致以崇高的敬意，您我是几十年的老朋友，感谢您的厚意。您领导国家开发银行取得长足进步，给予诸位友人巨大的鼓舞。见证过发展之初的中国，我们今天所目睹的巨变超出了所有人的预期。这当然得益于技术的力量，但也归功于勇气和魄力，去打一场可能在专家们看来毫无胜算的硬仗。我谨代表在座的各位，尤其以我本人的名义，向您表达由衷的感激。同时，履新伊始，我相信新任董事长必将把开行的伟大传统发扬光大。

我作为开行国际顾问的价值并不在于参与经济议题的讨论，因此我想对国际形势做一简要分析。让我从结论说起。1971年我首次访华，至今来华80余次，与中国领导人进行的对话不计其数。然而没有哪次访问像这次这样让我如此充满希望，何况我并不是个天性乐观的人。为什么这么说呢？

“国际社会”是一个热点词汇，然而所谓的国际社会并不存在。因为世界上的不同地区遵循不同的组织原则，追求不同的目标。欧洲正在抛弃“民族国家”模式。而在过去两个世纪，一定程度上受殖民主义的影响，整个国际体系正是建立在民族国家的基础之上。在扬弃这一模式的过程中，欧洲左右为难：新的制度尚缺乏群众基础，旧的制度已失信于民。欧洲的领导人再也不能像过去那样要求民众做出牺牲，然而没有牺牲又如何建立新的体系。这在客观上导致了两个结果：消费导向的经济无法积累足够的资源，四平八稳的外交政策无力应对当今的危机。

亚洲的外交政策走的是欧洲19世纪的老路：建立强大的民族国家。亚洲的挑战在于如何让各民族国家和平共处。中东的挑战在于边境、国内体制和国际体系的威信；而这些挑战又影响着、牵扯着所有其他地区，但又缺乏统一的指导。

之所以提到上述情况是因为中国和美国共存于这一大背景之下，两国在历史上都从未完全参与过某个国际体系。过去，中国认为自己独一无二，由于地理和其他方面的原因，长期与外界隔绝。美国也认为自己与众不同，肩负着传教的使命，但主要是出于意识形态考虑而非国家利益考虑。因此，在某种意义上，正在形成的世界秩序的关键在于中美两国之间的关系。

单靠自身力量，中国或美国都无法解决问题，只有通过中美合作，才能解决问题。如果中美不合作，世界将分裂成相互对立的阵营，而我之前提到的各股势力势必将利用他国之间的对抗坐收渔翁之利。因此，中美合作是我们这个时代最大的机遇。我有幸见证了当代中美关系的缘起；并不是所有史学家都有亲历历史的幸运。在一开始，中美面临共同的对手，因此有共同的目标。在接下来的十年，双方在制定并行政策方面独具匠心。这也对冷战如何演进产生了重大影响。

1991年冷战结束后，出现了两个自相矛盾的现象。一方面，美国连续四届政府奉行对华友好合作政策，这成绩来之不易。中国六届政府亦采取了同样的态度。但问题也一直是双重的：第一，如何定义这种合作？第二，如何在没有冷战的时代运用这种合作？

在那段时期，我们避免了严重对抗的发生。现在的问题是，美国国内有相当一部分人认为中国和俄罗斯一样，是冷战遗留下来的产物。但前苏联几乎只是一个军事强国，而中国与世界经济有着密切的联系，其影响力主要基于经济表现而非军事实力——因此我们所面临的是不同的挑战。同样，中国国内有相当一部分人认为美国日渐衰弱，中国正在崛起，而衰落中的大国总是试图遏制其他国家的崛起，因此某些冲突不可避免。他们举的例子就是英德对抗。

另一方面，英德冲突的根源与其说是事件本身，不如说是政策的短视。最重要的是，欧洲历史的转折点是第一次世界大战。“一战”后欧洲元气大伤，至今没有恢复。但如果当时欧洲的领导人在1914年能预见到1918年的世界，就绝不会发动战争。

中美一旦发生冲突，后果将更为惨烈。因此两国领导人明白，无论学术界持何种观点，中美不能对抗。这话在座的有些人说了20年，还不时遭到批评，说我们被中国的热情好客或自己一时的感受所蒙蔽。然而现状的一个关键点在于两国领导人似乎都认识到必须找到合作的方式。我们成功解决了两国日常事务中的纠纷，但这还不够，况且日常纠纷对两个往来频繁的大国而言在所难免。回顾上世纪70年代，当时中美贸易还不及美国和洪都拉斯之间的贸易量。因此，随着国际交往的不断加深，我们面临的是罕见的机遇。这并非我一家之言，而是在我看来两国领导人业已达成的共识。

如果我们能把共识转化为具体的政策，两国可以从共同分析国际体系的走向入手，由此出发制定并非相同但是相向而行的政策。这是一个合适的切入点，因为我们所面临的诸多问题，如能源、环境、防扩散、空间、网络等，仅靠一国之力是无法解决的。而在空间、网络等领域，议题本身尚未界定清楚。所以我们必须携手。几年前这还像是天方夜谭，今天却是唯一现实的出路。

携手并不容易，因为中美做事的根本方式有所不同，两国的历史更是有天壤之别。美国从未有过强大的邻国，中国却无时无刻不受近邻强敌的威胁；美国人认为所有问题都有解决方案，中国人却认为每一个解决方案都会带来新的问题。如何弥合两国的分歧，这是当代最大的挑战。

话说回来，基于我对中国政府、中国领导人的了解，我相信中国正在进行的大刀阔斧的改革以及现实给美国带来的变革，奠定了两国重启真诚对话的基础。尽管前路漫漫，争议不断，我对中美关系的前景持乐观态度。我深信，两个在历史上本会成为对手的伟大国家是能够在新的国际秩序中并肩合作的。

陈主席，再次感谢您的邀请，感谢您几十年如一日的友谊。

[1] 本文是基辛格博士于2013年4月24日在国家开发银行国际顾问委员会第十四次会议上的讲话记录。

第2章 亚洲新秩序

保罗·基廷

2005年，时任国家开发银行行长陈元邀请我担任开行国际顾问委员会委员。该委员会由他于1999年创立。

当时陈行长告诉我，请我是因为我长期以来乐见中国在亚太地区发挥应有的作用并为之不懈努力。他还提到我担任澳大利亚总理期间促成泛亚政治架构的雏形，即亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议的建立。

初识陈元时，他尚在人民银行任职。离开人行后，陈元打造了一家世界级的开发银行。1998年，陈元出任国家开发银行行长。他审视包括世界银行在内的西方开发性银行的架构，思考如何因地制宜，为中国所用。陈元明白，仅靠商业银行抑或国家财政预算不足以为中国经济增长的最大动力，即大规模城镇化提供组织或资金支持。在开行的建设和发展过程中，陈元的管理和创新实践正是基于这一见解。

事实上，如今开行总资产接近1.2万亿美元，是世界银行的三倍。

在其新著《政府与市场之间》中，陈元用开行的成功明确证明，政策性银行并非只是享受补贴的亏损机构，而是自负盈亏、自给自足的金融机构。在开行转型之前，“很多人认为开行作为政策性银行，资金相当于第二财政，是国家给的‘免费午餐’，可以像财政拨款一样免费使用，不用偿还”。陈元用事实打破陈见，开行的不良贷款率从1998年他上任时的33%降至2004年的不足1%，这是何其惊人的转变。

在陈元的领导下，新生的开行已发展成为对中国人民和中国政府具有重要作用的一家机构。

陈元认识到设立国际顾问委员会可以对开行工作提供指导，可谓慧眼独具。因为鲜有如此规模的机构会有意识地听取外籍人士的意见，尤其是在一个以“中国特色”著称的国度。然而陈元意识到了顾问会的价值，而我本人也很高兴能成为其中的一分子。

国际顾问委员会的宗旨是为开行提供我们的视角：国际环境如何变化，对中国有何影响。我想我应先就政治局势发表一般性意见，因为政治正是全球经济治理的关键背景。

在人类历史上，世界经济从未像今天这样在全球范围内实时运转。全球化、冷战的结束和殖民主义的终结导致了目前的局面。全球性的领导力对世界经济的正常、稳健运行从未如此重要。然而与其他时期相比，或许全球领导力也从未如此匮乏。

简言之，世界处于领导真空的状态。

20世纪末、冷战终结之际，我们曾有机会重塑世界权力的格局，却与之失之交臂。

冷战来了又去，世界仍在七国集团的掌控之下，大西洋是权力的中心。1991年苏联解体，美国以胜利者的姿态走下战场。克林顿和小布什在任16年，从未试图把中国、印度等人口大国纳入新的世界秩序。新秩序认识到无远弗届的技术和资本正在重建19世纪工业革命所打破的人口和GDP之间的联系，全球化则加速了这一过程。

在这一背景下，不言而喻，人口将再次成为新世界中GDP的决定因素。一旦明白了这一点，只需在时间的维度上推导出复合GDP即可。推导的结果将是各经济体的GDP及其对世界经济增长贡献度的全新排序。

然而，美国并未打算迎接这样一个世界的到来。相反，在克林顿政府必胜论的余晖之下，美国接连单方发动战争，历时十年，耗资三万亿美元，撕开如今巨额财政赤字的缺口。待到偃旗息鼓之际，又幼稚地以为金融体系在一定程度上围绕宏观经济运转，而不是宏观经济的中流砥柱。于是美国的金融体系从内部轰然倒塌，几乎连累世界经济万劫不复。

奥巴马总统适时重拾自由国际主义，然而美国的国际声誉和地位已遭受重创。上述一系列事件一再削弱美国在冷战及华盛顿共识的全盛时期的领导力。

因此，欧洲的危机虽由2007～2008年美国的金融危机引发，美国，或是国际经济管理中一度被推崇备至的经济共识也无能为力。

眼下，欧洲的一体化进程因设计缺陷和缺乏领导陷入僵局。稳定的货币联盟通常需要经济体本质的趋同。欧洲的症结在于事实上其成员经济体不尽相同，而其适应能力更是千差万别。

尽管欧洲一体化的创立者和拥护者心怀高远，建立政治联盟的建议总也得不到各国民众的支持，至少得不到普遍的支持。所以欧洲有货币联盟，却没有财政同盟，更没有具有约束力的政治同盟加以领导。欧盟经济区仍处于收缩阶段，财政紧缩计划导致“分母”一降再降，劳民伤财的同时债务占GDP的比重未见起色。

欧洲中央银行提供了巨额、紧急的流动性支持，然而我们仍不知道，也无从得知这一由迥异的经济体所组成的模式能否经得起单一货币的考验，抑或是该模式仅适用于由核心向外围进行转移支付的体系？

中东战争和金融危机之于美国，如同结构缺陷和衰退周期之于欧洲，欧洲在世界舞台上的影响力及其在管理国际经济和战略体系中的作用被大大削弱了。

由此便不得不提到中国和新兴经济体。

新兴市场将占全球经济增长的74%。而在20世纪的大半时间里，发达国家贡献了全球产值的约70%。新兴市场和发达国家的角色已然对换。

在这一转变过程中，中国一直是中坚力量，且到目前为止，情况良好。然而众所周知，高投资、高出口的模式不可持续；而早在数年前中国就应该开始向以城市消费群体为中心的模式转变，把重点放在消费和服务拉动的收入增长上。

一方面，中国继续深入参与世界经济，另一方面，中国把更多的注意力放在了国内。重大改革刻不容缓。

发展资本市场，体现资金的真实成本，让利于储户，减少对国有企业的财政补贴，管理房地产业的流动性，都应该是新一届政府的议题。而我认为中国的领导人必须在十年甚至更短的时间内完成上述变革，无所不在的社交媒体将监督并记录政府的每一点进步。

一般而言，美国或欧洲的过去或是现在，具体而言，中国的过去或是现在，都无法令人确信该如何对整个世界进行管理。事实上，世界缺乏指路的明灯。从全球意义上讲，真正的领导并不存在。

曾被寄予厚望的二十国集团已然沦为债务人和债权人的聚会，更为重要的事务仍在七国集团的框架内解决。有效、高效地管理世界经济变得无比困难，遑论协同一致地管理。

由于全球金融危机几乎席卷全球，《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》所要求的金融改革必须改变全球宏观经济的运行方式。金融体系从未围绕宏观经济运转，相反，金融体系是宏观经济的中流砥柱。因此，我相信宏观经济管理体制必须实现从传统的财政货币杠杆向更为全面的宏观经济审慎管理的转变。在新的体制下，中央银行将成为新的超国家机构。贷款成数、逆周期资本控制、量化宽松等新的央行措施，诸如此类的工具将构成新的管理规范。众所周知，量化宽松引发对收益率的追逐，这本身是有风险的。而央行的传统职责局限于稳定价格。对于上述风险的评估要求拓展央行的职责范围，包括通过一整套新的政策工具监控和调控风险。

政策收缩迫使银行退居国内，全球化呈现不同形态。一方面，金融机构过于庞大，一旦倒闭后果将不堪设想；另一方面，经济均衡的传统理论受到质疑。

因此，在传统的框架内讨论宏观经济是对问题的过度简化。

尽管困难重重，上述分析必须在全球政治社会中展开。而全球政治社会从未如此不济，如一盘散沙。

澳大利亚和世界新秩序

2013年4月，开行召开最近一次国际顾问委员会会议。会上，已是中国人民政治协商会议副主席的陈元告诉我，他一直以来关注我对地缘政治和经济观点的表述，包括中国在泛亚太地区的地位，且由于澳大利亚对中国及中国经济的重要性，也包括澳大利亚及其在本地区的作用。在此背景下，陈元对我2012年11月在维多利亚州立图书馆的演讲（基思·默多克演讲）内容给予了积极评价。

也许通过本书，我的演讲可为更多人所知。陈元有这样的想法，我也很高兴得到他的肯定。以下是修订后的基思·默多克演讲全文。

今天的演讲以基思·默多克为题。1921年默多克始任《墨尔本先驱报》（Melbourne Herald）编辑，1925年促成《先驱报》收购《太阳新闻画报》（Sun News-Pictorial），1928年出任《先驱时代周刊》（Herald and Weekly Times）总监。老默多克的创业生涯由此启航，60年后鲁伯特·默多克收购了其父一手打造的《先驱时代周刊》。

其实早在成为澳大利亚新闻巨擘之前，基思·默多克就已声名鹊起。

默多克最初成名是在“一战”时期，作为战地记者，他对加里波利战役的报道引起轩然大波。战前他负责跑暂驻在墨尔本的联邦议会，和安德鲁·费希尔[1]和比利·休斯[2]称兄道弟，与部长和知名议员打成一片。

因为这样的关系，费希尔和乔治·皮尔斯爵士[3]授意默多克调查澳大利亚武装部队在海外服役的情况。1915年8月下旬，伊恩·汉密尔顿将军[4]允许默多克探访加里波利。

默多克在加里波利呆了四天，其间不断发回对战役的批评意见。回到英国后，他给费希尔总理写了一封长信，矛头直指英军及其将领，并对澳新军团的勇气和智慧大加赞扬。

无论如何，基思·默多克无疑是20世纪初澳大利亚黯淡历史上一颗耀眼的明星。而立之年的他已在伦敦和左右世界命运的人们把酒言欢。那时，最终两败俱伤的第一次对德大战尚未揭幕，英国是公认的世界霸主。“一战”耗尽了英国的财富和心血，新生的美国方后来居上，稳居世界宝座至今。

20世纪，澳大利亚在大国俱乐部中始终颇具影响力，我也时常感叹于此。尽管澳大利亚人口稀少，但在两次世界大战期间，其领导人却与大国的同僚们平起平坐。

由于历史的渊源，澳大利亚和这些大国或多或少居于事件的核心，“二战”后依然如此，甚至在冷战期间我们的影响力也未曾消退。纵观20世纪，澳大利亚是英语世界中不容小觑的力量，而我们的影响力是基于“一战”、“二战”、朝鲜战争、越南战争、伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争中的军事存在。

对于一个在1942年以前没有自主外交政策的国家而言，这是了不起的成就。1931年，《威斯敏斯特法》通过，大英帝国中白人占多数的澳大利亚、新西兰、南非和加拿大获得自治。然而，澳大利亚批准该法令是在11年后，也就是1942年。

1942年2月，新加坡沦陷，英语世界唯马首是瞻的英国在本地区的影响力由此终结。随之消亡的是自1788年英国在澳大利亚建立第一个殖民地以来我们一直仰仗的战略保障。

“二战”后，澳大利亚赫然发现自己的邻国不再是欧洲列强的殖民地，而是独立的国家。

不管有多么穷困潦倒，这些国家终究挣脱了殖民主义的枷锁。印度和东南亚不再是英国的天下，印尼也不再是荷兰的天下，印度支那亦不再是法国的天下。

然而，正当我们以为我们在世界以及本地区的命运多少掌握在自己的手中时，冷战的寒流无情地袭来。

富兰克林·罗斯福总统一度希望灾难性的二次世界大战之后，在联合国的主持下，世界大国能再度聚首。然而前苏联在安理会的否决权令世界陷入长达半个世纪的两极对峙的深渊。1989年柏林墙倒塌，彼时中国勉强摆脱孤立和贫困，印度表现出微弱的改革和发展意愿，印尼仍一贫如洗，试图通过不结盟运动立足，而中东欧各国呼吸到了1939年以来的第一缕新鲜空气。

诚然，1945年以后，澳大利亚有过一段舒心的日子。1970年以前，得益于与英、美、日的贸易，1983年又实施经济改革，国民收入增长强劲。而澳大利亚的战略环境也相对有利，这主要是因为苏哈托将军的“新秩序”政府把注意力集中在东盟的建设而非和澳大利亚作对上。

1991年底我当选总理，澳大利亚的外交政策刚度过第49个年头。我们自力更生的日子还太短，只能自己摸索着寻找方向。我们必须思考英语世界的破裂和地缘政治的规则。我们必须理解印度、印尼、中国，我们身边这些蓬勃发展的国家的重要性，以及它们将对世界经济和战略产生的影响。

总的来说，澳大利亚的表现喜忧参半。孟席斯[5]和英国藕断丝连，导致苏伊士运河问题后患无穷。同一时期，孟席斯政府卷入越南战争，这是一个错误的决定。印尼和马来西亚对峙期间，孟席斯拿苏哈托毫无办法。孟席斯即将卸任之际，苏哈托对澳大利亚的态度有所好转，他才算是松了一口气。霍尔特[6]“永远和约翰逊总统站在一起”。戈顿[7]和麦克马洪[8]沉迷于苏哈托无害的幻境，对越南束手无策。惠特拉姆[9]和新中国建立外交关系，令局面大为改观，同时指挥澳大利亚从越南撤军。惠特拉姆同时努力与印尼苏哈托政府建立关系。弗雷泽[10]任职期间鼓励亚洲人赴澳移民，并与英联邦保持密切联系，重点关注津巴布韦等国，与鲍勃·霍克[11]日后对南非废除种族隔离制度所做的贡献有异曲同工之妙。霍克对中国十分友好，对印尼置之不理。战后，澳大利亚与东南亚国家的关系相对友善，但也仅限于此。

回望澳大利亚“自力更生”的头50年，关键词有：冷战、位高权重的盟友和非殖民化的反噬。

1991年我出任总理时，比我的前任们更清楚地看到英语世界衰落的征兆。更重要的是，我欣喜于本地区的多样性，东方古老而伟大的民族终于摆脱殖民主义和贫困的桎梏，开始走自己的路。不仅如此，我希望澳大利亚能与之同行。用柯廷[12]的话说，“不再为我们与英国的血脉渊源所累”[13]，在“英国”后面我还想加上“美国”，同时不失对历史和文化的感激和感怀。

就在我上任的前一周，苏联解体。不言而喻，随处可见新的机遇，两极世界行将就木，世界重获新生的机会就在眼前；至少，可以恢复到1914年之前、戾气泛滥的20世纪之前世界本来或是应有的模样。

首先，开放的区域主义成为可能，而这在冷战的两极世界中无从谈起。

冷战后的世界鼓励技术和资本的传播，从而重建人口和GDP之间的关系。换句话说，人口大国即是GDP大国。

工业革命打破了人口和GDP之间的联系，而无所不在的技术和资本将其重建。这意味着，澳大利亚不仅地处世界上经济增长最快的地区，同时也与经济总量最大的国家为邻，这可是破天荒头一回。

换言之，澳大利亚将身处新兴的地缘经济中心，而在历史上，澳大利亚一直处于边缘，而且是遥远的边缘。

上述巨变预示着国际新秩序的诞生。新的秩序将与“二战”的胜利者在1947年铸造的格局截然不同。

人们一度希望能够建立比七国集团（美国、英国、法国、德国、意大利、日本和加拿大）更具代表性的国际秩序。

过去，澳大利亚善于在位高权重的盟友之间闪转腾挪。新的际遇意味着忽然之间我们不必再走老路。忽然之间，只要我们足够勇敢，足够智慧，便可以闯出自己的天地，或如我当时所言，登上更广阔的舞台。

在我上任之前，澳大利亚的总理仅参加两项国际会议：英联邦政府首脑会议和南太平洋论坛。在各个多边场合，坐在美国、日本、中国、印尼或任何其他东南亚国家首脑身边的不会是我们的总理。而他们所领导的是我们不曾涉足的世界。澳大利亚是一条大鱼，却只游弋于狭小、偏僻的池塘。

20世纪90年代初，即便是澳大利亚最亲密、最强大的战友美国也对这种种迹象浑然不觉，而我们则必须有所觉察。我们不能平白让这20世纪末的灵光乍现烟消云散，而自己则原地踏步，囿于狭小的天地，仰人鼻息。我们不能眼睁睁地看着这翻天覆地的变化与自己擦肩而过，束手无作为。

澳大利亚的外交政策到了破茧重生的紧要关头，我们必须换挡加速。

我上任第十天迎来了乔治·赫伯特·布什总统。老布什是历史上第二位访澳的美国总统。

“世界新秩序”这个说法是老布什第一个提出来的。无论那是怎样的一种秩序，我决意让澳大利亚参与其中。

1992年元旦，我在悉尼的基力比丽楼[14]向老布什提议，美国与澳大利亚一道，越过太平洋，与中国、日本和印度尼西亚共同构建一种新的区域格局，这也将是一个新的政治架构。

这一提议在老布什的继任者克林顿总统手中成为现实。1993年11月，首次APEC亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议在美国西雅图举行。弹指一挥间，亚太经合组织第二十次领导人非正式会议不久前在俄罗斯符拉迪沃斯托克（海参崴）落幕。

在基力比丽楼与老布什总统会谈时，他的国家安全顾问斯考克罗夫特将军也在场。将军说，我道出了美国自己都还未曾阐明的太平洋接触政策。将军暗指冷战给美国的外交政策蒙上了欧洲中心主义的阴影。他的话或许还有另一层意思：“二战”结束后美国的太平洋政策戛然而止，这是美国海军和贸易代表所为，并不代表美国国务院的立场。

我督促美国领导人在多边而非一对一的基础上开展接触，对象包括中国、日本、印尼等东亚主要国家，以及亚太经合组织中一些较小的成员国。亚太经合组织是霍克总理于1989年一力促成建立的部长级经济组织。

澳大利亚人微言轻，要说服美国谈何容易。首先，我必须获得日本首相宫泽喜一的支持。宫泽首相是我的老相识，我们的交情一直追溯到我在财政部任职期间。但那时除非美国点头，日本不会轻举妄动。宫泽首相告诉我，日本加入的前提是我能打动苏哈托——很重要的提议：苏哈托不仅是印尼总统，更是不结盟运动举足轻重的人物。我在苏哈托身上下了很大力气，光是会谈就不计其数。做通了苏哈托的工作后，我又找到中国总理李鹏，鼓励中国也参加。李总理有很多顾虑，特别是台湾和香港都已经是亚太经合组织的成员。最终，我得到了李总理从政府层面上对建立太平洋组织的支持。

随后我又争取到了韩国和加拿大的支持，这时一个几乎是量身定制的组织基本成型，只待克林顿总统的首肯。而他的确给予了热情支持。

抛开亚太经合组织的多边架构，我投入大量的时间和精力发展双边，特别是与印尼的关系。我想我抓住了我的前任所忽略的一点，即澳大利亚以北的这一巨大群岛对澳大利亚及其安全的影响不可估量。我明白，苏哈托将军“新秩序”政府的诞生不仅支持了东盟的建设，也给本地区带来了和平与稳定。我认为苏哈托总统对澳大利亚总体持积极的观点，尽管澳大利亚媒体对20年前发生在巴里布的事件[15]耿耿于怀。事实证明我的猜想是正确的。我下决心在全新持久的基础上发展对印尼关系，而非如过去凡事皆从东帝汶的立场考虑问题。

历史记录了澳大利亚与印尼的这一蜜月期。经我提议，我与苏哈托总统一道建立了以广泛的定期部长级会议为基础的政治关系和以防御合作条约为基础的新的战略关系。这一条约是我们两国此前未曾也不可能想见的。《共同安全合作协定》（Agreement on Maintaining Security）不仅是防御合作协定，其中的一个核心要素在于两国约定在面对不利挑战时相互磋商来考虑分别或共同采取应对措施。

换言之，《共同安全合作协定》事实上是澳大利亚与其最大近邻订立的共同防御应急条约。《共同安全合作协定》承载了澳大利亚的战略梦想，就现实政治和分量而言绝不亚于《美澳新安全条约》[16]。

这是讲求实干的外交政策。澳大利亚独立自主，从自身利益出发，追逐自己的目标，填补冷战猝然结束后的空白。

以上是20世纪90年代澳大利亚所能展开的外交活动。加雷斯·埃文斯（Gareth Evans）在霍克和基廷政府期间担任外交部长，他也在一些国际场合大展身手，其中最重要的是东盟地区论坛、东盟主持的防务和安全对话、《柬埔寨和平协定》，以及澳大利亚牵头的《禁止化学武器公约》。

今晚我要说的是，我认为积极有效的外交行动主义的时代已经过去。我们的独立感与日俱减，随之而来的是对美国外交政策目标的盲从。尤其最近，我们对美国外交目标的重视导致其凌驾于澳大利亚的外交目标之上。

作为澳大利亚总理，我曾经说服中国总理加入一个有美国总统参加的多边组织，也曾把不结盟运动的灵魂人物苏哈托拉进了一个有美国和中国参加的组织。这样的日子一去不复返了。

如今，美国和中国不再关心澳大利亚能否像过去一样提议和建立各种架构。20年前我发起亚太经合组织领导人非正式会议。20年来，中国已成为世界第二大经济体。中国不需要澳大利亚帮助构建外交政策，美国也不需要澳大利亚居间给中国递话。这并不意味着澳大利亚不能在周边对美、中或是两国施加影响，也许我们能够并且应当施加影响。然而我们在大国中的影响力一落千丈。印尼也对我们将信将疑，因为在印尼这些国家眼中，澳大利亚在其世界里打拼的方式和别的大国，特别是美国，毫无二致。

这一点在约翰·霍华德[17]执政期间日趋明显，到陆克文[18]和朱莉娅·吉拉德[19]的时期并无改观。霍华德先是以美国的“副警长”自居，后又在伊拉克和阿富汗问题上被美国牵着鼻子走。另一方面，从“维基解密”公布的密电中，中国发现陆克文担任总理期间一直鼓动美国以武制华。待到吉拉德执政，美国总统奥巴马在澳大利亚国会下院对中国及其政体进行了语言和政策上的攻击。

此举立刻引发印尼外长以及随后印尼总统的极度焦虑。

事实上，澳大利亚的影响范围大不如前。

“二战”后以及冷战期间，澳大利亚作为英语世界的一员固然在当权者面前说得上话，但这权力源自“二战”的胜利以及我们和“西方国家”的联系。世界已经发生变化。我们向前的动力不应是日渐凋零的关系，而应是我们对自己的重新认识。知道我们是谁，想要什么；还必须清楚明白地知道如何实现我们的所思所想。

结论毋庸置疑：我们要想过得好，就得做自己，把才智使在刀刃上，用在我们最能有所作为、利益最攸关的地方，也就是我们所在的地区。过去，我们作为“西方国家”的身份最为重要，因为彼时“西方”是世界的主宰。然而，西方主宰世界的时代已成为历史。尚未成为历史、也不会成为历史的是澳大利亚的地缘政治定位。放眼四周，我们的邻里除新西兰外，皆非西方国家。如何善待、适应我们的生存环境，是澳大利亚永恒不变的课题。

与西方相比，亚洲包括南亚的增长潜力蒸蒸日上，生产力和生活标准也在追赶西方。这一长期变化趋势意味着，从今以后，澳大利亚与“西方”的安全纽带与战后相比将越来越不合时宜。基于共同的历史渊源和相似的文化背景，澳大利亚会一直与美国保持密切的联系。然而显而易见的是，澳大利亚安全观的指导原则在于融入本地区，成为区域不可或缺的一分子，而非敬而远之，还一往情深地死抱着江河日下的西方不放。

从今往后，澳大利亚必须把注意力放在自己最大有可为的地方，在我看来，也就是东南亚。东南亚是西南亚和东北亚之间的结点，联结印度洋及南亚次大陆和亚洲大陆、中国及西太平洋的命运。从地缘政治的角度看，东南亚睦邻友好，立足和平、合作；夹在世界上人口最多的两个地区之间：一边是巴基斯坦、印度和印度洋，另一边是中国、日本和西太平洋。

澳大利亚北部与上述结点毗邻，参加地区事务也就自然而然。与印尼接触自不必说，若能与东盟广泛联络则更为理想。这些国家代表的是东南亚的安全架构，而澳大利亚是能够与之开展实质性对话并充实其内容的。长此以往，澳大利亚应成为其中一员，把共同的贸易、商业和政治利益做实。这才是澳大利亚安身立命之地，也是我们最该重视的地区。

上述外交政策从澳大利亚的根本利益出发，其内在合理性保证了政策的连续性。说到这里，我很高兴最近外长鲍勃·卡尔阐明了与东盟进行更密切接触的政策。

澳大利亚在与东盟及其成员国对话方面取得了重大进展，包括于2005年首届会议加入东亚峰会。彼时霍华德任期已近尾声，政府认识到“融入亚洲”不是基廷一人的执念或是一时的政策异见而已，而是澳大利亚的必由之路。亚历山大·唐纳[20]负责澳大利亚加入东盟峰会的谈判，陆克文则说服东盟和中国允许美国和俄罗斯加入。

这些进展固然可喜，但其实质上仍属于外交政策的范畴，仍缺乏相应的政策加强国际社会与东盟国家的联系以夯实更为广泛的关系基础。

近年来，澳大利亚与印尼、马来西亚等国的关系着眼于事务性的问题，动辄难民管理、活牛出口，长远而言意义不大。

与此同时，针对最大近邻印尼的政策裹足不前，缺乏框架、判断和连续性。仿佛印尼仍停留在亚洲金融危机前的状态，未曾实现向民主制度的伟大转变，经济亦不曾重新起飞。

在许多方面，澳大利亚与印尼群岛是同呼吸共命运的。澳大利亚的战略利益要得到保障，印尼就必须一切妥当。对澳大利亚而言，印尼无疑是最重要的国家，而且印尼向我们展示了无比的宽容和善意。关注印尼必须是澳大利亚外交政策的重要驱动力。

印尼人口居世界第四，是一个政教分离的民主制国家，也是最大的伊斯兰国家。印尼岛屿众多，与澳大利亚隔空隔海相望。亚太乃至世界上的任何大国若想从澳大利亚以北以西动我们一根手指，都必须先经过印尼。

我一直认为印尼将成为澳大利亚最重要的战略伙伴。随着印尼经济的不断发展，此举的必要性与日俱增。

按购买力平价计算，印尼的经济总量已超过澳大利亚。因为人口是GDP的首要驱动因素，特别是随着技术的普及和资本的自由流动，印尼的经济规模至少是澳大利亚的两倍，随着时间的推移，差距还将进一步扩大。麦肯锡最近的一项研究预测，2030年印尼的经济规模将超过英国或德国。

就在澳大利亚以北的群岛，经济总量巨大，人口接近三亿；海空军实力也将与其经济规模相当。对此，澳大利亚该作何感想？事实上，印尼励精图治，开展大规模的经济与军事建设，以图扫清一切障碍，无论在南海还是印度洋。

问题是，印尼的实力对澳大利亚意味着什么？印尼会是我们在顺境中交恶的敌手，还是在我们的区域观、世界观指导下与之共同奋斗的伙伴？

要回答好这个问题，澳大利亚必须摆正心态，主动在印尼身上下工夫，改变过去摇摆不定的作风。这样一来，印尼必会投桃报李，放下对我们的纠结不安。

无论如何，澳大利亚必须更为重视与印尼的关系，并且应涉及文化、商业和政治各个层面。就算澳大利亚人要频繁光顾爪哇或苏门答腊，还得有印尼的公共政策开路。

澳大利亚比以往任何时候都更处于世界上经济增长最快地区的前沿和中心，显然我们的未来不仅仅取决于和盟友搞好关系。虽然过去我们精于此道，但当务之急是在这个生机勃勃的地区更有作为。这也意味着我们眼前是前所未有的机遇，要独立思考，独立行动。

如果澳大利亚无法应对挑战，便极有可能被人看轻，认为我们总是在寻找战略庇护，是西方在东方的一个哨卡，没有信心走自己的路。毫无疑问，决不能让上述情况发生。我们必须认清地缘政治的现实，开辟属于自己的天地。

[1] 安德鲁·费希尔（Andrew Fisher，1862年8月29日～1928年10月22日），澳大利亚第5任总理（1908～1909、1910～1913、1914～1915年）。

[2] 威廉·莫里斯·休斯（William Morris Hughes，1862年9月25日～1952年10月28日），澳大利亚第7任总理（1915年10月27日～1923年2月9日）。

[3] 乔治·福斯特·皮尔斯爵士（Sir George Foster Pearce，1870年1月14日～1952年6月24日），澳大利亚政治家，在澳大利亚工党在西澳的建立中发挥关键作用。

[4] 伊恩·汉密尔顿（Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton，1853年1月16日～1947年10月12日），英国陆军上将，生平最显著的战役是在加里波利之战负责指挥命运多舛的地中海远征军。

[5] 罗伯特·戈登·孟席斯（Robert Gordon Menzies，1894年12月20日～1978年5月15日），澳大利亚政治家，是澳大利亚在任时间最长的总理，前后任职达18年半之久。

[6] 哈罗德·爱德华·霍尔特（Harold Edward Holt，1908年8月5日～1967年12月17日），澳大利亚第17任总理。

[7] 约翰·格雷·戈顿（John Grey Gorton，1911年9月9日～2002年5月19日），澳大利亚第19任总理。

[8] 威廉·麦克马洪（William McMahon，1908年2月23日～1988年3月31日），澳大利亚第20任总理。

[9] 爱德华·高夫·惠特拉姆（Edward Gough Whitlam，1916年7月11日～），澳大利亚第21任总理。

[10] 约翰·马尔科姆·弗雷泽（John Malcolm Fraser，1930年5月31日～），澳大利亚第22任总理。

[11] 罗伯特·詹姆斯·李·霍克（Robert James Lee Hawke，1929年12月9日～），澳大利亚第23任总理。

[12] 约翰·约瑟夫·柯廷（John Joseph Curtin，1885年1月8日～1945年7月5日），澳大利亚第14任总理。

[13] 引自柯廷在1942年发表于《墨尔本先驱报》的新年贺词。

[14] 基力比丽楼（Kirribilli House）位于澳大利亚第一大城市悉尼，是除堪培拉总统府以外的另一座总理官邸。

[15] 1975年印尼入侵东帝汶，五名试图进行拍摄的澳大利亚记者遭到枪击，10月死于印尼边陲小镇巴里布。

[16] ANZUS，亦称《太平洋安全保障条约》。

[17] 约翰·温斯顿·霍华德（John Winston Howard，1939年7月26日～），澳大利亚第25任总理。

[18] 陆克文（Kevin Michael Rudd，1957年9月21日～），澳大利亚第26任总理。

[19] 朱莉亚·艾琳·吉拉德（Julia Eileen Gillard，1961年9月29日～），澳大利亚第27任总理。

[20] 亚历山大·唐纳（Alexander Downer，1951年9月9日～），1996～2007年间任澳大利亚外交部长。

第3章 20世纪90年代前中国金融的发展

（陈元在中国经济发展和国际合作关系中的角色）

保罗·沃尔克

我不记得初识陈元的情景，但在今天来看，那是一个完全不同的时代。我比陈元年长，又是美联储主席，故以长者自居。毕竟，上世纪80年代的中国尚未摆脱高度集中、政府主导的计划经济体制，以西方标准衡量，生产效率低下，生活水平不高。新的体制，如中央银行等重要机构，尚且成立不久，市场也极不健全。

彼时的陈元年纪尚轻，初涉金融业便在人民银行身居要职，同他的同事一样，渴望学习治理央行之道。那是个充满挑战的年代，商业银行和金融体系迅速发展壮大。在此期间，陈元牵头与美国及其他国家开展交流，与外国官员和独立学者及机构建立联系。

时至90年代末，我仍清楚地记得，当时我率领一个由退休央行人士组成的代表团，与中国官员开展了一系列的研讨。我们讨论中央银行的架构和政策，以及如何监管和发展强健的商业银行。那时，曾任人行副行长的陈元已是国家开发银行的行长。开行所面临的挑战显而易见：中国迫切需要发展大规模的交通设施，提高能源产量，建设高效通讯设施；如何鼓励重大基础设施建设并提供融资支持正是关键之所在。开行看到了支持经济增长的巨大融资需求，推出市场融资的新的有效手段。建立国际顾问委员会是陈元的一项早期举措，我也有幸担任该顾问会的委员。

通过仅仅一代人的努力，也就是在陈元半辈子的时间里，中国实现了经济腾飞，国际地位愈发举足轻重，这是何等了不起的成就！我们这些西方的老人们不敢再以人师自居前往中国了。相反，我们去中国是为了分享、参与和学习有史以来最辉煌的持续经济增长期。

陈元和开行是这段历史不可或缺的一分子，其作用体现在大型基础设施建设和金融市场的发展上。今天，随着中国的对外关系不断拓展，对他国而言，中国是日益重要的资金来源，也吸引着大量外国投资者前来分享中国的增长。在这两方面，开行都扮演了先驱的角色。

我想提及我自己小有参与的两项工作。开行从一开始就十分重视机场、公路、大坝、铁路等大型基建项目，这也是其应有之义。我就提醒开行要重视鼓励中小型创业企业发展，这些企业往往严重缺乏资本和贷款，但却具有巨大的经济和社会潜力。后来我负责调查联合国“石油换食品”计划腐败案期间，我与陈元和开行就广义上的反腐问题交换了意见。腐败是一种痼疾，屡屡破坏各国的发展前景，打击对政府机构的信心。

这些问题对中国和其他国家——无论是发展中还是发达国家——同样重要，然而经常得不到应有的重视。陈元直面这些通常被忽视的问题，功不可没。

总之，在我眼中，并且按中国的标准，陈元还很年轻。我的亲身经历告诉我，对于中国及其与世界的关系，陈元仍然可以继续发挥重要作用。与其为友，我深感自豪。

第4章 中国和世界经济的领袖

弗雷德·伯格斯坦

全球经济体系的挑战

中国已然跻身21世纪全球三大经济体之列，与美国和欧盟并驾齐驱。随着中国在未来至少20年间持续较快增长，逐步向世界最大的经济体挺进，其相对影响力无疑将继续显著提升。

然而，从历史的角度看，中国是一个独特的经济超级大国，至少体现在三个方面。就平均生活水平而言，中国仍是一个穷国。尽管中国正在成为世界第一大经济体，其富裕程度仍将远低于经合组织国家（不过其绝大多数沿海城市的人均GDP已接近经合组织水平，即便按市场汇率计算亦是如此）。中国尚未实现完全市场化，因此政府在经济生活中的作用远大于其他经济大国。但这一差距已有所缩小，并有可能在未来几年、几十年不断减小，虽然中国并不刻意追求西方眼中政府和市场分离的理想状态。中国还具有与其他经济大国迥异的政治体制。

历史告诉我们，崛起的经济大国融入全球领导体系的过程充满挑战，并对维护世界稳定乃至和平至关重要。19世纪晚期，美国和德国经济实力大增，带来诸多问题。两次世界大战之间，德国东山再起，日本开始崛起，随之而来的是更大的麻烦。伴随着欧盟的演变，日本战后的复兴，全球体系的稳定再次面临挑战，不过这次得到了较为妥善的处理。眼下中国后继有人。印度，巴西，以及一两个可以想见的国家，几乎正在上演崛起。历史表明，必要的体系调整并非不能一帆风顺，然而一旦失败，将产生严重甚至灾难性的后果。

融合所涉及的要素给守成大国以及崛起中的新兴大国提出了巨大难题。要实现平稳过渡，大国必须愿意和后来者分享领导权。这就意味着大国必须确信，在善待后起之秀和阻挠其担当大任之间，前者能更好地保障自身的利益。具体就美国而言，美国应摒弃长达半个多世纪的支配地位心态，并准备与非西方大国以前所未有的方式并肩作战（美国与日本的合作只是浅尝辄止）。

另一方面，后来者必须愿意接受国际体系所赋予的领导角色。这要求一国既认识到其行动的外部影响会反作用于国内经济，又认识到与跻身国际、世界一流的实力相辅相成的是责任。以上思考对当下的中国尤为重要：中国所确立的发展战略高度依赖于中国在更深层次融入全球经济。这意味着全球经济的运行，特别是维护开放的贸易体系和稳定的金融秩序，关乎中国的国家利益。

世界经济秩序2013

2013年的世界经济秩序可概括为：多极化的格局中，中美分庭抗礼。格局之所以多极化是因为至少有十多个经济体（欧盟视为整体），包括高收入、新兴和发展中经济体，显然在全球经济表现中举足轻重。这一队伍还在不断发展壮大。二十国集团取代七国集团成为最主要的国际经济领导机构，正是从体制上承认了多极化不断加深这一趋势。

然而，二十国集团过于庞大，无法有效运行，这也是普遍共识，因此需要一个小型的“协调员的协调组织”，担任世界经济非正式的指导委员会。这一组织的理想构成是三大经济体：美国、欧盟和中国。当然，操作起来有难度：欧盟既不能在绝大多数问题上协调一致，又不能选出某个成员国为欧盟代言。欧盟目前的经济状况也不利于其过多关注并承担重大国际角色。于是，全球绝大多数经济事务的主要责任不可避免地落在了中美两国的肩上，无论中美（或是世界）是否要给这种安排贴上“两国集团”的标签。

近年来，两国在履行上述责任，尤其是应对2007～2009年的危机方面毁誉参半。两国均采取了有效、关键的货币和财政措施，刺激本国经济乃至世界经济走出衰退。两国均对全球经济再平衡做出贡献，美国的逆差和中国的顺差均由历史高点大幅回落。虽有曲折反复，两国均未新设破坏国际贸易体系的重大壁垒。两国均支持国际货币基金组织扩大贷款和分配特别提款权，协助危机重创国实现经济复苏。上述举措都在二十国集团建立和发展的政策框架内进行，尽管除却最后一项，其他举措与其说是全球协调一致的危机应对，不如说是并行的国家行为（尽管国际上就上述行动的必要性达成一致，无疑促成了行动的开展）。

然而，两国均未能采取一些必要措施，确保本国（以及全球）经济的可持续复苏。美国的金融监管体制存在诸多不足，亟待全面改革。美国必须下决心削减预算赤字，中国必须实现经济增长重心从出口向内需的转变，允许人民币大幅升值，否则上述全球经济再平衡的成果将付诸东流。应对危机须采取非常的刺激措施，两国仍在摸索退出战略的内容和时机。

在若干问题上，中国和包括美国、欧盟在内的一些二十国集团伙伴的合作有所倒退，甚至出现了逆转。十年前，中国满腔热情地加入世界贸易组织，并利用世贸规则推动国内的市场化改革。但在2008年7月，中国（同印度一道）阻碍多哈回合取得进展。2009年，中美在全球变暖问题上看似步调一致，7月在华盛顿举行的战略与经济对话期间和11月奥巴马总统访华之后，双方重申立场（导致欧盟担忧哥本哈根也将是“两国集团”的天下）。结果中美“较劲”气候峰会，不欢而散。经济区域主义是两国关系的另一个雷区。中国继续推行区域内合作。美国则积极推动跨太平洋伙伴关系协议（也许最终着眼于亚太自由贸易区的建立）。这一全新的亚太架构有望补充甚至取代仅限于亚洲的各项安排。两国早先牵手绿色能源，承诺加强跨境投资，鼓励互利互惠的技术交流。取而代之的是围绕中国自主创新政策的分歧，知识产权问题的卷土重来，以及美国对部分中国企业对美直接投资的焦虑。

概念问题悬而未决

中国如何看待今后几年、几十年甚至更长一个时期内自身在世界经济中扮演的角色？以上讨论提出若干关键问题，有待解决：

1.在最广义的全球经济合作中，中国是否支持现有的二十国集团进程，抑或是倾向于其他更为有效的结构？后者因为有效，可能更为紧凑，也许更具政治代表性（因此可能更为庞大）。

2.气候变化领域尚无国际规则或机构。中国是否有意建立有效的全球机制？如果答案肯定，建立何种机制？

3.网络安全领域尚无国际规则或机构。中国是否有意建立有效的全球机制？如果答案肯定，建立何种机制？

4.外商直接投资领域鲜有规则，尚无专门的机构。中国是否乐见有关国际机制的建立？

5.中国是否仍视世贸规则及其机构安排为全球贸易体系的有效支柱？若否，应建立何种替代机制？中国如何看待区域贸易协定和全球经济秩序之间的关系？

6.中国如何看待本地区新兴的经济架构，特别是亚洲内部现行和待签的协定（“亚洲路线”）和通过跨太平洋伙伴关系日渐壮大的“太平洋路线”之间的关系？中国是否仍追求亚太经合组织实现“亚太地区自由开放贸易”的整体目标？作为实现上述目标的一个步骤，中国是否会考虑与美国签署双边自贸协定？

7.中国是否认为可以继续维持巨额（即使是大幅削减的）贸易顺差，而不危及全球金融体系和全球贸易体系的稳定（因为“货币战争”和贸易限制的冲击不可避免）？

8.中国是否将继续视汇率为纯粹的主权问题，抑或认识到，由于一切汇率问题至少牵涉两种货币，因此需要一定形式的国际规则和合作？如果答案肯定，除却现行的国际货币基金组织机制，应采取何种形式的规则和合作？是否应加强现有的规则（抑或新规），如何确保规则的有效实施？

9.中国是否希望通过进一步大幅增持美元这一储备货币继续增强美元的国际地位，并开始致力于推动多元储备货币体系的建立，包括通过更为积极地推动官方储备多元化并鼓励人民币的国际使用（包括逐步实现资本项目可兑换和大力减少资本管制）等做法，寻求国际共识，改革货币体系，更多关注特别提款权（包括替代账户）和国际货币基金组织的作用？

上述问题围绕的是同一个主题，即要求中国在国际层面上就眼下主导国际经济政策辩论的核心体系问题形成、表述并讨论自己的观点。对中国而言，这是确立并持续维护其在上述领域国家利益的重要步骤。对世界其他国家而言，这是与中国就此展开积极接触的重要步骤。如果中国和其他关键国家不对上述问题多加考虑，很难想象中国如何能够有效融入全球经济秩序，特别是该秩序的核心领导结构。接下来，中国和其他经济大国，尤其是美国之间也许能达成“大妥协”，为21世纪成功的全球经济秩序奠定基础。

这样一种秩序的有效建立和维护离不开中国的参与、创造和领导。关键的第一步是明确中国自身的体系目标和政策，这当然来源于中国对其国家利益的界定（包括外部经济发展对中国国家利益的影响，而其自身的行动也可能对外部经济发展产生重大影响）。第二步是就中国的想法开展国际大讨论，与其他主要国家集思广益，就新的安排（特别是在缺乏现成机制的领域，如气候变化和外商直接投资领域）和调整现有机制（如国际货币基金组织和世界贸易组织的机制）达成一致。这将是一个漫长而又充满争议的过程，但其结果也是不可估量的。这将有助于解决两个关键问题：中国在世界经济中的角色，以及世界经济在中国政策中的地位。

第5章 中国人民银行支付系统的建设

伊瑟尔·森卓维克

引言

以下是我关于1991～1996年访问中国（主要是访问北京）的回忆。中国在过去15～20年间发生了巨大的变化。历史性的、戏剧性的、前所未有的变化让中国登上世界第二大经济体的位置，这是对陈元及其同侪的褒奖，变化在他们的领导、远见和智慧之下得以构建和实施。在今天看来，一个人五年间的访问和有限的观察和视角或许有些奇特。然而，在中国加速发展和对外开放的进程中，这也不失为一种经验。时任中国人民银行（人行）副行长的陈元在我的历次访华中都扮演了关键角色。

个人印象

初识陈元是在1991年，当时我作为国际顾问专家组（IAP）的一员来华支持中国现代化支付系统（CNAPS）的开发建设。专家组由英格兰银行、德意志联邦银行、日本银行、香港金融管理局、瑞士国家银行和纽约联邦储备银行（我本人所在机构）的代表组成。陈元是专家组的主席。在我担任专家组成员期间，陈元是CNAPS项目中方人员和国际专家顾问之间的纽带。同时，他与美联储在多方面开展合作，率人行代表团多次来访，接待美联储访华人员。值得一提的是，1994年格林斯潘主席访问北京和上海，我记得陈元全程参与会议。

当时，纽约和北京之间没有开通直航，订票也很困难。我记得自己经旧金山、香港、天津一路辗转到了北京。北京机场很小，和我想象中中国首都机场应有的规模相去甚远。人行派人接机，进京的道路为双向两车道，路上几乎没有民用车辆。倒是有不少卡车、自行车和驴车，出租车很少。

那是在11月。进京途中，路边堆着小山高的大白菜。看来正值收获季节，北京市民少不得要冬储大白菜。习惯了纽约林立的高楼，北京的楼房显得十分矮小。

国际顾问专家组下榻王府饭店。酒店绝对是世界一流，富丽堂皇，只不过周围皆是低矮的平房。专家们坐车从王府饭店去人民银行，后来我们其中几个人决定骑车，因为自行车是最常见的交通工具。

在接下来的几年里，我们大约每半年来趟中国。中国发展的速度令人震惊。一时间，汽车代替了自行车。我们也不再骑车上班，因为感觉到处躲汽车有点危险。有一回刚到王府饭店，只见酒店孤零零地矗立着，方圆数里的矮房已被夷为平地，拆迁殆尽，最终为高楼所取代。机场高速业已建成，双向六车道。出租车随处可见。大多数会议在北京举行，在上海和西安分别开过一次会。

支付系统项目

当时，中国的支付系统与经济的发展速度不相适应。由于缺乏及时有效的交通基础设施，且技术运用尚未普及，支付系统以同城现金交易和低效的跨行异地纸面交易为主。因此，异地支付的最终结算能拖上30天，大笔资金要被冻结待结算。为改变这一状况，人行在世界银行贷款的支持下开始开发新的支付系统。同时聘请咨询公司指导系统开发必要的材料筹备工作。

国际顾问专家组的任务在于指导和评审顾问的工作并就会计惯例、监管规定、技术、运营和项目实施为人行提供意见。最重要的是，专家组基于各国支付系统开发建设的实践，为人行提供第一手的实用意见。鉴于美国支付系统较为先进，与中国在人口、地理上的相似性，我认为美国的经验对中国的借鉴意义最大。

人民银行对支付系统提出了很高的要求，包括：

·加快资金到账和周转；

·实现可靠、安全和一体化的支付、清算和结算系统，以满足经济增长的需要；

·方便用户，提高服务质量；

·及时准确地收集支付和有关核算数据，以增强央行金融宏观调控能力。

人民银行同时制定了一系列指导原则，包括：

·稳健、可靠；

·支付系统风险最小化；

·各类金融机构共享；

·实行成本回收原则，实现成本效益、自给自足；

·用户适当参与系统开发和建设。

项目同时成立国内顾问专家组（DAP），由人行内部人员、中国专业银行代表和国内技术、金融和会计专家组成。他们中的多数人英语并不流利，而只有一名国际专家能说汉语。大多数会议借助翻译完成。陈元说一口流利的英语，他主持会议，负责把国际专家及有关央行的经验与中国的国情紧密结合起来。他同时协调世行、咨询顾问和国际专家组的工作。

工作的重点在于制定支付系统的细节标准、建立核算架构、提供法律框架、描述基本规则和处理流程、调动专业银行参与、组织人行具有管理大型复杂项目能力的人员参与以及建立有能力管理如此规模项目的机构。进入项目后期，国际顾问专家组主要关注系统开发的招投标工作、项目实施和管理。

招标文件编讫并发放，最后日本的NTT Data中标。签字仪式在人民大会堂举行。我记得仪式当天恰逢感恩节，那是美国家庭团圆聚餐的传统节日。我虽无法与家人团聚，却也很高兴能参加签字仪式。我致贺词，并谈到今后的工作。

项目获得阶段性成功，陈元功不可没。在取得成绩的同时，我们也结下了深厚的友谊。

格林斯潘访华

1994年10月，格林斯潘主席首次访问中国。我有幸作为五人代表团成员随行。会议引人入胜，卓有成效。格林斯潘在北京分别会晤中共中央总书记、国家主席江泽民、总理李鹏、副总理兼人民银行行长朱镕基、财政部部长刘仲藜和人民银行常务副行长周正庆。此外，格林斯潘在上海会见了人行上海分行行长毛应梁和上海市副市长。陈元作为人行副行长参加了所有会见。他在北京主持了一场午宴，陪同我们前往上海，并设宴送行。

不出所料，会议围绕着共同的话题展开。中国由计划经济向市场经济的成功转变及其对世界经济的重要意义以及中国的改革进程是两个主要话题。会议还探讨了金融体系、中央银行和商业银行的作用、货币政策、金融监管和支付系统等问题。

与江主席的会面尤其令人难忘。江主席谈到改革的不同阶段，始于农业、农村，再转向城市。建设社会主义市场经济是改革的首要目标。国企改革十分重要，但必须考虑其社会影响。

江主席指出他与格林斯潘主席都生于1926年，属虎。1926年是个好年头。

结语

自我上世纪访华以来，中国迅速成长为世界金融和工业大国。陈元后来担任国家开发银行行长，继续在中国非凡的增长中扮演重要的角色。

我从国际顾问专家组卸任之际，陈元送我一幅书法，是王勃的《送杜少府之任蜀州》，上面写道：“海内存知己，天涯若比邻。”作为好友，我愿借此机会祝陈元在展开人生新的旅程之时，身体健康，万事顺遂。

第6章 陈元在中国现代化支付系统发展中的作用

沈联涛

引言

人们很少认识到个人的领导和远见对一国发展的重要作用。1989年至1993年，我在世界银行工作，其间参与的重大项目之一是帮助中国建设支付体系。世行在中国的主要联络人便是1988年至1998年担任中国人民银行副行长的陈元。

1986年至1988年，世界银行受中国政府委托，对金融行业开展重大调研，该研究建议对银行体系和金融市场进行深刻改革。上世纪80年代，中国人民银行着手开展全面改革和发展项目，加强货币和金融市场建设。同时人行开始承担央行职能，以满足快速增长的经济对银行和金融的需求。预计支付交易量将增长5～10倍，在2000年达到70亿笔。很显然，中国需要新的现代化支付体系与之相适应。货币政策的执行离不开运转良好的支付和清算系统以及高效的货币和资本市场。

1990年，中国人民银行开始设计新的支付体系。1992年，人行引入世界银行的技术和资金援助，项目为期10年，2002年结束。陈元是中国财税技援项目[1]的人行负责人，项目涵盖多个方面，支付体系是项目的核心内容。1994年就中国现代化支付系统（CNAPS）的建设实施进行国际招标。

支付系统无疑是陈元牵头的最重要、最复杂、最漫长的项目之一，需要大量国内国际专家的支持。项目规划始于1990年，然而由于其规模巨大，错综复杂，从最初的手工纸凭证处理到如今高度成熟的系统，支付体系的关键金融基础设施建成前后耗时15年。在世行的支持下，人行成立了以陈元为首的指导委员会，委员会听取两个顾问专家组的意见。国内专家组由国内银行、会计和技术专家组成，包括现任中国进出口银行董事长李若谷、时任人行支付结算司司长印甫盛（已退）和现任司长励跃女士等。国际专家包括英格兰银行的彼得·奥索普（Peter Allsop）、日本银行的安斋隆（Takashi Anzai）、德意志联邦银行的赫尔曼—约瑟夫·珀尔塞（Hermann-Josef Persé）、纽约联邦储备银行的以色列·桑德洛维奇（Israel Sendrovic）和已故的瑞士国民银行的克里斯蒂安·维塔尔（Christian Vital）。就支付体系的专业知识而言，专家组可谓阵容空前，各位专家正是发达市场现代化实时全额结算系统（RTGS）的设计者和实施者。

作为世行金融发展部高级经理，我有幸成为该项目的世行方面负责人。1993年10月，我离开世行出任香港金融管理局副总裁。罗伯特·开普勒（Robert Keppler）接替我在世行的工作，他在支付领域具有丰富的经验。

中国支付体系的构想

实现支付体系从计划经济体制下的手工核算向现代化支付体系的转变，无疑是一项艰巨的任务。这意味着银行和核算程序以及监管和法律框架的彻底转变[2]。所幸陈元具有非凡的领导力、远见和充沛的精力，自始至终不断推动项目取得进展。

1990年项目伊始，人民银行明确了中国现代化支付系统的主要目标：

·增强金融宏观调控能力；

·加快资金到账和周转；

·方便用户，提高服务质量；

·实现可靠、安全和一体化的支付、清算和结算系统，以满足经济增长的需要；

·按中国国情灵活、模块化扩展。

支付系统的设计、建立和运行遵循以下指导原则：

·各类金融机构共享；

·实行成本回收原则，实现成本效益、自给自足；

·支付体系风险最小化；

·稳健、可靠；

·用户适当参与系统开发和建设；

·兼顾运行要求和监管措施，实现系统设计成本最小化。

经过四年慎重细致的规划，结合最佳国际实践和标准、同时考虑中国当时实际情况的新支付体系的设计理念和愿景逐步成形。

20世纪90年代中国支付系统的建设主要考虑文化、交易量和基础设施等外部因素。当时非现金支付在消费者中尚未普及，因此支付体系交易量以企业大额支付为主，小额消费支付为零。然而，受经济特区快速发展的推动，中国经济当时正以两位数增长，预计潜在交易量也将加速增长，建设全国性支付体系刻不容缓。考虑到中国的特殊情况和发展阶段，关键的系统设计因素应满足以下需求：

·实现异地业务的电子交付，适应中国地域广阔的特点；

·异地支付以贷记支付为主，与借记支付相比更为可靠，贷记支付工具更利于票据截留；

·实现同城交易的借记支付；

·一旦中国有能力运用自动化技术，实现从初期混合/自动化系统向城市处理中心自动化向外迁移的清晰迁移计划；

·成本管理。

系统的概念框架主要包括两个部分：支付处理系统，即中国现代化支付系统（CNAPS），以及支持支付处理的全国性计算机通信网络系统，即中国国家金融通信网（CNFN）。国家金融通信网把人行的分支机构、各商业银行和其他金融机构有机连接在一起，提供快捷、安全、高效的报文传输服务，同时加强央行货币政策的实施。

让我仍记忆犹新的是，当时在信息传输方面面临两种选择：采用低空卫星，或建设国家地面光纤通信网。人行建成了卫星通信网，地面光纤通信线路随后建成，与卫星网互为备份，确保支付系统的稳健运行。

中国现代化支付系统结合了两个层次的金融支付服务。首先，大额支付系统（HVPS）采取逐笔实时方式处理跨行支付业务，全额清算资金。其次，银行和金融机构为客户提供灵活多样的金融服务。

人行肩负开发这一中国金融史上规模最大、挑战性最强的复杂工程的使命，成立项目办公室负责实施工作，同时得到了国际咨询公司的帮助。授标后，1996年开始项目建设。其核心系统，即大额支付系统耗时近十年建成，2005年以实时全额结算系统的形式在全国投入使用。

与中国相比，美国联邦储备系统的实时全额结算系统Fedwire于1970年实施，德国的系统于1987年实施，日本的银行金融网络系统BOJ-NET于1988年实施，英国的清算所自动支付系统CHAPS于1996年实施，香港的清算所自动转账系统CHATS也于1996年实施。

中国现代化支付系统的成型期

在许多方面，中国和其他国家一样，其支付体系的驱动因素是央行和商业银行确保付款人和收款人之间顺利安全转移资金的需求。用户都希望系统具有良好的成本效益且便捷易用。但在现代社会，人们早已习惯了支付体系的存在，和其他既有社会基础设施和管道系统一样，只有当系统出了问题人们才会着急。

支付体系开发中最具挑战性的问题是在第十一个五年规划（2006～2010年）之前和期间解决的。这是一个重要时期，银行体系经历重大改革：2002年起各大国有银行纷纷改组上市，2003年中国银行业监督管理委员会成立，现代支付手段如信用卡、借记卡和网络支付系统（如阿里巴巴旗下的支付宝）迅速涌现。

随着中国经济的腾飞，2006～2010年间，经济年平均增长速度达到10.5%，快速推进的城镇化、居民收入的增加以及贸易和消费模式的日趋复杂，对支付和转账服务提出了越来越高的要求。

要理解在中国建立全国性自动化支付体系的复杂性，不妨看一看中国银行业的架构。1979年以后，中国实现了由“大一统”的银行体制向双层银行体制的转变，该体系包括承担央行职能的中国人民银行，以及其他金融服务提供者，即四大国有商业银行[3]、上市和股份制商业银行、政策性银行[4]和外资银行在华分行和代表处。

就支付、清算和结算而言，中国的银行结构复杂是因为各商业银行在五级行政区［中央（总行）、省、市、县、村］设有众多分支机构，且各自为政，在基于行政区划的层级框架内独立运作。同一家银行可能在人行开设多个账户，每个账户需要独立的支付处理接口，而支付体系现代化的首要任务之一是实现银行机构内部代码、流程和程序的集中和标准化。

1996年年底以后，四大国有商业银行开始运行各自的全国电子资金汇兑系统，超过三分之二的异地支付量通过该等行内系统清算。1996年推出全国电子联行系统（EIS）后，各商业银行分支机构仍维持在当地人行分／支行的清算账户，因为一个商业银行的行内清算系统无法结算跨行支付交易。

中国现代化支付系统旨在改变上述分散的局面。通过建立技术基础设施，实现中国支付体系的现代化，全国性的数据通信网络将众多银行机构与全国和地区支付业务处理中心相联结。中国国家金融通信网（CNFN）这一技术基础设施支持大额支付系统（HVPS）、小额支付系统（BEPS）、银行卡电子授权系统和簿记证券系统（政府证券结算）的运行。人行拥有并运行的约2000家同城清算所（LCH）继续处理全部同城跨行支付交易和大部分同城行内支付业务，市县级清算所逐步实现自动化，并进一步整合集中。

大额支付系统是中国现代化支付系统的核心。鉴于其重要性，大额支付系统由人行拥有并运行，采用实时全额结算系统（RTGS）方式，2005年完成全国推广。大额支付系统为跨行转账、金融市场、证券市场、外汇市场等提供当日资金结算，也为小额支付系统、同城清算所、银行卡网络以及主要商业银行的电子汇兑系统提供日终净额结算。换言之，大额支付系统将区域经济和地方金融中心纳入统一的全国市场，商业银行作为系统的直接参与者，一旦在人行开设清算账户，系统不再在异地支付和同城支付、行内支付和跨行支付之间作区分。直接参与者还包括人行地市级（含）以上中心支行（库）。间接参与者是指未在人行开设清算账户而委托直接参与者办理资金清算的商业银行。间接参与者还包括人行县（市）支行（库）。特许参与者是指经人行批准直接通过大额支付系统办理第三方支付业务的机构。截至2010年底，共有1729家直接参与者、100510家间接参与者和6家特许参与者。

就支付体系而言，这一高度分散的人行账户结构不仅阻碍了一体化系统的实施，同时也给大额支付系统带来各种风险，包括流动性风险、信贷风险、法律风险和操作风险。各级商业银行分支机构必须在相应的央行分／支行开设三个账户，这一要求无助于货币政策的实施。银行体系条块分割加大了监管的难度，降低了商业银行现金管理的效率。中国现代化支付系统的设想是整合集中人行账户，一家商业银行的所有分支机构开设一个合并账户，从一个结点接入支付系统。这将简化异地支付的清算和结算，推动同城清算所净额结算和行内转账交易。这些问题将在第二代支付系统中得以解决，这也是中国第十二个五年规划（2011～2015年）的一项工作。

最新动向

中国人民银行和其他有关主管机构，与商业银行一道在中国支付结算系统整合方面取得重大进展。业务方面，自2005年上线以来，大额支付系统（HVPS）增长迅速（见表1），2011年占支付体系总交易量68%。

表1 中国大额支付系统（2006～2011年）

资料来源：中国人民银行，《中国支付体系发展报告》（2006～2010年）；中国人民银行，《中国人民银行年报2011》

如表2所示，与其他主要经济体大额支付系统相比，2011年，中国的大额支付系统交易量最高。交易金额远超巴西和香港。然而，就GDP倍数而言，大额支付系统处理的交易金额仍然较低，因此仍有巨大增长空间。

表2 2011年部分国家大额支付系统比较

资料来源：国际清算银行支付结算体系委员会（CPSS），《支付结算体系委员会国家支付、清算和结算体系统计数据：2011年图表》，2013年1月

同时，中国现代化支付系统在很大程度上达到了十国集团支付结算体系委员会（CPSS）系统重要性支付系统核心原则的国际标准。作为国际货币基金组织和世界银行金融部门评估规划项目的一个部分，2010年对中国现代化支付系统进行了详细评估，2012年3月支付结算体系委员会的《详细评估报告》[5]发表。由于小额支付系统（BEPS）的交易金额仍然较低，评估重点关注大额支付系统。就大额支付系统的改进，评估团在以下关键领域提出建议：

1.法律基础：中国政府应加快立法进程，完成支付和证券结算法律与监管框架的改革。

2.理解和管理风险：中国人民银行应告知参与者为降低风险所采取的措施和为消除风险所开展的项目。通过完善相关规则，建立第二代支付系统，人行还应加强对信贷风险和流动性风险的监控。

3.安全、操作可靠性和应急安排：第二代支付系统应具备更高效的运行和维护机制以及加强型的备份系统，如具备完整的业务恢复能力。

4.系统效率和实用性：为提高用户效率和实用性，应对现有系统三方面的功能进行调整，如多个访问结点，大额支票交易相关大额电子交易的成本较高，以及延长大额支付系统的运行时间。

5.参与标准：大力鼓励中国人民银行修订《银行业金融机构加入、退出支付系统管理办法》。

6.支付体系的治理：系统参与者应在更大程度上参与第二代支付系统项目，最终建立正式的用户群，以促进合作并逐步提升系统性能。

7.央行在运用核心原则方面的责任：中国人民银行应公开表明其在支付系统监管方面的政策立场，不仅包括支付体系的效率和可靠性问题，也包括推动竞争和保护消费者权益。

中国政府认识到所取得的重大成绩，尤其是银行卡支付系统和私营部门运行的其他零售支付系统的发展。在线支付、移动支付和电话支付发展迅猛。值得一提的是，中国人民银行会同公安部推出联网核查公民身份信息系统，进一步落实银行账户实名制以及“了解客户原则”。

“十二五”展望

在第十二个五年规划（2011～2015年）期间，中国现代化支付系统需要适应资金转账数量和金额的大幅增长、人民币国际化、技术变革和符合国际标准的数字经济的兴起等现实。

2011年5月，中国支付清算协会（PCAC）在北京成立，协会是全国性非营利社会团体法人，主管单位为中国人民银行。这是因为认识到有必要建立市场化的支付服务体系，结合政府监管与行业自律，以降低运营成本，改善监管效果，促进市场创新并确保支付结算系统的安全和效率。

本着透明公开的原则并参考国际惯例，中国人民银行每年对外发布《中国支付体系发展报告》。第一份报告于2006年发布，支付体系有关数据日渐丰富，便于市场分析和预测支付体系走势和服务。

2012年1月，中国人民银行发布《关于中国支付体系发展（2011～2015年）的指导意见》。《意见》阐明支付体系发展的政策取向，明确未来支付体系建设的工作重点，包括：

1.健全支付体系法律法规制度，夯实支付体系发展的法律基础。

2.扎实推进金融基础设施建设，构建安全高效的资金、证券结算系统网络。

3.鼓励非现金支付工具发展创新，推动非现金支付工具的普及应用。

4.优化账户服务和管理，增强社会诚信意识。

5.加强支付体系监督管理，维护支付体系安全稳定运行。

6.加强支付体系国际交流与合作。

中国支付体系的最终发展方向是扩大国内和国际的支付网络。

2011年，中国人民银行推动金融服务空白的农村地区银行卡存取款业务的开展。2012年人行发布《中国人民银行关于推广银行卡助农取款服务的通知》，明确在2013年底前实现助农取款在全国农村乡镇、行政村的基本覆盖，构建“支付绿色通道”[6]。

在国际层面上，中国人民银行积极参与国际会议，交流经验，推动支付结算合作。2011年，人行担任东亚及太平洋中央银行行长会议（EMEAP）支付结算体系工作组（WGPPS）主席。人行作为十国集团支付结算体系委员会（CPSS）的成员，以中英文两种文字编写完成《中国支付、清算和结算体系》（支付结算体系委员会红皮书）。另外，人行与欧洲、香港特别行政区及东南亚的对口部门召开双边会议，交流经验，加强跨境合作。

结语

显然，从陈元领导的中国现代化支付系统发展初期至今，中国的支付体系从初级走向成熟，不断扩大其国际国内覆盖。随着中国经济继续飞速发展，经济的复杂程度进一步提高，支付体系建设任重而道远。伴随人民币的国际化进程，中国贸易、投资和支付的国际地位不断提高，支付体系必须与时俱进。

因此，我们应当认识到在陈元领导下国际国内专家做出的重要贡献，在世界银行的帮助下，他们共同勾勒出中国重要金融基础设施的蓝图。

参考文献

1.中国人民银行，《中国支付体系发展报告》（2006～2010年），北京。

2.中国人民银行，《中国人民银行年报2011》，北京。

3.中国人民银行，《关于中国支付体系发展（2011～2015年）的指导意见》，2012年1月，北京。

4.中国仪器进出口公司下属中技国际招标公司，《中国财税技援项目：中华人民共和国国家支付清算系统——招标文件》（卷一和卷二），1994年2月，北京。

5.Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Statistics on payment, clearing and settlement systems in the CPSS countries: Figures for 2011, January, 2013.

6.EMEAP Working Group on Payment and Settlement Systems, Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in EMEAP Economies: China, Updated 2012.

7.International Monetary Fund & The World Bank, Financial Sector Assessment Program, People's Republic of China: CPSS Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, Detailed Assessment of Observance, March 2012, Washington, D.C.

8.Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Global Payment Systems, 1996, Hong Kong.

9.The World Bank, Implementation Completion Report （TF-27221;IDA-24230;SCL-4570） on a Credit in the Amount of SDR42.1 million & a Supplemental Loan in the Amount of US$8 million to the People's Republic of China for a Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project, Report No. 25455, 31 March 2003, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, Washington, D.C.

[1] 见世界银行2003年中国——财税技援项目。华盛顿特区：世界银行。http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P003623/financial-sector-technical-assistance-project?lang=en

[2] 见陈元，《全球支付系统——中国现代化支付系统（CNAPS）规划与实践》，香港金融管理局，1996年，第41～46页。

[3] 四大国有商业银行是中国工商银行（ICBC）、中国农业银行（ABC）、中国银行（BOC）和中国建设银行（CCB）。

[4] 1994年成立三家政策性银行，为经济贸易发展和国家投资项目提供资金，分别是中国农业发展银行（ADBC）、国家开发银行（CDB）和中国进出口银行（Chexim）。

[5] 国际货币基金组织/世界银行，《中国金融部门评估规划系列报告：关于中国遵守〈系统重要性支付系统核心原则〉详细评估报告》，2012年3月。

[6] 中国人民银行，《中国人民银行年报2011》，第66页。

第7章 开发性金融机构相对于商业银行的功能及定位

黄记祖

自中国加入世界贸易组织（“入世”）以来，各界试图更好地理解外资进入金融业将如何影响中国的商业银行。相比而言，对于开发性金融机构（DFIs）的关注甚少。本文将探讨开发性金融机构需要采取的举措，及其如何在瞬息万变的经济和金融环境下继续履行自己的职责，发挥应有的作用。

中国未来的发展蓝图将受以下几个重要因素的影响：

·持续快速的经济增长；

·“入世”；

·采取区域发展战略；

·深化经济改革。

这些因素对中国银行体系的结构及其主要参与者有着广泛的影响，并将持续干预资本配置过程。商业银行体系需要自我改革以应对即将进入中国市场的外资银行的竞争。亟待解决的结构性问题包括资产质量、资本状况、风险管理、公司治理、财务报告标准以及运营效率等。

尽管业务范围和功能不同，开发性金融机构也需关注商业银行面临的一些问题。这方面，国家开发银行在吸收国际最佳实践方面取得了长足进步，这对其转型至关重要。借用陈元行长的话说，就是让开行成为“国际一流的银行”。展望未来，国开行将坚定推进其目标的实现，在瞬息万变的环境中发挥自身作用，保持良好的地位和国际声誉。为此，国开行需要不断进行自我提升，保持资本充足和资产优质，践行至高标准的公司治理和风险管理，扩大并深化人力资源和技术能力。

随着中国商业银行逐步剥离政策性贷款业务，政策性贷款业务将仅由政策性金融机构开展。众多由政府资助的开发项目意味着政策性贷款领域依然需要开发性金融机构存在并发挥作用。因此，我认为开行作为中国首要开发性金融机构的作用还将存续。

然而，我也能想象得到开行将按照稳健的市场化商业准则，扩大其业务范围。在这一方面，开行能够并且应当凭借其核心竞争力同步开展一些业务，如提供长期性融资、项目融资、投资银行和财务顾问服务。在我看来，这些业务符合开发性金融机构的开发性作用和功能。

让我举几个例子来阐述开行能够开展的业务。首先，开行可以定位为中国长期性融资领域的主力银行。开行可以与国内外商业银行及包括保险公司、机构投资者在内的其他金融机构合作，通过发起、牵头、安排、发放贷款为基础设施等项目提供长期性融资。这样，开行将充当调用商业资本助力中国经济发展的角色。开行还可通过提供风险担保，为项目提供增信服务。同时，作为长期性融资和项目融资业务的领导者，在其他银行眼中，开行将成为融资支持中国经济增长和发展的首选合作行或天然渠道。

其次，开行可以为正在市场化经济中逐步走向现代化的本土企业提供投行和企业咨询服务。可以想象，由此将产生对公司与财务重组、财务管理和风险管理等咨询业务的需求。与此同时，我注意到开行已制订计划与中小商业银行合作，以此帮助改善中小企业融资难的问题。为了填补这些新业务领域内的重大空白并加快进入这些新业务领域，开行可以考虑与选定的外国金融机构合作结成战略联盟或成立合资公司。

随着中国发展的深入及金融业的进一步开放，开发性金融机构不断调整以保持其相关性与有用性将是一个自然演进过程。我的建议是开行凭借其优势调整和扩大其业务范围，同时继续发挥其政策性银行职能。通过追求这种“双轨制”战略，开行将在提供投融资及相关服务、促进中国经济发展方面发挥关键的核心作用，而这一职能定位符合其设立宗旨。

第8章 在华经营的外资保险企业：迎接挑战、促成变革

翟健

中国的保险市场经历了飞速发展。在短短20年时间内，中国建立并健全了市场监督机制，培育并壮大了国内保险业，同时阔步迈出了保险业对外资开放的步伐。

随着中国逐渐融入全球市场，截至2013年5月，来自14个国家和地区共计53家外资保险企业已经获得在华经营许可[1]。

本文将考察这些外资保险企业来华经营所采取的不同模式，并探讨监管者与市场参与者如何开展合作，在共同目标的指引下，推动保险业的发展。本文还将讨论中国保险业发展的路径以及外资保险企业在国内保险行业进一步发展过程中可以扮演的角色。

走合资路线

大多数外资保险企业选择合资方式进入中国保险市场，而且许多选择非保险行业的中国公司作为合作伙伴。这一模式对外资保险企业具有吸引力，因为它赋予外资保险企业更高水平的业务管控能力以及更大的塑造业务的自由。

此外，通过选择非保险行业的合作伙伴，外资保险企业可以从零开始构建合资企业。这意味着能够从基础开始打造自己的销售队伍，无须面对培训现有保险经纪人队伍的挑战，而现有保险经纪人大多已经被深深烙上了迥然不同的公司行为印记。

从不利的方面来看，经验证明合资企业可能沦为脆弱的联盟，跨文化联盟的合资企业尤其如此。为了能够长期立于不败之地，中外合资保险企业必须建立在双方共享的愿景之上，确保外方合作伙伴的经验、技术专长和管理手段与中方合作伙伴在对本地市场了解、关系和销售网络方面的优势相得益彰。

特别重要的是，合资双方必须确保对业务发展有着共同的期待。视业务拓展速度的不同，新成立的人寿保险公司可能需要长达七年的时间才能盈亏平衡。在某些合资保险企业，这样漫长的等待已经成为合资伙伴关系紧张的一大原因。合资双方并未在一开始就制定并达成清晰的业务发展路线图，因此国内合资伙伴可能逐渐失去等待的耐心。

在华经营的合资保险公司需要等待一定年限才能盈利，在此期间，业务扩张也需要消耗大量资本。因此，外资保险公司一般倾向于选择现金充裕的国内合作伙伴。这是比较关键的问题，因为国内监管机构对开设分支机构的审慎性要求十分严格。建立合资保险公司的注册资本金要求不低于2亿元人民币，此后每新增一个分支机构都需要追加2000万元的注册资本，除非注册资本总和已经达到5亿元。

寻求战略投资

除了建立合资企业之外，一些外国保险公司和金融机构还选择以战略投资者的身份进入中国市场。与建立合资企业相比，战略投资一般需要更大的初始资本承诺，但是可以为外国保险公司提供更快进入中国市场的渠道。合资企业可能需要15年的时间才能完成全国性的布局，但是战略投资可以在第一时间内为外国保险公司提供广泛的市场覆盖。

这对后来进入中国的外国保险公司尤其具有吸引力。市场的竞争格局近年来发生巨大变化，市场参与者过度集中，因此与从头开始建立企业的前景相比，战略投资已经成为更具吸引力的选择。

对于已经通过合资企业较深介入中国市场的外资保险企业来说，战略投资也具有吸引力，因为这为其寻求与国内保险公司建立协同合作关系打开了大门。

但是，战略投资无法为大多数外资保险企业提供理想的经营及管理控制。根据监管规定，单个外资保险企业在单个内资保险公司的持股比例不得超过20%，单个内资保险公司的所有外资持股比例总和不得超过25%，如果外资持股比例总和超出25%，则该公司将被划入外资企业的范畴。

有鉴于此，选择战略投资的外资保险企业必须将其角色更多限定为标的公司的顾问，尽管如此，还是能够发挥一定程度的领导力。

对于国内投资标的公司而言，吸引战略投资有两大好处：获得注资，和有机会引入国际管理经验与风险管理专长。用股权吸引外资保险公司成为战略投资者通常意味着国内保险公司有志迎接组织变革。组织变革可能包括调整运营结构和业务方向、吸收最佳国际经验、提高公司治理和风险管理水平等。外方成为战略持股人有助于中国保险公司共享前者的全球资源，从而能够促成上述变革的发生。

银行对保险业的投资

中国银行业监督管理委员会（CBRC）和中国保险监督管理委员会（CIRC）于2008年共同签署了《关于加强银保深层次合作和跨业监管合作谅解备忘录》，允许银行投资于保险公司。为了落实这一谅解备忘录，银监会和保监会相互配合做出这一特别的监管批准。

2009年9月，交通银行成为首家获得保监会批准的银行，在中保康联人寿保险有限公司持有51%的股份。在之后的两三年里，北京银行以6.8亿元的价格收购了北京首创集团持有的首创安泰人寿保险有限公司50%的股份；中国银行全资购买其持股的非寿险保险公司的全部剩余股份；工商银行以12亿元购买安盛保险公司60%的股份；建设银行完成太平洋安泰人寿保险有限公司51%股份的购股交易；农业银行于2011年2月份与嘉禾人寿签署购股协议，收购嘉禾51%的股份，嘉禾向农行定向增发10.367亿股。

更令人期待的是银保合作可以很好地互补，达成双赢效果。有银行投资的保险公司可以成为市场上的强强联合体。在进行股权收购之后，商业银行可以将更多的资源用于推广和销售自有的保险产品，而保险公司则可以发挥其专长，开发设计更贴合客户需求的产品。有统计表明，在交行入股之后，交银康联人保的保费收入即从2009年的8400万元增加到了2010年的7.12亿元，增幅超过了七倍。

有意思的是，五大国有商业银行都已成为各自所投资保险公司的控股股东，而某些外资保险公司，如安盛和永明，则在收购之后变成少数股东。虽然外资保险公司可以利用国内银行的庞大网络，但是这也绝非易事，因为随着持股比例的减少，其在董事会上的发言权也相应减少。

此外，监管机构对此类合作还持谨慎态度。银监会与证监会采取了一些措施来确保这类合作的长期稳健性。2009年11月，银监会发布《商业银行投资保险公司股权试点管理办法》，其中包括很多控制此类合作风险的条款。例如，每家商业银行只能投资一家保险公司；商业银行派至其入股的保险公司的高级管理人员必须与商业银行脱离薪资和劳动合同关系，不得相互兼职；商业银行不得以客户购买其入股的保险公司销售的保险产品作为向客户提供银行服务的前置条件。

尽管现在评判允许银行入股保险公司这一趋势是否取得实效还为时过早，但是银保合作这一新趋势为银行进一步发挥其资源优势拓展了新的渠道，提供了更多的投资机会。许多商业银行其实一开始就有意愿，未能达成合作协议的原因可能是政策限制或是难以找到合适的投资目标。

不断变化的市场格局

在中国加入世界贸易组织以来，市场准入水平在逐步提高。尽管保费收入仍相对较低，但外资保险公司的业务已经取得长足的发展。

截至2013年5月底，外资保险企业的保费总收入为280.1亿元，占全国保费总收入的3.62%。外资寿险公司作为保费收入的最大来源贡献了251.2亿元，占寿险市场的份额为4.94%（2000年为1.85%）。外资非寿险企业的保费收入为29亿元，市场份额为1.09%（2000年为0.54%）。[2]

这些市场份额数据反映了国内保险企业在中国市场上目前享有更大的市场覆盖。由于缺少与国内企业相媲美的销售网络，外资保险公司选择将业务重心放在经济活跃的沿海各大城市，例如北京、广州、上海和天津。

虽在相对有限的空间之内开展经营，但外资保险公司仍取得了较大的成功。在上海，外资保险公司的市场份额从2003年的14%上升到2009年的17%，2011年稳定在14%。

随着这些城市的市场逐渐趋于饱和（截至2011年年底，在上海取得保险经营牌照的寿险和非寿险公司共计120家），后来进入中国市场的公司选择开拓内陆市场。

与此同时，全国保险市场继续以惊人的速度增长。2001年至2012年年底，中国保费收入的年复合增长率超过了20%，2012年年底达到15488亿元，而2001年年初仅为1430亿元。同期，寿险保费在2001年1288亿元的基础上增加了14倍，于2012年达到1.9万亿元。

保险市场的增长受财富水平增加和人口老龄化的推动。随着财富增加，消费者会更多地消费于汽车、住房、旅游等项目，而人口老龄化则会提高人们对医疗保险和储蓄型产品的需求。

图1 保费增长

资料来源：2012年版《中国保险年鉴》和中国保监会网站上的数据统计

劳动力短缺和知识分享方面的挑战

尽管许多观察人士希望看到保险业监管进一步放松，能够让市场按照自己的速度来发展，但是扩张的速度总是会受到人力资源瓶颈的影响。

分析人士指出高素质人才的输送面临一个痛点，即教育的质量。虽然中国大学毕业生的数量在快速增长，但是受过高水平高等教育、可以适应世界一流公司就业需要的毕业生比例依然偏低。观察人士认为中国有必要彻底改革其教育体系，确保大学毕业生的素质水平能在长期不断提高。

招聘与培训是所有保险机构面临的首要挑战。在各种市场研究与报告中，中外合资企业提到的一大关注点就是，整个保险行业，包括销售、精算、承保、内部审计和后台支持部门，都缺少对口人才担任相应职位。许多外资保险公司预计，按照既定扩张速度，未来三年内的人员规模将需要扩大约1.33倍。看来，人才短缺的问题还将继续凸显。

员工素质会在很大程度上影响销售渠道的有效性。如果不经过正确的培训，销售人员就无法掌握有效销售各种产品的相关知识。例如，银保渠道约占寿险保费收入的20%，但这一渠道只局限于承保低毛利率和趸缴保费为主的产品，因为银行网点的销售人员并未获得足够培训去销售更复杂的产品。

一方面有经验的合格业界专才短缺，另一方面员工的流失率也已经上升到让人警惕的水平。有报道称在某些机构，员工流失率高达40%[3]。为了留住有经验的员工，保险公司必须加薪，然而员工调查显示，除了具有吸引力的薪酬之外，职业发展机会和工作环境等也是中国员工的考虑因素。

据观察，员工流失率低的公司一般更侧重于向员工提供职业发展与培训的机会，然后再将这些培训机会与员工薪酬挂钩。为减少员工流失，较为经典的策略是为员工提供清晰明确的、基于个人才干的职业发展规划，并在机构内部进行工作轮岗。如果能够花心思用社交聚会来打造组织内部的集体感，同时建立强大的内部沟通平台，那么员工对组织的忠诚度也会提高。

要留住员工，专业素质的持续提升也是一项有效手段。这是因为中国文化高度崇尚教育、职业发展与培训。许多中外合资保险公司资助其员工学习获取新的专业资质。

有些中外合资保险公司还在公司内部建立自己的商学院，帮助员工定期开展培训和教育，以提升员工的职业素养和知识水平。

中外合资保险公司和与外资保险公司结成战略合作伙伴关系的国内保险公司均具备一项优势，即能够利用手中的全球资源来保证员工留任。由于具备全球保险运营的网络，这些企业能够为本地员工提供为期一年的海外工作机会，或邀请海外专家来华为本地员工开展专门培训。

通过这种方式，外资参与中国保险业可以帮助中国提高相关人才的素质与技能水平。

市场与监管者的共同目标

虽然在过去的20年里，市场的准入机会有了显著的增加，但是许多调查还是称外资保险公司一致广泛地认为中国市场开放的步伐与其“入世”承诺不一致。

设立新分支机构的监管审批程序是主要争议点之一。国内保险公司可以同时申请开设多个分支机构，而外资保险公司必须逐个审批。此外，投资管理规定似乎也更偏袒大型国内保险公司。例如，开设一家保险资产管理公司的审慎性要求在设置上使得只有大型内资保险企业才能从事内部投资管理。

要为保险和金融服务业营造有效和高效的监管环境，中国在这方面面临诸多挑战，战胜挑战需要监管者和市场参与者的配合。而上述问题应该被视作这些挑战的组成部分。

国际金融协会（IIF）是为促进全球金融服务业风险管理以及发展最佳实践和标准而成立的全球性机构。在其看来，发展健康的金融监管体系应基于金融机构和监管机构可以合作实现的共同目标。其中包括经济发展与竞争、金融体系的稳定和安全、消费者保护和客户服务等。

在这些基本共同目标之上，可以就监管指导原则达成广泛共识，为中国保险业乃至金融服务业提供一个框架，以提高监管程序的效率。

为确保中国的监管环境能够解决金融机构全球扩张所带来的问题，同时适应金融市场一体化程度提高的大背景，开展国际合作势在必行。监管者可以通过标准化和互认等方式减少对跨国经营机构的差异监管和重复监管。

市场参与者与监管者之间定期、公开的对话有助于甄别监管需要，提高公共政策的质量和有效性。在修订规则的早期就联系业界与其他利益攸关方，进行有约束又不失条理的协商是上述对话的要义，有助于提高监管的有效性。

摒弃事后立法，采取主动性的政策监管目标对监管者和业界都有好处。监管还应该用原则来表述，清楚地向公众阐述，同时用于实现政策目标所需的规则应降到最少。

监管者还需要防止出现监管过度的问题。立法调整应当只在预计行业本身无法合理找到方式达成某项政策目标或解决某一问题时才予以使用。历史经验表明，鼓励业界进行自我监督的办法能够使监管更有效率。

继续开放市场的重要性

根据国际保险监督官协会（IAIS）的一份关于新兴市场保险业监管的指导报告，新兴保险市场的稳定只有在“当审慎性标准得到满足以及市场在国际环境下的运转具有竞争性、专业性和透明度时”[4]才能实现。

当竞争充分时，市场中的外资参与者可以通过提高服务质量的标准，带来产品创新，转让技术知识和最佳管理实践，来帮助新兴市场实现发展。竞争水平提高也能帮助有志于打造竞争优势的保险公司提高其服务的专业化程度。竞争带来的效果是服务水平的提高，市场效率的提升，最终使消费者受益。

开放市场有助于壮大新兴市场国家的保险行业，同时在理论上也会给整体经济带来一系列好处[5]。对中国而言，这意味着盘活国内银行账户上处于休眠状态的巨额国民储蓄，为经济发展所需的项目提供融资，例如国家基础设施和教育项目等。具有数十年国际投资经验的外资保险公司可凭借这一优势，帮助有效地配置保险资金，为国内保险企业树立标杆。

更重要的是，一个稳健、高效的保险市场有助于中国社会保障体系的转型，从国家出资的养老体系转为多层次的福利体系，这能够更好地为快速老龄化的人口提供养老资金。

有关外资参与的关注

许多新兴经济体的政府将发展强大的本土保险机构视作其国家保持经济和政治独立性的必要条件。这种看法有其合理性。过度依赖外资保险公司会威胁国家安全的说法有其历史渊源。对手国可以批准受其控制的保险公司退出市场，从而导致贸易瘫痪。但是应当指出的是，对外国保险公司的风险敞口可以通过监管进行分散，使上述风险降到最低。

外资参与的另一大风险是可能出现利润汇回导致资金外流。但是资金外流可以通过吸引更多的外商直接投资来抵消，由外资参与所推动的保险行业的壮大与发展是可以带来外资的。

整体看来，对外资开放保险市场利大于弊，前提是开放的同时应健全监管体系。

对市场的教育

教育在未来中国保险市场的发展过程中的作用可能非同小可，因为大多数中国消费者依然认为保险为非必需品。要转变这种观念，媒体不失为一种有效渠道。但是中国市场巨大，同时不同消费者细分市场的需要大不相同，因此这意味着必须根据人口结构的特点因地制宜，从而有效地普及知识[6]。

在城市地区，教育工作应侧重于能够买得起寿险产品的小康消费者阶层。政府应针对这一群体，每年一次向他们提供社保福利的明细单，同时指出保障方面可能存在的不足和商业保险如何能够帮助弥补这一不足等。

在农村地区，人们对寿险的基本功能还不甚了解，因此宣传的问题尤为突出。应从最有可能购买寿险产品的消费者开始，例如居住在经济活跃地区的村民和乡镇企业的职工等。

推动市场变革与创新

随着中国的人寿保险行业逐渐走向成熟，其发展轨迹将更多向发达市场靠拢。这意味着市场将从单纯的寿险和储蓄型产品逐渐走向共同基金和复杂的退休计划，最后演变为定制的理财解决方案，提供全方位的财务顾问、资讯、产品和服务。

这一演变正在通过创新逐步展开。这体现在荷兰国际集团ING在中国的合资企业之一——中荷人寿保险的产品开发速度之上。自2003年起，中荷人寿已经将其寿险产品范围从非分红式拓展到分红式、万能险、终身医院赔付医疗险以及期缴和趸缴保费的投连险产品等。

随着行业走向成熟，销售渠道也将更加多样化。寿险公司目前主要依赖其在华自建的分支网络与代理销售队伍，但是它们将逐渐转向通过财务策划顾问、银行和独立财务顾问等独立中介进行销售，之后随着消费者的日渐老练，则会增加基于互联网的网销渠道。

由于从成熟市场中积累了运营经验，所以外资保险公司会是推动上述演变的主要市场参与者，通过将已在发达市场经过验证的创新产品、营销理念和销售方法带入中国市场，加速市场的发展和保险服务的普及。然而，外资公司也必须确保创新给中国市场带来的是优质稳健的产品，为此，应避免向客户销售无法满足其真正需要或收费过高的所谓的创新产品。

外资保险公司也可以率先使用以信息技术为驱动的先进保单管理系统、保单服务流程与产品开发流程，从而促成国内保险行业采用效率更高的业务模式。

图2 市场演变的路径

同时，随着外资保险公司在中国站稳脚跟，国内的保险公司预计也将开始走出去，特别是到华人社区较为庞大的国家。这一趋势已经在金融服务业的其他领域率先发生，例如工商银行和其他中资银行最近纷纷在海外各大城市设立分支机构。

成绩令人瞩目

必须承认的是，中国保险行业年轻充满朝气，并已取得了令人瞩目的成就，特别是最近10年。应当看到的是现代保险业的种子直到1980年才在中国落地生根，而健全的保险业监管体系直到1995年才真正形成。

在“文化大革命”之后，保险行业出于各种原因被全面叫停，因为当时鲜有中国公民持有私产，并且所有企业均为国家所有。创建于1949年的中国人民保险公司（PICC）是中国当时唯一的一家保险公司。它的经营规模逐渐缩减，到50年代末仅剩外贸、国际货运和航空保险承保业务[7]。

在1980年开始经济改革的大背景下，中国人保重新焕发了生机。自那以来，中国的保险公司数量增加到了100多家。从本世纪初到2013年，保险行业的资产总规模已经增加了28倍多，从2000年的2604亿元增加到2012年的7.3万亿元，年复合增长率为30%。

显然，中国的保险业在短时间内迈出了大步，但仍处于发展的初级阶段，其监管框架有待进一步完善。在中国保险市场上，外资参与者希望看到市场改革加快，监管框架完善，但是与此同时，也必须认识到：中国保险行业并未经历过相对平稳和连续的市场演变，且缺乏监管决策可以依据的先例。

确实，就像外资保险公司正在中国市场进行摸索一样，中国的保险监管机构也是如此，虽然它们已经在强化监管框架和提高从业标准方面取得了很大成绩。最近几年，监管机构还通过制定相关的法律法规，进一步完善了监督。于2009年10月1日生效的新版《保险法》更多强调消费者保障，实施更严格的分支机构和固定代理渠道监管。财政部与保监会发布了新的保险合同会计处理规定。根据该规定，非保险相关风险取得的收入不再作保费收入处理。此外，还允许保险公司使用更多的投资渠道，包括股票市场、基础设施融资和货币市场金融工具融资等。

结论

中国的保险市场在短时间内取得了令人瞩目的成就。为了进一步推动行业的发展，监管机构和业界必须相互配合，推动有利于实现经济发展、维持金融行业稳定以及实现消费者保障等共同目标的变革。

就保险公司与监管机构开展合作的方式而言，其指导思想应包括监管者与市场参与者及其他利益攸关方之间开展经常性的、开放式的对话，提高监管的质量与效率；明确阐述政策目标；采用尽可能少的规则来达成这些目标。此外，政策目标应包括通过学校和其他渠道来提升公众对保险必要性的认识。

展望未来，保险行业在帮助中国实现重大的经济与社会发展目标方面起着关键作用。保险服务提供者是引导公众储蓄资金进入资本市场进行高效配置以推动经济增长的重要渠道。保险行业在建立现代养老金体系、保障快速老龄化社会的财务安全方面也可以发挥关键作用。

外资保险公司可以作为变革的催化剂，而这些变革则是保险行业实现上述目标的必要条件。通过引领产品创新、治理和商业规范，外资保险公司可以推动全行业在效率、客户服务和消费者保障水平等方面实现全面提升。

[1] 中国保险监督管理委员会（CIRC）网站，2013年5月。

[2] 中国保险监督管理委员会（CIRC）网站，2013年5月。

[3] 《在中国的外资保险公司》，普华永道，2007年9月。

[4] 《新兴市场经济体保险业监管与监督指导报告》，IAIS新兴市场问题委员会，1997年9月。

[5] 《进入新兴市场的外国保险公司：问题与关注》，小哈罗德·D·斯基伯博士，1997年。

[6] 《适合中国的人寿保险政策》，斯蒂芬·H·拜恩德、海蒂·Z·胡和彼得·B·沃克，2006年3月。

[7] 《中华人民共和国保险合同法：保单持有人权利的比较分析》，阿尔伯特·蒙蒂，米兰大学法学院和国际经济研究中心（ICER）。

第9章 国际环境及其对中国的影响[1]

雅各布·弗兰克尔

首先，我和基廷总理一道，祝贺陈元副主席领导国家开发银行取得长足进步。同时，欢迎并祝贺胡怀邦董事长履新。国际顾问委员会的诸位委员皆是开行的挚友，我们非常愿意继续全力支持开行的工作。

我今天发言的主题是全球经济概况介绍。重点不仅限于中国本身，而在于中国所运行的环境。10～15年前，国际经济形势与中国或中国背景下的讨论并无太大关系。随着中国融入并开始领导世界经济，这一话题对于中国就变得尤为重要。

我会谈到与世界重心转移相关的几大趋势，简要提到欧元，涉及美国和欧洲劳动力市场的情况，以及长期的财政挑战。

全球宏观经济形势

首先，让我们回顾一下过去20年全球经济增长情况（图1）。

图1 全球GDP增长

资料来源：国际货币基金组织，2013年4月，《世界经济展望》（2013年和2014年预测）

继2009年探底之后，世界经济普遍复苏或至少开始复苏。现在的问题是复苏并不均衡。尽管世界整体而言已经开始复苏，但工业化国家和新兴经济体之间存在巨大差异（表1）。50年前，差距尚不明显。事实上，50年前工业化国家的经济运行情况远优于发展中国家。而过去10年，新兴经济体比工业化国家的增长速度快三倍。

此外，工业化国家的情况也不尽相同。多亏了亚洲经济，特别是中国和印度，否则世界经济将惨不忍睹。事实上，2013年欧洲将持续负增长；美国表现平平，增速约为2%（图2）。

表1 世界经济实际GDP增长（按不变价格计算平均年增长率）

资料来源：国际货币基金组织，2013年4月，《世界经济展望》（2013年和2014年预测）

图2 有关国家实际GDP增长

资料来源：国际货币基金组织，2013年4月16日最后更新，《世界经济展望》（2013年和2014年预测）。2013年和2014年美国和欧元区部分为JP摩根预测，2013年4月19日最后更新

图3 全球GDP分布情况

资料来源：国际货币基金组织《世界经济展望》数据库，《世界经济展望》2013年4月16日最后更新

首先，世界已然发生变化。22年前，中国在世界经济舞台上无足轻重，仅占世界经济总量的4%。今天，中国占世界经济总量的14%，影响力不可同日而语（图3）。欧洲的地位相应下降，美国的比重也有所减少，日本亦是如此。简言之，全球经济的重心已经转移到亚洲，随之而来的影响也是不可估量的。

第二，贸易方面。正如基辛格博士所言，20世纪70年代，美国对华贸易尚不及美国和洪都拉斯之间的贸易量；从那时起，美中贸易量大幅增长。由此产生在我看来更为重要的一点，而这点恰恰是围绕美中贸易的公共政策辩论所忽视的。在图4中，中国位于中央，一侧是对美国、欧盟的贸易，另一侧是对亚洲的贸易。看中国和欧美之间的贸易：美国和欧洲从中国的进口是其对华出口量的两倍，因而全球经济失衡的论调甚嚣尘上。这样的论调错就错在，在一个全球化的世界里，我们应该把注意力放在多边关系而非双边关系上。事实上，中国对亚洲其他国家的贸易是中国对欧美贸易量的两倍，而中国从亚洲其他国家的进口实际上大于对亚洲其他国家的出口量。因此，在一个多边的世界里，我们也应从多边的角度看问题。

图4 中国在全球贸易中的角色（单位：10亿美元）

资料来源：中国国家统计局12个月数据

我要谈的第三个问题有关外部失衡，这个问题困扰了我们25～30年。长期以来，美国入不敷出，亚洲过度储蓄，结果亚洲积累顺差，美国出现逆差。加之中国的外汇储备激增，普遍认为财富从美国向亚洲转移。这一现象最近有所改观，即双方的收支差距正在缩小，尽管缩小的速度也许还不够快（图5）。

欧洲

再看欧洲，不均衡的情况尤为明显，这也正是欧洲危机的症结所在（图6）。就增长而言，2013年欧洲将连续第二年出现GDP负增长。根据国际货币基金组织估算，增速为-0.6%。事实上，绝大多数欧洲国家均为负增长，特别是希腊、西班牙和意大利。被视作欧洲经济火车头的德国2013年预计增幅仅为0.6%。

图5 经常账户（国际收支平衡）

资料来源：国际货币基金组织，2013年4月16日最后更新，《世界经济展望》（2013年和2014年预测）

图6 实际GDP增长（欧元区国家）

资料来源：国际货币基金组织，2013年4月16日最后更新，《世界经济展望》（2013年和2014年预测）。欧元区、德国、意大利和西班牙部分为JP摩根预测，2013年4月18日最后更新

欧洲存在两个现象：一是欧洲增长十分缓慢；二是欧元区各成员间差异巨大。原因何在？归根结底，各成员国对欧洲结构性政策的执行力度不一。因此，希腊和西班牙的失业率高达20%以上，而德国的失业率低于7%（图7）。

图7 失业率（欧元区国家）

资料来源：欧洲统计局，数据最后读取：德国（2013年3月）；意大利、西班牙和欧元区（2013年2月）；希腊（2013年1月）

以上两类国家——主要是德国和南欧国家——面临不同的挑战。让这些国家出台整齐划一的经济政策是十分困难的，除非其经济表现更为一致。同样，纵观欧洲的生产力状况，欧元诞生之初意大利的竞争力已落下一大截，而德国的竞争力不断提升，其他欧元区国家夹在中间。自危机爆发以来，欧洲的竞争力有一定程度的提升，如2009年以来西班牙的生产力有所提高（图8）。但总体而言，欧洲内部竞争力的差距仍然十分明显，即第二个主题。

欧洲何以为继？一直以来支撑欧洲的是，与欧盟其他国家相比德国巨大的国际收支顺差（图9）。过去三年出现了一定程度的重新调整，但上述现象依然如故，即德国继续保持顺差，其他国家利用德国的顺差通过资本市场为自己的开销买单。

图8 单位劳动成本（整体经济）

注：整体经济单位产出劳动成本。

资料来源：经济合作与发展组织，2012年和2013年预测

图9 欧元区经常账户余额（占GDP比例）

资料来源：国际货币基金组织，《世界经济展望》数据库，2013年4月16日最后更新，《世界经济展望》（2013年和2014年预测）

长期以来，欧洲的资本市场对风险错误定价（图10）。从欧元诞生到危机爆发，西班牙、意大利、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和希腊的借贷成本与德国相差无几，这是毫无道理的。长期以来，市场对欧盟内部所有主权借款人一视同仁。危机告诉我们，主权国家也有差异，市场必须按主权国家的风险程度对其风险进行差别定价。

图10 10年期主权债息差

资料来源：彭博资讯，路透社，2013年4月19日最后更新

劳动力市场

再来看劳动力市场。从经济、政治和社会的角度而言，失业都是个大问题。过去几年，美国的失业率大幅下降，欧洲的失业率巨幅增长。因此结论是，美国劳动力市场的情况好于欧洲（图11）。

图11 失业率（美国和欧元区）

资料来源：欧洲统计局和美国劳工统计局。数据最后读取：欧元区，2013年2月；美国，2013年3月

然而事实上，美国的劳动力市场也不尽如人意。实际上，美国失业率下降和欧洲失业率上升在很大程度上并非取决于创造了多少新的就业机会，而仅仅是体现了劳动参与率的变化。近十年来，美国的劳动参与率急剧下降，而欧洲的劳动参与率大幅上升。失业率的变化在一定程度上体现了上述因素，而非劳动力市场的改善（图12）。

谈到失业率，需要强调两点。有一种观点认为一旦美国经济恢复增长，失业问题就会不攻自破。这一论点成立的前提是失业率在本质上是周期性的。遗憾的是，最近美国的情况显示，失业率上升可能是结构性问题。事实上，目前美国失业人口的40%在半年以前就已经失业。长期失业的人群再次就业一般难度很大，因此，即使经济复苏，就业领域完全有可能仍然挑战重重。

这就意味着必须重点关注失业率背后的结构性问题，也就是教育和培训。美国7.6%的失业率在不同人群间存在很大差异（图13）。本科生的失业率仅为3%左右，远低于平均水平。未取得高中文凭的人群失业率高达11%以上。换言之，失业率只是一个平均值，掩盖了人群差异，而关键的差异在于受教育程度。因此解决劳动力市场问题的关键在于教育和培训。

图12 劳动参与率（美国和欧元区）

资料来源：欧洲统计局和美国劳工统计局。数据最后读取：欧元区，2012年11月；美国，2013年3月

图13 美国失业率（按受教育程度划分）

资料来源：美国劳工统计局。数据最后读取：2013年3月

宏观经济和长期财政挑战

最后，我想就宏观经济政策说几句。大家都说量化宽松是应对全球危机挑战的绝佳政策。尽管政策不错，但我有我的担忧：全球利率水平接近于零（图14），而当利率为零时，货币政策的灵活性大大下降。

图14 央行政策利率

资料来源：彭博市场数据。数据最后读取：2013年4月18日

事实上，零利率导致实际利率长期为负（图15）。这点值得引起关注。

在此背景下，各大央行不断收购大量优质和劣质资产，大家还为此感到欣慰（图16）。欧洲央行如此，美联储如此，现在日本央行亦是如此。也许这在短期内是有必要的，但必须认识到，我们的目标是支持可持续增长，而非短期增长。而可持续增长的基础是可持续的政策。目前的政策不可持续。实际负利率不可持续，央行大量收购资产、不断印钞不可持续。大家都知道无限制发钞的恶果，中国应该了解，有过类似经历的拉美国家更应记忆犹新。

图15 全球政策利率（发达市场）

资料来源：摩根大通，国家统计研究院。数据最后读取：名义，1997年10月；实际，2007年7月

图16 主要央行总资产（指数化）

资料来源：彭博资讯。数据最后读取：欧洲央行，2013年4月12日；美联储，2013年4月17日

现在不存在通货膨胀并不意味着可以高枕无忧，全球扩张性财政政策、大规模预算赤字、高负债和高杠杆都值得注意（图17）。

图17 财政状况（一般性财政收支）

资料来源：国际货币基金组织《世界经济展望》数据库。《世界经济展望》2013年4月16日最后更新

当然，全球已经出现去杠杆化的趋势。尤其在美国，美国家庭已经开始减债，但欧洲告别过度借贷的日子还十分遥远。

最后，必须谈一谈人口老龄化及其影响。世界普遍存在人口老龄化的问题，这不仅限于日本或是欧洲，亚洲其他国家亦是如此。1950年，发达国家65岁以上人口仅占总人口的8%（图18）；目前，该比例为16%～17%；到2050年，65岁以上人口占总人口的比例将达到25%以上（图19）。

美国人口老龄化的情况与世界大体一致，这将导致沉重的预算负担。请看目前美国政府财政开支状况：预算（不含利息支付）的23%用于社保开支，25%用于医保开支，余下的53%用于所有其他事项，如基础设施、研发、国防等（图20）。

图18 全球人口挑战

资料来源：联合国人口司，2010年修订

图19 美国人口挑战

注：1.享受联邦医疗保险（Medicare）年龄，65岁。

2.享受社会保障年龄：减额，62岁；全额，67岁（1960年后出生）。

资料来源：联合国人口司，2010年修订

图20 美国联邦开支构成

注：1.人口老龄化占社保和医疗预计开支增长的三分之二（国会预算办公室）。

2.医保包括联邦医疗保险（Medicare，2012年非利息支出的17%，2035年将达25%）和医疗救助（Medicaid）以及儿童医疗保险计划（CHIP）和医保交易补助（合计2014年非利息支出的8%，2035年将达14%）。

资料来源：国会预算办公室，《2012年长期预算更新》，2012年6月5日

快进20年到2035年，由于人口老龄化的问题，医保支出占美国联邦开支的比例将从2012年的25%激增至近40%。社保占24%，所剩38%的预算将用于解决所有其他开支（教育、基础设施、研发等）。政府是不可能仅靠38%的预算提供所有必要服务的。毫无疑问，美国必须重新审视福利计划、公民对政府的期望以及公民应为服务支付的对价，而非均作为福利大而化之。

公共部门需要重新制订社会契约。对美国如此，对世界其他国家亦然。我们在关注汇率、利率和失业率等短期问题的同时，需要时刻记取，社会的本质很可能改变，因为政府和公民之间的契约的性质将会发生变化。

融资支持中国的城镇化进程

现在我想谈一谈中国的挑战。我们需要找到办法，更好地完成中国的城镇化这一重大任务。我将中国的城镇化进程作为挑战来分析。

中国政府在数年前决定推动大规模的城镇化建设。这就涉及两个问题：一是如何成功实现城镇化；二是如何为城镇化提供融资。

城镇化既有宏观的影响又有微观的影响。首先，在宏观层面上，开展大规模的城镇化意味着必须创造数以百万计甚至千万计的就业机会。这一点十分重要，因为只有当新的城市人口在城里找到工作并达到一定的生活水平时，城镇化才称得上成功。因此理所当然的是，城镇化的第一步就是为这些人提供就业。但光提供就业还不够，还得保证这些工作是富有生产力的。这意味着中国的产值将由于这些新城市人口的贡献而以更快速度增长。问题是如何确保这一过程的可持续性？

第二步是确保新增产品有销路，只有这样才会实现经济均衡。需求既可能来自国内，也可能来自国外。由于中国储蓄率居高不下（原因是多方面的：有合理的原因，有文化的因素，也有激励措施的作用），内需的增长不足以消化新增的产值，结论是中国必须依赖外需。如果外需不足，中国的产品无处可去；产品卖不出去，就业就不可持续；就业不可持续，城镇化就不可能取得成功。因此，长期以来中国对外部需求的依赖是城镇化在内需不足背景下产生的必然结果。

一定阶段内情况还好，直到世界经济增速放缓。世界经济一减速，各国都为自己产品的销路发愁。而对于外需的过度依赖意味着，由于中国的巨大顺差，国际摩擦随之升级。之前我提到，这些摩擦背后的观点是不正确的，因为把注意力放在双边关系上，而我们生活在一个多边的世界里。尽管如此，国际纷争不断。这也说明要成功实现城镇化，拉动内需好处良多。于是大家讨论如何发展社会保障制度，如何发展退休养老体系，如何建立机制减少高额储蓄，以便促进内需增长。这便是讨论的宏观背景，我只是从支持城镇化的角度加以说明。

第二个问题，如何融资支持城镇化。城镇化进程一旦启动，就必须为支持城镇化的各项活动提供资金，无论是中小企业的建立，还是支持城乡巨变的基础设施的建设。谈到融资，关键在于加强金融体系、银行体系、融资机制，为支持城镇化进程的各项活动输送“氧气”。

另外，与城镇化息息相关的问题还包括：能源的合理使用、污染、交通拥堵，以及所有支持或阻碍城镇化的问题。妥善解决这些问题或多或少都需要资金，这也正是国家开发银行能够发挥核心作用的领域，尤其是为城镇化进程中大型基础设施项目提供融资。

[1] 本文是弗兰克尔博士于2013年4月24～25日在国家开发银行国际顾问委员会第十四次会议上所作的发言。

第10章 公私合作和机构投资者之发展

乌里·希克

私募股权投资之先导

中国和瑞士于1996年10月11日签署了一项关于建立一个私募股权投资（PE）合资基金的谅解备忘录，该基金将由两国政府共同发起。鉴于私募股权投资的概念在当时尚未引入中国，因此，上述基金的成立需得到中国人民银行的特批许可。中国人民银行于1997年12月9日予以批准，第一家中外合资政府间私募股权投资基金随即诞生。时任瑞士驻华大使希克博士担任该基金的主席。1999年3月27日，借时任中华人民共和国主席江泽民对瑞士进行正式国事访问之机，首批两家由中瑞合作基金（中瑞基金）参与投资的中瑞合资企业在巴塞尔签署协议。江泽民主席和瑞士联邦总统露特·德莱富斯共同出席并见证了签约仪式。

基于互信伙伴关系的政府间联盟

根据协议，在基金中，国家开发银行（China Development Bank,当时的英文名称为State Development Bank）代表中方，瑞士联邦经济事务秘书处（SECO）代表瑞方。国开行在其时任行长陈元的领导下，在该基金的成立过程中发挥了关键性作用。在协议签署前，瑞士联邦经济事务秘书处和瑞士驻华使馆组织了一场合同竞标，以便在中国境内主要银行（包括中国本土银行和在华外资银行）中遴选基金管理方。在陈元行长的积极参与和推动下，国开行提出的建议书最具可行性，从而赢得合同。后来，SECO将在基金中的利益后转由瑞士新兴市场投资基金（SIFEM）持有。SIFEM是瑞士国有金融机构，由政府资助发起的私募股权投资机构，在其时任首席执行官巴拉斯（C. Barras）的带领下，不断取得成功，此次转让就是一个很好的证明。SIFEM的核心业务是在新兴经济体开展私募股权投资活动，旨在推动这些经济体的资本市场发展，加强可持续性，帮助瑞士企业，尤其是中小企业在那些通常并不为这些企业所熟识的经济体内开展业务。

首家中外合作私募股权投资基金管理公司的成立

中瑞合作基金于1998年1月16日正式运营。直到2003年初之前，基金一直由国开行管理。2003年3月19日，中瑞创业投资基金管理有限公司（中瑞创投）成为中瑞合作基金的基金管理人。中瑞创投是一家独立的基金管理公司，也是首家中外合资私募股权投资基金管理公司。由此，中国和瑞士成功地创立了一个最先进的私募股权投资架构。这一点在签约仪式上得到了生动的体现。时任国开行行长陈元和时任瑞士驻华大使周铎勉（D. Dreyer）共同出席了签约仪式。至此，中瑞基金和中瑞创投均受国家改革和发展委员会监管。

扶持民营企业

中瑞基金的根本宗旨是加强中国和瑞士之间的经济与商贸往来，推动双边合作。主要目标是为帮助瑞士的直接投资进入中国，并推动中国资本市场，特别是私募股权投资行业的有效和可持续发展。中瑞基金将私募股权投资的概念引入中国，并在中国加以发展，为中国转型经济的发展势头提供积极支持。最终，通过调动私营部门的资源来促进瑞士在华中小企业及中国本土中小企业的发展，从而推动中国经济与社会的和谐与可持续发展。有鉴于此，国开行不失为一个理想的合作伙伴，其对于中国社会经济、行政、法律、监管和财务体系的熟悉，能为寻求进入中国市场的瑞士企业提供有效的建议和帮助。

关注可持续发展

鉴于其特殊的宗旨，中瑞基金主要投资于对具体行业及整个社会能产生持久、正面影响的项目，而不涉足娱乐、奢侈品等行业。本着这一原则，基金在成立初期就决定要“面向西部”，为中小企业在中国中西部和西南地区开拓资源。这与中国政府的相关政策也是高度吻合的。自成立以来，基金已在中国向中小企业项目投资了2.7亿元人民币，涵盖北京、上海、山东、浙江、江苏、四川、安徽、广东、山西等地，所涉及的行业包括信息技术、电子产品和软件、个人消费品、汽车零部件、医疗设备、新材料和电信等。借此，该基金在支持各行业及各地区的中小企业发展方面发挥了开创性的作用。

中瑞基金最成功的投资项目包括易保网络技术有限公司和索通发展有限公司。易保已成长为全球销量领先的端到端核心保险软件开发商。索通是世界领先的铝用预焙阳极研发生产商。

成功的关键因素

中瑞投资项目的成功取决于三个关键因素。首先，要对宏观经济周期有深刻了解，并能选择投资的恰当时机，这是确保投资项目取得上乘业绩所必不可少的条件。其次，要能洞察中国各行业的发展态势和前景。选对行业是至关重要的。基金对中国汽车行业和电气设备行业进行了投资。目前，中国正成为世界最大的汽车消费市场。基金在这两个行业的投资体现了具备上述第二项关键因素所能带来的收益。然而，归根到底，投资是否成功主要取决于投资标的公司的管理层是否具备专业素质、是否对公司忠诚、是否诚信。此外，基金管理公司（如中瑞创投）的管理层和员工的敬业精神和专业水准也同样重要。

直面挑战

法律和监管体系的复杂性常常会阻碍基金实现有效运作，使得私募股权投资公司不时为投资标的公司及政府和司法部门在司法解释方面的分歧意见所困扰。与此相关的一项现实挑战就是如何确保投资具备可行的退出战略，这一挑战长期以来一直困扰着投资者。2009年，随着创业板的引入，形势有所好转。创业板的上市要求比上海交易所和深圳交易所主板的上市要求低，从而使更多的中小企业具备了公开上市的资质。

然而，竞争也由此更加激烈，一些私募股权投资基金开始专注于首次公开发行前投资，以期利用创业板市场股票市值高的特点。这其中包括一批毫无经验或经验极为有限的本地新兴私募基金。与国际私募基金不同，这些本地基金在使用这种市场“对冲”战略时，更愿意接受较高的最初市盈率。此外，为求完成交易，这些本地基金也乐意在尽职调查方面做出让步，甚至彻底牺牲尽职调查的质量。他们的关注点是股票市场，而不是投资标的公司或其基本面。对于这些基金而言，上市要求优先于标的公司的未来成长或发展前景，而实现增加值或提供扶持等考虑则被他们放在了更次要的地位。

这种市场导向型的策略确实也促成了一些企业成功上市，并受到本地有限合伙人的欢迎。然而，此类投资能否获得长期成功尚存在不确定性，因为很多投资仍处于上市后锁定期内，锁定期最长可达三年。因此，相关股票尚不能立即交易，这使得相关投资在未来三年都将受到市场动荡及不确定性的影响。除非标的公司能够在上市后保持良好的业绩，且股票市场估值继续保持高位，否则，不少基金的业绩表现将差于预期，尤其是考虑到其此前所做的尽职调查不尽充分。

基金数量的空前增长带来了对可行项目和专业知识的激烈竞争，这在快速发展的经济体中是一个常见问题。具备资质的专业人士在早些年前就已是稀缺商品，而当前的强劲需求更使得此类人才愈发稀缺，从而推升了基金为吸引此类人才所需支付的成本。此外，考虑到私募股权投资行业在中国是一个相对新生的事物，且很多行业专家还未曾经历一个完整的私募股权投资周期，如何找到具备成功管理基金投资、实现基金宏伟目标所必需之经验的专业人士成为一项关键性挑战。

中期展望

展望未来，中瑞创投的中期目标是确保实现具有社会责任性和商业可行性的业绩，进而成为可持续投资者行为的典范，还要是一个关心员工职业和个人发展的雇主。鉴于上述挑战，中瑞基金旨在展示，即使是耗时长且标准严的项目遴选过程也能带来社会和经济双重效益。基金当前的各项活动和努力都是依据这一目标而设定的。当前投资市场中的普遍做法是速战速决，利用本地股市的发展和欠成熟的散户投资者群体，投资于上市前融资，标的公司可能会在未来12～18个月内实现上市。尽管如此，中瑞基金却只选择那些产品线具有独特性、拥有可持续市场和发展前景、能使工人和社会都获得收益的项目。之所以这么做，是希望能够践行中瑞合作的先驱性精神。自新中国和瑞士于1949年建立外交关系以来，中瑞合作一直是最可信赖、也是最成功的中外联盟之一。

第11章 银行业的开放

浦伟士

我第一次认识陈元先生是在上世纪80年代，当时他是中国人民银行的副行长。我以前会定期拜访他，主要是为了获得汇丰银行在中国设立分行的批准。在政策上，这类分行牌照是有严格限制的，但尽管如此，陈先生每次都礼貌地接待我，并听取我的意见。按照程序，我们获得了几张分行牌照。随着时间的推移，汇丰银行目前在中国已拥有100多家分行。

上世纪90年代初，陈先生多次接受我的邀请，在世界银行和国际货币基金组织年会期间共进午餐。他在这些国际客人眼里非常具有吸引力。

当陈先生被任命执掌国家开发银行后，他成立了一个国际顾问委员会，并诚挚邀请我担任委员。我有幸参加了三次国际顾问委员会的年会，并怀着浓厚的兴趣，见证了中国经济和银行业的逐步开放，尤其是开行在陈先生卓越领导下的成长。

我知道陈先生将不再担任开行的董事长。我衷心地祝愿他快乐退休，健康长寿。他是中华人民共和国银行业的重要领导人之一。

第12章 中英关系及国际化改革

韦德颖

引言

2007年至2008年的信贷危机让全世界陷入震荡，其影响远远超越金融业，导致全球经济下滑，至今仍未摆脱下行阴影。

失业率创下新高导致政府与社会的关系发生了变化。金融和银行业面临新的监管障碍，这些监管措施将逐步改变行业未来。

这些力量的发展和变化颠覆了完全自由市场经济理论。人们不禁会问，对金融业极少或完全没有监管干预到底好不好？

目前，全球经济形势仍然十分脆弱。在大多数发达国家，经济复苏受到财政整顿和金融系统薄弱的制约。国际货币基金组织对2013年的预测是，欧洲核心国家将出现正增长，但涨幅很小，例如德国0.6%，法国0.3%；其他某些欧洲国家，尤其是南欧，例如意大利和西班牙，将持续又一年的衰退；美国的平均增长率是2%，到2014年将升至3%，但仍将继续受到巨大财政挑战的拖累。

尽管中等发展中国家或新兴市场经济体较发达经济体要好一些，但在信贷危机中也未能独善其身。国际货币基金组织预计新兴市场的平均增长率是5.5%，其中中国为8.2%。2014年，巴克莱银行对中国经济增长率的平均预测是8.1%。

对中等经济体国家的政府来说，继续依赖供应面的改革以维持和推动经济增长将是一项政治挑战。

这类政策依赖于强健稳定的银行业和发达的资本市场来提供充足的融资。过去几十年里，中国的经济增长快于其银行业和资本市场的发展，因此信贷危机让中国的政策制定者更加关注改革资本市场并确保银行业的稳健。

中国与转型

中国的政策是逐步开放资本市场，包括发展债券市场、人民币国际化和银行业改革。这些政策举措可以支持不断增长的中国经济，但是，劳动力人口的减少也越来越需要审慎关注。

中国的劳动力人口在2012年减少了345万人，总数跌至9.37亿人。劳动人口（15～59岁）的减少将是中国从“奇迹增长”转向正常增长的基本因素。为了应对这一挑战，中国希望实现增长模式的转变，并精心设计社会保障政策，提供恰当的养老金计划和医疗保健体系。

中国的出口依赖型经济正在向内需拉动型转变。中国试图为民营企业创造一个公平的竞争环境，以实现长期可持续的经济增长，同时在解决养老金体系[1]资金不足方面取得进展，而这就意味着政府需要增加社保支出并减少固定资产投资。

收入再分配由国企转向民企和家庭以及填补养老金体系资金缺口的过程会导致未来的融资成本上升。而发展债券市场可能帮助中国经济获得更有可持续性的融资支持。

中国的债券市场

中国政府的债务状况目前还不错，财政状况也比较稳健。中国经济自改革以来（即1978年以后），大部分时候中央政府的预算赤字都占GDP的1%～2%左右。目前公共债务占GDP的比重接近16%，远远低于OECD 60%的警戒线。但是，中央政府的预算赤字并不包括或有债务，例如地方政府债务、铁道部债务和资产管理公司持有的不良贷款等等。如果把这些或有债务计算在内，中央政府的预算赤字还是很高的[2]。

即便将或有债务考虑进去，中国政府目前的资产负债表仍然是健康的，但随着劳动人口减少加速，这一状况会逐渐发生变化。从长期来看，财政收入的增长速度将越来越难以超过GDP的增长。再加上经济增长更多地向家庭和民营企业倾斜，还要填补养老金缺口的需要，因此政府必须拓宽融资渠道，不能过多地依赖银行借贷。

一种方法是加快发行离岸人民币债券，这个过程要与人民币的国际化同步。中国财政部可以通过发行大规模（约为300亿至400亿元人民币）全球基准离岸人民币债券来实现这一目标。债券应设多期限（即3年、5年、10年和20年），通过需求簿记建档的市场化方式定价，并面向全球投资者发售。面向全球发行如此大规模的债券将有效促进二级市场的流动性和风险管理工具的开发，同时还可以提高定价的透明度和效率。

除了由财政部设定离岸债券全球基准利率，国家开发银行也可以尝试对超长债的基准利率主动定价。国开行在这一市场已经有过尝试，例如2012年1月发行首支15年离岸人民币债券，以及2012年7月发行的20年债券。

在建立了完整期限结构之后，下一步就是将期限延长至30年，构建一个无风险离岸人民币债券收益率曲线，且要面向全球投资者可交易以提高透明度。鉴于国开行已经发行了15年期和20年期的离岸人民币债券，其完全具备发行30年期债券的条件。

最后，作为中国最大的人民币债券承销商，国开行可以与巴克莱银行合作，为更多的国际投资者提供投资机会。巴克莱通过合格境外机构投资者QFII项目，已证实其拥有为人民币债券引入国际投资者的能力和专长。

建立离岸人民币债券市场需要时间，因此不能忽略银行贷款的重要性。银行贷款仍然是中国经济主要的融资渠道。据中国国家审计署报告，地方政府2010年的10.7万亿人民币债务有79%来自银行贷款。

随着政策制定者调整国企的定位，制定促进民营企业公平竞争的政策，要改善对银行业系统性风险的管理，都需要推进透明度和针对弱势群体的民生金融。

民生金融

2008～2009年金融危机后，政策制定者和公众都加强了对金融机构的监督。有些本应避免的做法是这次危机的导火线。通过建立防止下一次灾难发生的规则，目前推出的新监管框架必定会弥补过去监管体系的一些缺陷。危机的教训应当且已经被吸取，在新的监管原则中都有体现，包括《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》的新资本目标，以及对市场结构、危机管理和解决、公司治理等问题的关注。金融机构在资本金和杠杆率方面采取的行动也体现了这一点。

我们应当牢记，银行对社会的贡献体现在提供贷款、为客户管理风险，并提供和拉动就业。对社会有益的金融机构能为客户、雇员及所在社区切实创造价值。

所有的银行都应该认识到它们在经济体中的应有作用，并认真履行对社会和经济的责任。在国开行的网站上，时任董事长陈元在董事长致辞当中，提到开行的诸多成就，包括通过帮助产业升级、企业并购和战略新兴产业和文化产业的发展，支持中国经济持续进行战略转型。此外，他还提到了开行对中小企业发展以及几百万元的助学贷款和住房按揭的支持。陈董事长关于“履行国家开发银行对帮助经济和社会发展的使命”的评论表明，开行非常重视这些目标，而这也应该是成功银行的工作重心。他还提到了银行内部运行的重要性。他说，有效的公司治理和风险管理是开行稳定运行的关键。在后全球金融危机时代，这些原则应该被看作是建立更加稳定和安全的金融体系的指导价值观。

在吸取过去教训的基础上，巴克莱银行也致力于推行同样的标准。我们对业务目标有着清晰的认识，那就是帮助个人、企业和经济进步与增长。

灌输企业公民意识能够为银行如何为经济做贡献、如何做生意和如何支持所在社区提供清晰的价值观。银行可以而且应该在它们所在的社区发挥更加广泛的作用。通过改善服务、对管理业务做出负责任的决策，以及积极管理业务的社会和环境影响，银行可以强化企业诚信建设。

最后，引导投资者资金投向生产率高的企业仍然是银行的核心业务活动。但是，故事到这里并没有结束。金融机构在社会的核心作用让它们处于特殊的地位，使它们能够对经营环境产生重大影响。银行内部如何实现自身目标也同样重要。正在形成的新环境将更加重视金融机构的社会功能和影响。

[1] 预计中国养老金体系的资金缺口高达2011年GDP的35%，而随着劳动力人口的减少，资金缺口还会继续加大。

[2] 据巴克莱测算，如果把所有其他或有债务计算在内，中国政府的总债务将达到GDP的62%～97%，当然这要取决于对养老金缺口的假设。这一数据是根据波拉克科娃1998年设计的财政风险矩阵模型计算得出的。

第13章 国际金融危机、欧债危机和日本经济

行天丰雄

从2007年美国次贷危机爆发，引发国际金融危机到现在，六年时间已经过去。这一轮危机至少表现出四个鲜明的特点。

首先，危机初发时仅仅是一般性的金融危机，即泡沫产生，然后泡沫破裂。世界曾经历过几百次类似的风险事件，此次危机仍然是伴随着信贷紧缩和需求骤减，至此，并无非同寻常之处。

其次，虽然危机初发时只是一般性的金融危机，但是它几乎立刻演变为全球性的危机。这是因为金融交易的全球一体化程度已经非常之高。

再次，危机给不同市场带来的影响有所不同，这取决于每一个市场的结构和条件。其中最引人注目的就是欧元区的例子。1999年推行欧元作为单一货币给欧元区带来了一系列巨大的好处，包括较低的利率和稳定的汇率，为某些成员国吸引了大量外资。但是，很不幸的是，欧元区某些成员国陷入了盲目自满，并肆意挥霍。此外，系统固有的缺陷，即货币统一和财政自主的固有矛盾以及缺乏有效的机制来弥合南北欧国家的差距，导致了欧洲的问题进一步恶化。虽然我认为欧元体系将会继续存在，但是欧洲宏观经济的复苏还需要若干年的时间。

欧元区危机对世界其他地区的影响体现在两方面。不管是美国次贷危机还是其他任何一次金融危机，最直接的经济后果就是信贷紧缩和需求急剧萎缩。但是，在中国、日本和韩国，信贷收缩的水平属于可忍受的范围，因为这些国家的金融体系和美欧的金融体系并不是完全不可分割。但是，由于亚洲对美欧的出口依存度很高，所以需求萎缩带来的影响非常严重。

在美国，房地产市场和劳动力市场遭受的破坏对经济产生了全局性的影响，因为这两大市场的荣枯与美国的家庭消费高度关联。

总之，在从危机中复苏时，每一个国家都必须确定适当的优先排序，服从共同的目标，即恢复稳定和可持续的经济增长。

第四，此次危机预示着世界经济范式开始发生改变。到目前为止，世界经济的增长主要还是依赖美国家庭消费拉动，这也造成了美国长期存在的赤字。但是与此同时，美国的消费给其他国家，特别是亚洲国家，创造了巨大的出口需求。这些国家因此积累了大量美元顺差，然后再将这些美元投资于美国国债，从而维持了美国的低利率以支撑美国家庭消费。换言之，这样一种全球失衡的结构撑起了世界经济双赢发展的谬论。而此次危机表明：这样一种全球失衡不断加剧的模式不管是对顺差还是逆差国家都是不可持续的。需要对这种增长模式重新进行审视。由这一问题自然引发的一个讨论是关于美元的地位。到目前为止，美元依然扮演着国际主要货币的角色。它为世界提供了充裕的流动性，是国际交易最有效率的金融工具。但与此同时，使用一国主权货币作为世界主要货币这一安排有必然的矛盾性，这一矛盾性随着2008年秋美国金融体系近乎瓦解进而凸显。另外，此次危机和随后金融市场出现的动荡也使人们质疑盎格鲁—撒克逊式市场经济的自我约束能力，而指导这一模式的原则是效率和概率。简言之，虽然世界还没有找到任何具有信服力的替代方案，但是人们都越来越觉得有必要探索一种更符合现实的经济范式。

换言之，世界经济正在脱离单极霸权的时代，尽管霸权为许多人提供了稳定和舒适。世界很可能将通过长期的摸索找到一种新的稳定的范式。在这一过程中，很重要的是设计某种制度安排，以确保权力和责任在各大主体之间实现公平分配。我确信这样一种安排能够帮助世界度过即将来临的不安宁。

欧债危机

欧债危机具有两面性。一方面它显示出和以往多次危机的类似之处：起因是流动性泛滥，流动性泛滥又导致资产泡沫的出现，泡沫最终破裂。从这一层意义上来说，欧元区的危机同之前发生在美国的次贷危机并无不同。但是，欧债危机还有另一面，因为它发生的范围是欧元区。在20世纪末欧元作为单一货币推出时，欧元区正幸福地陶醉于欧洲式的非理性繁荣之中：利率低而资本泛滥。随后是不可避免的财政挥霍。财政稳健如烟而逝。从这一意义上而言，欧债危机就是欧元区危机。

如今，欧元区正在极力摆脱自创建以来最严峻的一次危机。欧元区需要通过长期的坚持和不懈的努力才能度过。在我看来，欧元区必须在四方面打赢胜仗。

首先，受危机所困的国家必须通过痛苦的财政紧缩，重塑财政的稳健。他们还需要进行经济和社会结构调整以提高生产率，包括社保体系、劳工规范、补贴和保护以及税收体制等。

其次，欧元区需要一套内容广泛的金融安排来确保债务偿还，减少债务负担，提高银行资本水平，并建立可信的区域安全网。

第三，有必要对欧元体系进行改革和改进。此次危机暴露了欧元体系的两大缺陷，首先是货币统一而财政不统一带来的矛盾；其次是南北成员国不可调和的差距。最高政治层面的决策力是改革的必备条件。

第四，欧元区需要重振欧洲人民对一体化进程投入的使命感，就是这种使命感推动欧洲经过漫长努力走到了今天。尤为重要的是让年青一代相信在全球化的当今世界，一体化是欧洲存续的必由之路。

欧洲在多个领域取得了显著的进展，特别是金融安排方面。主权国家短期不存在违约或金融体系崩溃之虞，因此市场情绪也稍有平复。但是，欧元区依然距离稳定的目标很远。目前，市场正在密切关注并期待欧元区接下来两年内在上述四个方面取得更多进展。

从信贷紧缩和需求萎缩两个层面来看，欧元区危机对于世界其他地区又有什么影响呢？

信贷紧缩并未给亚洲造成太大的影响，唯一影响较大的是贸易融资中流动性的干涸。如果衰退时间过长，那么欧洲进口下跌的影响将会带来更严重的后果。

除了直接的经济影响之外，欧元区的危机，加上次贷危机，很可能带来范围更广、历时更长的影响。

首先，这两大危机将会加速全球力量的转移。危机彰显出美国和欧洲金融市场具有脆弱性，也不善于快速开展危机后的纾困工作。整体看来，危机发生和应对的过程充分说明了西方势力在全球经济事务中的主导地位有所削弱。

其次，危机同样挫伤了人们对民主和市场经济的信心。几十年以来，世界一直安于以民主和市场经济为基础的全球范式，大多数人相信民主终将获胜，许多人相信金融风险可以控制，市场能修复其自身缺陷。如今，具有讽刺意味的是，我们看到统治西方民主两大摇篮（希腊雅典和意大利罗马）的政府却是以非民选的方式上台的。我们现在也相信，市场不可能万无一失，也是有可能误入歧途的。全世界现在都在不遗余力地通过更严格的规制来管控市场。

再次，现在对于国际货币体系的稳健性存在越来越大的担忧。危机使人们对于欧元的命运产生了严重的怀疑，而欧元曾被寄予厚望，成为同美元平起平坐的主要国际货币。具有讽刺意味的是，由于产生严重的信贷紧缩，此次危机至少在短期内提升了美元的地位。然而，对于构筑在美元之上的国际货币体系存在全球性的担忧，因为美元是主权国家的货币，这就导致以美元为基础的国际货币体系和金融局势不可避免地将受到该国货币政策的主导。

总而言之，欧元区危机之后如何演变，现在仍然难以预见。欧元区如何从危机中恢复元气，这将对全球经济的未来产生深远的影响。

中国当然也无法逃避欧元区危机带来的影响。危机已经伤及中国经济并给其带来了挑战，但是也同时带来了机遇。一方面，信贷紧缩和需求萎缩给中国造成了困扰。尽管发达经济体采取了宽松的货币政策，但是所谓风险资本的流量却有所减少。所有新兴经济体的股市都受到了冲击，上证综指从2011年7月到2012年4月下挫了13.4%。欧元区经济放缓使中国出口受到了冲击。如果欧元区的衰退进一步恶化，中国经济将承受更多压力。为了避免增长突然放缓，有必要实行货币刺激政策。同时还需要注意通胀水平，继续开展经济调整的工作。借用前总理温家宝的话说，需要未雨绸缪。

欧元区的危机对包括亚洲在内的全世界而言都是一大威胁。中日韩等亚洲国家需要为欧元区提供支持，帮助其尽快纾困。我们应当为国际货币基金组织和欧洲稳定机制（ESM）提供资金支持。亚洲的银行应当加大对欧元区的贷款力度。亚洲的公司应当启动在欧元区的并购活动。

与此同时，欧元区的危机以及美国的次贷危机也给亚洲提供了宝贵的警示，即需要重视亚洲自身的区域合作。如今大家都在说世界的重心正在转向亚洲。确实，实体经济的重心正在向亚洲转移，但是在货币和金融领域，亚洲还是过于依赖美国和欧洲。为了减少这种过度依赖带来的脆弱性和波动性，亚洲需要加强区域合作，强化金融机构和金融市场的建设。

欧元区的危机给中国留下很多要做的功课。

关于日本经济

尽管全球局势如此，在日本却出现了经济复兴的曙光。在过去的20年里，日本一直受累于许多棘手的问题：通货紧缩、人口减少与老龄化、财政赤字巨大、社会保障体系不可持续、能源政策不明朗等。2011年3月发生的大海啸更是让日本局势雪上加霜。日本民众也因此陷入一种大规模的无助情绪之中。许多评论员称日本经济是在缓慢地走向死亡。

幸运的是，日本政府在近期实施了一系列非常规经济政策。它有三个重点或要素。一是大胆地进行货币宽松；二是灵活的财政政策；三是以鼓励私营部门投资为导向的经济发展战略。在货币政策领域，日本央行于2013年4月4日宣布推出一系列非常激进的货币宽松政策：（1）在两年之内达到2%的通胀率目标；（2）在两年内将基础货币翻一番；（3）增加从市场回购日本国债（JGB）的力度，使日本央行持有的国债量能在两年之内增加一倍以上；（4）风险资产的购买量增加一倍以上。

在财政政策领域，日本国会于2013年2月26日批准通过了《2013/2014财年追加预算》，授权增加13.1万亿日元（约1500亿美元）的支出。这笔经济刺激性支出预计将在四年内拉动日本GDP 1.6个百分点。在经济发展战略方面，政府列出了三个领域，并将于2013年年中出台具体的鼓励措施。这三个领域分别是：（1）振兴工业，包括进一步发展制造业以及放松能源、环境和医疗行业的管制；（2）创造并利用具有发展潜力的市场，例如卫生保健、能源、下一代基础设施、农业和渔业等；（3）提升日本企业的国际竞争力，强调多边及双边合作的推进，如“跨太平洋合作伙伴关系”（TPP）、亚太自由贸易区（FTAAP）、日本—美国、日本—中国、日本—欧洲、日本—韩国和日本—澳大利亚的经济合作伙伴关系协定（EPA）等。

日本政府的经济政策已初见实效。日本的股价从2013年年初至今已上涨逾20%。随着国内和海外投资者资本的注入，长期利率已降至历史最低。日元大幅度贬值，有利于出口商改善其资产状况。

在我看来，上述政策初现成效主要有赖于两大因素。首先，它成功扭转了民众对于经济复兴的失败主义者心态。通过提出大胆而切实的方案并且加以落实，日本政府成功重塑全民信心。其次，得益于纯粹的政策目标，即“抗通缩”。日本政府没有罗列各种需要实现的目标，而是锁定“消除通缩”，将其作为首要目标，因为20年持续通缩被视为经济停滞的标志。

确实，日本政府的经济政策开局不错。但是，显然此时是不容自满的。日本才刚刚迈出漫漫长路的第一步，还有许多工作有待完成。首先，虽然企业和家庭所持资产价值因股价上涨和日元走低而有所增长，但是我们必须确保这些钱确实用于投资、增加就业和促进消费。我们看到一些积极的迹象，但是还需要进一步看到切实的行动。另外，我们一定不能偏离财政整顿的路径，必须改革不可持续的社会保障体系，而通过促进经济增长来增加税收是到2020年实现财政收支基本平衡的首要条件。此外，充分、可信地实施经济发展战略也非常关键。日本政府必须展现强大的领导力，才能克服既得利益集团和官僚作风的顽固阻挠。

可让日本当局略感宽心的是在2013年7月日本上院选举之后，下一次全国性的选举就要等到2016年夏天之后。这对日本而言也是自20世纪90年代以来首次在政治上拥有这么长时间的稳定连贯期。换言之，日本当局正面临难得的机会，可以让选民吞下苦口良药而无须担心他们群起反抗。

综上所述，日本经济终于到了一个新起点。

第14章 中国银行业的国际化发展[1]

胡怀邦

随着全球经济金融一体化和我国对外开放不断深入，国际化成为我国银行业发展的重要趋势和潮流，这不仅是服务我国开放型经济体系建设的必然要求，也是银行自身应对日益激烈的金融竞争的客观需要。党的十八届三中全会提出要构建开放型经济新体制，形成全方位开放新格局，扩大金融业对内对外开放，这对银行业加快国际化发展、增强服务能力提出了更高的要求。我国银行业金融机构要加强谋划，抓住国际金融危机后世界经济金融格局深刻调整的有利时机，稳步推进国际化。

中国银行业国际化发展的成就

从1917年中国银行在香港设立分行算起，我国银行业国际化发展已经走过了近百年的历程。此后，随着我国政治经济体制的变迁，银行业历经多次调整，国际化进程一度陷入停滞。改革开放后，我国逐步建立现代银行业体系，银行业国际化进程重新起步。2008年以来，西方大型金融机构遭受国际金融危机重创，而我国银行业通过建立现代企业制度和股份制改革，综合实力显著增强，银行业金融机构抓住机遇，积极开拓国际市场，加快国际化步伐，有力支持国内企业“走出去”，促进了我国开放型经济水平不断提高。

1.海外业务快速发展，全球网络布局初步形成。截至2012年末，中国银行业的境外资产已达到1万亿美元，是加入世贸组织前的6倍，当年实现利润约169亿美元，占总利润的8.6%，共有16家中资银行通过自设、并购、参股等方式在境外设立了1050家分支机构，覆盖了亚洲、欧洲、美洲、非洲和大洋洲的49个国家和地区。从区域看，海外布局主要集中在中国香港、中国澳门和发达国家市场，近几年新设机构有向非洲、拉美等新兴市场国家发展的趋势。从机构主体看，工商银行、农业银行、中国银行、建设银行、交通银行五大行是境外机构建设的主力军，机构数量占比高达92%，其中中国银行599家，工商银行246家，占比81.4%。从设立方式看，中国银行主要通过历史上的优势自设机构，基本形成覆盖全球主要国家的网络布局，工商银行则通过收购印度尼西亚HALIM银行、澳门诚兴银行、南非标准银行、美国东亚银行、阿根廷标准银行股权等方式进入海外市场。近几年其他银行也开始大举在海外设点、并购，比如招商银行收购香港永隆银行、在纽约设立分行，国家开发银行设立香港分行和莫斯科、开罗、里约热内卢代表处等，国际化步伐明显加快。

2.治理结构、经营管理和人员队伍日趋国际化。在治理结构方面，引入境外投资者，推进海外上市，法人治理结构和规则向国际银行看齐。在业务流程方面，加快了“以客户为中心、以风险控制为主线”的业务流程再造，运用信息管理系统引领、支持和保障银行业务发展。在经营管理方面，积极探索经济资本增加值、风险调整后的资本回报率等业绩考核方法，提高中间业务收入，优化业务发展模式和盈利模式。在风险管理方面，引入国际通行的资产五级分类标准，适应巴塞尔新资本协议监管标准，强调对信用风险、市场风险和操作风险的管控，逐步加强流动性风险、声誉风险、系统性风险管理，有效抵御国际金融危机的冲击。在人员队伍方面，中国银行业在与外资银行的交流合作中培养了一批高层次、国际化的管理人员和金融人才。

3.服务能力逐步提升，支持企业“走出去”成效显著。随着中国对外开放水平日益提升，我国企业“走出去”的步伐也在不断加快，中国银行业则紧紧跟随中资企业步伐，做到企业发展到哪里，银行服务就跟到哪里。一是为企业提供结算服务。仅中国银行2012年的国际结算量就达2.78万亿美元，跨境人民币结算量2.46万亿元，均保持全球领先地位。二是开展贸易融资。不断丰富贸易金融产品体系，开展外币保函、应收账款保理等一系列贸易融资综合服务，解决进出口企业的资金难题，为我国对外贸易快速发展做出了积极贡献。2012年我国进口双保理业务量居全球第四位，出口双保理业务量已连续5年居全球首位。三是为企业“走出去”开拓市场、兼并收购提供融资服务。比如，近年来国家开发银行以贷款换能源、换资源，成功运作了中委基金、中俄石油、中土天然气等重大项目，支持我国龙头骨干企业“走出去”开展能源资源合作，为有效缓解我国能源资源瓶颈制约发挥了积极作用。

4.在国际市场上的认可度和话语权不断增强。国际金融危机以来，西方国家银行破产数量激增，而中国银行业逆流而上，大型银行的盈利规模名列前茅。英国《银行家》杂志2013年全球1000家银行排名中，96家中国银行榜上有名，涵盖了政策性银行、国有大型商业银行、股份制商业银行和半数以上的城市商业银行，其中工商银行、农业银行、中国银行、建设银行四大行均位居世界前十大银行之列，工商银行资产规模全球第一、一级资本全球第一，蝉联全球最赚钱银行。2011年以来，中国银行连续三年入选29家全球系统重要性银行名单，2013年工商银行也因为全球领先的各项指标、国际化的长足发展等因素入选该名单，表明了国际社会对中国银行业改革发展成就的高度认可，也证明了中国银行业对地区和全球金融市场有着不可小觑的重要性。国家开发银行不断加强与新兴市场国家金融机构合作，推动成立了上合组织银联体、中国—东盟银联体、金砖国家银行合作机制等多边金融合作机制，得到周边地区和新兴市场国家的广泛认同。

中国银行业国际化步伐不断加快，成为中资企业“走出去”的强大助推器，有力促进了中国在国际舞台上发挥日益重要的作用。近年来，中国积极参与国际经济金融体系调整，努力提升在世界银行、国际货币基金组织中的股权比例，在国际事务中发出中国声音、体现中国作用，都离不开中国银行业的有力支撑。

银行业国际化面临的机遇与挑战

当前，国际经济格局正在发生深刻变化。随着我国整体经济实力的增强和国际地位的提高，以及银行业金融机构自身综合实力的提升，银行业的国际化面临难得的历史机遇。

第一，经济实力显著增强，对外开放水平不断提高，为银行业国际化提供了广阔的发展空间。2002年至2012年，我国对外贸易额年均增长20.1%，出口和进口占全球比重已经分别达到11.2%和9.8%，连续四年居世界第一和第二位，成为名副其实的贸易大国。对外投资规模也迅速扩大，对外非金融类直接投资从2002年的27亿美元增长到2012年的772.2亿美元，跻身全球对外投资大国之列。与此同时，我国企业“走出去”步伐加快，对外贸易、对外投资、海外并购等经贸活动日益活跃。这使跨境金融服务需求不断扩大，银行业国际化具有坚实的市场和客户基础。

第二，国家提出全面提高开放型经济水平，加快推进金融体制改革，为银行业国际化提供了良好的政策环境。十八大提出要完善互利共赢、多元平衡、安全高效的开放型经济体系，加快“走出去”步伐，增强企业国际化经营能力；深化金融体制改革，稳步推进利率和汇率市场化改革，逐步实现人民币资本项目可兑换。《金融业发展和改革“十二五”规划》指出，完善金融机构“走出去”相关制度，引导金融机构采取行之有效的海外发展战略，加强国际型人才储备，逐步发展大型跨国金融机构，鼓励金融机构稳健拓展国际业务，提升国际化经营水平。2013年以来，利率市场化改革加速推进，上海自贸区正式挂牌，金融改革成为自贸区改革的重要内容。十八届三中全会提出完善金融市场体系，扩大金融业对内对外开放，必将使各项金融改革进入深入推进的新阶段。这些政策和措施，将进一步提升金融业开放的水平，促进银行业增强创新能力，为银行业的国际化创造有利条件。

第三，人民币跨境使用稳步扩大，以人民币计价为基础的经贸投资活动日益增多，为银行业国际化提供了新动力。2009年以来，我国先后启动贸易、投资人民币结算试点工作，人民币跨境使用规模和范围不断扩大，在境外的接受程度不断提高。截至2012年末，我国已与18个国家和地区签署双边本币互换协议。2012年，我国跨境贸易人民币结算金额2.94万亿元，同比增长41%，其中，货物贸易结算金额2.06万亿元，占同期海关货物进出口总额的8.4%，比上年上升1.8个百分点；人民币对外直接投资结算金额304.4亿元，同比增长51%。人民币跨境使用的快速推进，使中资银行跨境人民币业务前景广阔，银行业可以借助本币优势实现全球化发展。

第四，欧美金融机构受国际金融危机重创，调整收缩业务，为银行业开拓国际市场提供了难得的时间窗口。国际金融危机爆发后，欧美金融机构陷入经营困境，纷纷去杠杆化，一些金融机构出售海外资产和业务、退出部分海外市场，实施大规模裁员计划，削减经营成本。当前，尽管国际大型金融机构经营状况有所好转，但尚未从危机中完全恢复，这为我国银行业金融机构开拓国际市场带来很好的时机。

在看到机遇的同时，也应看到，世界经济复苏仍具有不确定性、不稳定性，国内经济进入增长速度换挡期、结构调整阵痛期、前期刺激政策消化期叠加的阶段，我国银行业正处于经营转型过程之中，这使银行业国际化也面临一系列严峻挑战。

第一，世界经济复苏艰难曲折，国际政治经济环境复杂多变，使银行业国际化面临的风险加剧。发达经济体尽管出现复苏迹象，但结构性问题远未解决，新兴市场国家经济增速普遍放缓，随着各经济体联系的日益紧密，全球经济的波动性正在增大；中东、北非等地区社会矛盾激化，政局持续动荡；金融保护主义有所抬头，一些国家出台新的保护措施阻止外国资本投资本国市场，对他国金融机构开展业务实施限制、制裁。这使银行业国际化面临更大的经济、政治和法律风险。

第二，中国经济转型，银行业盈利增速下降，国内业务对国际化的支持受到影响。2012年，商业银行实现净利润1.24万亿元，同比增长18.9%，增速较2011年下降17.4个百分点。2013年上半年，商业银行实现净利润7531亿元，同比增长13.8%，增速较2012年全年下降5.1个百分点。在盈利增速下降的同时，商业银行不良贷款明显增多，尤其是2013年前八个月，不良贷款余额比年初增加842亿元，达5746亿元。在经济转型、利率市场化改革加快的背景下，银行业规模、盈利高速增长的时代已经结束，需要下更大力气夯实国内业务基础，才能为国际化提供有力支撑。

第三，经营管理和创新能力等较国际先进水平仍有差距。比如，我国银行业依靠规模扩张和保护性利差的传统经营模式难以适应国际化的需要；银行业经营管理仍不够精细，产品定价、综合营销、风险管理等方面能力有待提高；业务结构单一，过分依赖资产业务和利差收入，中间业务收入占比偏低；金融工具的综合运用能力不强，综合金融竞争力不足；国际化人才缺乏，具有国际视野、精通银行业务、有海外工作经验的专业人才较少；整体信息化程度不高。这些因素都制约了我国银行业的国际化发展。

第四，全球金融监管趋严，对银行业的资本、流动性等提出了更高的要求。金融危机以来，国际银行业监管标准日益严格，比如提高资本充足率要求，引入留存额外资本、逆周期额外资本、系统重要性银行额外资本等；推出杠杆率要求，弥补资本充足率要求下无法反映表内外总资产扩张情况的不足；加强流动性管理，引入流动性监管指标等。这些严格的国际监管标准，对综合化经营能力较强、业务结构多元化、资产分布遍布全球的国际化大型银行来说，成本较低。而中国银行业资本基础相对薄弱，业务类型比较单一，经营模式和发展阶段与国际同业有较大差异，严格的监管标准使合规成本大大增加，制约了开拓国际业务的能力。

尽管银行业的国际化面临不少问题，但总体来看，机遇大于挑战。中国银行业金融机构应抓住有利时机，加快海外发展步伐，充分利用国内国外两个市场和两种资源，打造全球化的金融服务体系，助力我国经济转型和结构调整。

积极稳妥推进中国银行业国际化发展

提高我国开放型经济水平，加快经济发展方式转变，离不开全球化金融服务的支持。银行业金融机构应适应经济金融全球化发展趋势，积极稳妥地实施国际化发展战略，服务国家开放型经济体系建设，支持我国企业“走出去”，提升全球化服务水平和国际竞争力，提高在国际上的话语权。

第一，明确目标方向，统筹推进国际化发展。一是牢牢把握服务开放型经济体系建设这一主题。银行业一方面要积极支持国内企业在全球范围的跨国并购和项目投资，促进对外贸易平衡发展和对外经济发展方式转变；另一方面要将经济全球化的国际形势和自身经营特点相结合，加快自身“走出去”，从国际化中获得发展优势，提高核心竞争力，促进中国提高在国际金融事务中的话语权和影响力。二是统筹规划，整体推进。银行业国际化是一个长期过程，需要循序渐进、分阶段逐步推进。要从国家层面统筹考虑银行业国际化发展战略，制定指导原则，明确“走出去”的重点领域、区域布局，有效防范国际化风险。三是加强政策支持和引导。政府要系统研究银行“走出去”的政策支持体系，建立“一行三会”的沟通协调机制，完善政策促进、服务保障和风险防控体系，加强政府、银行、企业间的信息交流共享，形成鼓励银行业“走出去”的良好政策环境。

第二，完善网络布局，有序推进境外机构建设。一是明确银行业金融机构自身的国际化发展战略，稳健推进海外机构布局。结合自身特点和发展战略制定明确的海外机构建设目标，量力而行、有序推进，可以选择仅在全球重点国家和地区适当布局，或选择在全球建立广泛的网络机构。二是选择适当的布局区域和布局顺序。从满足全球交易和结算的需要出发，优先在发达国家和地区的金融中心布局；从服务我国经济发展和具有一定业务增长空间出发，优先选择与我国经贸往来频繁、外交关系密切的国家和地区布局；从满足特定业务发展需要出发，优先选择能够提升该项业务发展水平的国家和地区布局，比如，如果希望借鉴私人银行业务发展经验，可考虑在瑞士等私人银行业务发达的国家布局。三是科学选择新设机构、收购兼并等机构建设方式。新设机构相对容易管理和控制，但建设周期较长，布局分散，且存在一定壁垒。收购兼并可以利用原有客户基础和经营网络，迅速融入当地市场，但内部整合与管理成本较高。要根据目标市场的地域特点、法律政治环境等，采取不同的发展模式，推动各项业务顺利开展。

第三，转变发展方式，提升国际竞争力。一是深化综合经营，优化业务结构。积极发展资产管理、投资银行、金融市场等新兴银行业务，加快发展保险、信托、租赁、证券等非银行业务，减少对利差的依赖，优化盈利、收入结构，为客户提供全方位、综合化的金融服务。二是加快流程改造，实施组织架构转型。根据客户类别和需求对各类业务进行梳理，对业务架构进行设计再造，建立以客户为中心的流程银行运行体制，提升对市场和客户需求的快速响应能力。三是加强金融创新，提升服务水平。依托不断发展的境内外金融市场，提供更多管理风险、增加流动性、提升收益和降低融资成本的新型金融工具，为客户提供个性化、简单化、跨产品条线、跨部门的创新产品服务。四是打造国际化人才队伍。通过对现有人才的业务培训、实践锻炼以及引进国际化专业人才，建立精通国际业务、熟悉海外市场和法律的专业化人才队伍。

第四，加强同业合作，互利共赢开拓国际市场。一是深化境内金融机构之间的合作，加强海外业务交流，通过组建银团等方式共同开拓海外市场，形成优势互补、风险共担的整体合力，共享“走出去”成果，避免恶性竞争。二是加强与国际金融机构的合作，借鉴国际化大型银行的先进经验，提升国际业务管理水平，利用境外机构熟悉当地市场和政治法律环境的优势，快速拓展海外业务，有效防范风险。三是加强与多边金融机构等国际性合作平台的沟通与交流，利用平台建立更广泛的业务合作关系，获取更多业务资源与支持。

第五，强化风险管控，确保国际业务稳健发展。一是境外机构的经营管理要注重与当地文化的融合。不能简单将国内的管理制度和企业文化移植到境外市场，而要结合当地的文化和风俗，实施本地化的管理，防范文化冲突产生的经营风险。二是密切跟踪国际政治经济形势。对海外业务面临的国家风险进行常态化跟踪，重点关注所在国的政治、经济动向，金融、税收、外汇等经济制度和政策信息，做好国别风险预案，增强抗风险能力。三是加强市场风险管理。尤其是要高度关注汇率的波动，提高风险识别、计量、监测与控制的技术和能力，运用对冲金融工具，使汇兑损失最小化。四是加强法律风险防范。深入研究国际公约、国际惯例、国际商务习惯以及海外市场法律规定，建立海外业务法律风险预警机制，有效控制法律风险。

第六，加强监管支持，助力银行“走出去”。进一步推进银行业的国际化需要监管部门发挥更大的作用。一是进一步加强与国际监管机构的协调与沟通，提升在国际监管标准制定过程中的话语权，同时协助国内银行解决国外法律、监管争端，维护我国银行业在海外设立机构、发展业务的正当权益。二是在实施新的国际银行业监管标准过程中，充分考虑我国银行业的发展阶段和特点，既有效控制银行业风险，又有利于我国银行业加快发展，尤其是有利于我国银行业抓住机遇，加快国际化步伐。三是逐步建立国家层面的国别风险监控、预警和防范机制，动态监控银行机构的相关指标，并引导银行业稳步推进海外业务，扩大综合经营的范围、规模，提升银行业的服务能力。

展望未来，我国银行业的国际化征程不会一帆风顺，但只要银行业金融机构坚持服务开放型经济体系建设的目标，科学规划、稳扎稳打，不断提高综合实力，就一定能够实现国际化发展的宏伟蓝图，使中国银行业在全球经济金融体系中占有一席之地。

[1] 本文发表于《中国银行业》2013年特刊。

第15章 “十二五”规划和人民币国际化的意义[1]

刘遵义

首先，我想感谢国家开发银行和陈元董事长邀请我参加本届国开行国际顾问委员会会议。我很高兴和荣幸能够受邀再次参加。陈元董事长确实为开行、并通过开行为中国经济做出了卓越的贡献。作为中国银行业的领导者和先行者，他引入了许多新的概念和实践。近年来，他还将开行业务拓展到海外，显著提升了开行的国际知名度、业务覆盖和影响力。

我初识陈元董事长大抵是在80年代末。他时任中国的央行——中国人民银行副行长。当时，他众多职责中有一项是管理中国的外汇储备。在人行任职期间，中国的外汇储备从1988年的30亿美元增加到1997年的1400亿美元。1998年，陈元被任命为目前依然受中国国务院直属的国家开发银行的行长，并自那时起掌舵国开行15年（2008年12月其职务从行长变为董事长）。

国开行作为政策性银行成立于1994年，其宗旨为向规模、风险和期限超出一般商业银行融资能力范围之外的项目提供融资。它直接或间接由国家所有，享有准主权的信用评级。国开行为三峡水库、国内大型机场和港口、高速铁路、桥梁、高速公路、电站、通信网络、城市公共交通系统、基础和创新行业等重大基础设施项目提供了大部分的融资。国开行是中国城镇化进程的有力支持者，向北京、上海、天津和重庆等重点城市提供信贷。截止2010年年底，国开行资产总额约为8000亿美元，贷款余额为7150亿美元，是世界银行规模的两倍多。国开行的大部分增长是在陈元董事长的领导下发生的。同时，陈元董事长还将不良贷款率保持在2010年的0.68%（自此不良贷款率又已降至0.4%以下）。这对中国银行业和世界各大银行来说都是值得羡慕的纪录。

中国已成为世界第二大经济体，并已开始实施第十二个五年规划（2011年至2015年），致力于转变经济发展模式。人民币已经开始在中国的跨境交易（包括贸易、投资和贷款）中使用。这些发展将为国开行带来巨大的潜在机会。我将在下文中详细讨论。

国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划（2011年至2015年）

中国的《国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划》（2006年至2010年）正式于2010年12月31日结束。“十一五”规划的大部分目标已获实现或超越，包括单位GDP能耗较2006年年初降低20%等。“十一五”规划提出了2005年到2010年GDP实际年增长率达到7.5%的目标。最后完成的实际增长率则为每年10.84%。唯一未能实现的主要目标是GDP中用作研发支出的比重：目标定为2%，实际实现为1.8%。

中国的《国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划》于2011年3月中旬由全国人民代表大会批准通过。规划本身主要还是建议性的而非强制性的。“十二五”规划最突出的特点是将“十一五”规划的年实际增长率的平均目标从7.5%下调至7%。几乎可以确定的是和“十一五”规划目标一样（最后取得的实际增长率为10.8%），这一目标将被超越。但是，增长率目标的下调预示着中国政府决心弱化对经济增长数量的强调，转而在“十二五”规划期间侧重经济增长的质量。

“十二五”规划的一个核心命题是转变中国经济发展的模式。首先，将出口导向转为内需驱动；其次，从要素驱动转为技术进步或创新驱动。还有一项目标是在“十二五”期末实现货物和服务对外贸易的基本平衡。

“十二五”规划（以下简称《规划》）呼吁加快城镇化。在“十二五”期间，农村人口占总人口的比例预计将从51%下降到47%。加快城镇化有助于刺激国内总需求实现必要的增长。《规划》同时提出要增加教育和卫生的支出，特别是在农村地区，以及环境保护和生态修复、大气和水污染控制等。《规划》还列出了在“十二五”期内提高能效（单位GDP能耗下降16%）和减少碳排放（减少17%）的强制性目标。《规划》还提出要通过税收、转移支付以及教育、医疗等公共产品的政府定向支出和社会保障网络和养老体系的完善来缩小实际收入的差距。《规划》还呼吁加大对中西部地区的基础设施投入，并通过加快城镇化进程，缩小区域间的收入分配不均。

图1 中国出口、进口和贸易平衡月度数据

有一种普遍存在的误解，认为中国经济高度依赖于出口，特别是以贸易顺差作为增长的动力。实际上，中国一直到2005年才开始出现对外贸易的高额顺差，而中国经济从1978年开始就以年实际增长率近10%的平均水平在增长。因此，应该明确的是贸易顺差不可能是过去30年中国经济发展的重要动力。中国经济的增长在过去、现在和未来都不会依赖于其贸易顺差。

从1982年到2004年，中国贸易顺差占GDP的比重在正负4.5%的区间内波动，平均水平不到2%。这一比例在2007年达到约9%的峰值，之后则大幅下降，到2010年已不足3%，2011年约为2%。中国实现美国建议的贸易顺差占GDP 4%的目标应该没有太大问题。中国的对外货物和服务贸易将在未来几年内实现基本平衡，而未必需要通过人民币兑美元汇率的大幅调整来实现。这一目标能够实现是因为中国国内储蓄和投资的差距正在逐渐缩小，而且人民币兑美元自2005年年中以来也大幅升值，实际升值幅度高达约25%。

图2 中国货物和服务贸易收支占GDP的比重

图3 中国货物和服务出口占GDP的比重

中国出口占GDP的比重自1978年以来稳步上升，2006年达到约40%的高点，自此回落到2009年的约25%。这一比例看似很高，但是与香港地区、新加坡、韩国和台湾地区动辄为GDP几倍的出口额相比则显得很低。而且，中国出口占GDP的比重实际上夸大了出口在中国经济中的地位，因为这一数字并未考虑中国对外出口平均附加值低的事实。

图4 中国实际零售额的月度同比增长

中国的居民消费时常被看作是中国国内总需求的长期可持续潜在增长点。实际上，从2009年一季度开始，每月实际零售额同比增长已超过两位数（图4），这表明居民消费已经在快速增长。实际零售额的增长速度已经远超同期实际GDP或居民实际收入的增长速度。这在一定程度上反映了居民消费调整滞后于收入增长，因此，即使实际GDP的增长速度回落，实际消费的增长速度还是可能继续上升，至少一段时间内持续上升。当然，实际消费增长率远高于实际GDP增长率只有在实际居民收入继续以高于实际GDP增长的速度增加时才会持续。出现这种情况的唯一条件是居民收入占GDP的比重（目前不到50%）得以持续提高。

1949年，中国农村人口的比例略低于90%。到了1978年，农村人口的占比为82%。2010年，农村人口的占比已经降到了51%——几乎一半的中国人口依然居住在农村地区。农村人口比例预计在“十二五”期间将继续下降到47%（图5）。农村人口比例下降的速度约为每年一个百分点，与第一产业（农业）吸纳就业的比例下降的速度相当。

图5 中国农村和城市人口的比例

对研发的持续投入对一个经济体的技术进步至关重要。近年来，中国开始大力投资于研发——研发支出的绝对值和占GDP比重都增长迅速（图6），但仍落后于发达国家以及东亚的新兴工业化经济体。中国为2015年设定的研发支出的GDP占比目标为2.2%，依然低于美国现在的水平。自20世纪50年代末至今，美国研发支出占GDP的比重平均保持在2.5%。相比之下，日本和韩国每年研发支出占GDP的比重均超过3%（图7）。

图6 中国的研发支出与占GDP的比重

图7 研发支出占GDP的比重：G7国家、四个新兴工业化的东亚经济体和中国

评估技术进步潜力（国家创新能力）的一项指标是每年的新增专利数量。图8列出了各年美国向本国人和外国人授予专利的数量。美国在过去40年无疑占据着第一位的宝座，2010年授予专利的数量超过10万件。排名第二位的是日本，专利授予数量约为4.5万件。由于这些是美国授予的专利，也许美国有主场作战的优势。但是，其他国家之间的比较应当是公平的。

就美国授予专利的数量而言，每年授予中国的专利数量从1985年的1件增加到2010年的2657件，韩国和台湾地区依然领先于中国，2010年两地的专利授予数量分别为11671件和8238件。

计算研发资本存量的方法是将过去累计的实际研发支出扣除每年10%的折旧。研发资本存量被证明与专利授予数量之间存在直接的因果关系（图9显示的是每个国家每年研发资本存量与专利授予数量的对应关系）。

图8 美国授予的专利数量：G7国家、四个新兴工业化的东亚经济体和中国

图9 美国授予的专利数量和研发资本存量之间的关系

中国巨大的国内市场极大地提升了无形资本（例如研发资本和商誉）的产出效率。此处所指的无形资本包括本地自发形成和从海外获得。一项新产品或流程的固定研发成本在一个大市场里很容易进行摊销。对商誉的投资（如打造品牌）在大市场中也可以带来更大的好处。但是，促进创新的关键在于保护知识产权，使中国的创业家有意愿将自主创新及从海外获得的专利和技术进行商业化。巨大的国内市场也可以让中国积极参与产品和技术标准的制定，例如第四代（4G）电信标准，并分享作为标准制定者的好处。

人民币国际化

1994年，中国实现人民币经常项目可兑换。但是，资本项目依然未实现完全可兑换。中国依然存在双向资本管制。某些类别的资本移动需要事先征得政府批准。但是，中国公民每年每人可汇出最高五万美元的等值外汇，基本没有任何限制。

接受并持有某种外币的意愿取决于该货币是否可兑换，但未必完全可兑换（完全可兑换即经常项目和资本项目下均可兑换）。个人（或公司）可能会很愿意接受并持有某种外币，无论该外币是否为完全可兑换，条件是他（它）知道与之打交道的下一个人（或公司）也同样愿意接受该货币。

举例来说，对华出口的出口商可能乐意接受人民币付款，前提是他知道他所在国家从事进口中国货物和服务的进口商可以使用这些人民币账户余额来支付进口货款。尽管人民币在法律上还未实现完全可兑换，但是由于在一般性承兑中广泛使用，因此它在许多东亚经济体已经逐渐实现了事实上的可兑换。例如，人民币在香港地区、澳门、老挝、缅甸和与中国接壤的其他边境地区，已经被作为交易媒介和储值货币广为接受和使用，尽管它并不是这些地区的法定货币。在香港，人民币银行存款从基数基本为零快速增加到占银行本外币存款总额的约10%（图10）。这表明某种外币即使尚未实现完全可兑换也是有可能在较大范围内用作一般性承兑的。

图10 香港的人民币银行存款

自中国1978年改革开放以来，中国外贸，包括货物和服务的进出口，几乎清一色地使用美元计价和结算。从2009年开始，中国某些地区的出口商和进口商开始可以通过自主选择和签订协议的方式使用人民币进行贸易结算。这一做法在2011年推广到全国。中国约有30%的贸易是与东亚经济体之间进行的。如果中国的进出口商在与东亚的贸易伙伴开展业务往来时使用人民币作为结算货币，中国对在跨境交易中使用美元的需求将会大大减少，而中国的央行，即中国人民银行，将不再需要持有现在这么大规模的外汇储备。相比之下，日本约有一半的外贸是用日元计价和结算的。

中国从除日本外的东亚地区的进口额每年有三千亿美元，如果仅是这些进口能够以人民币结算，那么就可以减少交易用外汇储备的需求量。同样，中国对除日本外的东亚地区的出口额每年超过三千亿美元。如果这些经济体的进口商能够获得人民币（例如从出口商处获得），那么他们也将能够并可能有意愿用人民币来支付他们从中国的进口。如果出现这种情况，他们各自的中央银行也将能够减少以外汇储备方式持有的交易用美元资产。

中国对外贸易中用人民币结算的比例从2010年的2.5％增加到了2011年一季度末的7％。这一比例预计未来还会继续增加。到目前为止，用人民币做贸易结算主要还是针对来自中国的进口，约占全部使用额的90％。为了更好地推广中国的出口商用人民币做结算，海外进口商必须自己能够获得人民币。实现这一点还有待时日，但是随着这些经济体的对华出口企业开始使用人民币收款，它们的人民币余额在原则上也将能够为其本国进口商所用。使用人民币作为贸易结算货币的另一个驱动因素是由中国人民银行建立或监管下的离岸人民币远期市场，市场参与仅限于真正的对华出口和从中国进口的企业。

此外，如果香港、印度尼西亚、韩国、马来西亚和泰国等其他东亚经济体也开始使用各自的本币或人民币作为双边贸易结算的货币，这将进一步减少在国际交易中使用美元的需要以及这些经济体的央行在外汇储备中持有美元计价资产的比例。

2011年5月，亚洲开发银行在河内召开年会，期间，中国、日本和韩国的财政部长举行旁会并发表声明，提出将研究是否可在三方贸易结算中使用各自的本币。如果双边贸易基本平衡，则与贸易伙伴国在贸易结算中使用各自本币可以直截了当。只有存在持续的双边贸易顺差或逆差时才可能出现问题。顺差国的央行最终将会持有逆差国的货币。问题是如何向顺差国保证非短期持有逆差国的货币是不会吃亏的。

两国的央行之间通过相互签订协议的方式，承诺使用其他硬通货（如美元或欧元）、黄金或通胀指数债券等赎回对方央行持有的本国货币，由此顺差国的央行能确保其购买力不会削弱，而购买力则是最终关注的重点所在。如果使用本币进行贸易结算最后能够成为范围广和持续时间长的一项安排，那美元作为国际贸易结算主要货币的地位可能会被取代。

即使人民币无法实现完全可兑换，即无法完全取消资本的双向管制，其他国家和地区的央行与货币主管当局依然可以使用人民币资产作为其外汇储备的一部分，前提是中国人民银行通过协议的方式向外国央行做出承诺，其持有的人民币都会兑换成美元或欧元或其他任何所谓的“硬”通货，甚至是按照事先商定的平价兑换成黄金。外国央行可以持有人民币，用作与中国或其他愿意接收人民币的经济体开展潜在交易。中国人民银行与阿根廷、白俄罗斯、香港地区、印度尼西亚、韩国、马来西亚和蒙古的央行（或货币主管当局）已经签订了双边货币互换协议。未来预计将会签署更多此类协议。

人民币能否成为主要的国际储备货币还需拭目以待。一国货币被其他国家用作国际储备货币有利也有弊。日元虽为完全可兑换，但日本政府并未鼓励其他国家将日元用作主要的国际储备货币。目前，虽然人民币还未实现完全可兑换，但是香港地区、新加坡和韩国都在考虑将其外汇储备的一部分投资于人民币计价的证券，以使组合结构更加多样化。

对国家开发银行的影响

“十二五”规划对国家开发银行有何影响？根据“十二五”规划，中国将转变经济增长模式，由“出口导向型转为内需拉动型”，并从“投资拉动型转为创新或技术进步驱动型”。

国内需求实现持续增长的推手有哪些？除家庭消费和公共基础设施投资（例如高速铁路、城市公共交通系统、发电厂等）外，主要包括以下几个方面：（1）城镇化进程的加速发展；（2）安居工程建设；（3）在节能、清洁可再生能源及环保领域的投资；（4）教育和医疗卫生领域及高新技术在这些领域的应用。

为基础设施项目提供长期融资是国开行的强势领域。因此，“十二五”规划应能给国开行带来很多机会。城镇化的推进需要配套的基础设施，例如公路、铁路、机场、发电厂、供水设施、通信及光纤网络、公共交通系统及住宅等。为实现节能减排，需要对发电厂（燃气发电、水力发电、核能发电）、清洁煤和其他替代能源投入新的资金。

“十二五”期间，新建保障型住房套数将达3600万套。国开行在这方面可有所作为，以使保障房能在更多地方让更多人负担得起。国开行可新设一个住房贷款部门，向金融机构、养老基金和其他长期投资者发放长期固定利率债券，并用所获收益从贷款发放机构方手中购买合格的长期固定利率按揭贷款。与此同时，应要求贷款发起方对其发放的按揭贷款持有一定比例的剩余权益，例如5%至10%之间（以降低道德风险）。

在推动创新方面，国开行可融资支持构建一个连接全国各地的全国性光纤网络，这一光纤网络可使中国各地都能免费或低价接入互联网。这将大大加速信息和知识的传播，在较为发达的沿海地区和欠发达的内陆西部地区之间实现机会均等。青海是中国最穷的省份之一，而上海是中国最富有的城市。一旦能接入互联网，青海的学生就能和上海的学生一样，获取同样的信息。网络还能为小企业更平等地和大企业进行竞争提供平台。

此外，国开行可通过其投资部门在全球进行风险资本投资。进行风险资本投资是试图为那些未来可能会像苹果、微软、雅虎、谷歌、脸谱和推特等一样成功的公司，在其最初创业期提供融资。风险资本投资的成功概率低，大约为十分之一。但是，如果能选对一家创业公司进行早期投资，风险投资的回报也会很高。此外，对于一家中国公司而言，如果想要购买诸如苹果或微软等已经获得成功的公司的百分之十的股份几乎是不可能的（价格过高，当地政治上的反对），但是如果投资标的公司为创业期公司，可能性就会相当大了。然而，很难事先预测到哪个风投项目能获得成功，因此，国开行应广撒网，进行大范围的早期投资——早期拨下很多种子，数年后就可收获数棵大树。

在融资支持新技术试点项目进行商业规模扩展方面，国开行也可发挥主要作用。此类新技术包括煤炭液化技术、页岩气水力压裂技术、核聚变技术、新材料技术（例如强度与钢材相当的塑料）等。一旦试点项目获得成功，后续项目的单位成本就将大大降低。这些新技术可为传统形式的能源和材料提供切实可行的替代物，从而将逐渐遏制其价格的攀升。在应对由商品价格上涨所引发的通胀方面，唯一有效的长期规避手段就是开发切实可行的替代品。

国开行可向有良好海外投资信用的中国直接投资者提供以美元或其他货币计价的长期外汇贷款。国开行可通过在境内外发行外币债券筹集发放贷款所需资金。国开行也可从中国人民银行管理的国家外汇管理局直接借取美元或其他外币，借款利率为接近美国国债或同期限的其他国家政府债券的利率水平。若能获得以投资目的地国货币计价的长期贷款，进行海外直接投资的中国投资者就能有效规避长期汇率风险。国开行还拥有提供基础设施贷款的独特优势。中国企业到海外收购自然资源，需要在投资目的地国进行基础设施开发，以便开采和出口其所收购的自然资源。在这一领域，国开行也可发挥重要作用。

随着人民币国际化进程的推进，人民币在中国境外的可获得性和使用将日益增加，国开行也可利用这一机会进一步推动自身业务的国际化。国开行可为来华直接投资提供长期融资。例如，国开行可向信用良好的外国直接投资者（例如英特尔、微软等）的在华投资项目提供以人民币计价的长期贷款，外国投资者因此可以在货币单位和贷款期限方面实现资产和负债匹配。如果能获得此类贷款，外国直接投资者就可以有效规避长期汇率风险。然而，为减少道德风险，外国投资者（实际上为其最终母公司）应被要求向国开行提供直接贷款担保，担保额与贷款的美元（或其他硬通货）金额等值。如果投资项目失败且剩余资产不足以偿付未偿贷款，将由母公司补足差额。

随着人民币在中国对外贸易结算中的使用日益广泛，中国进口商用于支付其外国供货商的人民币将在一段时期内留在中国境外，至少在这些人民币结余被外国进口商用于支付给中国供应商购买中国的商品和服务之前，将会留在中国境外。在国外开展业务的中国商业银行在这些人民币结余的中间业务领域将扮演重要角色。但是，当这些人民币结余以贷款或债券收益的形式重新流入中国时，若回流量达到一定规模，可能会因为届时在岸和离岸人民币资金之间存在较大利差，而给中国的金融业带来困难。

然而，国开行可开展一种不会对中国国内金融业造成影响的人民币回流业务。国开行可以在境外——例如香港（随着人民币在贸易结算中的使用日益广泛，也可在其他国家或地区）——发行以人民币计价、用人民币购买的债券。当前，国开行享有准主权信用评级，国开行的离岸借贷年利率不高于2%，可能更低，而中国境内的借贷年利率则为4%甚至更高。国开行可以使用其人民币收益从人行购入美元或其他外币，用于支持其海外业务。国开行还可以用其收益，向那些有正当人民币需求（例如需要人民币支付从中国的进口或在中国进行直接投资）的海外借款人放贷。通过开展上述业务，国开行可以帮助人行减少外汇储备，帮助人行降低为避免人民币出现过快或过高升值而采取本外币对冲操作的成本。

最后，作为一家拥有国际业务的中国政策性银行，国开行还可以代表人行经营一个离岸银行间人民币远期市场，提供公共服务。参与这一银行间市场的商业银行可由此向中国市场中的真正的货物和服务进出口商（但不向纯粹的货币投机者）出售远期人民币和美元。

结论

国开行应保持其作为中国主要政策性银行的独特地位，及其为普通商业银行因顾虑规模过大、风险过高或期限过长等原因而不愿或无法提供融资的项目融资的独特能力。为满足对长期固定利率融资的需求，银行不能倚赖波动相对较大的短期可变利率存款来筹资。在这方面，国开行拥有独特的优势：享有主权信用评级或准主权信用评级，因此能够以低于商业银行的成本，通过资本市场筹集长期固定利率的资金。国开行应充分利用这一优势。

因此，国开行应继续保持其国有独资的性质，而不应全部或部分实现私有化。如保持国有独资的性质，国开行就能继续享有主权信用评级或准主权信用评级，且可避免受到来自私有股东要求实现利润最大化，尤其是短期利润最大化的压力。美国房利美和房地美的部分私有化和公开上市是灾难性的，应引以为戒。政策性银行在任何时候都不应私有化。一旦实现全部或部分私有化，银行管理层最重要的考虑将变为追逐利润，而不是实现政策性目标，而且会失去主权信用评级或准主权信用评级，从而导致融资成本上升。如政策性银行在私有化后仍得以保留准主权信用评级，则会因为各方都认为该银行永远不会被允许倒闭，而引发银行管理层、私有股东和所有市场参与方的道德风险的上升。

[1] 本论文较早的版本曾在2011年5月19日举行的国家开发银行国际顾问委员会第十二次会议上提出过。

第16章 国家开发银行与未来的金融格局

汉斯·瑞奇

中国国家开发银行成立于1994年3月17日，隶属国务院领导，以提高人民生活水平，促进国家竞争力为宗旨。

为达到上述目标，国开行主要负责两大工作：为包括社会基础设施建设在内的国家基础设施建设项目提供融资；为加强中国与其他国家在实体经济领域的合作提供融资。

开行成立之初，中国经济已在国家倡导和大力扶持的外贸发展模式下取得了连续15年的增长——中国社会主义市场经济体制的成功实施正是上述经济增长的推动力，这种经济体制的基本原则在今日仍然发挥着作用。

在与开行国际顾问委员会成员的一次会晤中，中国国家总理曾如此描述国开行的工作：“尽可能保持必要的社会主义成分，尽可能多地实现市场经济”。这种说法虽然仍秉持政府主导经济的概念，却并不僵化。实际上，中国人的社会地位与经济增长之间的相互关系不断变化，总会影响政府对于经济发展的干预程度，同时这样的经济增长也为人民生活水平的持续提升开拓了空间。

此外，中国市场对外资实现了较大程度的开放。其他国家的出口导向型企业都注意到，长期看来，除贸易之外，他们还可以利用在华生产来开拓中国的巨大市场——前提是他们同意遵循中国的外资管理规定，与中国公司建立合资企业。自此，资本、制造业、产品和市场营销方面的专有知识不断涌入中国；作为回报，中国提供了更低的成本和在长期看来规模巨大的市场。

就中国的金融业而言，有人可能认为其发展能够而且应该与实体经济发展并驾齐驱，然而诸多因素阻碍了其发展。比如，政府基于某些原因曾经并且依然对外资主导中国的金融业有所保留。首先是人民币的不可兑换和政府设定的官方汇率；此外，中国不希望对外资银行产生依赖。其结果是，中国只允许外资持有金融机构25%以下的股权，而且还以外方保证分享其专有知识为前提。

究其主要原因，可能是中国政府认识到中国的银行体系仍处于不健全的状态。作为所谓的“专业银行”，中国的银行传统上一直为那些需要达到计划经济目标的国有企业输送资金，因此只能扮演中国财政性金融体系中代理人的角色，而非投资者和借贷者之间的真正中介。

中国的银行也不注重转型风险。它们通过揽存来补充资金，如果仍不够，则求助于央行。中国银行体系缺乏风险管理机制，这更进一步加剧了问题的严重性，使银行不断累积亏损和坏账。

这些问题广泛存在于庞大的国有企业和国有银行之中，处理起来极为艰巨，需要强有力的政府干预才能解决。而且银行重组改制，采用现代化的经营和风险管理体系都不可能一蹴而就。中国政府的一项宏大计划是，通过帮扶中小企业并为其提供融资、促进住房建设、鼓励中国企业对外投资、确保中国的商品供应，从而推进基础设施建设、改善社会基础设施，加强经济基础设施。实现这些计划又迫在眉睫。

中国政府了解上述种种问题，并在此背景下建立了国家开发银行，希望将其打造成中国金融市场中一家管理先进、经营稳定、口碑良好的金融机构。国开行融资成本低，由政府所有和监管，同时由顶尖人才按照银行业最佳实践进行管理和运营，成为中国银行业重组改制的标杆。

国开行的职责包括：促进中国资本市场发展；支持国有企业建立透明的财务报告制度，使其可以用于信用评估；创建风险和项目管理体制，使资金按照既定目标得以恰当地使用。

国开行自成立至今并非一帆风顺。虽然始终保持盈利，到1998年资产增加至700亿美元，但不良贷款约占三分之一。

正是在这样的背景下陈元开始承担起国开行的领导职责。此前他在中国人民银行担任副行长，履历辉煌：他在人行转型成为现代化中央银行的过程中发挥了举足轻重的作用。陈元在开行履新之后，雷厉风行地开始调整银行的组织架构和发展战略，包括建立风险管理机制，改变经营策略，利用并促进中国资本市场的发展，推进国际化进程，在全球范围内建立联系，从而吸收其他开发性金融机构的最佳实践。

这样的战略立竿见影。总资产至2010年增长了十多倍，达到近8000亿美元，利润率同步增长，不良贷款率则降至0.7%。开行成为资本市场的创新者，首次发行了资产抵押证券（ABS）。在提供发展融资方面，国开行仍遵循稳健的风险管理原则。由于其取得的巨大成绩，开行在2008年由政府经营的机构转制为一家完全按照公司法管理的公司，资本金也大幅提升至550亿美元。

2008年全球金融危机阻碍了开行进一步私有化的步伐。这不仅是因为发行股票的市场条件不成熟，而且由于危机向实体经济蔓延，中国政府重新认识到拥有一家开发性金融机构的重要性。

在这种情况下，需要对国开行未来经营模式进行新的探讨。笔者认为有以下三种选择：

1.政策性业务和商业银行业务相结合。事实上，两者不能由一家银行或实体同时承担。因为两者的经营策略、目标和管理理念完全不同，这将导致两种业务都只能取得次优结果。此外，投资者将无法区分哪些资金由政府支持，哪些不是（相比美国的机构）。中国经济和社会仍需要强有力而高效的政策性银行。如果中国政府决定将国开行改制为一家商业银行，则必须决定在未来如何延续政策性银行业务，以及如何将政策性银行相关的资产和资金进行转移。

2.另一个可能的选择是成为一家全能银行，从事投资、公司和零售银行业务，以及资本市场、证券和股票业务，包括交易服务、资产管理和保险。这种方式能够保证银行从收费和利息中获得稳定、均衡的收入。但是，由于如此宽泛的业务范围管理起来难度很大，所以银行的管理人员应牢记一条基本原则：事事追求完美则诸事不成。因此，国开行至少不应提供保险服务，不仅是因为其与银行业务有所冲突，开行也没有保险业务专家，而且新的银行应开发其独特的销售优势从而在竞争中脱颖而出。从这一点来讲，目前开行积累的项目融资的专业知识技能可以成为新机构的一大优势。

3.一个为公共部门服务的金融机构。该业务可以成为国开行的强项，但监管环境的变化和一些国家潜在的主权风险难以支撑一个可盈利的商业环境。

此外，多数的多边开发银行都从低融资成本中获益。他们正在寻找新的业务定位，并已进入新领域。在公共领域这样的薄利领域，保持资金成本低廉至关重要。通过承担资金业务较高的转移和错配风险来弥补该领域的劣势，这样一种经营模式不可持续。

一旦决定了采用哪种经营模式，接下来的问题就是在何地实施，即发展银行业务的地理布局问题。

当然这在很大程度上取决于中国经济将向何处去。很明显，中国经济发展由出口拉动。这种趋势将会延续，尽管国内消费也在同时增长。中国出口的成功，其背后的推手正是外国直接投资。在未来，中国企业将会大量对外投资，开拓新市场，维持现有市场，寻求原材料供应保障，获得高新技术。

任何一家中国的银行，若想服务全球客户，提供所需的全部产品并进入全球资本市场，都必须在海外建立商业据点。这听起来很容易，但如此一来，银行需要服从东道国所有的监管要求，并因此需要配套建立一个规模巨大、成本高昂的行政管理体系。决策层将需要决定是否要在所有地区提供所有服务。举例来说，零售银行业务对于银行资金的多元化非常重要，但不应在准入成本过高的成熟市场提供此类服务，而应考虑发展中和新兴国家市场。海外扩张的最佳办法是进行审慎收购。我并不推荐基于公司总部从零开始建立新业务。

综上所述，最佳的选项应是第二个选择，即依托现有的项目融资优势，成为一家全球性的全能银行。这与中国经济的发展方向相吻合，而国开行正是在这样的土壤中成长起来的。如能很好地管理，该模式将可以带来稳健而多元化的收入、资产风险组合和融资来源，并且能够帮助开行广泛地切入资本市场。

同样，还需要考虑此类型银行的组织结构。

一个最基本的原则是，应按照客户的需求建立组织结构，决策也应尽量贴近客户。因此，领导和责任应分布全球。各地区的机构必须具有独立的预算、损益和资产负债。在海外设立分支机构方面，要吸纳当地人才，并使员工有足够的自由空间发挥创造力，有动力为客户提供高效的服务，这样才能在海外获得成功。

此外，支持保障和信息技术服务应当集中，从而实现规模效应。

总而言之，中国无疑需要全球性的、能够在各地区提供多元化金融服务的大银行。这也是满足中国经济发展，实施“走出去”和全球化战略的需要。在经历短期实施后，相比其他中国银行，这样的模式将为国开行带来竞争优势。

同时，中国无疑也需要一家政策性银行来弥补市场机制的不足，推动结构性改革。其将代表政府来实现支持中小企业、加快城镇化进程、节能环保、节约能源、建设社会及其他基础设施等目标。

无论未来国开行会做出何种决策，它都已经拥有了一个良好的基础：财务稳健，拥有经验丰富、受教育程度高且充满干劲的员工，其组织架构也堪称中国金融业的一个标杆。

这些成绩应当归功于陈元。他为自己的祖国做出了功勋卓著的贡献。

第17章 改革全球金融架构[1]

安浩德（已故）

引言

用“架构”这个词来形容当前国际金融体系的临时性安排可能不太恰当。即便是改革后的金融体系也注定会缺乏优秀建筑架构的特征：即清晰的结构与设计。但是，金融体系也应遵循某些容易理解并被广泛接受的基本原则。我今天要讨论的就是这些原则。

据我所知，“全球金融架构”这个词并没有普遍认同的定义。我认为这个词有三层含义：首先是开展国际金融关系的基本模式；其次是为管理这些关系而设置的体制安排；最后是该体系的决策权如何在各个国家之间进行分配。这三层含义将在下文中有更清晰的阐述。我的中心思想是：在过去几十年中，国际金融架构在这三个方面受到了世界经济发展以及目前危机中凸显的某些趋势的深刻影响。

“二战”后的第一个主要趋势是自由市场理论的影响力越来越大。人们把关注点放在了金融市场的开放和全球化上，并以此作为国际资源分配的主要推动机制。这一国际金融关系模式不仅不同于布雷顿森林体系的设计，而且要求新的体制机制来加以管理。但目前的金融危机对这一新模式的可行性提出了挑战。

第二个主要趋势是新兴经济体在世界经济中的分量越来越重。这就使“二战”后国际机构的权力分配方式变得过时了。由于这次危机起源于世界主要金融中心，所以新兴市场国家强烈呼吁增加它们在国际金融关系管理中的话语权。

这些趋势以及目前对金融架构提出的问题对亚洲国家意义重大。亚洲国家大部分时间是金融全球化的受益者，但有时又是受害者。亚洲国家占世界产量和贸易的份额增长最快。因此，更加稳健的国际金融框架以及更加公平的决策权符合亚洲的核心利益。但是亚洲在设计和管理国际货币体系方面发挥的作用仍相对较小。

我在今天的讲话中将首先介绍国际金融关系模式的变化，以及体制结构针对这些变化做出了哪些调整。其次，我将介绍过去两年的经验如何改变了人们对国际金融体系的认识，以及改革从中吸取了哪些教训。最后，我将讨论为了反映全球经济权力平衡的新现实，国与国之间的相对作用将如何变化。

国际金融关系模式的变化

国际经济关系的基本模式与“二战”后设定的体系相比已经发生了巨大的变化。用帕多亚斯基奥帕（前意大利财长Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa）和萨柯曼尼（现任意大利财长Fabrizio Saccomanni）的话说，国际货币体系已经从“政府主导”转向“市场主导”[2]。

建立于1944年的布雷顿森林体系强调政府决策的重要性。那时，各国的金融体系基本上是隔绝和独立的。国际金融体系的四个基本要素是：汇率、国际收支调整、国际流动性创造和资本账户支付安排。在布雷顿森林体系下，这四个基本要素大多由政府来管理。汇率是固定的，只有出现“根本性失衡”的情况下，才能通过政府间协议来改变。否则，政府需要通过干预汇市来保持汇率的稳定。国际收支调整通过审慎使用国内需求管理来确保经常账户的稳定。国际流动性取决于黄金的固定美元价格，创造流动性的机制一直是国际论坛上热议的话题。而资本账户支付在大多数国家都通过外汇管制加以限制。

但随着时间的推移，这一由政府主导的体系被金融开放（尤其是资本市场）的力量所瓦解。资本管制很难执行，而且最终从哲学理念的层面被否定了。主要国家间的固定汇率在1971年被打破，取而代之的是主要受市场力量影响的浮动汇率制。国际流动性基本上由需求决定，原因是外汇储备总余额日益成为国家的决策目标。国际收支调整过程也基本上由市场推动，这是因为主要国家的政府不设置经常账户目标并允许汇率自由浮动，而不是通过国内需求政策来实现外汇供需的平衡。总而言之，以前主要由政府决策来主导国际货币体系的管理，但到了20世纪后半叶，主要是由市场力量来主导实物和金融资源的跨国流动。

当然，并不是所有的国家都发生了同等程度或同等速度的变化。即便在今天，许多新兴市场仍然管理汇率并实行一定的资本管制。但是，到了本世纪初，可以说国际金融体系的基本架构是由市场力量决定的，并通过开放和全球化的资本市场来运作。各国政府普遍承担了实行审慎货币及财政政策的责任，但这也意味着要允许市场力量来决定汇率和国际金融资本的流动。

新模式对体制的影响

自由化开放的一个主要结果是跨境资本流动的大幅上升。“二战”后那些年还存在于各国资本市场之间的藩篱几乎完全被打破，形成了一个单一的全球资本市场。与此同时，金融机构无论是规模还是地理覆盖范围都大幅扩张，还研发了新的金融工具协助其管理风险并在各种市场上进行投资交易。随着市场变得更加“完整”，政府的政策要想避开市场的约束也越来越难。但是，这被认为是市场化国际金融体系的另一个优点。

全球金融市场的增长预示着管理国际经济关系的基本模式发生了巨大变化。有关汇率、流动性创造等问题的政府决策变得不那么重要了，而有关金融机构和市场的监管决策却变得越来越重要。

在国民经济中，中央银行和金融机构及市场的监管部门越来越重要，尤其是央行，其货币政策可以直接影响金融市场状况。但令人惊讶的是，现在回过头来看，监管机构的主要目标并非确保金融稳定。几十年来，许多市场的金融体系一直受到严格监管，对业务领域、市场准入、服务价格和利率水平都有管制。这些管制造成了金融抑制，但却将金融体系有效隔离起来，确保其稳定。可以说，监管寻租的缓冲作用是如此之大，以至于监管失灵的可能性是极小的。

但随着自由化开放的力度加大，金融体系的行政监管模式在国内和国际上都受到了质疑。自由派经济模式的基本假设是市场力量大部分是有益的，因此监管应该有助于市场力量发挥其作用。在这一模式下，金融动荡的危险更大，但一般认为这些危险是可控的，原因是市场参与者对自身利益的考虑、市场的自我平衡性以及监管机构基于风险的“低干涉”监管可以确保金融稳定。

从国际角度来看，轻度监管的市场化金融体系需要确保全球金融机构能够公平竞争，也就是各国的市场监管要具有可比性。但是，在体系的“架构”中，哪个机构应该负责推动必要的全球监管合作呢？

国际货币基金组织不适合承担这一任务，原因有几个方面。首先，基金组织的专长是基于宏观经济的，其员工在金融事务方面经验相对薄弱。其次，基金组织是一个政府间机构，主要受各国财政部的控制，而金融领域的权力大多归属于其他机构，例如央行和金融监管机构。

因此，管理国际金融体系的责任主要交给了基金组织以外的机构。当时的观察家对此几乎没有做出任何评述。其中一部分责任交给了巴塞尔。各国央行行长自20世纪30年代以来就定期在巴塞尔举行会议。随着货币政策日益成为宏观经济政策的主要工具，以及央行独立性的增强，央行行长每月（后来是每两月）一次在巴塞尔召开的会议成为了国际经济关系管理结构中的重要组成部分。

体制架构的其他重要变化还包括1975年巴塞尔银行监管委员会的创建，国际证监会组织（IOSCO）的权力扩大，以及央行行长委员会网络的建立，负责监控市场趋势和发展。最后，1999年还成立了金融稳定论坛，把事关国家和国际金融稳定的主要机构纳入了这一单一组织。

这一新体制架构有三个方面值得关注。首先，这一架构基本上是临时成立的，没有任何正式的条约义务框架。这一特点使其在操作上具有灵活性，但却使其失去了合法性。其次，这一架构基本上没有经过规划，也就是说，每个委员会的建立都是为了满足一个具体的需求，在协调或整体设计上几乎没有下任何功夫。最后，这一架构的框架理念认为市场力量基本上是稳定的。

危机的影响

鉴于目前的危机，市场化的全球金融体系以及管理这一体系的架构真的合适和有效吗？危机给我们提供了很多教训，但或许最明显的教训就是，放任自流的市场力量并没有防止全球金融市场的同步崩溃，而且还对实体经济活动和就业造成了灾难性的影响。我们发现市场失灵比我们原先预想的波及面更大，后果也更严重。监管较少的金融体系不一定能实现稳定平衡。

因此，以往的监管理念必须改革。现在的问题是，改什么和怎么改？仅对基本的开放市场模式修修边角？还是应该对市场力量加以更深远广泛的约束，甚至是回到全球化以前的状态？在解决这些问题的同时，还有一个问题：什么样的体制结构对管理改革后的金融体系最有效？

一种观点是，目前的危机证明全球化有不足之处，需要政府在关键经济领域进行更多的干预。这就包括进一步管制汇率、更严格地控制资本流动，并收紧对金融产品的许可授权。此外，政府还应该更多地控制国内金融体系的业态发展，可以拆分大型金融集团及/或限制外国公司的经营活动。持这一观点的人认为，虽然这样做意味着倒退回全球金融市场一体化以前的状态，但其代价并没有想象的那么大，而且要实现国内金融体系的稳定，这个代价是值得付出的。

毫无疑问，政府更直接地干预主要金融市场和定价，以及各国政府加强对国内金融市场的管控在表面上很有吸引力。这样做可以避免由于放任自流的市场过激反应而产生的某些后果，并防止政府的政策目标受市场冲击。例如，本次危机让亚洲的新兴市场国家觉得它们管制汇率、积累大量外汇储备以及保持资本管制的政策是正确的。那些在金融业限制外资参与的国家认为这样做使它们避免了信贷枯竭。

增加对金融机构的限制还可以控制代价惨重的跨境危机蔓延。英国金融监管局等监管机构就试图防止输入性动荡，具体做法是要求跨国金融机构根据所在国的审慎标准来管理其在各国的资产负债表。还有人呼吁管理金融创新，以避免它们成为金融业的“大规模杀伤性武器”。

虽然这些观点很诱人，但我认为如果做得太过反而会让世界经济付出沉重的代价。全盘接受这些观点可能会导致资本市场的割裂及全球化的倒退。我们不应忘记，全球一体化的资本市场带来了巨大的好处。目前亟待进行的改革应当保留这些好处，同时修复造成破坏性动荡的市场缺陷。因此，新的金融架构应该认识到市场有可能失灵，所以市场力量应该更好地加以管制，而且管理金融体系需要新的体制和机制。那要怎么做呢？

关于宏观经济变量，很显然市场力量可能造成资本流动和资产价格的过度上升。但这并不意味着政府决策会产生更好的结果。一般来说，政府决策往往会让情况变得更糟。但我们可能需要一个概念框架，让我们能够决定什么时候应该为了金融体系稳定可以罔顾市场信号。以资产泡沫为例。过去我们一直认为资产泡沫是无法提前发现的，最好的政策就是等泡沫破灭后再来收拾残局。现在，我们更希望看到由信贷催生的泡沫在刚出现时就被扼杀于摇篮中，以及用货币或监管政策来控制泡沫。现在已经有一些研究成功发现了不可持续金融失衡的早期预警信号。

但是，如果想成功地应对金融失衡，就需要国际合作。在选择可行合适的政策上达成一致非常重要。各行其政可能导致货币政策不统一以及不希望看到的汇率变动。目标应该是治理金融动荡的潜在来源，而不是试图抑制其后果。

从对宏观经济的担忧转向金融监管，我们应该设计市场化的工具来保持金融体系的稳定，而不是采取行政措施，限制金融机构的业务范围和经营区域。危机表明，银行需要更多的资本缓冲来内化政府救助的成本，此外还需要将更多类别的金融机构纳入监管范围。危机还显示，必须考虑金融系统的顺周期性，并加强维护系统性稳定的宏观审慎监管。因此，各国协商制定一套金融体系管理原则的条件已经成熟。对国际社会的研究与政策议程来说，制定并应用这些原则虽然有难度，但应该可以克服。

如果有国家单独另寻他法来强化其金融体系，可能会造成不利的结果。全球化资本市场的好处取决于国与国之间的监管有较大的一致性，从而为公平竞争创造条件。监管不一致会产生监管套利的风险。经验表明，如果存在监管套利的情况，国内监管机构就会对跨境业务活动设置壁垒，以保持其控制国内金融体系风险的能力。这种做法可以理解，但会削弱全球化资本市场流动带来的好处。

在我看来，有效的国际金融架构应该包含真正全球化的监管框架，以及如何管理危机和处置破产金融机构的国际协议。唯此，监管机构才能让国内民众放心，确保在消除金融动荡风险的同时保留开放国际金融体系的好处。

有三个原则至关重要。第一，监管应该基于一套共同的规则框架，其管辖范围是超越国界的。虽然做到这一点不是太容易，但相对来说这是最容易实现的。银行及其他金融机构的监管部门应当就其管辖的机构达成最低的审慎监管标准，并确保监管的机构类型和市场范围是相同的。这就需要在目前的巴塞尔资本要求基础上进行修改，以强化那些不够严格的规定。

第二，同时也更难实现的是，需要就监管的实施达成一致，即如何解读和执行通过共同协议制定的法规。难点在于国内的监管机构对在其辖区内成立的机构负有法定的监管责任，但对总部设在国外的机构实行审慎监管，常常不情愿又不得已去依赖国外的监管机构。关键是要找到一种机制，比如通过监管机构组织，让国内的监管机构可以信赖外国同行的判断。

第三，需要一个可以有序处置破产机构的机制。毫无疑问，这是最困难的，原因是这会直接触及一个国家的法律体系核心以及政府的财政责任。出于道德风险的考虑，没有任何一个机构是大而不倒的，因此需要找到一种机制，让机构破产但又不给本国的纳税人或合作伙伴国家带来不能承受的代价。

可行的破产处置程序有四个先决条件：（1）让利益相关方承担的损失具有可预测性并符合避免道德风险原则；（2）避免让“无辜的旁观者”受到不必要的伤害，尤其要防止可能引起对本来经营良好的金融机构失去信心的情况；（3）尽可能减少纳税人的负担；以及（4）任何遗留的财政负担在受影响的国家间公平分担。

这些要求确实很高。我很清楚设定这些要求远比执行起来要容易。但是，如果我们不能建立一个更加协同的国际监管和危机管理架构，几十年来金融全球化取得的成就有可能付诸东流，而首当其冲的地区就是亚洲。因此，亚洲国家需要想清楚如何改革金融架构，并利用其在全球决策过程中上升的地位来实现自救。

决策权的分配

最后，我想谈谈国际金融体系的参与国应该如何运用权力和影响力。这是关于国际货币基金组织改革讨论得最多的一个主题。

争论的原因是显而易见的。自20世纪70年代初以来，各国间的相对经济实力发生了快速的变化，现有的国际金融权力结构已经过时了，尤其是国际货币基金组织和世界银行的配额和投票权。很多地区的经济实力发生了变化，亚洲尤其明显。亚洲国家在过去30年经济发展迅速。除日本外亚洲占世界产量的份额从1975年的7.8%上升到目前的14.6%。即便是这个数字也没有充分体现出亚洲国家在国际金融关系中重要性的上升。在同一时期，亚洲占世界出口的份额从8%上升至23%，占全球外汇储备的份额从21%上升至49%。

显然，亚洲应当在关键的国际决策机构中拥有更多的代表性。但要有效增加亚洲的话语权，亚洲国家需要有明确的目标。第一，找出构建全球金融架构中最有影响力的机构。第二，制定在这些机构中获得更多“影响力”的战略。第三，决定亚洲国家在实质上想从国际金融关系中得到什么。第四，用日益增长的集体话语权实现这些目标。

关于未来金融体系最有影响力的机构，我认为不能只关注国际货币基金组织和世界银行。这两个机构当然很重要。作为讨论宏观经济失衡的论坛，基金组织将扮演重要的角色。但同样重要的是G20及其下属的各种机构。其中，金融稳定理事会（FSB）尤其突出，该机构很可能将负责设计改革后金融体系的监管架构，并对统一国际监管标准提出建议。同样重要的还有国际清算银行（金融稳定理事会的成员）下属的各类委员会，尤其是巴塞尔银行监管委员会、全球金融体系委员会和支付结算体系委员会。

好消息是，G20的亚洲成员国目前也是所有上述机构的成员国。但第二个问题还没有解决，那就是如何在这些委员会中建立与亚洲国家日益上升的重要性相称的话语权。这不是投票权的问题，因为这些委员会里没有投票的机制。相反，影响力取决于其他国家如何看待亚洲国家在思想讨论中的价值和意义。因此，亚洲国家必须派出受人尊敬的技术专家作为代表，并给予他们充分参与讨论的自由，不用受到“政党路线”的制约。照稿宣读准备好的正式政府声明可能只会收效甚微。

第三，同时也是最重要的，亚洲国家需要决定什么样的国际金融体系最适合其中长期的需求。我认为亚洲会更积极地参与跨境金融关系，因此一个能促进全球资本市场及银行体系一体化的架构应该对亚洲是有利的。如果是这样的话，一个能促成最多协调统一的全球决策的监管架构会使亚洲受益。当然，这与我们本能的认识是相反的，我们会本能地认为在监管方面应该保留更多的国内行动自由。亚洲国家必须平衡长期的利益，并对如何实现这些利益做通盘考虑，而不是对每个具体问题都单独处理。

最后，亚洲国家必须决定如何在利益有分歧的时候团结起来推动集体利益。鉴于G20和金融稳定理事会都是临时成立的组织，没有普遍合法性和条约的约束，我认为这些机构的亚洲成员国应该主动与本地区的非成员国接触，既让这些非成员国了解最新动态，又在关键决策中征询其意见。这样做会使亚洲的话语权更具合法性。

结论

总之，未来的全球金融体系“架构”将继续以市场为主导，但与以往相比，市场监管将发挥更大的作用。管理这一体系的体制结构将是分散的，各类金融监管机构将与现有国际金融机构共同分享这一职责。亚洲国家现在有机会增加在其中的话语权。

如果我的预测是对的，这一新架构将是混乱的。但该架构会基于几个主要原则，具体安排将遵守这些原则，包括认可开放的市场是国际金融关系的基本组织框架；在集体认定市场失灵时进行干预的意愿；建立机构网络组织来执行上述原则；机构权力的分配必须让所有参与国感到其观点能得到充分考虑。

把这些原则付诸实践是一个挑战。但这样做是值得的，因为可以确保国际金融体系的稳定与合作，全球资本市场将得以充分发挥其毋庸置疑的优势。

[1] 本文是安浩德爵士于2009年10月18～19日在旧金山联储银行的会议上发表的演讲。

[2] T. Padoa-Schioppa和F.Saccomanni，“管理市场主导的全球金融体系”，收录于P.B.Kenen（版）“管理世界经济：布雷顿森林会议50年后”，华盛顿特区，国际经济学院，第235～268页。

后记

如果中国没有实现经济和金融体系的巨变，未能成为世界领先的贸易和投资大国，无法让五亿多国人成功脱贫，国家开发银行也不可能取得今天的成就。本书所收录的文章还表明，高瞻远瞩的领导、稳健的财务管理、对市场新机遇的及时把握是实现机构成功的关键。

中国在21世纪的征程方才起步，新的挑战、新的机遇层出不穷。尽管世界正从20世纪30年代大萧条以来最严峻的衰退中复苏，在发达经济体经济增速放缓的大背景下，中国经济势必进入减速期。

经历了过去30年的“大稳健”和大繁荣后，今天世界要应对的问题迥然不同。危机过后，新技术、发达市场和新兴市场间权力和贸易再平衡、社会不公和环境问题带来新的机遇。几乎所有经济体都需要创造更多就业，缩小收入和贫富差距，为未来的人才和基础设施进行投资。

新兴市场将18.面临跳出中等收入陷阱的挑战，这就需要加强治理并对有限的资源进行战略部署。新兴市场不能再依赖出口作为主要增长引擎，而是要通过扩大内需保增长、促就业。同时，新兴市场面临众多“烟囱工业”产能过剩的问题；越来越多的年轻劳动力涌入熙攘的城市，要解决他们的就业问题；环境、福利、社会不公的问题也集中显现。

许多国家纷纷重启产业政策，如韩国的绿色经济计划。开发性金融或政策性金融的新角色也得到了重新审视。例如，金砖国家正考虑成立金砖开发基金或金砖开发银行。开行等开发性金融机构立足本地，放眼全球，促进发展，无疑对上述举措起到了积极的借鉴作用。

简而言之，陈元以其卓越的领导和远见树立了开发性金融的标杆，为新兴市场的改革和金融创新积累了丰富宝贵的经验。谨以本书献给陈元，愿本书引人深思，不断探索开发性金融在推动全球发展和稳定中扮演的角色。

撰稿人简介（按英文姓氏首字母排序）

弗雷德·伯格斯坦

弗雷德·伯格斯坦先生，彼得森国际经济研究所（PIIE，前身为国际经济研究所）高级研究员、名誉所长。1981年至2012年期间任该所第一任所长。他是美国总统贸易政策与谈判顾问委员会以及美国进出口银行顾问委员会的成员，并在由美国和印度贸易部长作为成员的美印贸易政策论坛担任私营部门顾问小组的共同主席。伯格斯坦博士还曾担任过以下职务：美国财政部负责国际事务助理部长、亚太经合组织（APEC）杰出人士小组主席、美国国会创办的竞争力政策委员会主席。他还曾担任由八国集团成员国顶尖经济和外交专家等组成的八国集团影子小组（Shadow G8）的主席，于2000年至2005年间为八国集团政府的年度峰会提供咨询意见。伯格斯坦博士自著、合著、编辑或合编有多部有关国际经济问题的书作。

安浩德爵士（1943～2012）

安浩德爵士（已故），曾于1994年1月1日至2003年3月31日担任国际清算银行行长；1999年4月至2003年3月31日，担任金融稳定论坛主席。1972年至1989年，他任职于国际货币基金组织。1989年至1993年，在担任英格兰银行执行董事期间，他兼任欧盟货币委员会成员、国际货币基金组织英国副理事和经合组织（OECD）第三工作组成员（后任主席）。安浩德爵士曾是三十人集团（G30）成员、国际会计准则委员会理事会成员、中国银行业监督管理委员会和国家开发银行的国际顾问委员会委员。国际清算银行为纪念安浩德爵士专门开设了两年一次的“安浩德纪念讲堂”，首次的演讲人为时任芝加哥大学金融学教授、现任印度储备银行行长的拉古拉姆·拉詹。

雅各布·弗兰克尔

雅各布·弗兰克尔博士，摩根大通国际主席、摩根大通集团执行委员会及国际理事会的成员。他同时还担任致力于国际经济与货币事务的私立非营利顾问团体三十人集团的理事会主席。之前他还曾担任泛美开发银行（IDB）理事会主席、欧洲复兴与开发银行（EBRD）理事会副主席、国际货币基金组织以色列理事、世界银行以色列副理事和以色列央行行长。他著有多部国际经济学与宏观经济学方面的书作与文章。

行天丰雄

行天丰雄博士，自1995年12月起担任日本国际货币研究所（IIMA）所长至今。国际货币事务研究所是由东京银行（现三菱东京日联银行株式会社）成立的一家研究机构。行天丰雄博士在日本财务省供职多年，1989年作为负责国际事务的副财长荣退。他也曾经在国际货币基金组织和亚洲开发银行工作过。1988年至1990年，他在巴黎担任OECD第三工作组的主席。他曾是哈佛大学商学院和普林斯顿大学的客座教授。1992年至1996年，他担任东京银行株式会社会长；1994年至1997年，担任国际金融协会（IIF）会长；1998年，担任日本前首相小渊惠三的特别顾问；1998年至2010年，担任日本内阁特别顾问，包括行使首相特使之职务。2009年9月，行天丰雄博士被聘为日本财务省的特别顾问。他与保罗·沃尔克合著《时运变迁》一书。

胡怀邦

胡怀邦博士，2013年4月加入国家开发银行担任董事长、执行董事。此前，他从2008年起担任交通银行董事长；2007年9月至2008年9月担任中国投资有限责任公司监事长；2003年7月至2007年9月历任中国银行业监督管理委员会监事会工作部主任、纪委书记；2000年6月至2003年7月在中国人民银行先后担任成都分行副行长、西安分行行长兼国家外汇管理局陕西省分局局长等职务。胡怀邦博士1999年从陕西财经学院获得经济学博士学位。

保罗·基廷

保罗·基廷先生，于1969年当选为澳大利亚联邦众议院代表布莱斯兰选区的议员；1975年在澳大利亚前总理惠特拉姆的内阁中担任澳大利亚北方地区部长；1991年12月，当选澳大利亚总理，并在1993年3月带领澳大利亚工党（ALP）赢得历史性的第五次执政连任。基廷先生将澳大利亚的对外政策中心放在亚洲区域，积极促成了APEC论坛的成立并在论坛的领导人年会上率先承诺启动区域自由贸易议程。他还同澳大利亚的邻国，特别是印度尼西亚，巩固了双边关系。2003年4月15日，保罗·基廷先生获得新南威尔士大学荣誉法学博士学位。2000年3月，他著作《接触：澳大利亚面对亚太》一书出版，书中分析了其总理任内澳大利亚的外交政策目标与成就。

翟健

翟健先生，曾任荷兰国际集团（ING）亚太区首席执行官。他于1974年加入ING集团从事风险管理工作，此后他曾先后担任ING集团电子商务全球主管，ING银行国际业务部总经理、董事长等职务。20世纪80年代，他作为骨干之一帮助ING集团在拉丁美洲成功打下市场领先地位，之后回到集团总部任职。现任韩国KB金融集团（前身为韩国国民银行）的非执行董事和ING Vysya银行的董事，拥有芝加哥大学的工商管理硕士学位。

亨利·基辛格

亨利·阿尔弗雷德·基辛格博士，现任国际咨询公司基辛格事务所主席、摩根大通国际委员会委员、美国国际战略研究中心顾问兼理事、美国外交政策协会荣誉会长、国际奥林匹克委员会荣誉委员。基辛格博士还受聘担任国家开发银行国际顾问委员会委员、美国康地集团董事会成员、美国运通公司董事会顾问。1968年至1977年，基辛格博士曾在尼克松总统任内担任美国国家安全顾问、国务卿，在福特总统任内继续担任国务卿一职。基辛格博士斩获的殊荣包括1973年的诺贝尔和平奖、1977年的美国总统自由勋章（国家最高公民奖）、1986年的自由奖章（10位非美国本土出生的领袖获此殊荣）。基辛格博士著有多本书作，包括最新出版的《论中国》。他曾在哈佛大学任教，是外交政策、国际事务和外交史方面的权威。

刘遵义

刘遵义教授，香港中文大学蓝饶富暨蓝凯丽经济学讲座教授，中投国际（香港）有限公司董事长。他自1966年起任教于斯坦福大学经济系，1976年晋升为经济学教授，1992年出任该校首任李国鼎经济发展讲座教授；1992年至1996年间担任斯坦福大学亚太研究中心共同主任；1997年至1999年间担任斯坦福经济政策研究所主任。刘遵义教授专研经济发展和经济增长、东亚经济，在中国经济研究领域业已树立权威。2004年7月至2010年，刘遵义教授出任香港中文大学校长。2009年至2012年，他担任香港特区政府行政会议非官守成员。2012年，他出任中投国际董事长。刘遵义教授撰写和编辑有五部书作，并在专业刊物上发表过160多篇文章和评论。

黄记祖

黄记祖先生，现任新加坡凯德置地集团董事长。之前他曾担任新加坡电力公司主席，并自2003年7月1日起担任星展集团控股有限公司首席执行官的高级顾问。黄记祖先生1970年加入星展银行，先后担任多项职务，曾任星展银行副首席执行官。他是职总英康（NTUC）收入保险合作社有限公司主席和印度尼西亚金融银行理事主席，新翔集团有限公司、新加坡证券交易所、富登金融控股私人有限公司和凯德置地集团董事，新加坡国际基金会理事。他还是新加坡淡马锡控股私人有限公司顾问委员会和中国国家开发银行国际顾问委员会的委员。

浦伟士爵士

浦伟士爵士,司令勋章（CBE）、杰出服务勋章（DSO）和大紫荆勋章（GBM）获得者，曾于1986年起担任汇丰集团首席执行官，并于1986年至1993年兼任汇丰集团董事长。浦伟士爵士1954年加入香港上海汇丰银行（现汇丰集团），在任职44年后于1998年荣退。他曾在多个国家担任高级顾问职务：中东不列颠银行董事长、米特兰银行有限公司董事长、阿尔斯通公司副董事长；苏格兰医药有限公司、泛太平洋控股有限公司、全球船运和投资有限公司、路透创办人股份公司、特莱顿安全保障有限公司董事；香港行政长官特设国际顾问委员会、国家开发银行国际顾问委员会委员。1990年，获得大英帝国司令勋章，1993年获女王授勋。曾于1951年在“国王私人苏格兰边民团”服役，并因在联合国驻韩部队的联合行动被授予杰出服务勋章。

汉斯·瑞奇

汉斯·威尔内·瑞奇先生，自2008年9月1日起担任花旗集团全球市场公共部门主席。他担任的其他职务包括：德国阿瑞尔银行监事长兼监事、德国复兴信贷银行（KFW）董事长兼执行董事、德国工业银行副监事长、德发银行副董事长兼非执行董事、联盟资本德国基金董事总经理。他也是阿尔斯特隆（ALSTROM）公司、德国能源署、科伯（HUK-COBURG）保险集团、科伯控股公司、鲁尔工业集团和蒂森克虏伯钢铁集团欧洲公司（蒂森克虏伯钢铁集团）、德国工业银行、安宜信用保险股份公司、德国邮政集团、德国电信集团的监事，法兰克福机场公司经济顾问组成员。

伊瑟尔·森卓维克

伊瑟尔·森卓维克先生，曾在纽约联邦储备银行工作了33年时间，其中担任首席信息官19年，担任管理委员会成员15年。他在纽约联储开发并应用了世界领先的资金转账系统——Fedwire。森卓维克先生还为私营部门的“持续连接清算（CLS）”银行系统的成功设计、开发、应用和运行提供监督，该系统的建立旨在降低大额（超过一万亿美元）外汇交易每日结算中存在的风险。他作为该项目的高级顾问和中间人，在主供应商IBM、CLS、监管机构、中央银行和股东间协调合作。他代表纽约联储参与国际清算银行计算机专家小组工作长达20年之久，并出任安全事务工作组主席达9年，在该职位上，森卓维克先生带领十国集团特别工作组完成了有关电子货币安全的研究。他还为各国央行和国际组织提供支付系统及技术方面的咨询。

沈联涛

沈联涛先生，香港经纶国际经济研究院院长。曾于1998年至2005年担任香港证监会主席。他是马来西亚国库控股公司的董事，国家开发银行、中国投资有限责任公司、印度证券交易委员会国际顾问委员会的委员。他也是清华大学经管学院兼职教授、马来西亚敦阿都拉萨大学副校监、马来亚大学经济与管理学院兼职教授和第三任敦伊斯迈阿里讲座教授。

沈联涛先生在央行工作多年，曾担任马来西亚中央银行助理行长兼首席经济学家；1989年至1993年，在世界银行任职；1993年至1998年，出任香港金融管理局副总裁。沈联涛先生撰写过众多有关金融和货币事务的文章及著作，包括《十年轮回：从亚洲到全球的金融危机》（2009年剑桥大学出版社出版），并共同编辑了2012年出版的《亚洲资本市场改革》。

乌里·希克

乌里·希克博士，商业记者出身，2003年起担任瑞士荣格集团的董事会副主席，1999年至2003年是该公司的董事长。曾担任瑞士驻中国和朝鲜大使，也是瑞中商会的第一任会长。他对亚洲的深刻了解有力推动了荣格集团在越南和中国的业务开拓。同迈克尔·荣格先生一样，希克博士热爱当代艺术，是中国艺术家作品的知名藏家。

保罗·沃尔克

保罗·沃尔克先生，为美国联邦政府供职近30年，1979年至1987年期间两届出任美联储主席。退休前，沃尔克先生担任与美国信孚银行合并后的沃尔芬森投资公司主席。2000年至2005年，沃尔克先生出任国际会计准则委员会理事会主席。2003年，他带领私营部门的公共服务委员会，提出对美国联邦政府的组织及人事规范进行全方位改革的建议。2004年，他主持了对联合国“石油换食品”计划的独立调查。2007年，他带领专家组对世界银行机构诚信部的运作进行审查。2008年，他出任美国总统经济复苏顾问委员会主席。沃尔克先生在日本协会、国际经济研究所、美国会议（American Assembly）和美国德国事务委员会担任职务。他也是三边委员会名誉主席兼三十人集团理事会主席。目前，沃尔克先生通过“沃尔克规则”参与了全球金融危机后美国金融体系的改革。

韦德颖爵士

韦德颖爵士，圣麦克尔及圣乔治爵士大十字勋章（GCMG）和皇家维多利亚中尉勋章（LVO）获得者，曾是英国外交家。1990年，他被任命为英国驻韩国大使，四年后返回伦敦在英国外交及联邦事务部担任副外交次长。1996年至1999年，他被任命为英国驻日本大使，之后成为负责促进英国出口和吸引外资的英国国际贸易总署署长。2002年，他卸去在英国外交机构的职务，加入巴克莱集团的投资银行部门巴克莱资本并担任副董事长，负责管理巴克莱亚太地区银行客户的关系以及巴克莱与英国政府及其他公共部门机构的关系。他同时还是英中贸易协会的副总裁、国家开发银行国际顾问委员会委员、全日空公司国际顾问委员会委员、皇家莎士比亚剧团理事。他也是英韩贸易协会的现任会长。

Finance, Development and Reform: Essays in Honor of CHEN YUAN

Edited by

Andrew Sheng

Essays by friends and members, past and present, of the International Advisory Council, China Development Bank in honor of Chen Yuan, Chairman of the Board of Directors, China Development Bank （1998-2013）

Foreword

As China Development Bank（CDB） approaches its twentieth birthday,I am delighted to see Finance, Development, and Reform—Contributed by CDB's international advisors and expertly edited by Mr. Andrew Sheng—published as a tribute to CDB's 20th anniversary. Reading the essays of my old friends and colleagues collected in these pages and looking back upon the past years that I have had the privilege to share with them, I find myself deeply moved and grateful for all that they have done for CDB and for China.

I first left China's central bank to take the helm of CDB in April 1998, in the midst of the Asian financial crisis. Circumstances appeared dire for CDB both internally and externally at the time; the bank struggled under a non-performing loan ratio of 40 percent, while the Asian financial crisis had driven China's economy into a state of deflation for the first time since the beginning of economic reform and opening in the late 1970s. As a policy bank, CDB had a mandate to support the growth of the national economy while guarding against financial risks. After careful consideration and with the approval of Premier Zhu Rongji, I decided to form the International Advisory Council at CDB, bringing together world-class experts from the public sector, academia, and the financial industry who would offer strategic insight and advice on CDB's future development and reform.

It was an honor to have these great minds and dear friends serve on our council of advisors. Since 1999, the annual International Advisory Council meetings have been a constant source of inspiration for CDB. The breadth, depth, substance, and richness of discussion at these meetings and the keen perceptiveness and intelligence of its participants has broadened the bank's horizons and fueled a more global and more sophisticated business approach. The council has also helped to raise CDB's international profile and, indeed, led to a deepened understanding of China and expanded opportunities for global growth.

In what feels like no more than a blink of an eye, fifteen years have now passed since the first International Advisory Council meeting, and CDB itself is nearing its twentieth birthday. Thanks to the generous support of our international advisors and the persevering efforts of the bank's staff, CDB has not only developed into China's largest medium- and long-term financier, but has indeed emerged as the largest development finance institution in the world, boasting an impressive track record and playing an indispensable role in China's infrastructure and industrial development, cross-border cooperation, and promotion of grass-roots finance. Not only has CDB's business expanded to over 100 economies with assets totaling over RMB8 trillion, but it also maintains a world-class level of asset quality, a nine-year record of NPL ratios of under 1 percent, and profit-and asset-per-employee ratios that outperform industry standards both within China and abroad.

The success of CDB today, however, would not have been possible without the years of guidance and assistance from our international advisors. Over the past fifteen years, these advisors have contributed invaluable insight and tireless support to CDB's development and reform, and I and everybody at CDB will always hold those contributions dear to heart.

I want to specially thank Andrew and all the contributors who put such tremendous effort into this book, which is comprised of essays written by the international advisors and the current chairman of CDB. These essays include theoretical discourse as well as practical analysis, and can be taken individually or as part of a larger whole; with articles covering geopolitics, global governance, financial reform and the history of CDB, this book is a valuable academic and historical work that is every bit as readable as it is informative.

While I am no longer a CDB executive, I will always deeply care for and support CDB as it continues to grow, and I wish the bank an even brighter future moving forward on its mission to serve China's development and social progress. I also trust that CDB's international advisors will remain caring friends of the bank and of China as a whole—it is that sentiment, perhaps, that infuses this book with such value.

陈元

Chen Yuan

February 17, 2014

Beijing

Introduction

Andrew Sheng

China Development Bank （CDB） was established in 1994 as one of the three policy banks of the People's Republic of China, with the primary role of providing medium- and long-term financing to support major infrastructure and industrial projects. This is a role that it has achieved with great success, particularly in the last decade, in step with the spectacular macroeconomic growth and dynamism of the Chinese economy. CDB raised most of the funds for the country's key mega-infrastructure projects, including the Three Gorges Dam, the Shanghai Pudong International Airport, the sporting facilities for the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai World Expo. Its financing operations cover projects in infrastructure, basic industries, energy and transportation extending across the farthest reaches of China, as well as revitalizing old industrial centers.

In 1998, Governor Chen Yuan assumed leadership of CDB and for the next 15 years he was the main driving force behind the transformation of CDB into a world-class development institution. CDB was market-driven in its business approach towards directing resources to areas that are aligned to national priorities in economic and social development. It was relentless in its efforts to upgrade operations and practices to international standards, particularly in the management of asset quality. As testimony to the success of CDB in risk management, the bank's non-performing loan ratio （NPL） dropped significantly from 40 percent in 1997 to less than 1 percent by 2003. CDB has been able to maintain its NPL at that level, notwithstanding the impact of the 2007-09 global financial crisis on the Chinese economy.

In December 2008, CDB officially became a commercial bank and Governor Chen Yuan was appointed as the Chairman of the Board of Directors. The role of the redefined CDB is to engage mainly in medium-and long-term financing activities that support the State's policy on “sustaining economic growth, expanding domestic demand and optimizing economic structure” whilst implementing CDB's commercialization transformation. As a commercial bank, the CDB focused its activities on six areas that would address the national priorities of restructuring, inclusiveness, modernization and globalization:

1. In terms of implementation of the State's macroeconomic policies to ensure sustained growth, the bank provided four broad categories of loans:

·Central government-endorsed investment projects under the State's stimulus package to combat the global financial crisis.

·Projects that expand domestic demand, such as low-income housing projects, rural infrastructure, medical and healthcare, culture and education, ecology and environment.

·Critical infrastructure projects （including the North-South water diversion project, high-speed railways, highways, nuclear power stations and the Shanghai World Expo）; development of key sectors and financially constrained areas （such as coal, electricity, oil, transportation, agriculture, telecommunications and public infrastructure）.

·Environmental protection and energy conservation related projects as well as regional development projects in the central and western regions of China and the North East Industrial Base.

2. Loans to assist in the development of grass roots financing, which included lending to the agriculture, rural communities and farmers, urban and rural planning, SMEs, low-income housing and student loans.

3. Financing of “Go-Global” projects, including loans to Central Asian member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization （SCO）, Latin America and Africa.

4. Building CDB as a top bond-financing bank.

5. Promoting commercialization, transformation and continuous impro-vement of business operations.

6. Enhancing enterprise-wide risk management structure and overall risk management practices.By the end of the first year as a commercial bank, CDB had cumulatively issued bonds （in both domestic and foreign currencies） of over RMB5 trillion as at end-2009. The outstanding Chinese bonds reached RMB3.3 trillion, accounting for 25 percent of the total outstanding volume in China's interbank bond market.CDB also successfully issued 3 billion RMB-denominated bonds in Hong Kong in 2009, making it the first Chinese bank to issue RMB SHIBOR-based floating rate bonds. As at the end of 2009, total assets were RMB4.5 trillion, total net profit reached RMB31.9 billion and the NPL ratio was at a low of 0.94 percent.

With strong growth in each of the above business segments thereafter and continued adherence to the core principles of “controlling the aggregate loan amounts, focusing on prioritized areas, adjusting the structure in accordance with state priorities, controlling risks and promoting coordination”, CDB posted impressive financial results year after year. Based on 2012 financial results, total assets exceeded the RMB7 trillion mark to reach RMB7.52 trillion （US$1.21 trillion）; the NPL ratio was held below 1 percent for the 8th consecutive year; the capital adequacy ratio was maintained at close to 11 percent while net profits rose to RMB63 billion.

In the last decade （2003-2012）, CDB has issued an accumulated total of RMB1.6 trillion in loans to more than 4000 projects.In 2012, CDB accounted for 39.3 percent of the banking industry's investment in major national initiatives in energy, agriculture, water, telecommunications and public infrastructure. At the social end of the loan spectrum, CDB loans to social housing projects accounted for 60 percent of total bank lending to this sector in 2012; innovative lending models benefited the SMEs and student loans over the years have helped to educate a cumulative total of 7.7 million young people across China. Reflecting CDB's responsibility towards environment protection, green credit and low-carbon finance amounting to RMB249 billion in 2012 were in the form of loans to environment conservation, energy efficiency and emission reduction programs.

In furthering its international presence, CDB continues to broaden its collaboration with foreign governments, enterprises and financial institutions by investing in large international projects to support the development of infrastructure, agriculture, energy and social sectors and to assist Chinese enterprises in their Go-Global projects.As at the end of 2012, CDB had outstanding foreign currency loans of US$224.5 billion and an offshore yuan-denominated loan balance of RMB72.6 billion. CDB also has a network of 638 correspondent banks in 101 countries/regions to support its international business.

The achievements of CDB should be documented as a case study of an institution that has built on its advantages as a policy bank before transforming itself into a market-driven commercial bank to serve Chinese as well as global economic development. All these achievements can be attributed to leadership, particularly the vision and application of Chairman Chen Yuan. After 15 years at the helm, Chairman Chen Yuan stepped down as Executive Chairman of CDB on April 15，2013, following his elevation to the vice-chairmanship of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on March 11，2013.At the April meeting of the International Advisory Council of CDB, Chairman Chen was honored with the title Chairman Emeritus IAC.

The purpose of this book is to pay tribute to Chairman Chen Yuan through a compilation of essays by people who had the privilege to work with Chairman Chen.This spanned the crucial financial reform period from 1988-89, when he was the Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China, and during his tenure in China Development Bank. His successor at CDB, Chairman Hu Huaibang, and I are deeply honored and grateful that the distinguished members of the International Advisory Council of CDB have enthusiastically supported us in this exercise by contributing essays on Chairman Chen's role in the financial transformation of China. The outcome is a book that provides exceptionally rare personal insights by 17 world class statesmen, diplomats and thought leaders in the field of banking and finance on their early impressions of China and how they see the country has evolved into becoming the world's second largest economy today.

The book is divided into four sections.Section I covers the Opening up of China. Section II describes Building Systems and Institutions in China. Section III focuses on the importance of Global Partners in Growth; and finally, Section IV is on Shaping China Development Bank for the Future.

SECTION I: THE OPENING UP OF CHINA

The four essays in this Section are by the Honorable Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger, the Honorable Paul Keating, Mr. Paul A. Volcker and Dr. C. Fred Bergsten, all authorities in their field of national security, leadership and finance.

The Honorable Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger,was Nobel Peace Prize recipient and former Secretary of State of the United States from 1973 to 1977.He orchestrated the formalization of relations between the United States and China that was marked by the Summit in 1972 between the leaders of the two countries that marked the historic opening up of China to global trade and investments, implemented by Deng Xiaoping.

His special essay on“United States-China Relationship” was delivered on the occasion of the April 2013 meeting of China Development Bank's International Advisory Council in Beijing.In a breath-taking survey of historical perspective, Dr. Kissinger noted that his 80 visits to China since the 1970s enabled him to gain first hand and lasting impressions of a China that had the enterprise and all the makings of a nation becoming a world power.He has been steadfast in his conviction that the key to world order is cooperation between China and the United States.What is witnessed today is a fulfillment of his strong belief.

Dr. Kissinger expressed his hope of seeing this understanding between the United States and China being translated into concrete policies that share a common purpose towards addressing a whole set of global problems that cut across energy, the environment, non-proliferation and the domains of cyber and space.This process will have its challenges because of the different histories and cultural mindsets of the two countries. America thinks that every problem has a solution, whereas the Chinese think every solution creates a new problem. However, having seen China today and having had the privilege of knowing its leaders of the calibre of Chen Yuan, he is optimistic that the efforts being undertaken in China have created the basis for dialogue with the United States that has not been seen in a long time. The outcome will demonstrate how two great nations can work together as partners in the international order that is emerging.

The Honorable Paul Keating was 24th Prime Minister of Australia from 1991 to 1996, and chairs the International Advisory Council of China Development Bank.In his essay on “Asia in the New Order”, Mr. Keating steps back to provide a political and historical tour de horizon to current discussions on the new global economic order. He laments the lack of collective global leadership after the end of the Cold War in 1991 to bring about a good and proper functioning of the world economy.In recent years, the global imbalances and crises in the advanced countries have hurt the standing of the advanced economies, particularly the leadership role of the United States, even as Europe has been held hostage to the crisis resolution of its monetary union of disparate economies.

China and the rest of the developing world have emerged to provide nearly three quarters of global growth and have swapped roles with the developed world as drivers of the global transformation process.However, Mr. Keating felt that the high investment and export model is no longer a sustainable option for China because it has to catch up with building a model that addresses home issues that include raising domestic consumption and services, income growth and meeting the needs of an urbanizing population.He sees China and Asia having an important role in changing the way the global economy works, which includes moving away from traditional fiscal and monetary levers towards a more comprehensive system of macro-prudential management.

Former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 1979 to 1987, and one of the most respected central bankers and commentator on financial matters,the Honorable Dr. Paul A. Volcker wrote on the“The Financial History to the 1990s”.His essay is a memoire of his relationship with China and Chairman Chen Yuan over the years. In the 1980s, he witnessed a China that was emerging from a centralized, state-directed regime, operating at a low level of productivity and with a low standard of living.Today, China has reached a high stage of economic development after a most remarkable period of sustained growth in history. Mr. Chen Yuan, who was Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China from 1988 to 1998 and then took on the role of steering development finance, is an integral part of this remarkable story. Mr. Volcker traced the importance of policy thinking and reform in the funding of the enormous infrastructure projects and the transformation of financial markets in China, particularly the establishment of the right institutions and institutional reforms over time.Chen Yuan also had the courage to deal with issues that often did not receive sufficient attention, such as corruption, and the importance of building people and institutions.

Dr. C. Fred Bergsten,Senior Fellow and Director Emeritus of the Peterson Institute for International Economics，served on the International Advisory Board of the China Development Bank from 2002. In his essay on “China and Leadership of the World Economy”, he suggests some steps necessary for the successful integration of China in the global leadership system. History has shown that the integration of rising economic powers in the global leadership system is both extremely challenging and critically important for the maintenance of global stability and even peace. While the necessary systemic adjustments can occur very successfully, failure to accomplish them can trigger severe and even cataclysmic disruptions. These integration imperatives place heavy responsibilities on the incumbent powers and the rising powers. For a smooth transition, incumbents must be willing to share leadership with the newcomers. Newcomers must also be willing to accept a systemic leadership role that recognizes both the important feedback to their domestic economies from the external impact of their own activities, and the responsibility that comes with global presence and world-class capabilities.

The world economic order of 2013 is a multipolar structure with at least a dozen economies that have an important impact on worldwide outcomes. This number is growing and the continuing shift to enhanced multipolarity has already been recognized institutionally by the replacement of the G7 by the G20 as the primary body for international economic leadership. As too large a body may not function effectively, a smaller “coordinator of the coordinators” is needed to operate as an informal steering committee for the world economy. Such a group would ideally include the three economic superpowers: the United States, the European Union and China.

As the European Union is pre-occupied with the resolution of its financial crisis and not in the condition to take on a major international role, the primary responsibility for most global economic matters inevitably falls on the United States and China, regardless whether they choose to characterize those arrangements as a “G2”. On one hand, both countries have mixed records in fulfilling these responsibilities in recent years, particularly with respect to the crisis of 2007-09. On the other hand, both countries have failed to adopt some of the actions needed to assure that their recoveries are sustainable. Furthermore, in several issues, cooperation between China and some of its G20 partners, including the United States and European members, seem to have deteriorated or even reversed.

A successful world economic order can be constructed and maintained effectively only with the full participation, creativity and leadership of China. An essential initial step is clarification of China's own systemic goals and policies, derived from its definition of national interest. The next step would be serious international engagement on China's ideas, joining them with the thoughts of other major countries to seek agreement on new arrangements or amendments to existing regimes.That process is certain to be protracted and contentious but its payoff is potentially huge in paving the way to address both China's role in the world economy and the world economy's role in the policies of China itself.

SECTION II: BUILDING SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA

The four essays in Section II are by Israel Sendrovic, Andrew Sheng, Ng Kee Choe and Jacques Kemp.

Former Executive Vice President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank,Mr.Israel Sendrovic, provided a personal story on“Payment System Development：The World Bank/People's Bank of China Project”.Mr. Sendrovic was part of the team of international advisors from the advanced central banks that provided critical input into China's payment system project funded by the World Bank in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this period, he developed a lasting friendship with Chairman Chen Yuan, and has shared in this paper his personal recollections of the changes that propelled China into the second largest economy in the world.As Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China in charge of implementing the project, Mr. Chen was instrumental in the design and development of China's payment system, the China National Automated Payment Systems （CNAPS）, under the guidance of two teams, a Domestic Advisory Panel and an International Advisory Panel.For a project of this complexity, Sendrovic provided insights of how effectively Mr. Chen bridged the language barrier and differences in Eastern and Western work culture and mindsets to ensure that all aspects of the payment system were rigorously studied and the critical technical standards, accounting structure, legal framework, processing procedures and organization structure were properly coordinated to implement a project of such importance and magnitude.

Former central banker and financial market regulator, and currently President of the Fung Global Institute,Mr. Andrew Sheng, supplemented the essay of Mr. Sendrovic with a chapter on “Chen Yuan's Role in Developing China's National Payment System”.He pays tribute to Chairman Chen by setting out in greater detail the development of CNAPS that was indeed one of the most important, complex and longest-running infrastructure project for the financial system in China. With the help of both domestic and international advisers, of which Mr. Sendrovic played a leading role, Mr. Chen Yuan led the conceptualization and blueprint of a modern, high value payment system that would involve the complete transformation of the banking and accounting procedures as well as the financial regulatory and legal frameworks. The project progressed into the international tendering stage in 1994, began construction in 1996 and then was rolled out nation-wide over a period of almost ten years.The core component of CNAPS, namely, the real time gross settlement High Value Payment System （HVPS） across the books of the People's Bank of China came on live in 2005.Between 2006 and 2011, the annual transactions in HVPS increased five-fold to RMB1355 trillion. Without the implemen-tation of CNAPS, China's financial development, including the commercia-lization of the banking system and the conduct of monetary policy would not have been so smooth.

The former Deputy Chief Executive of the Development Bank of Singapore and currently Chairman of CapitaLand Ltd,Mr. Ng Kee Choe contributed his thoughts on the “Functions and Market Positioning of Development Financial Institutions and Commercial Banks”.Mr. Ng drew on his 33 years of experience at the Development Bank of Singapore （DBS） to share his perspectives on the role development financial institutions （DFIs） can play in a rapidly changing economic and financial environment in China. In the process of financial sector liberalization, commercial banks in China would be expected to progressively shift away from traditional policy lending, thus leaving this role to be filled by DFIs, especially for the various state-sponsored development projects and the municipal and provincial infrastructure projects.In his view, China Development Bank, being China's foremost DFI, should leverage on its competencies to provide long-term finance, project finance, investment banking services and advisory services to discharge its policy lending function, consistent with its economic development role. CDB has already made significant progress in adopting international best practices that were essential to transforming CDB into a top-ranking international bank.

The former CEO of ING Insurance & Investment Management, Asia-Pacific,Mr. Jacques Kemp, contributed his views on “Foreign Insurers in China:Meeting Challenges, Facilitating Change”. Mr. Kemp provided an in-depth analysis of the growth of the insurance industry in China, the route it took and the role foreign insurers can play in driving continued evolution of the industry. Within a decade from 2001 to 2010, China's insurance market has developed at a remarkable pace, with a dominant homegrown insurance sector with some foreign participation. The insurance industry will continue to be driven by the growth of affluence, which will see higher demand for insurance on consumer durables and houses, and by an aging population that will raise demand for medical insurance and savings plans.It is important that there is continued market liberalization to allow foreign participants to help emerging insurance markets to improve services and efficiency as well as to mobilize massive national savings to fund economic development and infrastructure.

SECTION III: GLOBAL PARTNERS IN GROWTH

The five essays in Section III by Dr. Jacob A. Frenkel, Dr. Uli Sigg, Sir William Purves, Sir David Wright and Dr. Toyoo Gyohten all demonstrate the importance of having a global perspective in development finance, drawing upon the growing importance of China in global trade and investments and the experience of other countries.

Dr. Jacob A. Frenkel, the former Governor of the Bank of Israel and currently Chairman of J.P. Morgan Chase International, surveyed “The International Environment and Implications for China”.Dr. Frenkel makes an invaluable contribution to this book with his seamless narration of the international economic environment in which China operates in, the macroeconomic situation, the trends in trade and external imbalances, the Eurozone dilemma, and the realities of a deep-seated unemployment situation that is further complicated by aging populations. His message is that these global problems faced cannot be resolved by short-termism in policies.We need a longer term approach to deal with a different nature of contract between government and its citizens.Discussing the impact of urbanization on development, the two main policy supports are firstly, employment for the masses moving into cities; and secondly, finance for the range of activities that come with urbanization, be it finance for the small and medium enterprises or larger scale finance for infrastructure. It is precisely in the areas of long term finance—large infrastructure projects that must be efficient, energy conserving and enviromentally friendly—that calls for CDB to play a major role.

Dr. Uli Sigg,the former Ambassador of Switzerland to the People's Republic of China （PRC） from 1995 to 1998 and currently chairman and director of the boards of several international corporations, contributed an important insight into the role of “Public-Private Partnerships and Development of Institutional Investors”.Dr. Uli Sigg shares his experience of working with Chairman Chen Yuan in establishing the first ever Private Equity （PE） joint venture fund between the governments of Switzerland and the PRC in 1997. The PE concept mobilizes private sector resources to boost the business of Swiss and Chinese small and medium enterprises （SMEs） in China. The success of this Sino-foreign alliance was underpinned by three pivotal factors—firstly, understanding the macroeconomic cycle and timing of investments; secondly, choosing the right industry; and thirdly, inculcating professionalism, loyalty and integrity in the management of the investee companies. For longer term sustainability, the fund invests only in projects that cite a lasting positive impact on specific industries and the society, and refrains from investing in industries, such as entertainment or luxury goods. In line with Chinese government policies, the fund has opened up resources for SMEs in the country's inland and western, as well as south-western regions.

Sir William Purves, the first Group Chairman of HSBC Holdings who retired in 1998 after 44 years of service with the bank, shared his recollections in“Liberalization of the Banking Sector”. In his special message to Chairman Chen Yuan upon hearing that Chen Yuan was retiring from CDB, Sir William Purves, recalled how difficult it was in the 1980s for foreign banks to open branches in China. In due course, HSBC was allocated a small number of branch licences by the People's Bank of China and today, the bank has over 100 branches in China. The foresight and open-mindedness that is associated with Chairman Chen's leadership in the central bank and in China Development Bank were fundamental to the gradual opening up of the Chinese economy and of banking.

Sir David Wright,the Vice-Chairman of Barclays Capital,contributes his experience in his essay on“China-United Kingdom Relationships, International Reforms”.He sees that the transition of China to a domestic-driven economy will entail a process of income redistribution to the private sector and households from state-owned enterprises as well as plugging the funding gap in the national pension system. As such, development of the bond market, in particular the RMB offshore market in Hong Kong （CNH） bond market, is one of the more sustaining paths towards supporting the expansion of the Chinese economy while being consistent with the internationalization of the Renminbi. Besides depending on the Government to initiate a large global benchmark issuance, China Development Bank should also leverage on its lead policy bank status to become a benchmark setter for longer dated bonds. At the same time, China Development Bank has to fulfil its social role. Among its many achievements, China Development Bank has supported the continuing strategic transformation of China's economy through the facilitation of industrial upgrading, assisting corporate merger & acquisitions, supporting strategic emerging industries, cultural industries and small and medium enterprises as well as student and mortgage loans. By recognizing that effective corporate governance and risk management are key to China Development Bank's stable operation, the bank is exemplary of a socially useful financial institution that creates explicit value for customers, employees, and the communities in which they operate.

Dr. Toyoo Gyohten,President of the Institute for International Monetary Affairs of Japan; Senior Advisor,The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd; and former Vice Minister of Finance of Japan, wrote on“Global Crisis, Euro Crisis and Abenomics”.Dr.Gyohten suggests that an integrated analysis of financial crises would cover four salient points. Firstly, its bubble-then-burst genesis would invariably be accompanied by a contraction of credit and a collapse in demand. Secondly, an ordinary financial crisis instantly becomes a global crisis because the world is now a highly globalized network of financial transactions. Thirdly, crises affect different markets in different ways because of differences in the structure and conditions of each market. Fourthly, the global financial crisis has triggered an evolution of the world into a new economic paradigm involving global power shifts.

Asia, in particular China, will be affected by the Euro crisis. While the physical economic power is shifting to Asia, Asia is still too dependent on financial markets in the U.S. and Europe for intermediation. Therefore Asia should step up regional cooperation to strengthen its financial institutions and financial markets.

Turning to Japan,Abenomics represents a good start to reviving the Japanese economy by focusing on a single target of “anti-deflation”. However, bold monetary easing, flexible fiscal policy and a growth strategy to encourage private sector investment may not be enough. Companies and households have to spend; fiscal consolidation will have to go on; the social security system will have to be streamlined and tax revenue will have to be strengthened in order for the economy to achieve primary balance by 2020.

SECTION IV: SHAPING CHINA DEVELOPMENT BANK FOR THE FUTURE

The final four essays in Section IV by Dr. Hu Huaibang, Professor Lawrence J. Lau, Hans W. Reich and the Late Sir Andrew Crockett cover suggestions on the role of China Development Bank in an uncertain future.

CDB Chairman Dr. Hu Huaibang draws on his rich experience in central banking and bank regulation to write about the “The Internationalization of China's Banking Sector”. He reviewed the achievements of the internationa-lization of China's banking sector, its opportunities and challenges, and underlined the push by Chinese banks to broaden their exposure to the international market. The banking sector in China has advanced significantly in the internationalization of its operations since Bank of China set up its first branch in Hong Kong in 1917.By 2012, the total overseas assets of Chinese banks exceeded US$1 trillion, supported by a well-functioning global network for attracting foreign capital to China and supporting Chinese enterprises going global. The prospects are for further internationalization of the banking sector alongside the increasing role of the RMB in cross-border investment and trade and the financial reform policies of China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan. In the face of sluggish and uncertain recovery of the advanced economies and tightening of global financial regulation, Chinese banks are focusing on effective strategies and innovations that can take them to the next level of international status.Chairman Hu's survey of the opportunities and challenges facing Chinese bank internationalization is realistic and pragmatic, with concrete proposals on the way forward.

Dr. Lawrence J. Lau is the Chairman of CIC International （Hong Kong） Co. Ltd. and former Vice-Chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong.His paper on the “Implications of China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan and Internationalization of the Renminbi”, provides an analytical and practical discussion of how China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan （2011-2015） and internationalization of the Renminbi will open up tremendous opportunities for the growth of China Development Bank. The commitment of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan to rebalance the economy from export-oriented to domestic-demand oriented growth and also from an input-driven to a technology and innovation-driven strategy will call for long term financing of infrastructural projects and affordable residential housing, for which China Development Bank has the forte.

In order to promote technology and innovation, China Development Bank can, for example, finance the completion of China's national fibre-optic network and the development of commercial-scale pilot plants for new technologies. With the internationalization of the Renminbi, China Development Bank can take advantage of the increasing availability and use of the Renminbi outside China to further internationalize its operations, such as providing long-term RMB-denominated loans for inbound foreign direct investment. Dr. Lau calls upon China Development Bank to maintain its status as a wholly state-owned policy bank that has the ability to raise long term fixed rate funds at lower cost than commercial banks and thereby channel these funds for the long term financing of socio-economic development projects.

Hans W. Reich, the Global Chairman of Citibank's Public Sector Group, focused on “The Future Financial Landscape:China Development Bank”.In his essay, Mr. Reich reflects on the circumstances in China's banking system that led to the establishment of China Development Bank （CDB） in March 1994. Under the chairmanship of Chen Yuan, CDB has surpassed all expectations of its performance as a development finance institution. Besides turning around a bank which was burdened with non-performing loans, Chen Yuan initiated an organizational and strategic realignment of CDB. This included building an exemplary risk management system, refocusing the business strategy, promoting the development of a Chinese capital market as well as internationalizing the bank, and communicating globally in order to assimilate the best practices of other development finance institutions. The success of this strategy led to a tenfold increase in the total assets of CDB to US$800 billion by 2010; profitability kept up with growth and the NPL ratio fell to 0.7 percent. The bank turned into a capital market innovator, for instance in the issuance of the first asset-backed security.In pursuit of a future business model for CDB, Reich offered three principal options: Option 1 is to combine policy and commercial banking; Option 2 is to turn CDB into a universal bank；and Option 3 is for CDB to remain as a public sector financing institution. Irrespective of the final decision on the future of CDB, the bank is financially sound and serves as a benchmark in China's financial sector. Its strength and achievements are attributed to Chen Yuan and his leadership.

The Late Sir Andrew Crockett was the former General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements from 1994-2003, former Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund, economist and central banker. He was a member of China Development Bank's International Advisory Council from 2005 to 2010. Before his untimely demise in September 2012, a busy schedule prevented Sir Andrew Crockett from writing an essay specially dedicated to Chairman Chen Yuan. As an alternative, he suggested that his luncheon address on “Reforming the Global Financial Architecture” delivered in October 2009 at a conference on Asia and the Global Financial Crisis, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Santa Barbara, be considered for inclusion in this festschrift.

Indeed, we could not have been given a more befitting paper to serve as a concluding chapter of this book. The “global financial architecture” encompasses three things—first, the basic economic models by which international financial relations are conducted; second, the network of institutional arrangements that are put in place to manage these relations; and third, how decision-making power in the system is distributed among individual countries. All these three aspects have been evolving—the basic model of international financial relations that was government-led after the Second World War is now a market-driven model; the ascendancy of newly emergent economies in the world economy has intensified calls by emerging markets for more say in the distribution of decision making power in international financial relations. While the latter is valid, what is important is for Asian countries to be clear about what shape of international financial system best suits their need for the medium and long term future. To borrow a conclusion from Sir Andrew Crockett's Per Jacobsson Lecture on “What financial system for the 21st Century? ” （2011）,he said “… to devise a new and stronger financial system…It should be global, it should be robust, it should be an effective servant of the real market economy.”

Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the visionary leadership of Mr. Chen Yuan, which inspired this festschrift. The book was conceptualized in 2011 and after a period of research and review of various contributions from individual members of the International Advisory Council, the project received the unanimous approval from the leadership of China Development Bank and its International Advisory Council.

It has been an honor and privilege for all of us to engage in this book project as paper contributors, editors or as part of the production team at CDB. I am deeply grateful to Chairman Hu Huaibang for his support and encouragement and most of all for giving his time to write a special chapter for the book. I would like to thank each of the Council members for contributing excellent papers that contain unique insights and perspectives never published before.

Special thanks are due to Ms. Wang Yuan, Mr. Liang Huijiang, Mr. Bian Shiyuan, Ms. Qiao Rui and all staff of CDB who worked tirelessly to coordinate the translation, editing and production of this bilingual publication. My special thanks go to Mrs. Tan Wai Kuen, Mrs. Theresa Chan, Ms. Jodie Hu and Ms. Jillian Ng for their dedicated contributions in the compilation, editing, research and assistance in making this book possible.

We hope this book befittingly records the pioneering achievements of China Development Bank under its dedicated leadership in the area of policy-banking, development and growth.

Chapter 1 United States-China Relationship[1]

Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Guests:

I would like to express, first of all, my appreciation to Chairman Chen Yuan for his decades of friendship, for the leadership he has provided to the bank, and the inspiration he has provided to his friends. For any of us who saw China at the beginning, the transformation we now see would have been beyond our imagination. This resulted, of course, from great technical knowledge, but also from the courage to undertake and to enterprise what most experts would have considered impossible when it was started. So let me thank you—I am sure on behalf of all of us, but especially on my behalf. And let me also wish every success and express every confidence in the new chairman that he will continue the great tradition that he inherits.

My participation in this group does not result from the contribution I can make to economic discussion, so I will confine my remarks to a brief analysis of the international situation. And let me begin with the conclusion. I have been to China over eighty times since my visit in 1971. I have had more conversations than I can count with Chinese leaders. I have never left with a more hopeful conviction than after this visit—and optimism is not my outstanding characteristic. Let me explain why I believe this to be the case.

There is a great deal of appeal to a so-called world community. But there really is no world community, because different regions in the world are following different principles of organization and pursue different aims. Europe is in the process of abandoning the model of the nation state, a model on which the international system for the whole world has been based for two centuries, partly as a result of colonialism. But in the process, it is caught between new institutions that do not yet have a popular base and old institutions that have lost their confidence. European leaders no longer have the same capacity to ask for sacrifices from their people that they did in the past. And unless you are willing to sacrifice, you cannot build. And the objective result is then twofold: a consumption-oriented economy that does not accumulate enough resources, and a foreign policy of no-risk that does not meet the requirements of the contemporary crisis.

In Asia, foreign policy is conducted the way it used to be in the 19th century in Europe: with strong national states. The challenge in Asia is to bring these national states into a non-confrontational relationship with each other. In the Middle East, there is a challenge to borders, to domestic institutions, and to the international systems; and these challenges are affecting every other region, and drawing in every other region, but without as yet an overall guide.

I have mentioned this because within this framework, there is China and the United States, two great continental nations that have, in their histories, never fully participated in an international system. China believed that it was unique, and because of geography and other reasons, was largely contained within its own reality. America believed that it was also unique, but that it had a missionary obligation, but it did so more on an ideological basis than on the basis of reasons of state. In a way, therefore, the key to an emerging world order is the relationship between China and the United States.

China and the United States cannot solve the problems by themselves, but the problems cannot be solved without cooperation between China and the United States. Without cooperation between China and the United States, the world will be divided into opposing camps, and the temptation will be huge for every component that I've described to exploit the rivalry of the other countries. So that cooperation is the great opportunity of our age. I have had the good fortune of being present at the beginning of contemporary relations between China and the United States. Not often can a historian experience what he is writing about. At the beginning, we had a common adversary, and therefore we had common goals. For a decade, a great ingenuity was developed in establishing parallel policies. This made a great contribution to the conduct of the Cold War.

When the Cold War was over in 1991, two things happened that were somewhat contradictory with each other. On the one hand, in America, four successive administrations have pursued a policy of friendship or cooperation with China. That's an important achievement. And six Chinese administrations have done the same thing. But the problem has been, again, two-fold: How do you define that cooperation? And secondly, how do you apply it to a period without a Cold War?

So in that period, we have avoided serious confrontation. But now we are facing this issue: In the United States, there are significant elements that consider China as a vestige of the Cold War. But the Soviet Union was almost exclusively a military power; whereas China is closely connected with the world economy. Its impact does not derive primarily or importantly from its military strength, but from its domestic performance—that's a different challenge. By the same token, in China there are important elements that believe the United States is a declining power, that China is a rising power, and that declining powers always try to keep down the rising power, and therefore some conflict is inevitable. And they mention the British-German rivalry as an example.

On the other hand,Britain and Germany clashed due not to the nature of events as much as the shortsightedness of policies. Above all, there is one important fact: the turning point in European history has been World War I. Europe has never recovered from World War I. And yet if any of the leaders who went into World War I had known in 1914 what the world would look like in 1918, they would never have done it.

A conflict between China and the United States would have even greater consequences, and therefore our leaders know that no matter what academic studies say, we should not deal with it as a confrontation. Now some of us in this room have been saying this for twenty years. And we were often criticized as being unduly seduced by Chinese hospitality or by short-term experience. But the crucial aspect of the present situation is that the leaders of both sides seem to have realized that it is essential to find a cooperative pattern. It is not enough, as we have done successfully, to solve the day-to-day problems that arise between our countries. And a lot of day-to-day problems are bound to arise when two major countries interact with each other. From my experience, I can look back to the days of the 1970s when the trade between China and the United States was less than the American trade with Honduras. So in this new world of vast interactions, we have now an unusual opportunity; not because I say so, but because our leaders seem to me to have come to such an understanding.

Now, if we are able to translate a general understanding into concrete policies, the United States and China could begin with a common analysis of where we think the international system is going and should go: a means of developing not identical but parallel policies. We are aided in this because there is a whole set of problems—like energy, environment, non-proliferation, space, cyber—in which there is no possible national solution. And in issues like cyber or space, there is not even an agreed-upon definition as to what the problem is. So we are impelled to this common approach, which a few years ago would have been considered hopelessly idealistic, and which today is the only realistic basis for proceeding.

It is difficult to do this because the basic approach of Americans and Chinese is not always the same—their histories are totally different. The United States has never had a powerful neighbor; China has never been without a powerful enemy on its borders. Americans thinks that every problem has a solution. Chinese think every solution creates a new problem. So how to meld these things together? That is the big challenge of our time.

But again, having been in this city and having had the privilege of knowing its leaders, I believe the enormous reform effort that China is now undertaking, and the transformations that reality imposes on America, have created a basis for the kind of dialogue that hasn't been seen in a long time. And while it will be difficult, and while there will be controversies, I leave with an optimistic prognosis for relations between China and the United States, and the fulfillment of this goal of showing how two great nations that historically would have been rivals, can work as partners in the international order that is emerging.

Thank you again for inviting me, and for the friendship, Mr. Chen Yuan, that you have shown me over the decades.

[1] A transcript of Dr. Henry Kissinger's remarks at China Development Bank's International Advisory Council Meeting, April 24, 2013, Beijing, China.

Chapter 2 Asia in the New Order

Paul Keating

Mr.Chen Yuan, then Governor of China Development Bank（CDB）, approached me in 2005 to become a member of China Development Bank's International Advisory Council, a council he established in 1999.

At the time, Governor Chen told me that the basis of his approach arose from what he believed was my long term interest in and commitment to China taking its place in the community of nations in the Asia-Pacific region. And he instanced my work as Prime Minister of Australia in establishing the first structure of a pan-Pacific political architecture, the APEC Leaders' Meeting.

Chen Yuan, whom I had known during his tenure at the People's Bank of China, was to go on and build the premier development banking institution in the world. Following his appointment as Governor of China Development Bank in 1998, Chen Yuan examined the structure of western development banks, including the World Bank, and then sought to adapt such structures to Chinese needs and conditions. He understood that the great wave of urbanization in China, the principal driver of China's growth, could not be organized or funded solely through commercial banks or for that matter, the national budget. That insight directed his managerial and entrepreneurial effort in the construct and growth of the institution.

It is a fact, in the years since, that CDB's balance sheet now approaches US$ 1.2 trillion, three times the scale of The World Bank's balance sheet.

In his recent insightful book,Government and Markets Aligned, Chen Yuan made clear his ambition that policy-based banks be “not merely subsidy-feeding loss makers but…profitable and self-sufficient institutions.”Before CDB's contemporary incarnation, he said many considered CDB to be a policy-based bank in name but an extension of the Treasury in fact; that its loans were akin to fiscal handouts—a free lunch “to projects that left borrowers under no real obligation to pay.”Chen Yuan vaulted that policy chasm such that CDB's ratio of non-performing loans had fallen from 33 percent where he found them in 1998, to under 1 percent in 2004, a truly remarkable transformation.

As a consequence, under Chen Yuan's leadership the nascent CDB transitioned to become an institution of great utility to the Chinese people and to its government.

His insight in recognizing the value of an international advisory council as a forum for guidance is also notable in that few institutions of this scale would conscientiously employ the advice of foreigners—especially in a country with problems so particular to it.But Chen Yuan did see that value and in my case I have been pleased to have been a part of it.

The purpose of the International Advisory Council is to give China Development Bank our perspectives of the unfolding international environment and its implications for China. I thought I should make some comments on the general political scene; the scene which provides the critical backdrop to the management of the global economy

Never before in human history has the world economy conducted itself globally, operating in real time.Globalization, the end of the Cold War and the end to colonialism brought about this situation. More than ever before, leadership on a global basis is imperative to the good and proper functioning of the world economy. Yet perhaps more than in other times, global leadership is now less evident.

In plain truth, the world is broadly, un-led.

There was a chance at that epiphany toward the end of the twentieth century, the end of the Cold War, to re-cut power in the world. But that did not happen.

The Cold War came and went, yet the world remained broadly managed through the old G7 structure, managed from the Atlantic. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States declared victory and walked off the field. Through the two Clinton terms and the two Bush terms of sixteen years, there was no attempt to bring the great populous states like China and India into a new world hierarchy. A hierarchy which recognized that the nexus between population and GDP, broken by the industrial revolution from 1800, was being re-established by the ubiquity of technology and capital-facilitated by rapid globalization.

In these circumstances one did not need a crystal ball to understand that in this new world, population would again be the principal driver of GDP and that once one came to that understanding, it was simply a matter of extrapolating compound GDP over time. And that extrapolation would reveal an entirely new pecking order in the world GDP and the respective contributions to world economic growth.

Yet instead of planning for this kind of world, following the triumphalism of the Clinton years, the United States entered into a decade of unilaterally-declared wars, spending up to US$ 3 trillion of U.S.public funds, opening up that country's now large public deficits. And at the conclusion of this adventurism, courtesy of the naive belief that the financial system was, in some way, a system in orbit of the macro-economy and not central to it, the United States financial system imploded and very nearly took the world economy down with it.

Notwithstanding President Obama's timely return to liberal interna-tionalism, the United States has suffered a severe blow to its international prestige and standing. Those events have acted together to neuter the kind of clout American leadership had during the Cold War and the years of triumphant Washington consensus.

As a consequence, the crisis in Europe, itself triggered by the U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2008, is barely influenced by the United States or by the nostrums of the economic consensus which were once the holy grail of international economic management.

Europe's great post-war project is now hostage to poor design and a dearth in leadership. Stable currency unions have generally required a fundamental similarity of economies. Europe's problem is that its economies are, in fact, very different. And not only different, they exhibit even greater differences in their ability to adjust.

Notwithstanding the high ideals of the European project's founders and adherents, the model has not been endorsed by constituent populations whenever the concept of a political union has been proposed—not universally anyway. So Europe has a monetary union, no fiscal union and no abiding political union to superintend it. As an economic zone it is still contracting, with austerity programs driving down the denominator—guaranteeing little to no progress in debt/GDP, notwithstanding the tragic cost in human resources.

Save for huge and urgent liquidity accommodations by the European Central Bank, we still do not know and cannot know whether such a model of disparate economies can survive within a single currency, or whether the model can only work within a system of transfer payments from the center to the periphery.

Like that which happened to the United States with its wars in the Middle East and its financial crisis, Europe's structural malaise and its recessionary loop, has had the effect of broadly neutering its impact on the world stage and its role in the management of the international economic and strategic system.

Which brings me to China and the emerging economies.

The emerging markets will provide 74 percent of global growth. For the greater part of the twentieth century, roughly 70 percent of global output came from the developed world. These roles have now been swapped.

China has been the major contributor in this transformation and so far so good. But as we know, the high investment and export model is not a sustainable option for China, yet it has lost years in the shift to a model built around its populations in the cities, focusing more on income growth arising from consumption and services.

While an integral and continuing player in the world economy,China is now focusing more squarely on its home base. Important reforms now have to be made and made quickly.

The development of capital markets, changes to the real cost of money, giving savers a real return on their savings, diminishing financial subsidies to state-owned enterprises, managing liquidity in real estate, have to form part of the new term agenda. And I believe China's leaders will not have a decade to see these kinds of changes into place. The ubiquity of the blogosphere will monitor and record their every progress.

In a collective sense, none of what is happening or has happened in the United States or in Europe or in a more discrete sense, in China, gives one confidence as to the management of the whole. The fact is the world is without a guiding light—there is little to no leadership in a truly collective sense.

The G20, which started out with great hopes, effectively became a debtors' and creditors' gathering with much important business still being done within the old G7 conversation. This makes it exceedingly difficult to run the world economy effectively or efficiently, let alone co-operatively.

And because the global financial crisis very nearly took us all down, the Basel III round of financial reforms has to change the way the global macro-economy works. Because the financial system was never a system in orbit of the macro-economy but one central to it, I believe the world will have to move from a system of macro-economic management, away from traditional fiscal and monetary levers, to an altogether more comprehensive system of macro-prudential management. In this world, central banks will become the new supra-authorities. Tools such as loan to valuation ratios, counter-cyclical capital controls and the new central bank processes like quantitative easing will become part of the new norm. And as we know, quantitative easing induces a search for yield which carries its own risks; risks which will now have to be assessed by the same central banks, whose traditional mandate, price stability, while narrow, will have to be subsumed within a broader mandate of monitoring and regulating risk via a new set of policy instruments.

With policy shrinking banks back to within home borders, we are witnessing a variation on globalization's theme. Institutions can be too big to fail while at the same time past notions of coherent economic equilibrium are being challenged.

This is why a macro-economic discussion within the traditional framework is now overly simplistic.

And however difficult that may be, such analysis has to take place in a global political society which has rarely been less competent and unified.

Australia and the New World Order

At the most recent meeting of the International Advisory Council in April 2013, Chen Yuan, by then Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, told me that he was always interested in my insights and articulation of geo-political and economic views as they related to the wider Asia-Pacific, with reference to China—and because of Australia's importance to China and its economy, to Australia and its role in the region.And in this context, he remarked positively on the contents of the address I had given on November 2012 to the State Library of Victoria—the Keith Murdoch Oration.

In the context of this publication, perhaps the speech is worthy of wider dissemination.He thought so and I am gratified by the compliment.The following is an edited version of the Keith Murdoch Oration.

Keith Murdoch, in whose name this oration is given, was appointed editor of the Melbourne Herald in 1921 and played a corporate role in the Herald acquiring the Sun News-Pictorial in 1925, becoming managing director of the Herald and Weekly Times in 1928.And so began the entrepreneurial career of the first Murdoch, building the Herald and Weekly Times, which sixty years later his son Rupert acquired.

But Keith Murdoch's fame burned brightly long before he became the doyen of Australian newspaper publishing.

He first came to public prominence as a war correspondent covering the First World War and controversially, over his coverage and writings on the Gallipoli campaign. Having been a reporter covering the then Melbourne-based Commonwealth Parliament before the war, he was on first name terms with Prime Ministers Andrew Fisher and Billy Hughes, as he was with ministers and prominent members of parliament.

It was these associations which led Andrew Fisher and Sir George Pearce to commission Murdoch to investigate the Australian Imperial Force abroad, leading to General Sir Ian Hamilton granting Murdoch permission to visit Gallipoli in late August 1915.

During his four days on Gallipoli, Keith Murdoch sent back dispatches critical of the campaign and upon returning to England had composed and dispatched a long summation of it to Prime Minister Fisher.This document was perhaps the first to praise the general bravery and resourcefulness of the ANZACs in the context of his otherwise harsh criticism of the British Army and its generalship.

At any rate, Keith Murdoch's star shone brightly against the darkened backdrop of early twentieth century Australian history.At thirty, he was hobnobbing in London with the people who ran the world.In those days, before the first long and internecine battle with Germany, Britain was the world's acknowledged superpower.It was not until the war had drained it of wealth and energy that a nascent America emerged to become the force it remains today.

It has always struck me how influential Australia had been in the councils of major powers across the twentieth century.In two world wars, despite our small population, our leaders have sat with those of the most powerful states in the world.

By dint of our lineage we were, for better or worse, at the center of things.This broadly remained true after World War Two; we even managed to remain influential during the Cold War.Across the twentieth century we were a paid-up member of the Anglosphere, with our dues paid in military commitments in World War One, World War Two, in Korea, in Vietnam, in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

Not bad for a country that did not even have its own foreign policy until 1942.In 1931, the passage of the Statute of Westminster gave autonomy to the whiter parts of the British Empire—Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada.Even after that, we did not ratify the Statute until late 1942—eleven years later.

The fall of Singapore in February 1942 ended the influence in our part of the world, of the principal seat at the high table of the Anglosphere, Britain, and with it, the strategic guarantee on which we had relied since settlement in 1788.

And after the war, when we looked up, our immediate neighbors were no longer European colonial powers but independent nations.

However beset by straitened circumstances and endemic poverty, these states had slipped the yoke of colonialism; no more the British in India and South East Asia, no more the Dutch in Indonesia nor the French in Indo-China.

But just when we thought we had, more or less, to make our own way in the world and in our part of the world, the great freeze took hold: the Cold War.

Despite Franklin Roosevelt's hope that following a second disastrous world war, a new convergence of world powers could be garnered under the auspices of a United Nations, the vetoes given Soviet Russia within the Security Council damned the world to a new bipolarity which shackled it for fifty years.When the epiphany came in 1989,China was only limping from its isolation and poverty, India had only shown modest inclinations to reform and prosperity, Indonesia was dragging itself from poverty, finding a place in its Non-Aligned status, while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had breathed their first breath of fresh air since 1939.

Indeed, since 1945, in Australia we had had a reasonable time of it; strong income growth up to 1970 off the back of our trade relationships with Britain, the United States and Japan and then a renewal of activity from 1983.And our strategic circumstances had remained benign mainly because General Soeharto's New Order government in Indonesia had turned its efforts to constructing ASEAN rather than annoying us.

When I became Prime Minister at the end of 1991, Australian foreign policy was one year short of fifty years old.So brief had been our time on our own, the time we had had to set our own direction and make our own luck.The time we had had to ponder the fracturing of the Anglosphere and the imperatives of our geography.The time we had had to understand the import of the great societies around us, now off and running—India, Indonesia, China—and the impact they would have on the world both economically and strategically.

On the whole, we turned in a patchy performance.Menzies could never make the break from Britain and ended up making a botch of Suez.During the same period, he committed us to the war in Vietnam, a war we should never have been in.He did not know what to do with Sukarno during Indonesia's period of confrontation with Malaysia; he was relieved by Soeharto's generally benign view of Australia at about the time he left office.Holt went “all the way with LBJ”, Gorton and McMahon occupied the non-threatening wallow provided by Soeharto, not knowing what to do about Vietnam.Whitlam sharply improved the game by establishing diplomatic relations with China, while superintending our withdrawal from Vietnam.He also sought to positively establish a relationship with Soeharto and Indonesia.The Fraser years encouraged Asian immigration to Australia, while Fraser maintained a close connection with the British Commonwealth, with a primary interest in issues such as Zimbabwe as Bob Hawke later did with South Africa and apartheid.Bob Hawke embraced China but he ignored Indonesia.Our relationship across the post-war period with the countries of South East Asia was cordial but you would be searching for superlatives to add more to it than that.

If you distil it, our first fifty years “on our own” was about the Cold War, great and powerful friends and the backwash from de-colonialization.

As Prime Minister from 1991, I saw the writing on the wall as to the relative decline of the Anglosphere, perhaps more clearly than my predecessors.More than that, I rejoiced in the diversity around us and the fact that the big and old societies of the East, formerly locked down by colonialism and poverty, were free to go their own way.Not only that, I wanted Australia to go with them; to use a Curtinism “free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom”, to which I would have added, “and the United States”, but not with any lack of appreciation or the nostalgia which attends our history and culture.

The Soviet Union was dissolved a week before I became Prime Minister.You had to know that new opportunities would abound, that the stultifying bipolarity would lift, that the world was capable of being made anew; certainly made to look something like it was or might have been before 1914—before the full onset of the violent twentieth century.

For a start, open regionalism became possible as it was impossible under the bipolarity of the Cold War.

The spread of technology and capital, which the new post-Cold War world encouraged, was to have the effect of re-establishing the nexus between population and GDP—where again the largest states by way of population, would again be the largest by way of GDP.

The industrial revolution had broken that nexus but the coming ubiquity of technology and capital would re-establish it.And the effect of that had to mean that for the first time in Australia's history,Australia would be situated not simply in the fastest growing part of the world but among the largest economic states of the world.

That is,Australia would be in the neighbourhood of the emerging geo-economic center, where for all of its history it had otherwise been on the periphery.And a distant periphery at that.

These vast changes portended a new international order—one completely different from the template of 1947, the one cut by the victors of World War Two.

One hoped a more representative international order than the one represented by the G7—the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada—could be constructed; would be constructed.

These new circumstances meant that all of a sudden,Australia had the opportunity to move beyond the old pathways, where we had made an art form of managing powerful friends with the slender hand we had been dealt.All of a sudden, if we were game, if we were able, we could strike out on our own—or as I used to say at the time, move to the big canvas.

Before I became Prime Minister, the Australian Prime Minister only attended two international gatherings—the British Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the South Pacific Forum.In no multilateral fora would our Prime Minister sit with the leaders of the United States, Japan, China, Indonesia or any of the states of South East Asia.The leadership of those countries occupied a world beyond us.We were an important fish but only in the most marginal of ponds.

In the early 1990s it was imperative that we understood the signs, even if our greatest and most powerful friend, the United States, was missing them.Imperative that we not let the epiphany at the end of the century dissipate in an orgy of nothingness, only to find ourselves back in our usual place as marginal players; scammers at the temple of the superpower—watching these world-defining changes play themselves out while conducting ourselves as some kind of passive onlooker.

This was the point where Australian foreign policy had to break out of the mould.If it could mix metaphors, where we had to change gears and move up a cog.

I became Prime Minister ten days before the second only visit of an American President; President George Herbert Bush.

It was President George Herbert Bush who first used the phrase “New World Order,” so whatever that was likely to become, I was determined to deal Australia into it.

On New Year's Day 1992 at Kirribilli House in Sydney, I unveiled a proposal to President Bush for the United States to join with Australia to reach across the Pacific to China, Japan and to Indonesia to create a new regional structure; a new piece of political architecture.

It is history now that I succeeded in that proposal with President Bush's successor, President Bill Clinton, and that the first meeting of what became the APEC Leaders'Summit Meeting was held in Seattle in November 1993.Indeed, the twentieth anniversary meeting of the APEC Leaders' Summit Meeting recently concluded in Vladivostok.

During my discussions with President Bush at Kirribilli House, his national security adviser, General Brent Scowcroft who was present, said that I had articulated a policy of engagement for the United States in the Pacific that the United States had not articulated for itself.General Scowcroft was alluding to the fact that the Cold War had cast a Euro-centricity over U.S. foreign policy and he might have also been alluding to the fact that since the Second World War, the sharp end of U.S. policy in the Pacific had been made by the United States Navy and the Trade Representative, but not the State Department.

I was urging not a one on one but a multilateral basis of engagement by the United States at leadership level, with the leaders of the major East Asian states, namely, China, Japan and Indonesia, as well as those smaller states which had been included in the membership of APEC, the ministerial economic body, which Bob Hawke had been central in establishing in 1989.

Coming from the relatively small state of Australia, this was a difficult thing to do.To succeed I first had to secure the support of the Japanese Prime Minister, then Kiichi Miyazawa.Miyazawa I had known well from my Treasury years but, in those days the Japanese would not do anything other than that countenanced by the United States.Miyazawa told me that he would only come with me if I was able to get Soeharto—not simply the President of Indonesia, but a leading figure in the Non-Aligned Movement: a big call.I made a huge effort with Soeharto; discussion after discussion, but once I had him, I was able to approach Li Peng, the Chinese Premier, to encourage China to come in too.Li Peng was exceptionally suspicious of it, particularly as APEC, the economic body, already had Taiwan and Hong Kong in its membership.But eventually I did get the support of Premier Li Peng for a head of government level, Pacific-wide body.

After I had added South Korea and Canada to the stock of states in support of the idea, I was able to approach President Bill Clinton for his support for what was virtually a custom made group.Support, I might add, he gave graciously.

Away from multilateral constructs of the APEC variety, I gave enormous time and attention to the development of bilateral relationships, most notably with Indonesia.I think I grasped, perhaps more than any of my predecessors, the singular importance to Australia and to its security, of the vast archipelago to our immediate north.I understood that the advent of General Soeharto's New Order government had brought peace and stability to our region, as it had to support for the building of ASEAN itself.It turned out I had been right in assuming that President Soeharto possessed a generally benign view of Australia, notwithstanding the preoccupation of the Australian media with the events in Balibo two decades earlier.I was completely determined to establish a totally new and durable basis for our relationship with Indonesia other than the one we had which saw everything through the prism of East Timor.

History has well recorded that this period was a high point in Australia's relationship with Indonesia from which I was able to propose and then with President Soeharto, build a political relationship based around regular meetings of a broad ministerial forum and a new strategic relationship built around a defense cooperation treaty of a kind our two countries had never had nor earlier could have contemplated.Called the Agreement on Maintaining Security, it was not simply a defense cooperation agreement—it had within it an active element—an agreement to consult one another in the event of adverse challenges and to consider individual or joint measures to respond.

In other words, the Agreement on Maintaining Security was, in effect, a contingent mutual defense pact and one negotiated with our nearest largest neighbor.The document was a strategic dream for Australia with at least as much realpolitik and clout as the treaty we have with the United States: ANZUS.

This was get-it-done foreign policy.Australia acting independently and in its own interests, pursuing its own objectives, filling the void which followed the thunderclap which ended the Cold War.

These were the kind of moves which Australian foreign policy was able to make in the 1990s.Gareth Evans, who was foreign minister in both the Hawke and Keating governments, also succeeded in a number of interna-tional initiatives; perhaps the most important being the ASEAN Regional Forum, the defense and security dialogue, operating within the aegis of ASEAN; the Cambodia Peace Accords and our sponsorship of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The point I want to make tonight is that, I believe, this era of effective foreign policy activism has passed.Our sense of independence has flagged and as it flagged, we have rolled back into an easy accommodation with the foreign policy objectives of the United States.More latterly, our respect for the foreign policy objectives of the United States has superimposed itself on what should otherwise be the foreign policy objectives of Australia.

The days when, as Prime Minister of Australia, I was able to wrest the Chinese Premier into a multilateral body shared with the President of the United States, when I was able to bring the virtual head of the Non-Aligned Movement, President Soeharto, into a structure which included the United States, indeed into a structure with China to boot, are behind us.

The United States and China will now not encourage us to propose and build structures of the kind we have in the past.In the twenty years since I put the APEC Leaders' Meeting together, China has become the second major economic power in the world; it does not need us to help construct its foreign policy, any more than the United States needs us to insinuate ourselves onto China to its account.That is not to say we cannot be influential at the margin, on either or both of them,we probably can and should be.But we have been traded down in the big stroke business.Even states like Indonesia are dubious of us because they do not see us making our way in the world or their world other than in a manner deferential to other powers, especially the United States.

This became apparent during John Howard's prime ministership; it has remained apparent under the prime ministerships of Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard.After playing the deputy sheriff, John Howard had us dancing to the tune of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, while upon the release of the WikiLeaks cables, the Chinese discovered that Kevin Rudd, as Prime Minister of Australia, had been advising the United States to reserve the military option against them.During the current prime ministership, that of Julia Gillard, the U.S. President Barack Obama, made an oral and policy assault on China and its polity, from the lower chamber of our Parliament House.

This brought immediate pangs of disquiet from the Indonesian foreign minister and later from his president.

The fact is,Australia's former sphere of influence is diminishing.

Our membership of the Anglosphere through the post-War years and down through the Cold War, did give us influence in the temples of power—but that power came from the victory of World War Two and our associate membership of “the West.” That world has changed.Now, we have to be propelled not by regard of withering associations but by our enlightened sense of self.Knowing who we are and what we are and what we want.And not only what we want, having a solid idea about how we get it.

This discourse leads to one conclusion: we will always be best being ourselves, exercising our ingenuity where it matters most, where we are most relevant, where our interests mostly coalesce and that is in the neighbourhood—the place we live.recognizing that our general membership of “the West” was most relevant to us while ever “the West” was the dominant global grouping—but that period is now passing.What is not passing and what will not pass is our geopolitical positioning.The immutability of our need to successfully treat with and adapt to the neighbourhood—a neighbourhood which, save for New Zealand, is completely non-Western.

The secular change in the diminished growth potential of the West vis-a-vis that of Asia and South Asia and the “catch up” in productivity and living standards going on there will mean that, from now on, our security linkages with “the West” will seem more incongruous than during the post-War years.While we will always have a close relationship with the United States based on our shared history and our similar cultures, it is obvious that the right organizing principle for our security is to be integral to the region—to be part of it rather than insulating ourselves from it, hanging on in barely requited faith, to attenuated linkages with the relatively declining West.

From now on we have to concentrate on where we can be effective and where we can make the greatest difference.I believe that is fundamentally in South East Asia.South East Asia occupies the fulcrum between South West Asia and North East Asia; the fortunes of the Indian Ocean and the sub-continent vis-a-vis those of continental Asia, China and the western Pacific.In a geopolitical sense, this region is a place of amity, a zone of peace and cooperation, perched between the two most populous neighbourhoods on earth: broadly, Pakistan and India and their ocean, and China and Japan and their ocean.

Northern Australia is adjacent the fulcrum point.It is completely natural therefore, that Australia be engaged there; certainly, with Indonesia but preferably, with the wider ASEAN.This grouping represents the security architecture of South East Asia, the one with which we can have real dialogue and add substance.In the longer run we should be a member of it—formalizing the many trade, commercial and political interests we already share.This is the natural place for Australia to belong; indeed, the one to which we should attribute primacy.

The utility of such a foreign policy would be to distil the essence of our primary national interests, such that the naturalness of it gave it a self-reinforcing consistency.And on that note, I was pleased to see recently the Foreign Minister, Bob Carr, articulate a policy of closer engagement with ASEAN.

We have made some important movements in our dialogue with ASEAN and its member states, among them our inclusion in the East Asia Summit from its inaugural meeting in 2005.The latter development came about relatively late in the term of the Howard government, when it came to the realization that closer integration with Asia was an imperative for Australia, rather than being a Keating obsession—a contrary view which had formerly driven its policy.Alexander Downer negotiated our membership of the East Asia Summit, while Kevin Rudd effectively lobbied ASEAN and China to include the United States and Russia.

Good and significant as these changes were, they were of their essence, of a foreign policy kind.What they were not, were policies designed to make our general community more relevant to the nations of ASEAN—to set our broader relationships on firmer foundations.

In recent years, our relations with countries like Indonesia and Malaysia have been focused on transactional issues of marginal long term significance; refugee management and live cattle exports come to mind.

In the meantime, policy towards our nearest, largest neighbor,Indonesia, has languished, lacking framework, judgments of magnitude and coherence.It is as if Indonesia remains as it was before the Asian Financial Crisis—before its remarkable transition to democracy and before the re-firing of its wealth machinery.

How things go in the Indonesian archipelago, in many respects, so go we.Indonesia remains the place where Australia's strategic bread is buttered.No country is more important to us—and it is a country which has shown enormous tolerance and goodwill towards us.Focus on this country should be a major imperative driving our foreign policy.

The fourth largest country in the world, a secular democracy, the largest Muslim state,Indonesia's vast archipelago straddles the air and sea approaches to our country.No major power in or beyond the wider region could hope to have the capacity to project forces towards Australia, certainly to our north and west, without needing to transit Indonesia.

I have always thought Indonesia will become our most important strategic partner.The need of this will become more apparent as its economy gets stronger.

Already, on a purchasing power parity basis, the Indonesian economy is larger than our own.Because population is the principal driver of GDP, particularly with the ubiquity of technology and capital, Indonesia's economy is likely to be at least twice as large as Australia's and in time, even larger.Indeed, a recent study by McKinsey and Company, forecast that by 2030,Indonesia's economy would be larger than either Britain's or Germany's.

How might we feel with a massive economy to our immediate north, in an archipelago approaching 300 million people?And a country, which by then, would probably have naval and air forces commensurate with its economic wealth.The fact is,Indonesia is building the weight to stand on its own feet, both economically and militarily, against anything that might come its way—either from the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean.

The question is what will that weight mean for us?An adversary with whom we failed to come to terms in good and propitious times or a partner to share common cause in our own view of the region and the wider world?

The answer to that question will best be settled by Australia positively discriminating in its attitude and in its efforts towards Indonesia, removing the ambivalence which has traditionally informed our approach.In this way, there is every likelihood that Indonesia would respond in kind, diminishing its own ambivalence towards us.

Whichever way we cut it,Australia must lay a bigger bet on its relationship with Indonesia.And this has to be cultural and commercial as well as political.The Australian people are unlikely to beat a path to Java or to Sumatra without public policy in this country divining the way.

Now that Australia is front and center in the fastest growing part of the world as never before, our future has to amount to more than simply managing alliances.Effective at that as we have been in the past, we are now compelled to be more relevant to the dynamic region around us.This must mean that our opportunities to exercise independence and independence of action will be greater than they have ever been.

Not to measure up to this challenge would be to run the risk of being seen as a derivative power, perpetually in search of a strategic guarantor, a Western outpost, seemingly unable to confidently make its own way in the world.Surely we have reached the point where we have to turn away from that scenario, recognize the realities of our geography and strike out on our own.

Chapter 3 The Financial History to the 1990s

（Chen Yuan: His Role in China's Economic Development and in its Co-operative International Relationships）

Paul A. Volcker

I do not recall the first time I met Chen Yuan, but from the present perspective it was in a different era. I was older and as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in the United States considered myself the senior. After all, China in the 1980s was still emerging from a centralized, state-directed economy, operating, by Western standards, at a low level of productivity and with a low standard of living. New institutions, importantly including a central bank, were just being created and markets were poorly developed.

Chen Yuan, then a relatively young man with limited exposure to the world of finance, assumed a senior position at the People's Bank of China, eager with his colleagues to learn about central banking. It was a challenging period, with the creation and rapid growth of commercial banks and the financial system. In the process, Chen Yuan was a leader in developing relationships in the United States and elsewhere, establishing contacts both with foreign officials and with independent scholars and institutions.

In the late 1990s, I well recall leading a small delegation of retired central bankers to conduct a series of seminars with Chinese officials. We discussed central banking structures and policies and the regulation and development of strong commercial banks. By that time, Deputy Governor Chen Yuan of the People's Bank of China had become the Governor of China Development Bank. The institutional challenge was clear: to encourage and finance major infrastructure in a country with pressing needs for large-scale transportation projects, greater energy production, and more efficient communication facilities. Recognizing there would be large financial requirements in support of economic growth, the China Development Bank provided new and effective techniques for raising funds in the markets. One of Chen Yuan's early initiatives was to create an International Advisory Council, upon which I was honored to serve.

What an accomplishment by a single generation—a period covering only half of Chen Yuan's lifetime—to enable China to reach a high stage of economic development and to achieve a highly influential role in the world. No longer can we older Westerners visit China with at least the pretense of teaching. Rather, it is to share, to take part in, to learn from what has been the most remarkable period of sustained economic growth in human history.

Chen Yuan and China Development Bank have been an integral part of that remarkable story. That role is reflected in both enormous infrastructure projects and in the growth of financial markets. Today, relationships overseas are being extended. China is an increasingly important source of capital for other countries as well as an attractive place for foreign investors to share in China's growth. In both respects, China Development Bank has been a pioneer.

I like to recall two initiatives in which I had a small part. China Development Bank was initially and appropriately focused on tangible and very large projects—airports, roads, dams, railroads and the like. I helped bring to its attention the importance of encouraging small and medium-sized entrepreneurial-driven enterprises, businesses often starved for capital and credit but with large economic and social potential. Later, when I became concerned with corruption in the United Nation's Oil-for-Food Programme, we could exchange views on how to cope with corruption more broadly, a disease that too often has damaged prospects for development in many countries and undermined confidence in governmental institutions.

These are matters important to China as to all countries, developing and developed. Too often they do not receive the attention required. Chen Yuan deserves great credit for dealing with issues that too often are neglected.

After all, by my standards, by Chinese standards, Chen Yuan is still a young man. I know first-hand that he has still much to contribute to China and to its relationships with all the world. I am proud to count him as a friend.

Chapter 4 China and Leadership of the World Economy

C. Fred Bergsten

The Challenge to the Global Economic System

China has become one of the three global economic superpowers of the 21st century, along with the United States and the European Union.Its likely rapid growth for at least the next twenty years, as it becomes the world's largest economy to an increasing extent, clearly indicates that its relative impact will continue to expand at an impressive pace.

China is a historically unique economic superpower, however, in at least three different senses.It is still a poor country in terms of average living standards and will remain much less affluent than the OECD countries even as it becomes the largest economy in the world（though its per capita GDP is already near OECD levels, even at market exchange rates in much of the urban coastal zones）.It is not yet fully a market economy and hence the government plays a much larger role than in the other global economic powers, though that distinction has narrowed and will probably narrow further over the coming years and decades even if China does not aspire to the same degree of separation between market and state that is viewed as optimal in the West.China also has a very different political system than the other economic powers.

We know from history that integration of rising economic powers in the global leadership system is both extremely challenging and critically important for the maintenance of global stability and even peace.Both the United States and Germany caused significant problems during their periods of increasing economic capability in the late 19th century.Even more daunting difficulties arose with the resurgence of Germany and the rise of Japan in the years between the two world wars.More recent challenges to systemic stability centered on the evolution of the European Union and the postwar ascendance of Japan to global prominence, both of which were handled reasonably successfully.In the present era, China's rise could be followed—and, to a much lesser degree, is being paralleled even now—by India, Brazil and conceivably one or two others. The historical record reveals that the necessary systemic adjustments can occur very successfully but also that a failure to accomplish them can trigger severe and even cataclysmic disruptions.

These integration imperatives pose extremely difficult issues for both the incumbent powers and the rising powers.To achieve a smooth transition, the incumbents must be willing to share leadership with the newcomers, which means that they must have confidence that their national interests will be better protected by accommodating the newcomers than by resisting their assumption of a greater global role.In the specific case of the United States at present, this calls for shedding the mindset of dominance that has prevailed for over half a century and for adopting a readiness to work intimately with non-Western powers in a way that has not been achieved（or even attempted only modestly, with Japan） before.

For their part, the newcomers must be willing to accept a systemic leadership role that recognizes both the important feedback to their domestic economies from the external impact of their own activities, and the responsibility that comes with global presence and world-class capabilities.These considerations are especially important for China at present: it has chosen a development strategy that relies heavily on deep integration into the global economy with the result that global economic outcomes, and especially the preservation of an open trading system and a stable financial order, are essential elements of its national interest.

The World Economic Order in 2013

The world economic order of 2013 can best be characterized as a multipolar structure within which two countries, the United States and China, stand as primiinter pares.The system is multipolar because at least a dozen economies（including the European Union as a single entity）, some high-income and some emerging or developing, clearly have an important impact on worldwide outcomes.This number is growing and the continuing shift to enhanced multipolarity has already been recognized institutionally by the replacement of the G7 by the G20 as the primary body for international economic leadership.

It is widely agreed, however, that the G20 is too large to function effectively.Hence a smaller “coordinator of the coordinators” is needed to operate as an informal steering committee for the world economy.Such a group would ideally include the three economic superpowers: the United States, the European Union and China.The operational problem at present, of course, is that the European Union can neither function as a coordinated unit on most issues nor select one of its members to represent the group. Nor is its current economic position conducive to focusing on, and assuming, a major international role. Hence primary responsibility for most global economic matters inevitably falls on the United States and China, whether they（or the world more broadly）choose to characterize those arrangements as a “G2”.

Both countries have mixed records in fulfilling these responsibilities in recent years, particularly with respect to the crisis of 2007-09.Both of them initiated effective and critically important monetary and fiscal actions to stimulate recovery of their own economies, and thus the world economy, from the global recession.Both have made progress on global rebalancing, with the U.S. external deficit and Chinese external surplus down sharply from their record highs.Despite a few deviations, both have avoided erecting significant new barriers that could have disrupted the global trading system.Both supported the expansion of IMF lending facilities and the allocation of SDRs that aided the recovery of countries hit hardest by the crisis.All these steps were taken within a policy framework set and nurtured by the G20 summits though all but the last could more accurately be characterized as parallel national, rather than internationally coordinated, responses to the crisis（although the international agreement on the need for such actions undoubtedly contributed positively to their adoption）.

Both countries have also failed, however, to adopt some of the actions needed to assure that their（and the global）recoveries are sustainable.The United States has yet to comprehensively reform its inadequate system of financial regulation.The progress noted above on global rebalancing may shortly go into reverse if the United States does not decisively correct its budget deficit and China does not transition to a growth path that is driven more by domestic consumption and less by exports, including by letting its exchange rate appreciate much more substantially.Both countries are still feeling their way on the substance and timing of exit strategies from the extraordinary stimulus measures required to fight the crisis.

There are also several issues where cooperation between China and some of its G20 partners, including the United States but also the Europeans, seem to have deteriorated or even reversed.China joined the World Trade Organization with apparent enthusiasm a decade ago, and used the rules of the institution to promote internal market-oriented reforms, but played a major role（along with India）in blocking the Doha Round in July 2008.China and the United States appeared to be moving in compatible and even perhaps coordinated directions on global warming in 2009, with reinforcing statements at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington in July and after President Obama's visit to Beijing in November（that intensified European anxieties that they might even face a “G2” in Copenhagen）, but then wound up as antagonists at the climate change summit itself.A possible clash looms within the area of economic regionalism, where China continues to champion such cooperation primarily within Asia while the United States is actively promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership（perhaps en route to a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific）that would create a new Asia-Pacific architecture as a complement to, or even substitute for, such Asia-only arrangements.Efforts to enhance cross-border investment and encourage mutually beneficial technology exchange, as in the promising earlier talks on “green energy,” have given way to tensions over Chinese policies to promote indigenous innovation and renewed problems over intellectual property rights as well as continued U.S. anxiety over some inward direct investments from Chinese companies.

Unresolved Conceptual Questions

All these issues raise several key unresolved questions regarding China's view of its role in the world economy over the coming years and decades and even beyond:

1. At the broadest level of global economic cooperation, does China support the current G20 process or prefer some alternative structure（s）that could be more effective, and thus probably smaller, and/or perhaps more politically representative（and thus probably larger）?

2. On climate change, where no international rules and institutions exist, does China seek an effective global regime? If so, of what type?

3. On cybersecurity, where no international rules and institutions exist, does China seek an effective global regime? If so, of what type?

4. On foreign direct investment, where very few rules and no dedicated institutions exist, would China like to see the creation of an international regime?

5. Does China still view the WTO rules and institutional arrangements as a useful centerpiece for the global trading system? If not, what alternatives should be pursued? What is China's view on the relationship between regional trade agreements and the global economic order?

6. What is China's view on the emerging economic architecture in the region, particularly on the relationship between the current and pending trade agreements within Asia（the “Asia track”）and the developing “Pacific track” via the Trans-Pacific Partnership? Does China still share the agreed APEC goal of achieving “free and open trade in the Asia-Pacific region” as a whole? Would it consider a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States as a step in that direction?

7. Does China believe that it can continue running large, even if substantially reduced, external surpluses and further expand its foreign exchange reserves, including via a substantially undervalued exchange rate, without jeopardizing the stability of both the global financial system and the global trading system（due to the inevitable backlash from “currency wars” and trade restrictions）?

8. Will China continue to view the exchange rate as “purely sovereign” or recognize that, since at least two currencies are involved in all such issues, it requires some form of international rules and cooperation? If so, of what type if not the current IMF regime?Should the current rules, or a new set, be strengthened and how could they best be enforced?

9. Does China want to continue enhancing the global role of the dollar by adding substantially further to its holdings of that reserve currency and/or embark on a serious effort to promote a multiple reserve currency system, including through more aggressive diversification of its own official holdings and by encouraging international use of the Renminbi（including by moving to capital account convertibility and sharply reducing its capital controls）, and/or seek international agreement to reform the monetary system to focus more attention on Special Drawing Rights（perhaps including a Substitution Account）and the International Monetary Fund?These questions have one central theme: they ask China to formulate, communicate and discuss internationally its views on the central systemic issues that seem likely to dominate the international economic policy debate for at least the immediate future.These would seem to be essential steps both for China itself, to clarify and pursue consistently its own national interests on these topics, and for the rest of the world that seeks to engage actively with China on them.It is hard to imagine effective integration of China into the global economic order, and especially into its core leadership structure, without more explicit consideration of these questions in both China and other key countries.It might then be possible to construct a “grand bargain” between China and the other key economic powers, especially the United States, that would provide the foundation for a successful global economic order for the 21st century.

Such an order can be constructed and maintained effectively only with the full participation, creativity and leadership of China.An essential initial step is clarification of China's own systemic goals and policies, derived of course from its definition of its national interests（including the impact on them of external economic developments that its own actions may substantially influence）.The next step would then be serious international engagement on China's ideas, joining them with the thoughts of other major countries to seek agreement on both new arrangements（especially in areas without current regimes, like climate change and foreign direct investment） or amendments to existing regimes（as with the IMF and WTO）.That process is certain to be protracted and contentious but its payoff is potentially huge in paving the way to address both China's role in the world economy and the world economy's role in the policies of China itself.

Chapter 5 Payment System Development：The World Bank/People's Bank of China Project

Israel Sendrovic

Introduction

These notes reflect memories of my visits to China, primarily to Beijing, between 1991 and 1996. Much has changed in China over the past 15 to 20 years. The historic, dramatic and unprecedented change that propelled China into the second largest economy in the world is a testament to the people like Chen Yuan who had the leadership, foresight and wisdom to architect and implement the change. One person's visits and limited observations and perspectives over a five year period, in today's context, may strike some as quaint. However, they represent experiences as China's development and opening up to the outside world were accelerating. Chen Yuan, who was then the Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China（PBC）, was a central player in each of my visits.

Personal Recollections

I first met Chen Yuan when I went to China for the first time in 1991 as a member of the International Advisory Panel（IAP）on the project that supported the development of China's payment system, CNAPS. Members of the panel included representatives from the Bank of England, the Bundesbank, the Central Bank of Japan, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Swiss National Bank and myself from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.Chen Yuan chaired the IAP. In the years that I was a member of the IAP, Mr. Chen was the link between the Chinese staffs working on the CNAPS project and the international experts and consultants who participated in it. Mr. Chen also worked with the Federal Reserve on many matters, visited the Federal Reserve with members of the PBC staff and hosted Federal Reserve personnel that visited China. Most memorable, was the visit of Chairman Greenspan when he visited Beijing and Shanghai in 1994. I remember that Mr. Chen participated in all the meetings during Mr. Greenspan's visit.

At that time, there were no direct flights between New York and Beijing. It was difficult for me to get reservations and I remember that my itinerary took me, via San Francisco, to Hong Kong, from there to Tianjin and then on to Beijing. The Beijing airport was quite small for what I had imagined to be for the city that was the capital of China. A member of the PBC staff accompanied me on the ride to Beijing. The road to the center of the city had two lanes, one each way, with very little civilian vehicular traffic. There were many trucks, bicycles and donkeys on the road but very few taxis.

It was in November and, as we entered Beijing, we saw huge mounds of cabbage on many streets. It seemed to me that the harvest had just come in and the cabbage was a common staple for Beijing's residents. The buildings were relatively small to what I had become accustomed in New York.

The members of the IAP stayed at the Palace Hotel which can only be described as an excellent world class hotel by any standard. It was very beautiful and luxurious. Yet, it was surrounded by very small buildings, the vast majority of them only one storey high. We travelled by car from the Palace Hotel to the PBC and some of us decided to travel by bicycle since that was the most common mode of transportation.

For the next few years, we visited China every six months or so. We were amazed at the rapid pace of development. Over a very short period, much of the bicycle traffic gave way to automobiles. We stopped using bicycles because we thought it had become a bit dangerous, dodging the cars in the traffic.One time, upon arrival at the Palace Hotel, the hotel was like an island with no other buildings in sight for blocks. The small buildings had been torn down to make way for urban renewal and were eventually replaced with high rise buildings. The road from the airport became a three lane highway in each direction and there were throngs of taxis. Most meetings were held in Beijing with one held in Shanghai and one in Xi'an.

The Payment System Project

China's payment system had not kept pace with the growth in its economy. The absence of a timely and effective transportation infrastructure and the absence of widespread use of technology resulted in a system largely driven by local cash transactions and slow, paper-based, non-local interbank transactions. As a result, finality of non-local payments could be delayed as much as thirty days and large amounts of funds were frozen pending settlement. To correct this situation, the PBC began the development of a new payment system with funding provided by World Bank loans. A consulting firm was retained to direct the preparation of the material that would be necessary for the development of the system.

The purpose of the IAP was to guide and review the work of the consultant and to advise the PBC on accounting practices, regulations, technology, operations and project implementation. Most importantly, the IAP members provided the PBC with practical advice gained from their experience in the payment systems in their respective countries. I thought that the United States experience had the greatest applicability to China given the advanced state of its payment system, population size and geographic coverage.

The PBC had ambitious objectives for the payment system. They were to:

·Reduce float and speed up the circulation of funds;

·Achieve a reliable, secure, and integrated payment , clearing and settlement system to meet the needs of a growing economy;

·Improve convenience and service to users; and

·Strengthen central bank macro-economic management through the timely and accurate collection of payment and accounting-related data.

They also had ambitious guiding principles. They were:

·Integrity and reliability;

·Minimization of payment system risks;

·Universality of access by all financial institutions;

·Cost efficiency and self-financing through cost recovery; and

·Appreciate user participation in system development and impleme-ntation.The project also had a Domestic Advisory Panel（DAP）which consisted of PBC staff, representatives of the Chinese specialized banks and local technical, financial and accounting experts. Not many of the staff were fluent in English and all, but one, of the IAP members did not speak Mandarin. For the most part, translators had to be used for the meetings. Chen Yuan was fluent in English. He ran the meetings and managed the work required in bringing the experiences of the IAP members and their respective central banks to be closely aligned with the Chinese realities. He also coordinated the work of the World Bank on the project, the consultants and the DAP.

Great emphasis was placed on producing detailed specifications for the payment system, establishing an accounting structure, providing the legal framework, describing the basic rules and processing procedures, getting the involvement of the specialized banks, getting capable people at the PBC that could manage large complex projects and putting in place an organization that could manage a project of this magnitude. In the latter stages, the main focus of the IAP was on the bidding process for the development of the system, project implementation and management.

A request for proposal was produced and sent out to bidders.The bid was won by NTT Data, and a signing ceremony was held at the Great Hall of the People. I remember the time of the ceremony coincided with the Thanksgiving holiday in the United States when it is traditional for families to get together and enjoy a festive dinner. Although I was away from my family, I was delighted that I was able to attend the ceremony. I made some congratulatory remarks and commented on the way forward.

Chen Yuan was instrumental in bringing the project to that point. The work resulted in a fine product and great friendships.

Chairman Greenspan's Visit

Chairman Greenspan's first visit to China was in October 1994. I was honored to be part of the five-person delegation that accompanied him.The meetings were fascinating and productive. Separate meetings were held in Beijing with President and Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, Vice Premier and People's Bank head, Zhu Rongji, Minister of Finance, Liu Zhongli and Executive Deputy Governor of the PBC, Zhou Zhengqing. Meetings were also held in Shanghai with the PBC Shanghai branch head, Mao Yingliang,and the Vice Mayor of Shanghai. Chen Yuan, as PBC Deputy Governor, participated in all the meetings. He hosted a lunch for us in Beijing, accompanied us to Shanghai and hosted a farewell banquet for us.

As could be expected, similar themes were discussed at all the meetings.China's extraordinary success in moving from a centrally planned to a market economy and its importance to the world economy was a major theme as was the pace of reform.Discussions were also held on the financial system, the roles of the central bank and the commercial banks, monetary policy, financial supervision and the payment system.

The meeting with President Jiang was especially memorable. He discussed the phases of reform, starting with agriculture, the villages and then moving on to the urban areas. A major goal was to have a market economy with a socialist system. Reforming the state-owned enterprises was important but they needed to consider the social aspects.

Mr. Jiang noted that both he and Chairman Greenspan were born in 1926, the year of the Tiger. It was a very good year.

Close

China has grown tremendously, since the time of my visits, into a world financial and industrial giant. Chen Yuan went on to become the Governor of China Development Bank and continued to have major roles in this extraordinary growth.

At the end of my work with the IAP, Mr. Chen presented me with a Chinese scroll that contained lines based on the Farewell to Vice-prefect Du Setting Out for his Official Post in Shu written by Wang Bo. It read:“We may be separated by oceans and thousands of miles, but no distance is too great between good friends.” I take this opportunity, as a good friend, to wish Chen Yuan good health, great joy and happiness as he enters the next stage in life.

Chapter 6 Chen Yuan's Role in Developing China's National Payment System

Andrew Sheng

Introduction

Very few people appreciate how important individual leadership and vision can contribute to national development.From 1989 to 1993, I worked at the World Bank and one of the most significant projects I participated in was the payment system development project in China. The main counterparty of the World Bank in the project was Mr. Chen Yuan, then Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China from 1988 to 1998.

Between 1986-88, the World Bank undertook a major financial sector study for the Chinese Government that recommended far-reaching reforms to the banking system and financial markets. The 1980s was a period when the People's Bank of China（PBC）was embarking on wide sweeping reform and development programs to deepen the monetary and financial markets in China that would also enable the PBC to undertake central banking functions to support the banking and financial needs of a fast growing economy. It was becoming clear that China needed a new and modern payment system with the capacity for annual transaction volumes projected to dramatically increase by 5 to 10 times to 7 billion items by 2000. Monetary policy simply could not be executed without well-functioning payment and clearing systems and efficient money and capital markets.

In 1990, the PBC began planning for the design of a new payment system for China and subsequently obtained technical and financial assistance from the World Bank in 1992 for a period of 10 years until 2002. Chen Yuan helmed this China Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project[1]on the PBC side, which had many components, but the Payments System component was central to the Project. The construction and implementation of what is now referred to as the China National Automated Payment Systems（CNAPS）went for international tendering in 1994.

CNAPS was indeed one of the most important, complex and longest-running project led by Chen Yuan that required considerable local and international expertise. Planning of the project began in 1990 but because of its enormity and complexity, it took a decade-and-a-half for the key financial infrastructure of China's payment system to evolve from its paper-based manual beginnings to its present-day sophistication. With the support of the World Bank, the PBC formed a top-level Steering Committee chaired by Chen Yuan.The Committee was advised by two Advisory Groups, a domestic group comprising banking, accounting and technical experts from within China, and an International Advisory Panel of Experts.Among the Chinese experts were Li Ruogu, currently the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of China, Yin Fusheng（retired）, then Director General of the Payments Department and Li Yao, currently the Director-General of the Payments Department.The international experts comprised Peter Allsop from the Bank of England, Takashi Anzai from the Bank of Japan, Hermann-Josef Persé from the Deutsche Bundesbank, Israel Sendrovic of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the late Christian Vital of the Swiss National Bank.In terms of state-of-the-art knowledge on payment systems, it was the finest collection of experts who were themselves at the cutting edge of designing and implementing modern real time gross settlement systems（RTGS）in the advanced markets.

I was privileged to be the Project Manager from the World Bank side when I was Senior Manager of the Financial Development Department of the World Bank and was ably succeeded by Robert Keppler, an experienced payments specialist, when I left the Bank to become the Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in October 1993.

Conceptualizing the Payment System in China

The transformation of a payment system from manual accounting under a centrally planned economy to a modern automated system was a huge task by any standards. It involved the complete transformation of the banking and accounting procedures as well as the regulatory and legal framework[2].We were fortunate that Mr. Chen Yuan showed outstanding leadership, vision and energy to push through the project from the beginning.

From the outset of the project in 1990, the PBC had stated that the primary objectives of the China National Automated Payment System were to:

·Strengthen macro-economic management；

·Reduce float, speed up the circulation of funds and increase the efficiency of funds transmission；

·Improve convenience and service to users；

·Achieve a reliable, secure and integrated payment, clearing and settlement system to meet the needs of a growing economy； and

·Expand flexibly and modularly to suit Chinese conditions.

The design, establishment and operation of the national payment system were to adopt the following guiding principles:

·Universal access by all financial institutions；

·Cost efficiency and self-financing through cost recovery；

·Minimization of payment system risks；

·Integrity and reliability；

·Appropriate user participation in system development and implemen-tation； and

·Cost minimization in system design through trade-off between operational requirements and regulatory measures.After four years of careful and detailed planning, the design concept and vision of the new payment system took shape, combining the best of international practices and standards while meeting the realities of existing conditions in China.

The realities of implementing a payment system in China in the 1990s centerd around culture, volume and infrastructure. The consumer sector in China was not yet an active participant in payments of a non-cash nature. This significantly limited the payment system volume to high value business payments with no lower value consumer payments. However, working on the basis of projections that potential volume will accelerate in line with double-digit growth in the Chinese economy, led by the rapid expansion of the special economic zones, the importance of building a nationwide payment system was not an option. The key design elements, customized to suit China's unique conditions and stage of development, would have to include the following:

·Need for electronic delivery for non-local items to overcome China's vast geographical size;

·Reliance on credit-based payments for non-local payments to provide greater certainty than debit payments.Credit payment instruments are better suited for truncation purposes;

·Need to accommodate debit payments for local transactions;

·Need for a clear migration plan from a hybrid/automated system in the initial stages to outward migration of automation from the urban centers when the country has the capacity to absorb automated technology;

·Need for cost management.The conceptual framework that evolved comprised two major components—the payment processing system, called the China National Automated Payment Systems（CNAPS）and the underlying nationwide computer telecommunications network called the China National Financial Network（CNFN）, which supports the payments processing. The CNFN will connect the extensive branches of the PBC with the commercial banks and other financial institutions all over the country and provide convenient, rapid, safe and efficient message transfer services, while reinforcing central bank monetary policy.

What I remembered was fascinating was the choice of either using low-level satellites to transmit information across China or to build a fiber-optic landline national telecommunications network.The satellite system was built by the PBC, but eventually, the fiber-optic landline was built and thereby provided sufficient backup telecommunication infrastructure to support a robust national payment system.

CNAPS integrated two levels of financial payment services. At the first level, CNAPS incorporated a High Value Payment System（HVPS）, whereby the banks settle all their interbank payments across the books of the central bank on a real time gross settlement basis. At the second level, the banks and finance companies provide flexible and multiple financial services for their clients.

The PBC was entrusted to develop this complex project, considered as one of the largest and most challenging in the financial history of China. A project office was established within the PBC to undertake the implementation work, assisted by an international firm of consultants. Construction of the system began in 1996 upon the award of the contract and it took almost ten years for the core component of CNAPS, the High Value Payment System, to be commissioned nationwide as a real time gross settlement system（RTGS）in 2005.

By way of comparison, the RTGS of the US Federal Reserve System, Fedwire was implemented in 1970, that of Germany in 1987, BOJ-NET of Japan in 1988, CHAPS of the United Kingdom in 1996, and CHATS of Hong Kong also in 1996.

The Formative Years of CNAPS

In many respects, payment systems in China, as in other countries, are driven by the requirements of the central bank and the banks to ensure the smooth and secure transfer of funds between payers and their payees.All users want a system that is cost-effective, convenient and easy to use. Yet, in modern society, payment systems are taken for granted as a social infrastructure or plumbing that exists and we worry about the infrastructure only when it breaks down.

The most challenging issues of payments system development were addressed in the years leading up to and during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan（2006-2010）. This period was significant as major reforms took place in the banking system, with the reform and listing of the largest state-owned banks beginning in 2002, the establishment of the China Banking Regulatory Commission in 2003, and rapid adoption of modern payment methods, such as credit cards, debit cards and internet payment systems, such as Taobao（operated by Alibaba.com）.

As the China economy began to take off with economic growth that averaged 10.5 percent between 2006 and 2010, the high rate of urbanization, rising income and sophistication in trade and consumption patterns made increasingly higher demands on better payment and fund transfer services.

To understand the complexity of setting up a national automated payment system in China, it is useful to look at the architecture of China's banking sector. Since 1979, China's mono-bank system had become a two-tiered banking system, comprising the PBC as the central bank and a group of other financial services providers, namely, the four major state-owned commercial banks[3], a group of listed and public-owned commercial banks, the policy banks[4] and the branches and representative offices of the foreign banks.

For purpose of payment, clearing and settlement, the Chinese banking structure is complex because each commercial bank has many branches at five major levels of administration—central（headquarters）, provincial, city, county and village—each operating virtually as a separate entity and having its own well-defined hierarchy based on geographical territory. One of the first tasks of modernization involved centralizing and standardizing codes, processes and procedures within the same banking organization which may maintain separate accounts with the PBC, each requiring a separate payments processing point.

Since the end of 1996, all the four major state-owned commercial banks have operated their own nationwide electronic intra-bank funds transfer systems. More than two-thirds of all non-local payment volume were cleared through these intra-bank clearing systems. What had still not changed despite the introduction of the national electronic inter-bank system（EIS）in 1996 was that all the commercial bank branches continued to hold a clearing account with their local PBC office because a particular commercial bank's intra-bank clearing system cannot settle the intra-bank payment transactions.

CNAPS set out to change this fragmented environment by establishing the technical infrastructure to modernize China's payment system through a nationwide data communication network which connects various banking institutions to the national and regional processing centers. This supporting technical infrastructure, called the China National Financial Network（CNFN）, covers the components of CNAPS, namely the High Value Payment System（HVPS）, the Bulk Electronic Payment System（BEPS）for processing payment transactions of low value, bank card authorization system and a book-entry system for the settlement of Government Securities. Over time, the approximately 2000 Local Clearing Houses（LCH）owned and operated by the PBC continued to exist to facilitate the exchange and settlement of all local inter-bank and most local intra-bank payments at the city and county levels were automated and consolidation and centralization improved.

The High Value Payment System represents the core of CNAPS.Given its importance, this system is owned and operated by the PBC as a real time gross settlement system that went nationwide in 2005. It provides same-day settlement for interbank transfers, payment transactions in financial markets, securities markets, foreign exchange markets, among others. It also provides for the net settlement for BEPS, LCHs, Bank Card Payment and the intra-bank funds transfer systems of the major commercial banks. In other words, the high-value payment system is to connect the regional economy and the local financial centers into an integrated national market, without distinguishing national payments from local ones, and inter-bank payments from intra-bank payments so long as the direct participants, namely the commercial banks, hold RMB reserve accounts with the PBC. Direct participants also include the city-level branches of the PBC. Indirect participants are the commercial banks which have no direct link to the HVPS and entrust direct participants to submit and receive interbank payments. Indirect participants also include the county-level branches of PBC. Chartered participants were approved by PBC to have direct access to the payment system as a third party, for purpose of handling specified payment transactions by HVPS. At the end of 2010, there were 1,729 direct participants, 100,510 indirect participants and six chartered participants.

With respect to the payment system, this highly decentralized PBC account structure is not only an obstacle to the implementation of an integrated system but also subjects the HVPS to various risks that include liquidity risk, credit risk, legal risk and operational risk. The requirement for every local branch to hold three accounts with their local PBC branch did not support the conduct of monetary policy. Segregating the nation's banking system makes banking supervision more difficult and impedes efficient cash management by commercial banks themselves. The thinking was for CNAPS to move into the consolidation and centralization of PBC accounts, by having all branches of the same commercial bank to hold only one consolidated account and to have one entry point into the payment system. This would simplify clearing and settlement of non-local payments and will facilitate the settlement of LCHs net balances and intra-bank fund transfer transactions. These proposals will be addressed in a second generation of CNAPS that is underway under China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan（2011-2015）.

Latest Developments

The PBC and other authorities, in collaboration with the banks, have made significant headway in integrating China's payment and settlement systems. In terms of operations, the High-Value Payment System（HVPS）, accounted for 68 percent of the entire payment system turnover in 2011, having registered impressive growth since it was launched nationwide in 2005 as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 China's High-Value Payment System（2006-2011）

Source: People's Bank of China, China Payment Development Report, 2006-2010; People's Bank of China, Annual Report, 2011.

As shown in Table 2,China's HVPS had the highest volume of transactions in 2011 when compared with the large value transfer systems of other major economies. Its transactions value well exceeded those of Brazil and Hong Kong. However, the value processed by the HVPS was low in terms of turnover of GDP, suggesting significant room for growth.

Table 2 A Comparison of Large Value Payment Systems in Selected Countries in 2011

Source: Committee on Payments and Settlements Systems（CPSS）,Statistics on payment, clearing and settlement systems in the CPSS countries, Figures for 2011, Bank for International Settlements, January 2013.

CNAPS has also to a large extent fulfilled the international standards of the G10 Committee for Payment & Settlement Systems（CPSS）Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems. As a component of the IMF and World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program, a detailed assessment of CNAPS was conducted in 2010, following which a Detailed Assessment of Observance of CPSS was published in March 2012[5].The main focus was on the HVPS as the Bulk Electronic Payment System（BEPS）has yet to gain significance in terms of value of transactions. The recommendations of the FSAP team covered the following key areas for improvement of the HVPS:

1.Legal foundation:The Chinese authorities should accelerate the legislative process to complete the reform of the legal and regulatory framework for payment and securities settlement.

2.Understanding and management of risks:The PBC should provide participants with information on the measures it has taken to mitigate risks and the projects underway to eliminate them. The PBC should also strengthen the monitoring of credit risk and liquidity risk by improving relevant rules and building a second-generation payment system.

3.Security and operational reliability, and contingency arrangements: The second-generation payment system should have a more efficient operation and maintenance mechanism as well as a back-up system with enhanced features, such as complete production recovery capability.

4.Efficiency and practicality of the system: To increase efficiency and practicality to the users, three main features of the existing system should be adjusted, such as the multiple access point feature, high cost of the high value electronic transactions in relation to large value cheque transactions and extension of the operating hours of CNAPS.

5.Criteria for participation: PBC's plan to revise the administrative measures for screening banking institutions accessing and exiting the payment system was strongly encouraged.

6.Governance of the payment system:Greater involvement of system participants in the second generation project and eventual creation of a formal users' group to facilitate cooperation and foster better performance of the system over time.

7.Central bank responsibilities in applying the core principles: The PBC should provide details of its policy stance in payment system oversight in a publicly available document, not only efficiency and reliability of the payment system but also the promotion of competition and the protection of consumer interests.The Chinese authorities noted that there were significant achievements so far, particularly the bankcards payment system and other retail payment systems run by private sectors. Online payment, mobile payment and telephone payment have been developing dramatically. In particular, the PBC launched a nationwide identity authentication system of accounts with the Police Bureau to implement the “know your customer” scheme.

Moving into the Twelfth Five-Year Plan（2011-2015）

Under the current Twelfth Five-Year Plan（2011-2015）, CNAPS would have to respond to the dramatic increases in the volume and magnitude of fund transfers, the internationalization of the Renminbi, the changes in technology and the advent of a digital economy on international standards.

In May 2011, the Payment and Clearing Association of China（PCAC）was established in Beijing as a national non-profit organization operating under the guidance and oversight of the PBC.This was a recognition that it is important to establish a market-based system for payment services that combines government supervision with self-regulation to help to reduce operational costs, improve the effectiveness of supervision, facilitate market innovation and ensure the safe and efficiency of the payment and settlement system.

In order to improve transparency and access to information, the PBC has followed the international practice of public disclosure by publishing annually a China Payment System Development Report.The first was published in 2006, and gradually the data on payment systems have improved to allow the market to analyze and forecast payment system trends and services.

In January 2012, the PBC issued the Guidelines for Development of China's Payment and Settlement Systems（2011-2015）. The document set up clear policy direction and emphasized priority areas in the development of future payment systems. These included:

1. Improving the laws and regulations to lay a solid legal foundation for the development of the payment system.

2. Practical improvement of the financial infrastructure for a highly efficient and robust network for securities and capital market settlement systems.

3. Encouraging the development and innovation of non-cash payment instruments and their widespread application and coverage.

4. Improving customer service and enhancing public awareness of consumer rights.

5. Strengthening the management and oversight of the payment system for efficient and robust operations.

6. Increasing international connectivity and international cooperation in payment systems.Finally, the development of the national payment system will move in the direction of widening the payments net domestically and also internationally.

In 2011, the PBC facilitated the promotion of bankcard deposit withdrawal services in rural areas not covered by the financial network. A PBC Notice on Promoting Bankcard Service for Helping Farmers Draw Money issued in 2012 stipulated that by the end of 2013, such services should cover all rural townships and villages to form a so-called “green payment corridor”.[6]

At the international level, the PBC participated actively in international conferences to exchange experiences and to foster cooperation in payments and settlements. The PBC held the chair of the Working Group on Payment and Settlement Systems（WGPPS）of the Executive's Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks（EMEAP）in 2011. As a member of the Commission of Payments and Settlements（CPSS）of the G10, it completed the China's Payment, Clearing and Settlement System（CPSS Red Book）, available in Chinese and English. The PBC also held bilateral conferences with its counterparts in Europe, Hong Kong and South East Asia to exchange experiences and to strengthen cross border cooperation.

Conclusion

It is quite clear that since the pioneering days of CNAPS under the leadership of Mr. Chen Yuan, the Chinese payment system has moved from a rudimentary system to become one of the more sophisticated systems that has extended its coverage both domestically and internationally. Much remains to be done, since the economy continues to advance in both speed and complexity. Even as the Renminbi becomes more international, and Chinese trade, investments and payments become more important at the global level, the payment system needs to evolve with the times.

We should therefore acknowledge the important contributions of the international and domestic experts under the leadership of Mr. Chen Yuan, who laid down the blueprint, with the help of the World Bank, in shaping an important financial infrastructure for China.

References

Bank for International Settlements,Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Statistics on payment, clearing and settlement systems in the CPSS countries: Figures for 2011, January, 2013.

EMEAP Working Group on Payment and Settlement Systems,Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in EMEAP Economies: China, Updated 2012.

Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Global Payment Systems, 1996, Hong Kong.

International Monetary Fund & The World Bank,Financial Sector Assessment Program, People's Republic of China: CPSS Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, Detailed Assessment of Observance, March 2012, Washington, D.C.

People's Bank of China,China Payment System Development Report, Annual Series 2006-2010, Beijing.

People's Bank of China, Annual Report, 2011,Beijing.

People's Bank of China, Guideline for Development of China's Payment and Settlement Systems（2011-2015）, January 2012, Beijing.

The People's Republic of China International Tendering Company of China National Instruments Import & Export Corporation（CNIIEC）,China Financial Technical Sector Assistance Project: National Payment and Clearing System of the People's Bank of China, Bidding Documents, Volumes I and II, February 1994, Beijing.

The World Bank,Implementation Completion Report（TF-27221;IDA-24230;SCL-4570）on a Credit in the Amount of SDR42.1 million & a Supplemental Loan in the Amount of US$8 million to the People's Republic of China for a Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project, Report No. 25455, 31 March 2003, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, Washington, D.C.

[1] http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/03/2350336/china-financial-sector-technical-assistance-project

[2] See Chen Yuan, China National Automated Payment System （CNAPS）， Plan and Practice, Global Payments System, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 1996, pp 41-46.

[3] These are the Industry and Commercial Bank of China（ICBC）, the Agricultural Bank of China（ABC）, the Bank of China（BOC）and the Construction Bank of China（CBC）.

[4] The three policy banks established in 1994 to finance economic and trade development and state-investment projects were the Agricultural Development Bank of China（ADBC）, China Development Bank（CDB）and the Export-Import Bank of China（Chexim）.

[5] IMF/World Bank, Financial Sector Assessment Program, People's Republic of China, CPSS Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, Detailed Assessment of Observance, March 2012.

[6] Source, People's Bank of China, Annual Report 2011, pp 66.

Chapter 7 Functions and Market Positioning of Development Financial Institutions and Commercial Banks

Ng Kee Choe

Since China's accession to the WTO, much efforts have been directed to understanding the impact that foreign entrants to the Chinese financial sector will have on the Chinese commercial banks. Comparatively, the focus on development financial institutions（DFIs）, in the same context, has been much less intense. In this paper, I shall share my thoughts on the initiatives that DFIs need to embark on, and the roles which they can play as they continue to discharge their responsibilities in a rapidly changing economic and financial environment.

China's future development agenda will be shaped by several key factors:

·Continued rapid economic growth;

·Its entry into the WTO;

·The adoption of a regional development strategy; and

·Deepening economic reforms.

These factors have widespread implications for the structure of China's banking system and its major players, which will continue to interme-diate the capital allocation process. The commercial banking sector needs to reform itself to meet the impending competition posed by foreign entrants. The structural issues that require remedying include asset quality and capitalization, risk management, corporate governance, standard of financial reporting, as well as operating efficiency.

Despite the difference in business scope and function, DFIs too need to pay attention to the same issues that commercial banks are now grappling with. In this regard, CDB has made significant progress in adopting international best practices that are essential to transforming CDB into a, and I quote Governor Chen Yuan, “sound top-ranking international bank.”Looking forward, CDB will do well to steadfastly pursue this objective, not only to make itself useful and relevant in a changing environment,but also to maintain its soundness and international repute. CDB must thus stay the course to strengthen itself, maintaining strong capitalization and asset quality, practising the highest standard of corporate governance and risk management, and broadening and deepening its capabilities especially in human resources and technology.

As commercial banks in China progressively jettison any residual legacy policy lending, the policy lending function will reside solely with DFIs. The multitude of state-sponsored development projects will mean that there will be a continuing need and role for DFIs in policy lending. Thus, going forward, I envisage CDB to continue with its role as China's foremost DFI.

However, I can also envisage CDB taking on expanded activities which are commercially driven and based on sound banking principles. In this regard, CDB can and should leverage on its core competencies to develop concurrently, on a parallel track so to say, in activities such as the provision of long-term finance, project finance, investment banking services and advisory services as well. Such activities, in my view, are consistent with the development role and function expected of DFIs.

Let me elaborate by giving a couple of examples what CDB can do. One, CDB can aim to be the leading provider of long-term finance in China. CDB can originate, lead, arrange and underwrite the financing for infrastructure and other projects working in collaboration with domestic and foreign commercial banks, and other financial institutions including insurance companies and institutional investors. In so doing, CDB will also act as mobilizer of commercial funds to finance economic development in China. CDB can also provide credit enhancement for projects by extending guarantees against credit and political risks, and by becoming the leader in long term and project finance, CDB will become the preferred bank of choice or the natural conduit for other banks wanting to participate in financing China's growth and development.

Two, CDB can offer investment banking and corporate advisory services to local enterprises as they continue on the path towards modernization in a market-driven economy. Conceivably, there will be a need for advisory services in areas such as corporate and financial restructuring, financial management and risk management. In line with this, I note that CDB has already laid out plans to increase its lendings to commercial banks to help improve the access of SMEs to financing. To fill critical gaps and/or to accelerate its entry into these new areas of activities, CDB can consider collaborating with selected foreign financial institutions via strategic alliances or joint-ventures.

As China makes further advancement and as it liberalizes its financial sector, it will be necessary for its development financial institutions to evolve so as to remain relevant and useful. What I have proposed is for CDB to evolve and expand its activities by leveraging on its competencies while concurrently discharging its policy lending function. By pursuing this “dual track” policy, CDB will play a key and pivotal role in providing financial and related services to further promote economic development in China, a role which, I believe, is consistent with its charter.

Chapter 8 Foreign Insurers in China：Meeting Challenges, Facilitating Change

Jacques Kemp

China's insurance market has developed at an astonishing pace, establishing a fully fledged framework for market supervision, nurturing a sizeable homegrown insurance sector, and taking significant steps to opening up to foreign participation in the space of just two short decades.

Amid the country's gradual integration with the global marketplace, as of May 2013, a total of 53 foreign insurers from 14 countries and areas have received licences to operate in China.[1]

This essay will examine the different approaches these foreign insurers have taken to establishing a business in China and look at how regulators and market participants can work together, based on common objectives, to drive the development of the industry. It will also discuss the path of development for China's insurance industry and the role foreign insurers can play in the industry's continued evolution.

Taking the Joint Venture Route

Most foreign insurers have chosen to enter China through joint ventures and many in alliances with domestic companies from non-insurance sectors. This model has appealed to foreign insurers because it gives the foreign insurer a higher level of management control and greater freedom to shape the business.

In addition, non-insurance partners allow the foreign insurer to work with a clean slate in building their joint ventures, which means being able to build a sales force from the ground up rather than face the challenge of re-training an existing group of insurance agents, who have already been indoctrinated by vastly different corporate practices.

On the downside, joint ventures can prove to be fragile alliances and ones involving cross-cultural alliances especially so. In order to succeed over the long run, the Sino-foreign insurance joint venture needs to be built upon a shared vision, which combines the experience, technical expertise and management practices of the foreign partner with the local market knowledge, connections and distribution strength of the local partner.

In particular, the joint venture partners need to ensure they have built a consensus regarding expectations for the business. Depending on its rate of expansion, a life insurance start-up enterprise may take as many as seven years to break even. At some insurance joint ventures, this wait for profit has become a source of tension, with the domestic partner running low on patience because a clear road map for building the business was not established and agreed upon at the outset.

Because joint venture insurance companies in China will take years to become profitable and in the meantime drain capital as they expand, foreign insurers have also preferred cash-rich domestic partners. This is a critical issue given the high prudential requirements set by the regulators for opening new branches. While the minimum registered capital for the establishment of a joint venture insurance company is RMB200 million, the enterprise must subsequently add RMB20 million to its registered capital for each new branch it opens unless its total registered capital has reached RMB500 million.

Identifying Strategic Investments

Rather than establish a joint venture, some foreign insurers and financial institutions have elected to enter China's insurance market through strategic investments in domestic insurers.These investments generally require a greater initial capital commitment than a joint venture, but provide the foreign insurer with a quicker path into the China market. While a joint venture may need 15 years to establish a nationwide presence, the strategic investment provides the foreign insurer with wide market exposure instantly.

This has appealed particularly to foreign insurers that have arrived late to China. As the competitive landscape has changed dramatically in recent years, with the market becoming increasingly overcrowded, making strategic investments has become an increasingly attractive option compared with the prospect of starting up a business from scratch.

Strategic investments are also attracting foreign insurers that have already made substantial inroads into the China market through joint ventures, as they can open the door to synergistic relationships with a domestic insurer.

However, strategic investments do not afford the level of operational and boardroom control most foreign insurers would like. Regulations restrict the shareholding which a single foreign insurer can own in a domestic insurer to 20 percent, although total permitted foreign ownership capped at 25 percent. If foreign ownership in a Chinese insurer increases to more than 25 percent, the enterprise is reclassified as a foreign-funded enterprise.

Thus, the foreign insurer making a strategic investment investing must restrict itself to a role in which it serves more as consultant to the Chinese insurance company, although it can still provide a certain level of leadership within this capacity.

For the domestic investor, the strategic investment brings two main benefits: a capital infusion and the opportunity to tap into international management experience and risk management expertise. The sale of a strategic stake to a foreign insurer often represents a commitment by the domestic insurer to embrace organizational change. This may include the restructuring of operations, a new business direction, or the adoption of international best management practices, improved corporate governance and advanced risk management techniques. Foreign strategic shareholders help facilitate such change by making their global resources available to Chinese insurers.

Banks' Investment in Insurance Industry

In 2008, the China Banking Regulatory Commission（CBRC）and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission（CIRC）jointly released the Memorandum of Understanding on Strengthening the Supervisory Cooperation and Cross-industry Cooperation of Banks and Insurers, which allowed banks' investment in insurance companies. To realize the initiative, China Banking Regulatory Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Commission worked together to give this special regulatory approval.

In September 2009, the Bank of Communications was the first bank approved by the CIRC to acquire 51 percent stake in CMG Life Insurance. And in the following two or three years, Bank of Beijing spent RMB680 million for the 50 percent stake of Beijing Capital Group in ING Capital Life; Bank of China acquired the entire equity interest of its non-life insurance company; the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China（ICBC）took 60 percent share of AXA by RMB1.2 billion; China Construction Bank concluded the deal of acquiring 51 percent share of Pacific Antai Life;and Agricultural Bank of China signed the subscription agreement with JIAHE Life in February 2011, JIAHE sold a 51 percent stake to the Agricultural Bank of China through private placement of 1.0367 billion shares.

A more optimistic expectation is that the cooperation between banks and insurance companies may be quite complementary to each other and achieve win-win results, and such banking-invested insurance companies might become a strong combination in the market. Commercial banks could allocate more resources in the promotion and distribution of their own insurance products after such acquisition, while insurance companies may leverage their expertise in producing more tailor-made products to customers. According to the statistics, the premium income of BoCom Life has been increased more than seven times from RMB84 million in 2009 to RMB712 million in 2010 after Bank of Communications' equity investment.

It is interesting to see that the five state-owned commercial banks have all become the controlling party of the invested insurance companies, while some foreign insurers of the joint ventures, e.g., AXA and Sunlife, became the minority owners after such acquisition. Although foreign insurers can take advantage of the large networks of the domestic banks, this is by no means an easy way as they lose some of the bargaining power in the board as the equity shares decreased.

Moreover, the regulatory party has been cautious to such cooperation. The CBRC and the CIRC have taken measures to ensure a sound cooperation will prevail. In November 2009, the CBRC released the Supervision Rules for the Pilot Investment of Commercial Banks to Insurance Companies, in which many terms have been adopted to control the risks of such cooperation; for example, each commercial bank can only invest in one insurance company; senior management sent by commercial banks to insurance companies should cancel the wages and labor contract relationship with commercial banks, and should not become part-time staff for each other; and commercial banks are not allowed to force the customers to buy the products of its invested insurance companies as the precondition of providing banking services.

Although it is too early to judge the real consequences of this new trend by allowing banks to invest in insurance companies, the new initiative opens a window for banks to further leverage their resources and provides more investment opportunities. Many commercial banks have the intention at the very beginning, although they do not finalize a deal either because of the policy limitation or because of the difficulty to find an appropriate target.

Evolving Market Dynamics

As market access has been gradually raised following China's entry into the WTO, foreign insurers have enjoyed significant business growth, although their premium income remains relatively small.

As at the end of May 2013, foreign funded insurance ventures generated a combined RMB28.0 billion in premiums, representing a 3.6 percent market national share. Foreign life insurers contributed the bulk of this business, generating RMB25.1 billion in premiums, which represented a 4.9 percent market share（compared with 1.8 percent in 2000）. Foreign non-life insurers generated RMB2.9 billion in premiums for a 1.1 percent market share（compared with 0.5 percent in 2000）.[2]

These market share figures reflect the vastly greater reach enjoyed by domestic insurers across the entire China market. Without the sales network to compete with domestic insurers on these terms, foreign insurers have chosen instead to focus on the major coastal cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Tianjin, where there is strong economic activity.

Foreign insurers have achieved a much greater degree of success within this narrow geographical focus. In Shanghai, foreign insurers have grown their market share from 14 percent in 2003 to 17 percent in 2009, before stabilizing at 14 percent in 2011.

With these urban markets now reaching saturation point（a total of 120 life and non-life insurance companies were licensed to operate in Shanghai by year-end 2011）, later entrants to China are opting to develop hinterland markets.

Meanwhile, the national insurance market continues to grow at an astounding pace. From 2001 to the end of 2012, insurance premium income in China has surged at a compound annual rate of more than 20 percent, reaching RMB1.5 trillion at the end of 2012, compared with RMB143.0 billion at the beginning of 2001. During the same period, life insurance premiums increased over 14 times from RMB128.8 billion in 2001 to RMB1.9 trillion in 2012.

The growth of the insurance market will be driven by the growth of affluence, which will see consumers spend more on items such as cars, houses and travel, as well as the ageing population, which will raise demand for medical insurance and savings plans.

Chart: Insurance Premium Growth

Source:Year Book of China's Insurance, 2012 and Data Statistics on the website of China Insurance Regulatory Commission.

The Labor Shortage and Knowledge Sharing Challenge

While many observers would like to see the insurance industry given freer rein to develop at its own speed, the pace of expansion has to be tempered by the limitations of human resources.

One of the main points in the supply of skilled labor identified by analysts is the quality of education. While China is churning out graduates at a remarkable rate, the proportion of graduates that have enjoyed the standard and relevance of education needed to function in a world class company remains relatively small. Observers believe China must look to overhaul its educational system to ensure the quality of university graduates improves over the long term.

Recruitment and training have become the single biggest challenge for all market participants. In market studies and reports, foreign joint ventures have voiced concerns over the lack of suitable personnel to fill positions across the entire spectrum of careers in the insurance industry from sales, to actuaries and underwriters, to internal auditors and other back office staff. This problem is likely to persist given many foreign insurers estimate they need to expand headcount by as much a 133 percent in the next three years to maintain the targeted pace of expansion.

The quality of staff has a strong bearing on the effectiveness of distribution channels. Without the right training, sales personnel have the knowledge to sell only a limited range of products. For example, through the bancassurance channel, which is estimated to generate some 20 percent of the premiums in the life market, insurers have been confined to underwriting mostly low margin and single premium products, because the sales staff at bank branches do not have sufficient training to sell more sophisticated offerings.

Amid the shortage of experienced, qualified industry professionals, staff turnover rates have increased to alarming levels. It has been reported that in some organizations, staff turnover is as high as 40 percent.[3] To ensure experienced staff staying on board, insurers have to raise salaries, yet surveys of employees suggest the Chinese worker is as motivated by other factors such as career opportunities and work environment, as they are by attractive compensation.

Companies with high staff retention are often found to focus more on providing career development and training opportunities to their employees and then linking these training opportunities back to compensation. The ability to offer a clearly defined merit-based career development path and job rotation within an organization is classic strategy for enhancing staff retention. Employees also respond to companies that have gone the extra mile to build community spirit in the organization through social gatherings and a strong platform for internal communication.

Continued professional development can also be effective in the battle to retain employees, given the high value placed on education, career development and training in Chinese culture. Many foreign joint venture insurance companies are providing the funding for their employees to study for new professional qualifications.

Some foreign funded insurance joint ventures have also established in-house business schools to facilitate regular staff training and educational programs aimed at raising employees' competence and knowledge levels.

Foreign funded ventures and domestic insurers with strategic links to foreign insurers have the advantage of being able to draw upon the global resources available to them to enhance staff retention. With access to a global network of insurance operations, these enterprises can provide local employees with the opportunity to work overseas on year-long assignments or bring overseas experts to China to conduct specialized training for local employees.

In this way, foreign participation in the insurance market is helping to raise the quality and skill level of China's labor pool.

Shared Objectives between the Market and Regulator

While access to markets has increased substantially in the last two decades, many surveys have claimed there is a wide consensus among foreign insurers that market liberalization has not been implemented at a pace consistent with China's trade agreements in the wake of its accession to the World Trade Organization.

Regulatory procedures for new branch openings are one of the main points of contention, with domestic insurers able to apply for multiple branch openings concurrently whilst foreign applications are processed sequentially. In addition, investment management regulations appear to be skewed in favor of the big domestic insurers. Prudential requirements for opening an insurance asset management company, for example, are set at a level that makes internal investment management prohibitive to all but the largest Chinese insurers.

Tackling such issues should be seen as part of a broader challenge faced by China in creating an efficient and effective regulatory environment for the insurance and financial services industry, which both the regulator and market participants need to work together to overcome.

The development of a sound financial regulatory system should be based on shared objectives that the financial services firms and regulators can work together to achieve, according to the Institute of International Finance, a worldwide association established to promote risk management and the development of best practices and standards in the global financial services industry. These shared goals are economic growth and competition, stability and security in the financial system, and consumer protection and customer services.

Based on these shared fundamental aspirations, a broad consensus on guiding principles can be developed to provide a framework for China's insurance industry and broader financial services sector to increase the efficiency of regulatory processes.

International cooperation is required to ensure the regulatory environment in China addresses issues raised by the global expansion of financial services companies and the increasingly integrated nature of financial markets. Regulators can reduce differences and duplication in the regulation of institutions operating across multiple jurisdictions through solutions such as standardization and mutual recognition.

Regular open dialogue between market participants and regulators promotes the identification of regulatory needs and improves the quality and effectiveness of public policy. A disciplined and methodical process of consultation, which engages the industry and other stakeholders at the earliest possible stage in the formulation of rule changes, is the backbone of this dialogue and can enhance the effectiveness of regulation.

It is also for the mutual benefit of the regulators and the industry when legislation is not reactive but based on proactive policy goals. Regulation should also be expressed in terms of principle, clearly articulated to the public, and involve the minimum rules needed to achieve its aim.

Regulators also need to guard against over-regulation. Legislative change should be used only when the industry itself cannot reasonably be expected to find a path to achieve a policy goal or solve a problem. An approach that encourages industry self supervision has historically proven to lead to more efficient regulation.

Importance of Continued Market Liberalization

According to a guidance report on insurance regulation in emerging markets by the International Association of Insurance Supervisor（IAIS）, stability in an emerging insurance market can only be achieved “when prudential standards are met and when markets operate competitively, professionally and transparently in an international environment.”[4]

When competition is allowed to flow, foreign market participants can help emerging markets to develop by raising the bar on service quality, bringing product innovation, and transferring technological knowledge and best management practices. Increased competition also leads to the specialization of services by insurance companies looking to develop competitive advantages. The results are improved services and market efficiency, which ultimately benefits the consumer.

To the extent that liberalization will strengthen an emerging insurance industry, it will theoretically also have a wide spectrum of benefits for the whole economy[5].For China, this means the mobilization of the massive national savings that lie dormant in domestic bank accounts to help fund economic development, such as national infrastructure and education projects. With the advantage of decades of international investment experience, foreign insurers could help allocate this capital more efficiently and set a benchmark for domestic insurers.

More importantly, a strong, efficient insurance market will facilitate the transformation of China's social security system from a state-funded pension to a multi-faceted welfare system, which can more capably shoulder the financial burden of its rapidly ageing population.

Concerns regarding Foreign Participation

With some justification, many governments in emerging economies view the development of strong domestic insurance institutions as an essential element of their country's economic and political independence. Arguments that an over-reliance on foreign insurers can compromise national security have some historical basis. A rival nation in conflict could sanction the withdrawal of its domestically-controlled insurers to cripple trade, although it is also true that exposure to foreign insurers could be diversified through the regulatory process to minimize such risks.

Another pitfall of foreign participation is the potential outflow of funds through the repatriation of profits. But the outflow of funds could be offset by the additional inflow of foreign direct investment, which a stronger, more developed insurance industry driven by foreign participation, may bring.

Overall, there would appear more to gain from opening up the insurance market to foreign participation than there is to lose, so long as the liberaliza-tion is accompanied by a sound regulatory framework.

Educating the Market

Education may have a significant role to play in the development of China's insurance market going forward, as the majority of Chinese consumers continue to view insurance as unnecessary. The mass media could prove an effective channel for changing such attitudes, but China's size and the vastly different needs of various consumer segments suggest that effective education would have to be tailored according to demographic parameters.[6]

In urban areas, educational efforts should focus on the mass-affluent segment of consumers, who can afford life insurance products. The government could target this group by sending out an annual statement summarizing their social-security benefits and pointing out the possible shortfalls in protection and how insurance could help address the issue.

In rural areas, where the basic functions of life insurance are still poorly understood, the problems of communication are much greater. Efforts should start with the consumers most likely to purchase life insurance, such as villagers in thriving areas and people who work for township enterprises.

Driving Market Evolution and Innovation

As China's life insurance industry matures, it is expected to follow a path of development similar to developed markets. This means a process of evolution from straightforward life insurance and savings vehicles, to mutual funds and sophisticated retirement solutions, and finally to bespoke wealth management solutions providing a holistic blend of financial advice, information, products and services.

This evolution through innovation is already well under way as evident in the rate of product development in ING-BOB Life Insurance, one of ING Insurance's joint ventures in China. Since 2003, the firm has extended its product portfolio from non-participating life insurance to participating life insurance, universal life insurance, whole life hospital indemnity medical insurance, and regular and single premium unit-linked insurance products.

As the industry matures, distribution channels will also become more varied. Life insurance companies currently rely heavily on their own branch network and agency sales force in China, but will gradually shift to distribution through independent intermediaries, such as financial planners, banks and independent financial advisors, before adding internet-based distribution channels when consumers become more sophisticated.

Because of the experience they have gleaned from operating in more mature markets, foreign insurers are likely to be among the chief market participants driving this evolution. By bringing innovative new products, marketing approaches and distribution methods, which have been tested in more developed markets, to the China market, foreign insurers can help accelerate the market's development and the penetration of insurance services. Yet they have to ensure that innovation will bring good and sound products to the Chinese market. They should therefore avoid selling to their customers so-called innovative products which are not meeting customer's true needs or carrying too high charges.

They can also be the catalyst for the adoption of more efficient business models in the domestic insurance industry by taking the lead in the use of sophisticated, IT-driven policy administration systems, policy service processes and product development processes.

Diagram: The Path of Market Evolution

Meanwhile, as foreign insurers become more entrenched in China, domestic insurers are expected to begin to extend their reach, especially into countries with sizeable Chinese communities. This is already happening elsewhere in the financial services sector, with the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and other banks lately setting up branches in various cities abroad.

Extraordinary Progress

The youth of China's insurance industry and the extraordinary progress that has been made, especially in the last ten years, must be acknowledged. It should be realized that the seeds of a modern insurance industry were not sown in China until 1980 and a fully-fledged regulatory framework for the industry has only existed since 1995.

Following the Cultural Revolution, the insurance industry was for all intents and purposes shut down, as few Chinese citizens owned personal property and all enterprises were state owned. The People's Insurance Company of China（PICC）, which was created in 1949 to be the country's sole insurer, gradually had its operations downsized until it was only underwriting foreign trade, international cargo and aviation insurance in the late 1950s.[7]

PICC was revived against the backdrop of economic reform in 1980 and, since then, the universe of insurance companies in China has expanded to more than 100 entities. From the turn of the century to 2012, the industry's total assets have increased more than twenty eight times, trending up at a compound annual growth rate of 30 percent from RMB260.4 billion in 2000 to RMB7.3 trillion in 2012.

Insurance business in China has clearly made great strides in a very short space of time, but remains an industry at an early stage of its development with a regulatory framework, which is a work in progress. The desire of foreign market participants for a faster pace of market reform and a more complete regulatory framework must be balanced against the understanding that China's insurance industry has not had the benefit of a relatively smooth, uninterrupted evolution and often has no precedents on which to base regulatory decisions.

Indeed，just as foreign insurers are on a journey of discovery in the China market, so is the country's insurance regulator, which has already achieved much in solidifying the regulatory framework and raising professional standards. And in recent years, the regulatory bodies have further improved the supervision through the development of relevant laws and regulations. The New Insurance Law became effective on October 1，2009, putting more emphasis on customer protection and implementing stricter supervision of branches and tied agency channels. The Ministry of Finance and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission issued a new accounting standard on insurance contracts, under which income from non-insurance-related risks will no longer be treated as premium income. Furthermore, insurers are allowed more investment channels including access to the equity market, infrastructure and some money market financial instruments.

Conclusion

China's insurance market has come a long way in a short time. In order to take the industry further forward, the regulator and the industry need to work in unison to effect change based on the common goals of driving economic growth, upholding financial sector stability and ensuring consumer protection.

Guiding principles for the way insurance companies and the regulator can work together include regular, open dialogue between the regulator and market participants and other stakeholders to improve the quality and effectiveness of regulation, the clear articulation of policy objectives, and the adoption of the least rules possible to achieve them. In addition, policy objectives should encompass a greater focus on driving awareness of the need for insurance among the public through education in schools and other channels.

Going forward, the insurance industry has a critical role in helping China achieve important economic and social objectives. Insurance providers serve as an important conduit through which public savings can be channeled into and allocated efficiently through capital markets to help drive economic growth. The insurance industry also has a critical role to play in the creation of a modern pension system to safeguard the financial security of the country's rapidly aging population.

Foreign insurers can be a catalyst for the changes needed to help the industry achieve these objectives. By providing leadership in product innovation, governance and business practices, foreign insurers can drive the development of greater efficiency, better customer service and consumer protection in the industry.

[1] China Insurance Regulatory Commission（CIRC）website, May 2013.

[2] China Insurance Regulatory Commission（CIRC）website, May 2013.

[3] Foreign insurance companies in China, PricewaterhouseCoopers, September 2007.

[4] Guidance on Insurance Regulation and Supervision for Emerging Market Economies Report, IAIS Emerging Market Issues Committee, September 1997.

[5] Foreign Insurers in Emerging Markets: Issues and Concerns, Harold D. Skipper, Jr., Ph.D. 1997.

[6] A life insurance policy for China, Stephan H. Binder, Heidi Z. Hu, and Peter B. Walker, March 2006.

[7] The Law of Insurance Contracts in the People's Republic of China. A Comparative Analysis of Policyholders' Rights Alberto Monti, University of Milano School of Law and ICER—International center for Economic Research.

Chapter 9 The International Environment and Implications for China[1]

Jacob A. Frenkel

Let me begin by joining Prime Minister Paul Keating in congratula-ting Chairman Chen Yuan for a fantastically productive tenure at China Development Bank. I would also like to welcome and congratulate Chairman Hu Huaibang for his appointment to this new important position. Speaking for my colleagues of the International Advisory Council, you have here a team of strong friends of China Development Bank who will be very happy to continue giving you our fullest support.

The subject of my paper is to provide an overview of the global economic scene. The paper will not focus on China per se, but on the environment in which China operates. Ten or fifteen years ago, talking about the global scene would have been an irrelevant topic for discussion in China or in the Chinese context. But the advancement of China into the world economic scene and into a position of leadership means that talking about the global scene has become an important issue.

I will cover several major trends that have to do with the change in the center of gravity in the world. I will touch briefly on the Euro, and shall also address the situation in the labor markets in the U.S. and Europe and then about the long-term fiscal challenges.

Global Macroeconomic Situation

First, on world growth over the past 20 years or so.

Figure 1 Global GDP Growth

Source: IMF, April 2013, World Economic Outlook（2013 & 2014 forecast）.

Following the deep decline in 2009, the world at large has recovered or at least started to recover（Figure 1）. But our problem today is disparity.Indeed, while on the whole the world has started to recover, the diversity between the industrial and emerging economies is very large（Figure 2）. That diversity was not large fifteen years ago; in fact, fifteen years ago, industrial countries were performing much better than the developing countries. What we have seen in the past decade is that emerging economies are growing about three times faster than the industrial economies.

Figure 2 Real GDP Growth in the World Economy

Source: IMF, April 2013, World Economic Outlook（2013 & 2014 Forecast）.

Furthermore,the industrial economies are also not monolithic.If it were not for the Asian economies, particularly China and India,the world would have been in a very miserable situation. In fact, we see that in 2013, Europe will still grow at a negative rate; growth in the U.S. is mediocre at around 2 percent（Figure 3）.

Figure 3 Real GDP Growth in Selected Countries

Source: IMF, last update April 16 2013, WEO（2013 & 2014 Forecast）for U.S. & Euro area 2013 & 2014 are JPM Forecast last update April 19 2013.

Firstly, the world has obviously changed. If you look at the world 22 years ago, China was under the radar screen, producing only 4 percent of world output. Today it produces 14 percent of world output, representing a huge change（Figure 4）. As a result, Europe is reduced to a smaller role in the world; the U.S. share of world output has also declined, so has Japan's. So the basic story of the changes in the center of gravity is here to stay, and that comes with major consequences.

Figure 4 Global Share of GDP

Source: IMF WEO database, last update April 16, 2013 WEO.

Secondly,on trade, Dr. Kissinger has observed how in the 1970s, the trade between the U.S. and China was less than the U.S. trade with Honduras. Since then, the volume of U.S.-China trade has increased significantly.Arising from this, there is in my judgment a more important point where the public policy debate over U.S.-China trade has been misplaced. Figure 5 shows China at the center of trade on one side with the U.S. and the EU, and on the other side with Asia. If we look at the China versus U.S.-EU nexus, the U.S. and Europe are importing from China about twice the amount that they export to China, hence the big public debate on global imbalance. This debate is misplaced, because in a global world you do not focus on bilateral relationships, you should focus on multilateral relationships.In fact, China's trade with the rest of Asia is twice the volume of trade with Europe and the United States.By taking this into account, China is in fact importing from the rest of Asia more than it exports to it. So in a multilateral world, the focus should be multilateral, too.

Figure 5 China's Role in Global Trade（USD billion）

Source: National Bureau of Statistics China, 12 Months.

The third issue that I want to raise has to do with external imbalances, which has plagued us now for 25-30 years. For a long time, the U.S. overspent relative to its income, and Asia over-saved relative to its income, and as a result, Asia accumulated surpluses while the U.S. had a deficit. This is being perceived as wealth moving from the U.S. to Asia, because of mounting international reserves in China. That phenomenon has recently been changed somewhat, in the sense that the imbalances are now narrowing, even though they may not be getting smaller fast enough（Figure 6）.

Figure 6 Current Account（Balance of Payments）

Source: IMF, last update April 16, 2013, WEO（2013 & 2014 forecast）.

Europe

Turning to Europe, the concept of disparities is most prominent, and that is the essence of the crisis over there. In terms of growth, overall GDP growth for Europe will remain negative for the second consecutive year in 2013, at minus 0.6 percent according to IMF estimates. In fact, growth in most of the countries in Europe is in the negative range, especially in Greece, Spain and Italy.Germany, considered as the locomotive of Europe, is expected to grow at only 0.6 percent in 2013.

So we have in Europe two phenomena: first,Europe is growing very slowly; second, there is a great diversity among the members of the Eurozone. Why is it? The main issue is that the structural policies that originated in Europe have not been implemented to the same extent across the Eurozone. As a result, unemployment rates in Greece and Spain are over 20 percent, compared with less than 7 percent in Germany（Figure 8）.

Figure 7 Real GDP Growth（Euro Area Countries）

Source: IM, last update April 16, 2013, WEO（2012 & 2013 forecast）. For Euro area,Germany, Italy, & Spain, JPM forecast, last update April 18, 2013.

Figure 8 Unemployment Rate（Euro Area Countries）

Source: Eurostat, last observation:Germany（3/13）; Italy, Spain, Euro area（2/13）; Greece（1/13）.

The two groups of countries, primarily Germany versus the South, are facing different types of challenges. If they want to behave like a single economic entity when it comes to economic policy, it will be very difficult, unless there is greater convergence in economic performance. Similarly, if you look at productivity within Europe, Italy lost competitiveness significantly since the beginning of the euro; Germany gained competitiveness while the rest of the Euro countries fall in between. Since the crisis,there have been some improvements in competitiveness as in the case of Spain, where productivity has improved since 2009（Figure 9）. But by and large, the second theme is that competitiveness within Europe remains very diverse.

Figure 9 Unit Labor Costs（Total Economy）

Note: Labor cost per unit of output for the total economy.

Source: OECD, forecast for 2012 & 2013.

What then has sustained Europe?Europe has been sustained by Germany having a very large surplus in its balance of payments vis-à-vis the rest of the European Union countries（Figure 10）. In the last three years or so, some rebalance started to take place, but the phenomenon persists—Germany is the surplus country, and this is the mechanism by which others are financing their spending—through capital markets.

Figure 10 Euro Area Current Account Balance（% of GDP）

Source: IMF, WEO Database, last update April 16, 2013, WEO（2013 & 2014 forecast）.

Figure 11 10-Year Sovereign Bond Spreads

Source: Bloomberg, Reuters, last update April 19, 2013.

Capital markets in Europe for a long period have mis-priced risk（Figure 11）. It made no sense whatsoever that since the introduction of the euro until the emergence of the crisis Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Greece could borrow at rates that were similar to the borrowing rate of Germany. For a long time, the markets treated all sovereign borrowers as equal and belonging to the same class. What we have learned since the eruption of the crisis is that not all sovereigns are the same and that the markets must price the risks according to the different degree of riskiness of the sovereign.

Labor Markets

Let me turn to the labor markets. Unemployment is a very important issue for economic, political and social reasons.In the past few years, the sharp decline in the unemployment rate in the U.S. and a very sharp rise in unemployment in Europe has led to the conclusion that the U.S. is doing pretty well when it comes to labor markets（Figure 12）.

Figure 12 Unemployment Rate（U.S. & Euro area）

Source: Eurostat and BLS. Last observation for Euro area: February 2013; for U.S.: March 2013.

However, in reality,the U.S. is not doing so well when it comes to labor markets. In fact, the decline in the unemployment rate in the U.S. and the rise in the unemployment rate in Europe to a large extent does not reflect the creation of new jobs, but rather changes in labor force participation. During this decade, labor force participation in the U.S. has declined sharply, and labor force participation in Europe has risen sharply, and to some extent the changes in the unemployment rate really reflect these factors, rather than a more satisfactory labor market（Figure 13）.

Figure 13 Labor Force Participation（U.S. and Euro area）

Source: Eurostat and BLS. Last observation for Euro area:November 2013; for U.S.: March 2013.

Two points need to be emphasized when it comes to unemployment. Expectations that the unemployment rate in the U.S. will solve itself once growth recovers are based on the argument that the unemployment rate is cyclical in nature. Unfortunately, what we have seen in the U.S. recently is that the rise in the unemployment rate may actually be structural. In fact, today more than 40 percent of those who are unemployed in the U.S. have already been unemployed for more than half a year. People who have been unemployed for a long period tend to have great difficulty in re-joining the employment pool. And it is perfectly possible that when the economy recovers, there will still be significant challenges in the unemployment area.

This means that much more focus should be on the issues that underlie the structure of the unemployment, and that has to do with education and training. The unemployment rate of 7.6 percent in the U.S. has great diversity（Figure 14）. If you are a college graduate, your unemployment rate is only around 3 percent, much better performance. If you do not have a high school degree, you are more likely to be unemployed and the rate for this group is more than 11 percent. In other words, the unemployment rate—which is the average—is masking great diversity, and the key is education. So that if one wants to deal with the labor market, training and education is key.

Figure 14 U.S. Unemployment（by Level of Education）

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Last observation: March 2013.

Macro-economic and Long-term Fiscal Challenges

Let me conclude by saying a few words about macro-economic policies. Everyone is talking about quantitative easing as the great policy response to the challenges brought about by the global crisis. While it was a good policy response, I am worried because of the following reasons: interest rates all over the world are near zero（Figure 15）. And when interest rates are zero, monetary policy does not have the degrees of freedom that it normally has.

Figure 15 Central Bank Policy Interest Rate

Source: Bloomberg Market Data. Last observation: April 18, 2013.

In fact, as a result of zero interest rates,real interest rates are negative and have been for too long（Figure 16）. This is something that should be of concern to us.

Figure 16 Global Policy Rates（Developed Markets）

Source: JP Morgan Chase, National Statistical Institute. Last observation: Nominal,October 1997; Real,July 2007.

Figure 17 Total Assets of Key Central Banks（Indexed Levels）

Source: Bloomberg. Last observation: ECB, April 12, 2013; Federal Reserve, April 17, 2013.

In this context, central banks have been buying assets of good quality and then of bad quality, time and again, and everyone is proud of having central banks buying so many assets（Figure 17）. This is true in the European Central Bank（ECB）,in the Federal Reserve and now, in Japan. Now, maybe it is necessary in the short term, but let us remember that our objective is to support sustainable growth, not short-term growth. And sustainable growth can only be supported by sustainable policies. The policies of today are not sustainable. It is not sustainable to have negative real interest rates, and it is not sustainable for central banks to buy assets and to print money. We know in the past what happened when you print so much without limit—China should know, and those countries that suffered in the past in Latin America should recall.

Not having inflation today does not mean you should not be concerned about expansionary fiscal policies, large budget deficits, large debt and large leverage all over the world（Figure 18）.

Figure 18 Fiscal Positions（General Government Balance）

Source: IMF, WEO Database. Last update April 16, 2013, WEO（2013-2014 forecast）.

Of course we have seen the beginning of a de-leveraging process, especially in the U.S. where households have started to de-leverage, but in Europe there is still a lot way to go to de-leverage the excessive borrowings of the past.

Finally,we have to talk about an aging population and its implications. We have an aging population all over the world; not only in Japan, not only in Europe but also in Asia.In the developed world, in 1950, only 8 percent of the population was above the age of 65（Figure 19）. Today, 16-17 percent are above 65. In 2050, more than a quarter of the population will be above the age of 65（Figure 20）.

Figure 19 Global Demographic Challenge

Source:UN Poputation Division,2010 revision.

The pattern of aging is similar in the U.S., and this is going to put a huge burden on the budget. If I look at U.S. government spending today: 23 percent of the budget（other than interest payments）is going to social security payments and 25 percent is going to healthcare, leaving 53 percent of total government spending for everything else, such as infrastructure, research and development, defense（Figure 21）.

Figure 20 U.S. Demographic Challenge

Note:Age of Medicare eligibility:65.

Age of Social Security eligibility,reduced benefits:62;full benefuts:67（for those born after 1960）.

Source:UN Poputation Division,2010 revision.

Figure 21 Composition of U.S. Federal Expenditures

Note:Aging accounts for 2/3 of projected risein expenditures on social security and healthcare（CBO）.

Healthcare includes Medicare（17% of noninterestspending in 2012,25% in 2035）and Medicaid, CHIP,and exchange subsidies（combined for 8% of noninterest spending in 2012,14% in 2035）.

Source:Congressional Budget Office,2012 Long-Term Budget Update,June 5,2012.

Fast forward 20 odd years to 2035: the aging of the population will propel healthcare spending to nearly 40 percent of U.S. Federal expenditure from only 25 percent in 2012. After allocating another 24 percent for social security, only 38% of the budget will be left to take care of everything else（education, infrastructure, research and development, you name it）. There is no way that a government can provide all the necessary services with only 38 percent of the budget. There is no question that a fundamental rethinking will need to be undertaken about the role of entitlements and about how much citizens can expect from the government, and how much citizens should be expected to pay for the services that they receive, rather than these being entitlements.

A new social contract will need to be revisited; this is true for the U.S. and true for the rest of the world. While we focus on the short-term issues like exchange rates, interest rates and unemployment rates, we need always to remember that in the longer term, the entire nature of society will be probably different because of the fact that there will be a different nature of contract between government and its citizens.

Financing China's Urbanization

Let me now turn to the challenges for China.We need to find a way in which the major task—China's urbanization—could be enhanced. I will look at the issue of China's urbanization as a challenge.

The government of China decided some years ago to pursue a massive program of urbanization.The task at hand is first, how to make the program itself a success; and second, how to finance the program?

Urbanization has both macro implications and micro implications. First, the macro implications. The decision to have a massive program of urbanization means that new jobs—millions or even tens of millions of new jobs—have to be created. This is important because only if the individuals newly moved into the cities are employed and are provided with an appropriate standard of living will this urbanization be seen as a success. So I take it for granted that the major objective—the first step—is to provide them with jobs. But if you provide them with jobs, they must be productive jobs; and if they are productive jobs, it means that output in China is going to grow faster than it would have otherwise,just because the newly moved individuals are producing output. But how can you make sure that this process is sustainable?

The next step is to ensure that there is a demand for these new products—only then will there be an equilibrium. But demand for these products can either come from domestic demand or from external demand. Since China has been saving a very high proportion of its income（because of a variety of reasons; some of them are reasonable, some of them reflect culture, some of them reflect incentives）and domestic demand was not growing fast enough to absorb the newly produced output, it follows, therefore, as a corollary, that China had to rely on foreign demand. Because in the absence of foreign demand, there would be no demand for China's products.When there is no demand for the products, there will be no sustainable employment; without sustainable employment, there will be no successful urbanization. So therefore, the reliance on external demand that took place for a long period of time was really a logical corollary of the urbanization in the absence of domestic demand.

So far so good; until the world started to go into a slowdown. When the world goes into a slowdown, every country is nervous about the demand for its own products. And hence the extraordinary reliance on foreign demand meant that international tensions emerged as the result of the large surpluses that China had with the rest of the world. These tensions, as discussed earlier in this paper, are misplaced because the focus was on bilateral relations in a multilateral world. Be that as it may, the international tensions emerged. It also implied it was very desirable for more than one reason to develop domestic demand as the rationale for successful urbanization. Hence a lot of the discussions are about how to develop a social security system; how to develop a pension system; and how to develop mechanisms that will reduce the need to have a very large savings so to enable domestic demand to grow. This is the macro context that has been discussed time and again;I merely presented it from the angle of how to support the urbanization objective.

Coming to the second issue on financing urbanization.Given that urbanization takes place, you need to provide financing to the activities that support the urbanization, whether it is small or medium enterprises, or the infrastructure that is supposed to be in place to accommodate the massive shifts, and the like. When we speak of finance, the issue is how to strengthen the financial system, the banking system, and the mechanisms by which you are providing the “oxygen” to the activities that need to be developed to support the urbanization process.

So let me also say that there are additional issues that come hand in hand with urbanization: it has to do with proper address of energy use, pollution, congestion, and all of those issues that will support urbanization. And in order to be addressed properly, they need to be financed. Some of them require smaller finance, some bigger finance, and it is here that China Development Bank is becoming a central player, especially in the financing of large infrastructure projects that come along with urbanization development programs.

[1] This was a presentation at China Development Bank's International Advisory Council Meeting on April 24-25, 2013.

Chapter 10 Public-Private Partnerships and Development of Institutional Investors

Uli Sigg

Pioneering Origins for Private Equity

China and Switzerland signed a memorandum of understanding on October 11, 1996, on the establishment of a Private Equity（PE）joint-venture fund to be jointly incepted by both governments. As the PE concept had not yet been introduced in China at that time a special approval from the Peoples' Bank of China, the country's central bank,was required. Once it had been issued on December 9, 1997, the first Sino-foreign inter-governmental PE fund came into existence with Dr. Uli Sigg, the Ambassador of Switzerland to China as its chairman. On March 27, 1999, the first two Sino-Swiss joint ventures featuring a Sino-Swiss Partnership Fund（SSPF）investment were signed in Basel on the occasion of an official state visit of President Jiang Zemin, the President of the People's Republic of China（PRC）at that time. President Jiang and his counterpart, Mrs. Ruth Dreifuss, the President of the Swiss Federal Council both graced the signing ceremony with their personal presence.

An Inter-governmental Alliance on the

Basis of a Trusted Partnership

According to the agreement, China Development Bank（CDB）, at that time the State Development Bank,who under its Chairman, Governor Chen Yuan had played a pivotal role in the inception of the fund was to represent China's interests, while the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs（SECO）would represent the Swiss interests in the fund. Preceding the signing of the agreement, SECO and the embassy had organized a contest amongst leading banks in China, Chinese or with Chinese representations, for the fund management contract. CDB, with active engagement from Governor Chen Yuan, made the most coherent proposal and subsequently won the contract. Eventually SECO's interests were transferred to SIFEM（Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets）, a government-owned financial institution, reflecting the rising success of Switzerland's state-sponsored PE organization under its CEO C. Barras. SIFEM essentially conducts PE activities in new economies with a view to contribute towards the development of their capital markets, to enhance sustainability and to support the activities of Swiss enterprise and notably the country's small and medium enterprises（SMEs）in economies where they tend to enjoy more limited familiarity.

Inception of the First Ever Sino-foreign Joint Venture

private equity fund management company

The Sino-Swiss Partnership Fund formally commenced operations on January 16, 1998 and was managed by CDB in the earlier years until the beginning of 2003. An independent fund management company, the Sino-Swiss Venture Capital Fund Management Company Limited（SSVC）, in fact the very first Sino-foreign joint-venture private equity fund management company, assumed this responsibility on March 19, 2003. China and Switzerland had thus succeeded in creating a state-of-the-art PE setup, an aspect which was vividly reflected in a signing ceremony attended by CDB Chairman of the Board, Governor Chen Yuan, and the Swiss Ambassador to China at that time, Mr. D. Dreyer. Both SSPF and SSVC were operating under the regulatory supervision of the National Reform and Development Commission.

Support of Private Enterprise

The fundamental purpose of the fund is to strengthen economic and commercial ties and co-operation between China and Switzerland. Key objectives are the facilitation of Swiss direct investment into China, as well as contributing towards the effective and lasting development of the Chinese capital markets, in particular the PE industry. By introducing and further developing the PE concept in China, the SSPF aims to actively support the momentum of China's economic transition. Ultimately, the aim is to mobilize private sector resources in order to boost the business of Swiss and Chinese SMEs in China, and thus to be conducive to the harmonious and sustainable development of China's economy and society. In this context, CDB forms an ideal partner as its familiarity with the country's socio-economic, administrative, legal, regulatory and financial reporting systems enables it to effectively advise and support Swiss companies seeking an entry to China's markets.

Sustainability in Focus

In line with its special purpose, the fund invests in projects that cite a lasting positive impact on specific industries and society as a whole, and refrains from investing in industries, such as entertainment or luxury. Similarly, and very much consistent with Chinese government policies, the fund has decided early on to “turn West,” opening up resources for SMEs in the country's inland and western, as well as south-western regions. Since its inception, the fund has invested RMB270 million in SME projects across China, including Beijing and Shanghai, as well as the Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Anhui, Guangdong and Shanxi provinces. Sectors or industries of interest include IT, electronics and software, consumer products, automobile parts, medical equipment, new materials and telecommunication. The fund has thus played a pioneering role in endorsing SMEs in the various industries and the local economies.

Among the most successful investments executed by SSPF are the software developer eBao Tech Corporation, which has risen to a globally leading position in sales for end-to-end core insurance software, as well as the Sunstone Development Co. Ltd., a global champion in developing electric conductors for aluminium production.

Identifying the Critical Success Factors

The accomplishments of SSPF's projects depend on three pivotal factors. Firstly, a profound understanding of the macro-economic cycle and accordingly the right timing for investments are indispensable in ensuring above average performance. The second main criterion is the insight into China's industries, their trends and prospects. Choosing the right industry is of critical relevance. The fund's investments into China's automotive industry, with the country by now forming home to the world's largest automobile market, or into electric equipment, are signs of a rewarding combination of the above mentioned criterion. Ultimately, however, the success of the investments conducted relies mainly on the professionalism, loyalty and integrity of the management of the investee companies. Moreover, the commitment and professional standards to the management and employees of the fund management company, in this case SSVC, are of equal importance.

Confronting the Challenges Ahead

The complexities of the legal and regulatory framework on many issues regularly pose an obstacle to the effective working of a fund, and leave PE companies vulnerable to the occasionally diverging legal interpretations of investee companies as well as government and judiciary bodies. A concrete challenge pertaining to this issue is to ensure valid exit strategies for investments, an aspect which has traditionally caused headaches for investors. Conditions improved to some extent in 2009 with the introduction of the Growth Enterprise Board or Venture Board which allows more SMEs to qualify for public listings, since requirements are lower compared to the Main Boards of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.

However, this also induces a sharp increase in competition and encourages some of the PE funds to target quick pre-IPO investments. These funds, including a host of new local players with little or no experience, hope to take advantage of the high stock market valuations on the Growth Enterprise Market（GEM）Board. In contrast to international players, they are much more willing to accept high entry price earnings multiples when employing this market “hedging” strategy. Such funds are also ready to compromise on or completely sacrifice due diligence in order to compete for deals. Their focus lies with the stock market, not the underlying portfolio company or its fundamentals. Listing requirements take priority over future growth or development prospects of the invested company, let alone value added or extending a helping hand.

In some cases, this market-oriented approach has indeed led to a number of IPOs, earning much applause from local LPs. The long-term success, however, remains uncertain, given that many investments are still in a lock-up period lasting up to three years post listing. Shares can thus not be traded immediately, leaving investments exposed to market volatilities and uncertainties over the course of three years. Unless the underlying portfolio companies continue to perform after the IPO and high stock market valuations persist, many of these funds could fall short of expectations, in particular since insufficient due diligence has been performed.

With this unprecedented increase in funds arises a common issue in fast developing economies, namely the intense competition for valid projects and professional expertise. While qualified professionals were a scarce commodity even in earlier years, today's strong demand further tightens access to the talent pool, driving up costs for funds in their bid to offer attractive employment. Furthermore, in view of the relatively young age of the PE industry in China, as well as the fact that many industry experts have not lived through a full PE-cycle, the crucial challenge is to find professionals commanding the necessary experience to manage the fund's investments successfully and satisfy its ambitions.

Mid-term Perspectives

Looking ahead, the mid-term goal of the fund is to ensure a socially responsible and commercially viable performance and thus to emerge as a model in terms of sustainable investor behaviour, as well as a caring employer dedicated to the professional and personal development of its employees as far as SSVC is concerned. Bearing the above mentioned challenges in mind, SSPF tries to show how a slower, but stricter project selection process, combines social and commercial benefits. Accordingly, the fund's current activities and efforts are tailored to that cause. Rather than, as is common in today's investing environment, providing funding in a quick pre-IPO exercise which may（or may not）see the target company listed in 12-18 months by taking advantage of the local stock market and a less mature retail investor base, SSPF selects only projects enjoying a distinctive product universe, a sustainable market and development prospects which will benefit workers and society as a whole. In doing so, SSPF seeks to live up to the pioneering spirit of Sino-Swiss cooperation, which ever since the People's Republic of China and Switzerland established diplomatic ties in 1949 has consistently emerged as one of the most trusted and thus successful Sino-foreign alliances.

Chapter 11 Liberalization of the Banking Sector

Sir William Purves

I first met Mr. Chen Yuan in the 1980s when he was Deputy Governor of The People's Bank of China.I used to call on him on a regular basis seeking approval for The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation to open branches in China.Such branch licences were, as a policy, very restricted but despite this generally negative policy, Mr. Chen unfailingly received me politely and listened to my pleas.In due course we were allocated a small number of branch licences and, with the passage of time, the Bank now has over 100 branches in China.

During the early 1990s, Mr. Chen on a number of occasions accepted my invitation to lunch at the annual World Bank/IMF meetings and was always an attractive guest in the eyes of other international guests.

When Mr. Chen was appointed Chairman of China Development Bank, he formed an International Advisory Council and was kind enough to invite me to become a member of it.I was pleased to attend the annual meeting of the Council on three occasions and watched with great interest the gradual opening up of the economy and of banking in China and in particular, of the growth of China Development Bank under Mr. Chen's able leadership.

I understand that Mr. Chen will be stepping down as Chairman and I wish him a long and happy retirement with good health. He will long be remembered as one of the leaders in the banking industry in the People's Republic of China.

Chapter 12 China-United Kingdom Relationships, International Reforms

Sir David Wright

Introduction

The 2007-09 credit crisis sent shockwaves throughout the world with changes reaching far beyond the financial services industry, prompting the start of a global economic downturn that is still reverberating.

Unemployment soared to new heights, resulting in a shifting of dynamics between governments and the wider society. The financial and banking sectors face new regulatory hurdles that are progressively reshaping the future of the industry.

The unfolding of these forces has also debunked theories of a complete free-market economy, where questions have been raised about the good of little or no regulatory intervention in the financial sector.

Today, global economic conditions remain fragile. In most developed economies, recovery is hampered by fiscal consolidation and weak financial systems. The IMF forecast for 2013 is that core European countries such as Germany will have positive but anaemic growth, 0.6 percent for Germany and 0.3 percent for France, with certain European nations, especially in the South, such as Italy and Spain, continuing to experience another year of recession. The U.S. will average a 2 percent growth with a rising trend to 3 percent for 2014 but the U.S. continues to be dogged by significant fiscal challenges.

Mid-tier developing or emerging economies though surviving better than developed economies, were not unscathed by the credit crisis. The IMF expects emerging economies to experience 5.5 percent economic growth on the whole, with specific forecast for China to be at 8.2 percent. For 2014, Barclays' average forecast for China is 8.1 percent.

The continued focusing on supply-side reforms to sustain and drive economic growth is a political challenge for mid-tier economy governments.

Such policies are dependent on a strong stable banking sector and a robust capital market to provide sufficient financing. In the case of China, where its economy has grown faster than the development of its banking sector and capital markets for the past few decades, the credit crisis has resulted in Chinese policymakers paying closer attention to reforming both the capital markets and ensuring the banking sector remains stable.

China and Transitions

China's policies gradually to open its capital market, includes the development of the bond market, the internationalization of the RMB, and instituting reforms in the banking sector. These are some of the policy moves to support its expanding economy. However, a declining working age population represents an angle that will progressively require careful consideration.

China's working age population decreased by 3.45 million to 937 million in 2012. The drop of its working age population（aged between 15-59 years）will be a fundamental factor in China's transition from “miracle growth” to normal development. In response to this challenge, China aims to rebalance growth drivers while carefully navigating its social welfare policies to furnish appropriate pension plans and healthcare system.

China''s export-dependent economy is making a transition to a domestic-driven economy. It seeks to create a level playing field involving the private sector to achieve long-term economic sustainability, as well as making inroads to deal with its deficient pension system[1] which implies more social welfare spending and less fixed asset investment.

The process of income redistribution to the private sector and households from the state-owned enterprises, as well as plugging the funding gap in the pension system, may result in higher funding cost in the future. As a result the development of the bond market is one of many tools that may assist in developing a more sustainable path towards financing support for the Chinese economy.

China's Bond Market

The Chinese government's debt situation currently looks favourable and its fiscal position has generally been perceived as sound. The central government's budget deficit has been around 1-2 percent of GDP for most of the reform period（i.e. from 1978 onwards）. The current public debt/GDP ratio stands close to 16 percent, which is well below the OECD's warning line of 60 percent. However, the central government's budget deficit does not take into account contingent liabilities such as local government debts, debts from the Ministry of Railways, or asset management companies that hold non-performing loans. If these numbers are included in the calculation, the central government's budget deficit can be significant[2].

Though the government's balance sheet is healthy at this time, even when contingent liabilities are taken into account, this picture will evolve over time when a decrease in working age population starts to accelerate. It will get more challenging for fiscal revenue to grow faster than GDP on a sustained basis. Coupled with the need to rebalance growth towards households and the private sector, and to resolve the pension gap, increasing importance will have to be attached to diversifying funding sources from what is a market highly dependent on bank lending.

One approach will be to spur the pace of the offshore Renminbi（CNH）bond issuance, in lock-step with China's intention to internationalize the Renminbi. One of the ways this can be done is through a large global benchmark CNH bond（around RMB30-40 billion）issued by China's Ministry of Finance（MoF）. Such a bond should have multiple tenors（i.e. 3,5,10 and 20 years）and be priced by a market-driven book-build process with the participation of global investors. With a global bond issuance of this size, secondary liquidity and risk management tools will also be properly developed. This will also help to promote pricing transparency and efficiency.

Aside from encouraging China's MoF to set a global benchmark, CDB itself can enhance its position as an enviable policy bank by being the new benchmark setter for longer dated bonds.CDB has a history in this market, e.g. CDB issued the first 15-year CNH bond in January 2012 and a 20-year bond issue in July 2012, both led by Barclays.

As the full tenor spectrum has been established with the above bond issuance, the next step will be to lengthen tenors up to 30 years and build a risk-free CNH curve that is tradable by global players to promote transparency. CDB is well-positioned to open up this tenor given its outstanding 15-year and 20-year CNH bonds.

Lastly, being the largest RMB bond underwriter in China, CDB in collaboration with Barclays can provide access to more international investors given Barclays proven capability and expertise in introducing international investors to RMB bonds via the QFII programme.

Since it will take time to develop the CNH bond market, attention towards accessibility to bank financing cannot be underplayed. Bank financing remains a dominant source of financing for China's economy—China's National Audit Office reported that 79 percent of total local government debt of RMB10.7 trillion in 2010 came from bank lending.

As policymakers recalibrate the role of state-owned enterprises by instituting policies tilting the playing field towards the private sector and to better manage systemic risk in the financial sector, transparency and financial inclusion to under-served economic actors remain important.

Socially Useful Finance

Following the 2007-09 financial crisis,financial institutions have been put under great scrutiny by both policy-makers and the general public. Certain practices that should have been avoided contributed to a number of circumstances at the heart of the crisis. The new regulatory framework that is now emerging will certainly tackle some of the deficiencies of the old system by establishing rules that will prevent another cataclysm. Lessons should and have been learned as demonstrated by the new set of regulatory principles, starting with the new capital targets in Basel III but also covering a wide range of issues such as market structure, crisis management and resolution, corporate governance; but also by the actions already taken by financial institutions regarding capital levels and leverage.

It is imperative not to forget that the contribution of banks to society are best made through lending, managing risks on behalf of customers, and providing and being a catalyst for employment. Socially useful financial institutions create explicit value for customers, employees, and the communities in which they operate.

All banks should recognize the role that they play in the economy and take seriously their obligations to contribute at a social and economic level seriously. In a letter published in CDB's website, Chairman Chen says that, among its many achievements, CDB has supported the continuing strategic transformation of China's economy through the facilitation of industrial upgrading, assisting corporate merger & acquisitions（M&A）and supporting the development of strategic emerging industries and cultural industries. Furthermore, he also mentions the remarkable work of CDB in the development of the SME sector and the millions of RMB dedicated to student and mortgage loans. It is clear from Chairman Chen's comments on “fulfilling CDB's mission to assist the development of the economy and society” that CDB has focused its role on these objectives which should be at the heart of the work of successful banks. Chairman Chen also refers to the importance of the internal functioning of the bank itself. Effective corporate governance and risk management, he says, are key to the Bank's stable operation. In the wake of the global financial crisis, these principles may be seen as guiding values for the development of a more stable and safe financial system.

Having learnt the lesson from the past, Barclays is committed to these same standards. It has a clear sense of its business purpose—to help individuals, businesses and economies progress and grow.

Imbuing the organization with the concept of Citizenship provides a clear set of values on how a bank contributes to the economy, the way it does business and supports the communities in which it operates. Banks have the opportunity to—and should—play a broader role in the communities in which they live. Business integrity is reinforced by striving to improve service; making responsible decisions in how to manage the business; and actively managing the social and environmental impacts of what it does.

In conclusion, channelling money from investors to productive enterprises remains at the core of activities undertaken by banks. But, the story by no means ends there. The central role financial institutions play in society put them in a particular position to make a significant impact on the environment they operate in. Equally important is the way in which banks operate internally to achieve their objectives. A new paradigm seems to be emerging: one that recognizes the social function and impact of financial institutions.

[1] It is estimated that the funding gap for the pension system is as large as 35 percent of 2011 GDP, and may further widen as the working age population declines.

[2] Barclays estimates if all the other contingent liabilities are factored into the mix， China's total government liabilities could be at 62-97 percent of GDP, depending on assumptions made for the pension gap. This figure is arrived at by using the fiscal risk matrix framework developed by Polackova（1998）.

Chapter 13 Global Crisis, Euro Crisis and Abenomics

Toyoo Gyohten

Six years have passed since the outbreak of the global financial crisis triggered by the collapse of the sub-prime loan market in the United States in 2007.There are at least four salient features for the crisis.

The first is that it started as an ordinary financial crisis, i.e. birth of a bubble and then it burst. The world has experienced similar events hundreds of times in the past. Invariably, the crisis was accompanied by contraction of credit and collapse in demand. Thus far, there was nothing extraordinary.

The second point is that, although it had started as an ordinary financial crisis, it instantaneously became a global crisis because the world is now a highly globalized network of financial transactions.

The third point is that the crisis affected different markets in different ways due to the structure and conditions of each market. Most conspicuous was the case of the Eurozone. The introduction of the single currency Euro in 1999 brought a huge bonus of low interest rate, stable exchange rate and abundant foreign capital to some member countries. Unfortunately, however, it ended up in unwarranted complacency and profligacy in some countries. Also, a structural flaw of the system, i.e. the incompatibility of monetary integration and fiscal autonomy as well as the lack of an effective mechanism to fill the gap between the North and the South, contributed to make the European situation more exacting. While I believe the Euro system will survive, macro-economic recovery in Europe will take another couple of years.

There are two dimensions to the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the rest of the world.Like in the case of any financial crisis, including the U.S. sub-prime loan crisis, the immediate economic impact were a credit crunch and the collapse of demand. In China, Japan and South Korea,however, the damaging impact of the credit contraction was tolerable because their financial systems were not so inseparably intertwined with American and European finance. However, because Asia is dependent on exports to America and Europe, the impact of the collapse on demand was quite severe.

In the United States, the damage to the housing market and the labor market had pervasive impact on the economy because these markets are correlated with American household consumption.

In sum, in the process of recovery from the crisis, each country needs to identify the right order of priority, aimed toward the common goal of restoring stable and sustainable economic growth.

The fourth point I want to recognize is that the current crisis has signaled the advent of the evolution of the economic paradigm of the world. So far, the world economic growth was significantly supported by American household consumption which resulted in the chronic American deficit. At the same time, however, American consumption generated huge export demand for other countries, notably Asian countries. These countries accumulated the dollar surplus and recycled it to invest in U.S. Treasury bonds thereby keeping U.S. interest rate low to sustain household consumption. In other words, the structure of a global imbalance as such has supported the fallacy of a win-win growth model for the world economy. The current crisis has demonstrated that it is an unsustainable proposition for both surplus and deficit countries to live with a growing global imbalance. The growth model needs to be reviewed. A corollary to this problem is the role of the U.S. dollar. So far the dollar has played the role of the global key currency. It provided the world with ample liquidity and the most efficient instrument for global transactions. At the same time, the inherent dilemma of an arrangement to use a national currency as the international key currency became exacerbated by the near-collapse of the American financial system in the fall of 2008. Also, the current crisis and the ensuing instability in the financial market raised question to the ability of self-discipline of the Anglo-Saxon style of market economy which is guided by the principle of efficiency and probability. In a nutshell, although the world has not come up at all with any new credible alternative, there is a growing feeling that the time is approaching when the world has to explore an economic paradigm which will fit better the new reality.

To put it in a different way, the world economy is leaving the age of singular hegemony which provided stability and comfort for many. It is likely that the world will go through a great distance to reach a new stable paradigm. During the process, it seems quite important to devise some sort of institutional arrangement to secure a fair sharing of power and responsibility among major players. I do believe such an arrangement will enable the world to navigate through the unsettling period ahead of us.

The Euro Crisis

The Eurozone crisis has two faces.One face shows that it is one of those financial crises which occurred many times in many places.It was caused by the excess liquidity which created an asset bubble and which was, in turn, busted eventually.In that sense the Eurozone crisis is nothing different from the sub-prime loan crisis precedented in the U.S.However, it has another face as well, because it occurred within the framework of the Eurozone.When the single currency Euro was launched at the end of the last century,Eurozone was bathing in the bliss of irrational exuberance à la Europaine with low interest rate and flood of capital.Unavoidable fiscal profligacy followed.Fiscal soundness evaporated.In that sense, it was a Eurozone crisis.

Now the Eurozone is struggling against the most critical crisis since its inception.The Eurozone has to go through an extended period of perseverance and strenuous efforts.In my view, the Eurozone must win on four fronts.

First, countries in trouble need to restore fiscal soundness through painful austerity.They should also carry out economic and social restructu-ring in order to raise productivity.Cases in point are social security system, labor practices, subsidies and protections, and tax regime.

Second, Eurozone needs a broad set of financial arrangements in order to enable debt-servicing, to reduce debt burden, to boost banks' capital and to set up a credible regional safety net.

Third, the reform and improvement of the Euro-scheme is needed.The crisis exposed two apparent failures of the scheme.One is the incompatibility between monetary convergence and fiscal non-convergence.Another is the irreparable gap between the Northern members and the Southern members.The decision at the highest political level is sine qua non.

Fourth, the Eurozone needs to reinvigorate the European people's sense of destiny toward the unification which carried Europe through the long march until today.Particularly important is to convince the younger generation that, in today's globalized world, unification is Europe's only way of survival.

Significant progress was made on various fronts, particularly in financial arrangements.There is no immediate risk of national default or collapse, and therefore the market has restored a certain degree of comfort.However, the Eurozone is still distant from the goal of stability.At present, the market is keeping its fingers crossed to watch how far the Eurozone can make progress in the four areas mentioned above during the coming 24 months or so.

What implication does the Eurozone crisis have to the rest of the world from the two dimensions of a credit crunch and the collapse of demand?

In Asia, damage from the credit crunch was moderate except in the case of the drying up of trade finance.The decline of European imports will be much more damaging if recession is prolonged.

Beyond the immediate economic impact, the Eurozone crisis, combined with the sub-prime loan crisis, may well have broader and longer-term implications.

First, they will accelerate the global power shift.The two crises highlighted the vulnerability of the American and European financial markets, and their inability to fix the crises quickly.On the whole, the experience of the crisis vindicated the waning of the Western dominance in global economic affairs.

Second, in the same vein, the crisis undermined the credibility of democracy and the market economy.For the last several decades the world has been comfortable with the global paradigm based upon democracy and market economy.The majority of people believed that democracy will prevail.Many people believed we could control the financial risk and the market will repair its faults.Today, it is ironical to see that Athens and Rome, two cradles of Western democracy, are ruled by governments not elected in a democratic way.We are also convinced that the market is not infallible, it can go astray.The world is now busy trying to control the market by stricter regulations.

Third, there is now greater concern about the stability of the interna-tional monetary system.The crisis cast a serious doubt over the viability of the Euro which was expected to become a match for the dollar as a global key currency.Ironically, the crisis, at least temporarily, enhanced the role of the dollar due to the serious credit-crunch situation.Yet, there is global concern about the international monetary system built upon the dollar which is a national currency, because, under the system as such, the international financial situation is inevitably dominated by the key currency country's monetary policy.

All in all, the future of the Eurozone crisis is still almost highly unpredictable.Yet, how the Eurozone comes out of the crisis will have a broad implication in the future of the global economy.

China can certainly not escape the impact of Eurozone crisis.It has hurt the Chinese economy and posed challenges, but also provided opportunities.On one hand, both the credit crunch and collapse of demand are causing problems for China.In spite of the easy monetary policy in developed economies, the flow of so-called risk money has dwindled.All stock markets in the emerging world suffered.The Shanghai Index lost 13.4 percent between July 2011 and April 2012.The slowing down of the Eurozone economy has been hurting Chinese exports.If the recession in the Eurozone worsens ,the Chinese economy will feel more stress. There needs to be monetary stimulus in order to prevent an abrupt slowdown of growth.At the same time, you need to keep watch on inflation and to continue with effort to rebalance the economy.To quote Premier Wen, you need to fix doors and windows before the rain comes.

The Eurozone crisis is a threat to the world, including Asia.Asian countries, especially China, Japan and South Korea, need to provide support to the Eurozone so that they can fix their problems as soon as possible.We should provide financial assistance to the IMF and ESM, our banks should expand lending in the Eurozone and our companies should activate M&A in the Eurozone.

At the same time, the Eurozone crisis, together with the U.S. sub-prime loan crisis, has provided a valuable reminder to Asia of the importance of Asia's own regional cooperation.Today, everybody is saying that power is shifting to Asia.Indeed, the physical economic power may be shifting to Asia.However, in the world of money and finance Asia is still too dependent on the U.S. and Europe.In order to reduce vulnerability and volatility which come as result of the excessive dependence, Asia needs to step up its regional cooperation to strengthen financial institutions and financial markets.

The Eurozone crisis has left China with lot of homework.

Abenomics and Recent Developments in Japan

Against the backdrop of the global situation as such, in Japan there emerged a glimpse of hope of economic revival. For the last two decades, Japan has been plagued by many seemingly intractable problems: deflation, aging and shrinking population, huge fiscal deficit, unsustainable social security and confused energy policy. Furthermore, the plight was exacerbated by the tsunami in March 2011.As a result, there was a widespread sense of powerlessness. Many commentators declared that the Japanese economy was dying a slow death.

Fortunately, the new government, led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of the LDP, emerged after the national election in December 2012. Abe was quick in coming up with a comprehensive set of economic policies with a clear aim of reviving the Japanese economy. Abe's proposal, often dubbed “Abenomics” like Reaganomics, Thatcherism, or Deng Xiao Ping “nomics”, have three arrows or prongs, first: bold monetary easing, second: flexible fiscal policy, and third: growth strategy to encourage private sector investment. On the monetary policy front, the central bank, on April 4, 2013,announced a set of very aggressive monetary expansion policies.

（1）Achieve a 2 percent inflation target in two years,（2）double the monetary base in two years,（3）increase the purchase of Japan Government Bonds（JGB）in the market so that the central bank's holding of JGB will more than double in two years, and（4）more than double the purchase of risk assets. On the fiscal policy front, the Parliament approved, on February 26,2013, a Supplementary Budget which authorised the expenditure of Yen13.1 trillion（US$150 billion）. The stimulus is expected to boost GDP by 1.6 percent in four years. On the growth strategy, there are three identified areas with concrete measures.The three areas are:（1）Industrial revitalization, which includes further strengthening of manufacturing and deregulation in energy, environment and medical areas.（2）Creating and tapping potential growth markets, such as healthcare, energy, next-generation infrastructure, agriculture and fishery.（3）International business competitiveness, with main emphasis on the promotion of multilateral and bilateral cooperation such as Trans-Pacific Partnerships（TPP）,Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific（FTAAP）, U.S.-Japan, China-Japan, EU-Japan, South Korea-Japan, Australia-Japan EPA.

Already, Abenomics has produced tangible results. Stock prices have risen by more than 20 percent since the beginning of 2013.The long-term interest rate went down to historical lows, as money flowed in from both domestic and overseas investors. The yen's exchange rate depreciated considerably, thereby improving exporters' balance sheets.

In my view, the initial success of Abenomics is due to two factors. First, it succeeded in transforming the people's defeatist mentality on the economic revival. By presenting bold and concrete proposals and actually taking real steps, Abe changed the people's mindset to a “can do” mode. Second, it succeeded because it focused on a single target of “anti-deflation.” Instead of listing many targets which need to be achieved, Abe signaled out the job of “getting rid of deflation” as the first and most important because the two-decade long deflation has been viewed as a symbol of stagnation. The message was clear and convincing.

At present, public sentiment, both in corporate and household sectors, is very much buoyed. According to a recent poll, 74 percent of respondents said they supported Abenomics.

Indeed, Abenomics made a good start. It is obvious, however, there is no room for complacency.Japan has made just a first step of a long journey. There are still many unfinished jobs. First of all, although companies and households are enjoying bigger asset value thanks to higher stock prices and a weaker yen, we have to see to it that they actually spend the money for investment, employment, and consumption. There are good signs, but we have to see real action. Also, it goes without saying that we cannot deviate from the steady path of fiscal consolidation. The streamlining of unsustainable social security system and the strengthening of tax revenue through higher economic growth are the minimum prerequisite for the achievement of the primary balance by 2020. Furthermore, the implementation of an adequate and credible growth strategy is crucial. Abe must demonstrate strong leadership to overcome deeply entrenched resistance of vested interest groups and bureaucracies.

One good news for Abe is that, after the Upper House election in July 2013, there will be no national election until the summer of 2016. A political hiatus of this length is the first experience for Japan since the 1990s. In other words, Abe has a rare opportunity to let voters swallow bitter pills without fear of their electoral revolt.

All in all, Japanese economy, at last, has arrived at the starting line. You will see how he runs. Keep your fingers crossed.

Chapter 14 The Internationalization of China's Banking Sector[1]

Hu Huaibang

In line with China's outward integration with economic and financial globalization, the nation's banking industry has participated actively and is increasingly exposed to the international financial market. Internationalization has not only become a critical feature of financial support for the open economy, but also an objective condition for Chinese banks to remain globally competitive. The Third Plenum of the 18th Communist Party of China （CPC） Congress explicitly called for the development of an open economic system, including further opening of the banking sector both domestically and globally. This demands that Chinese banks accelerate their international development, and rapidly upgrade their service quality and business operations to global standards. China's financial institutions should therefore make bold plans to capitalize on the opportunities from global restructuring post-crisis, and steadfastly implement their internationalization.

Ⅰ.Achievements in Internationalization

Since the Bank of China set up its branch in Hong Kong in 1917, the Chinese banking system has undergone almost a century of internationa-lization. In line with the cycles of China's political and economic fortunes, her banking industry has experienced multiple shake-ups and pauses in internationalization. After reforms began in the late 1970s, however, China gradually built up a modern banking system and renewed its path towards internationalization. Since 2008, the large Western financial institutions suffered a major setback from the global crisis, whereas Chinese banks accelerated their internationalization through a series of corporate governance and shareholding reforms, strengthening their core competitiveness. This helped to support the outbound growth of Chinese companies and raised the openness of the Chinese economy.

1.Rapid expansion of overseas business and the formation of a global banking network.

By the end of 2012,Chinese banks' total offshore assets reached US$1 trillion, six times larger than the level of offshore assets when China acceded to the World Trade Organization （WTO）. That year, overseas profits reached roughly US$16.9 billion, or 8.6 percent of total profits. Sixteen Chinese banks established 1,050 overseas offices （branch, subsidiary, representative office） through organic growth, mergers and acquisitions （M&A） and equity investment, thereby expanding their reach to 49 markets across Asia, Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Oceania.

Geographically, Chinese banks' cross-border business is primarily concentrated in Hong Kong, Macau and developed markets, with more recent expansions into emerging markets in Africa and Latin America.

Institutionally,China's Big Five banks （Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agriculture Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Bank of Communications） account for 92 percent of the total offices abroad. Of these, Bank of China or BOC （599） and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China or ICBC （246） account for a combined majority share of 81.4 percent. BOC, the oldest Chinese bank, has focused on organic expansion in the major markets, whilst ICBC took the M&A route by acquiring Halim Bank in Indonesia and Seng Heng Bank in Macau. ICBC also bought stakes in Standard Bank in South Africa and Argentina, and the U.S. operations of the Bank of East Asia. In recent years, other Chinese banks have also expanded overseas through organic growth and acquisitions. For example, China Merchants Bank bought Wing Lung Bank in Hong Kong, established a branch in New York, and China Development Bank （CDB） established a branch in Hong Kong and representative offices in Moscow, Cairo and Rio de Janeiro.

2.Internationalization of governance structure, operations management and staffing.

The introduction of strategic foreign shareholders and offshore listings of the large Chinese banks have raised their structure and governance increasingly in line with global norms. Business processes are being re-engineered using strong information technology （IT） systems to deliver “customer-first plus risk-responsible services and operations”.

In terms of performance, assessment is increasingly based on criteria such as value creation, risk-weighted return on equity and other key performance indicators （KPI）. Banks have raised the share of fee-based business in total revenue and optimized their business development and profit models. In the area of risk management, the banks have applied the international five-category loan assets classification; adopted Basel rules on capital requirements; increased emphasis on controlling credit risk, market risk, and operational risk; improved the management of liquidity risk, reputational risk, and systematic risk; and strengthened buffers against global financial crisis shocks.

In the area of staffing,Chinese banks are cultivating more specialized and technical skills through exchanges with foreign partners, nurturing a new generation of globally minded executives and financial professionals.

3.Enhanced service in support of outward corporate growth.

As China's economy continues to open up, Chinese banks have followed their corporate clients abroad, expanding their operations into overseas markets to serve customers and clients as they set up shop offshore.

a）Settlement Services. In 2012, Bank of China alone conducted US$2.78 trillion in international settlements and RMB2.46 trillion in cross-border RMB settlements.

b）Trade Financing. Chinese banks are offering an increasingly comprehensive suite of trade finance products, such as forex letters of guarantee and accounts receivables factoring to meet the needs of importers and exporters and boost China's global trade. In 2012, China was the world's fourth largest import trade factoring market by volume, and was world leader in export factoring for five consecutive years.

c）Facilitating Client Overseas Expansion. Chinese banks are funding Chinese companies as they open new markets and make acquisitions overseas. For example, in recent years, CDB has provided energy/resources-backed loans, as well as backed major joint ventures by leading Chinese state-owned enterprises, such as a development fund with Venezuela, an oil pipeline project with Russia, and a natural gas pipeline project with Turkmenistan. Supporting key national enterprises as they expand into global markets plays an important role in alleviating bottlenecks in natural resources constraining China's development.

4.Increased international recognition and influence.

The global financial crisis led to a spike in failures amongst Western banks, but many Chinese banks bucked the trend and emerged as profit leaders. The British magazine The Banker's 2013 Top 1,000 Global Banks rankings included 96 Chinese banks, including policy banks, major state-owned commercial banks, joint stock banks, and more than half of the country's city commercial banks. China's Big Four （ICBC, ABC, BOC, CCB） were all ranked in the global top ten, with ICBC achieving first place in terms of assets, Tier 1 primary capital, and for the third successive year, total profits. Since 2011, BOC has for three years in a row been listed as one of the world's 29 Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions （G-SIFIs）. ICBC also made this list in 2013. All these demonstrated the international recognition of China's banking reforms and the undeniable influence of Chinese banks in regional and global financial markets.

As the leading development bank, CDB is continuously strengthening its cooperation with financial institutions in the emerging markets, promoting the development of multilateral mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Bank Association, the China-ASEAN Bank Association, and the BRICS Bank Cooperation Mechanism. These efforts have been widely acknowledged by China's emerging market and regional partners.

As China's banking sector internationalizes, it serves as a powerful driver of China's outbound business expansion and places China in an increasingly influential position on the world stage. Backed in part by its banking sector, China has in recent years emerged as an active player in rebalancing the world's economic and financial systems: increased quota and voting shares in the World Bank and IMF, and a bigger voice on major global issues.

Ⅱ.Opportunities and Challenges Facing Internationalization

The world's economic landscape is currently undergoing a process of profound transformation and rebalancing. As China attains greater economic strength and global positioning, the Chinese banking industry faces a historical opportunity to internationalize.

1.A stronger and more open economy offers greater space for the internationalization of Chinese banks.

From 2002 to 2012, Chinese trade growth averaged 20.1 percent year-on-year, with China's exports and imports currently accounting for 11.2 percent and 9.8 percent of global exports and imports respectively, ranking first and second place worldwide for four years running. Outbound investment has also grown rapidly, with non-financial direct investment increasing from US$2.7 billion in 2002 to US$77.2 billion in 2012, putting China amongst the world's top sources of FDI. Meanwhile, Chinese firms have ramped up their investments, M&A, and trade deals abroad. These trends have greatly broadened the demand for cross-border financial services and laid a solid market and client base for the internationalization of Chinese banks.

2.An enabling policy environment conducive to internationalization.

The government has called for China to develop an open economic system that is inclusive, comprehensive, balanced, secure and effective; for Chinese businesses to step up the speed and quality of their overseas expansion; and for deeper financial sector reform, including the gradual liberalization of interest and exchange rates and the RMB capital account convertibility. The 12th Five-Year Plan Outline for Development and Reform in the Financial Sector calls on Chinese financial institutions to prepare for overseas expansion by developing the right talent pool and institutions necessary for overseas business development and operations, effectively spurring the emergence of a new generation of major multinational financial institutions from China. Since the beginning of 2013, we have seen important progress in a number of reforms, including interest rate liberalization and the official establishment of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. The Third Plenum's call for improved financial market systems will further open the market both domestically and internationally, driving the sector into a new phase of deepened reform. These policies and measures will create conditions conducive to innovation and internationalization of the banking sector.

3.RMB-invoicing in cross-border trade and investment becomes new driver of bank internationalization.

Since 2009, China has launched a number of pilot projects in RMB settlement of trade and investment transactions, broadly expanding the scale and scope in which the Chinese yuan is used and increasing demand for the currency overseas. As at the end of 2012, China has concluded bilateral currency swap agreements with 18 countries and regions. Cross-border RMB trade settlements grew 41 percent year-on-year to 2.94 trillion yuan in 2012, with trade-in-goods accounting for 2.06 trillion yuan or 8.4 percent of the year's total volume of traded goods, up from 6.6 percent a year before. Settlements of RMB-denominated outbound investment grew 51 percent year-on-year to 30.4 billion yuan. The accelerated use of the yuan in cross-border transactions offers tremendous opportunities for Chinese banks to build and expand their business in cross-border RMB services and to achieve a more globalized business portfolio.

4.A window of opportunity to expand overseas as Western banks retrench post-crisis.

The global financial crisis placed a number of European and American financial institutions under severe pressure, causing a wave of deleveraging, layoffs, market exits, divestures and cost cuts. Even though recently, there has been an upturn in the position of multinational financial institutions, they have not yet fully recovered from the crisis. This presents Chinese banks with an excellent opportunity to grow their presence in overseas markets.

Whilst there are opportunities as described above, we should also recognize that the global economic recovery is still unstable and uncertain, that China's own economy is currently shifting gears and that this restructuring will not be without a certain degree of economic pain that will be felt more bluntly as the effects of earlier stimulus policies recede. Chinese banks must consequently transform to meet these changes, adding complexity and challenges to the process of internationalization.

1.The uncertain global recovery and complex political and economic environment bring increased risks to internationalization.

While developed economies are showing signs of recovery, a number of structural issues remain far from resolved.Meanwhile, growth in emerging markets has slowed significantly across the board. As economies grow ever more interconnected, we see increased volatility in the world economy as a whole, ranging from social unrest and political instability in North Africa and the Middle East to a rise in financial protectionism among countries that seek to block foreign capital and foreign financial institutions from entering local markets. These developments increase the economic, political, and legal risk of internationalization in the banking sector.

2.China's rebalancing is increasingly cutting into bank profits, undermining the domestic support for internationalization.

Commercial banks in China posted profits of RMB1.24 trillion in 2012, growing 18.9 percent year-on-year compared to 36.3 percent in 2011. Growth in profits slowed further in the first half of 2013, dropping 5.1 percentage points to 13.8 percent. Commercial banks are also faced with a marked increase in non-performing loans, which in the first eight months of 2013 grew by RMB84.2 billion to RMB574.6 billion. Economic rebalancing and the liberalization of interest rates foreshadow the end of rapid expansion and profit growth for Chinese banks. Moving forward, these banks must redouble their efforts to consolidate their underlying businesses at home as a critical foundation to support further internationalization.

3.Operations management and innovation capacity still lag behind global levels.

The success of Chinese banks has traditionally relied on market size and controlled interest rate margins, often leaving them unprepared to meet global competitive demands. The industry suffers from a lack of sophistication in operations, management, pricing, marketing, and risk controls; a lack of depth in business structure; an over-dependence on assets and interest margins to generate income; a dearth of revenues from fee-based business; weak application of advanced financial tools; an overall lack of synergy from integrated operations; a lack of experienced, globally competent financial talent; and insufficient IT infrastructure. All of these factors are serious constraints to the industry's further internationalization.

4.International regulatory standards are tightening, with more stringent capital and liquidity requirements.

Regulatory standards in the banking industry have grown increasingly strict since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, requiring higher capital adequacy ratios and greater capital reserves: retained capital buffers, counter-cyclical capital buffers, and SIFI buffers. A new overall leverage ratio framework has been introduced to capture both on- and off-balance sheet exposures that may go undetected by capital adequacy ratio calculations. Banks must also meet new required liquidity ratios. These strict international regulatory standards may not substantially increase costs for large, established financial institutions with diverse business structures and well-distributed global assets. For those Chinese banks that are still largely undercapitalized, homogeneous and unsophisticated in operations, these regulatory standards can drastically increase the cost of internationalization.

While China's banking sector faces a number of challenges to internationalization, taken as a whole,the opportunities appear to outnumber the obstacles. China's financial institutions should capitalize on these opportunities to accelerate their overseas expansion and draw on resources and markets both within China and abroad. The development of a globalized network of financial services will benefit the restructuring and rebalancing of the broader Chinese economy.

Ⅲ.Proactive and Prudent Promotion of Internationalization

The further opening and rebalancing of China's economy requires the support of a globalized financial services sector. Chinese banks must adapt to the trends of economic and financial globalization by developing strategies that are both ambitious and prudent. Such an approach will drive the development of an open economic system and support Chinese businesses as they seek to go global, improving service quality and competitiveness and bolstering China's influence on the world stage.

1.Set clear goals and coordinate the process of internationalization.

a）Prioritize service quality as key support for an open economic system. Banks should actively support the global M&A and project investment activities of Chinese firms abroad, thereby promoting balanced development of trade and investment. But these same banks should also seek to globalize themselves, matching their strengths with opportunities in foreign markets, boosting their core competencies and strengthening China's voice in the governance of global financial affairs.

b）Strategic planning for balanced growth. The internationalization of the banking sector is necessarily a long-term process, and requires a gradualistic and orderly approach. A comprehensive national strategy should be formulated to clarify guiding principles, priorities, and deployment plans with the goal of effectively minimizing risks.

c）Strengthen policy incentives. The government should develop a comprehensive package of policies to facilitate the internationalization of China's banking sector; establish effective coordination between the central bank and sectoral financial regulatory authorities; adopt measures to promote quality service and risk control in the banking sector; strengthen information-sharing between government, banks, and businesses; and create policy conditions conducive to the internationalization of the banking industry.

2.Optimize the deployment of a global network with a calibrated institutional expansion.

a）Banks should open overseas offices or institutions based on a coherent strategy of internationalization. These strategies should reflect the bank's own strengths, limitations, and goals. Banks' institutional expansion should be planned and executed in an orderly fashion by either concentrating on a specific set of priority markets or by seeking a broader network of institutions across the globe.

b）Properly identify and sequence target markets. To meet global transaction and settlement needs, expansion strategies should focus on the financial centers of developed markets. To serve China's economic development and position oneself for greater business growth, banks should choose countries with which China enjoys close ties; to develop a specific area of business, locate markets with the best track record in that area. For example, to gain experience in the private banking business, a Chinese financial institution may consider a country such as Switzerland, which traditionally boasts a mature private banking sector.

c）Choose the most suitable means of expansion （organic growth, M&A or other）. Organic growth may be less challenging from a management perspective, but such expansion is generally slower and more fragmented, and is likely to face barriers to entry. M&A growth takes advantage of pre-existing distribution networks and clientele and offers more immediate entry into local markets, but requires internal consolidation and increased management costs. Choosing the right approach requires flexibility and insight, and should ultimately depend on the specific conditions—including the legal and political environment—of target markets.

3.Build competitiveness through rebalancing.

a）Optimize business structures. Chinese banks must develop strong businesses in emerging banking services such as asset management, investment banking, and other financial market businesses, while stepping up non-banking services in insurance, trusts, leasing, and securities. Banks must reduce their dependence on interest margins, optimize profit models and revenue structures, and offer clients a full spectrum of financial services.

b）Streamline business processes and improve organizational architecture. Banks should organize business processes based on client types and needs, re-engineer their business architecture, and establish client-centered systems and process flows, thereby increasing responsiveness to markets and client needs.

c）Strengthen financial innovation for improved service quality. With expanding domestic and overseas business, banks should deploy innovative financial tools to improve risk management, increase liquidity, boost returns, and reduce funding costs. These services should be customer-friendly, easy-to-use, and fully integrated across product lines and departments.

d）Build a team of global talent. Training and assignment opportunities for existing staff combined with the recruitment of professionals with international business experience will allow Chinese banks to build globally competent teams that are well equipped to compete in overseas markets.

4. Strengthen industry cooperation to achieve joint success in international markets.

a）Encourage closer cooperation between domestic financial institutions. Cooperation through information exchange and loan syndication arrangements can help to open markets, build synergies, disaggregate risk, better distribute the benefits of internationalization and reduce unhealthy competition.

b）Strengthen cooperation with foreign financial institutions. China's banking industry should draw on the experiences of large multinational banks to improve business management practices and leverage partners' knowledge of local markets and the legal and political environments in which they operate.

c）Increase participation in multilateral financial institutions. Use such platforms as a channel to broaden business relationships and secure more customers, resources, and support.

5. Strengthen risk control to ensure the stable development of business abroad.

a）Management of overseas business must be locally adapted. Chinese management systems and corporate culture cannot simply be replicated in foreign markets; rather, local cultural norms must be fully integrated into a localized management system that reduces the risk of culture clash.

b）Closely track global political and economic trends. Banks should stay updated on country risk with regular updates on local political and economic developments and policy changes in the financial sector, and tax and exchange rate regimes. Contingency plans should be developed that reflect and mitigate country risk.

c）Strengthen market-related risk management. Banks should build capacity in the identification, measurement, monitoring, and control of currency risks, and hedge against fluctuations to minimize potential losses.

d）Increase management of liability risk. Banks should have a thorough understanding of international conventions, norms, commercial practices and foreign market regulations. Banks should establish mechanisms to warn of legal liabilities in overseas businesses and work towards effectively contro-lling and minimizing such risk.

6. Increase regulatory support for the global expansion of China's banking industry.

Further internationalization of the banking sector requires greater support from China's regulatory authorities.

a）Increase coordination with international regulatory bodies. China should seek more voice in the formulation of international regulatory standards; assist domestic banks in settling legal and regulatory disputes overseas; and protect the legitimate rights of Chinese banks as they build and grow businesses abroad.

b）Fully consider the Chinese banking sector's current state of development when implementing new international regulatory standards. Regulation should seek to control risk while facilitating growth, especially in regard to the internationalization of Chinese banks.

c）Establish a national monitoring, early warning, and control mechanism for overseas country risk. Develop dynamic oversight metrics as banks extend their businesses across borders, expand their scope and scale of operations, and increase service levels.

Conclusion

As China's banking sector moves forward, it is clear that the process of internationalization will inevitably face obstacles, but a firm commitment to the goal of an open economic system combined with sound plans and dedication to capacity building will certainly facilitate the realization of the vision of an internationalized Chinese banking industry with a prime position in the global financial system.

[1] This paper was first published in China Banking special edition, 2013.

Chapter 15 Implications of China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan and Internationalization of the Renminbi[1]

Lawrence J. Lau

First of all, I would like to thank China Development Bank and Chairman Chen Yuan for inviting me to participate in this Meeting of the International Advisory Council of the China Development Bank. It is my great honor and pleasure to be invited to this Meeting once again. Chairman Chen Yuan has really done wonders for China Development Bank and through the Bank for the Chinese economy. He is a leading pioneer in Chinese banking and has introduced many new concepts and practices. In more recent years he has also expanded the activities of the Bank beyond China itself, greatly elevating the profile, the reach and the influence of the Bank overseas.

The first time I met Chairman Chen Yuan was probably in the late 1980s, when he served as the Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China, the central bank of China. Among his many duties at the time was the management of the foreign exchange reserves of China. During his tenure at the People's Bank of China, Chinese foreign exchange reserves rose from US$3 billion in 1988 to almost US$140 billion in 1997. In 1998, Chairman Chen was appointed Governor of China Development Bank, which remains today under the direct supervision of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, and has served continuously as its Chief Executive Officer since then（with his title changed from Governor to Chairman in December 2008）.

China Development Bank was founded as a policy bank in 1994 with the mission of financing projects that are too large, too risky, or too long-term for ordinary commercial banks to be able to finance.It is owned directly or indirectly by the State and enjoys quasi-sovereign credit rating. China Development Bank has provided most of the funding for major infrastructural projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, major Chinese airports and seaports, high-speed railroads, bridges, highways, power plants, communication networks, urban mass transit systems, and basic and innovative industries—you name it, and China Development Bank was there. It has been a major supporter of urbanization in China, providing credit to major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing. By the end of 2010, CDB had almost US$800 billion in assets and US$715 billion in loans, more than double the amount at the World Bank. The bulk of the growth of CDB occurred under Chairman Chen's leadership. And he was able to keep the non-performing loan ratio to 0.68 percent in 2010（and it has since declined to less than 0.4 percent）, a most enviable record for not just Chinese banks, but for all major banks worldwide.

China has now become the second largest economy in the world, and has embarked on its new Twelfth Five-Year（2011-2015）Plan, with a commitment to transform its mode of economic development. The Renminbi has begun to be used in Chinese cross-border transactions: in trade, investment, and loans. These developments can potentially open up great opportunities for China Development Bank, which I shall discuss below.

The Twelfth Five-Year（2011-2015）Plan for National

Economic and Social Development

The Eleventh Five-Year（2006-2010）Plan for National Economic and Social Development of China officially ended on December 31, 2010. Most of the Plan targets were achieved or exceeded, including the reduction in energy consumption per unit GDP of 20 percent compared to the beginning of the year 2006. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan provided for a target rate of growth of real GDP of 7.5 percent per annum between 2005 and 2010.The actual rate of growth achieved was 10.84 percent per annum. The only major target not achieved was the percentage of GDP expended on R&D—the target was 2 percent and the actual achieved was 1.8 percent.

The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of China was approved by the National People's Congress in mid-March 2011. It is mostly an indicative plan rather than a mandatory plan. The most remarkable feature of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan is the lowering of the target real rate of growth from 7.5 percent per annum in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan to 7 percent per annum. It is almost certain that this target will be exceeded, just as the target of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan was exceeded（the actual rate achieved was 10.8 percent）. However, the reduction in the target rate of growth signals the determination of the Chinese Government to de-emphasize quantitative economic growth and to focus on the quality of the economic growth in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period.

A principal theme of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan is the transformation of the mode of Chinese economic development—first, from export-oriented to domestic demand-oriented and second, from input-driven to innovation- or technical progress-driven. The Plan also aims at essentially balanced international trade in goods and services by the end of the Plan period.

The Plan calls for accelerated urbanization. The proportion of rural population in total population is expected to decline during the period of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan from 51 percent to 47 percent. Accelerated urbanization can provide much of the needed increases in domestic aggregate demand. The Plan also provides for increased expenditures for education and healthcare, especially in the rural regions, environmental preservation, protection and restoration, and air and water pollution control. It has mandatory targets for improvement in energy efficiency（energy consumption per unit GDP to decrease by 16 percent）and reduction in carbon emission（to decrease by 17 percent）over the Plan period.The Plan also provides for reduction in real income disparity through taxation, transfer payments and targeted government expenditures on public goods such as education and health care, the improvement of the social safety net and the pension system. It also calls for more infrastructural investment in the Central and Western parts of the country, which, coupled with the accelerated urbanization, should help to improve the inter-regional income distribution.

There is a common mis-impression that the Chinese economy is highly dependent on exports, and in particular, on its export surpluses, as a source of growth. The facts are that China only began to have a significant trade surplus vis-à-vis the world in 2005, whereas the Chinese economy has been growing at an average real rate of almost 10 percent per annum since 1978. It should therefore be clear that the trade surpluses could not have been an important source of growth for the Chinese economy during the past three decades. Chinese economic growth has not depended, does not depend and will not depend on Chinese trade surpluses.

Chart 1 Chinese Monthly Exports, Imports and Trade Balance, USD

Chinese trade surplus as a percent of Chinese GDP fluctuated between -4.5 percent and 4.5 percent between 1982 and 2004 with an average of less than 2 percent of GDP.It then rose to a peak of almost 9 percent in 2007. It has since declined significantly, to less than 3 percent in 2010 and approximately 2 percent in 2011. China should have no problem meeting a 4 percent trade surplus to GDP target as proposed by the United States. Chinese international trade in goods and services vis-à-vis the whole world is expected to be essentially balanced in a couple of years, without necessarily any large adjustments in the Yuan/US$ exchange rate. This is possible because of the gradual closing of the savings-investment gap in China as well as the substantial real appreciation of the Yuan versus the US dollar that has occurred since mid-2005 of approximately 25 percent.

Chart 2 Chinese Trade Balance of Goods & Services as a percent of GDP, 1982-2011

Chinese exports as a ratio of GDP rose steadily beginning in 1978 and reached a peak of almost 40 percent in 2006 and then began to decline to approximately 25 percent in 2009. While this ratio appears large, it is not when compared to the ratios of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, where exports can be a multiple of the respective GDPs.And China's exports/GDP ratio actually exaggerates the importance of exports in the Chinese economy because it fails to take into account the low average domestic value-added content of Chinese exports.

Chinese household consumption is sometimes viewed as a potential sustainable source of growth of Chinese domestic aggregate demand.It has actually been growing quite rapidly, as indicated by the double-digit monthly year-over-year rates of growth of real retail sales since the first quarter of 2009（Chart 4）. The rates of growth of real retail sales have far exceeded the rates of growth of real GDP or real household income during the same period, reflecting in part the lagged adjustment process of household consumption to increases in household income. Thus, even as the rate of growth of real GDP falls, the rate of growth of real consumption can continue to rise, at least for a while. Of course, real rates of growth of consumption that are significantly higher than the rates of growth of real GDP may persist only if real household income continues to grow at a higher rate than real GDP. And this is possible only if the share of household income in GDP, currently less than 50 percent, can continue to increase.

Chart 3 Chinese Exports of Goods and Services as a percent of GDP, 1970-2010

Chart 4 Monthly Rates of Growth of Chinese Real Retail Sales, Year-over-Year

The share of rural population in China was just under 90 percent in 1949. By 1978, the share of rural population was 82 percent.By 2010, the share of rural population has fallen to 51 percent—almost half of Chinese population still lives in rural areas.It is expected to continue to fall during the period of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan to 47 percent（Chart 5）. The rate of decline of the share of rural population has been approximately 1 percentage point per year, about the same rate of decline as the share of employment of the primary（agriculture）sector.

Chart 5 The Shares of Rural and Urban Population in China, 1949-Present

Sustained investment in R&D is essential for technical progress in an economy.China has also begun to invest heavily in R&D in recent years—R&D expenditure has been rising rapidly, both in absolute value, and as a percentage of GDP（Chart 6）, but still lags behind the developed economies as well as the newly industrialized economies of East Asia. The Chinese R&D Expenditure/GDP ratio is targeted to reach 2.2 percent in 2015, still below the United States, which has invested on average approximately 2.5 percent of its GDP in R&D since the late 1950s.By comparison, both Japan and South Korea invest more than 3 percent of their GDP in R&D annually（Chart 7）.

Chart 6 China's R&D Expenditure and Its Share of GDP

Chart 7 R&D Expenditures as a Ratio of GDP: G7 Countries, 4 East Asian NIES & China

One indicator of the potential for technical progress（national innovative capacity）is the number of patents created each year. In Chart 8, the number of patents granted in the United States each year to the nationals of different countries, including the U.S. itself, over time is presented. The U.S. is the undisputed champion over the past forty years, with more than 100,000 patents granted in 2010, followed by Japan, with approximately 45,000.Since these are patents granted in the U.S., the U.S. may have a home advantage; however, for all the other countries, the comparison across them should be fair.

The number of patents granted to Chinese applicants each year has increased from 1 in 1985 to 2,657 patents in 2010. South Korea and Taiwan are still ahead of China in terms of the number of patents granted in the U.S., with 11,671 and 8,238 patents in 2010 respectively.

Chart 8 Patents Granted in the United States: G7 Countries, 4 East Asian NIEs & China

The stock of R&D capital, defined as the cumulative past real expenditure on R&D less depreciation of 10 percent per year, can be shown to have a direct causal relationship to the number of patents granted（Chart 9 plots the number of patents granted against the R&D capital stock for each country and each year）.

Chart 9 Patents Granted in the United States and R&D

Capital Stocks of Selected Economies

The huge domestic market of China greatly enhances the productivity of intangible capital（e.g., R&D capital, goodwill）, whether indigenously developed or acquired abroad.The fixed research and development costs of a new product or process can be easily amortized over a large market. The benefits of investment in goodwill, e.g., brand-building, are also much greater in a large market.However, the key to the promotion of innovation is the protection of intellectual property rights, so that the Chinese entrepreneurs will have the incentive to commercialize indigenous innovations as well as patents and technologies acquired from abroad. The huge domestic market also enables active Chinese participation in the setting of product and technology standards, for example, fourth-generation（4G）standards for telecommunication, and sharing the benefits of such standard-setting.

The Internationalization of the Renminbi

The Renminbi has been current account convertible since 1994. However, it has not become fully capital account convertible. There still exist both inbound and outbound capital controls in China.Some categories of capital movements require prior government approval.But individual Chinese citizens can remit up to US$ 50,000 per person overseas each year, with few questions asked.

The willingness to accept and to hold a non-local currency depends on whether the currency is convertible, but it does not need to be fully convertible, in the sense of being both current account convertible and capital account convertible. A person（firm）may be quite willing to accept and to hold a non-local currency, fully convertible or not, if he（it）knows that the next person（firm）he（it）comes across is also likely to accept the currency.

Thus, for example, an exporter to China may be quite willing to accept Renminbi as payment as long as he knows that importers of Chinese goods and services in his country can use the Renminbi balances to pay for the imports. Even though the Renminbi is not de jure fully convertible, it has gradually become de facto convertible in many economies in East Asia because of its wide general acceptance. For example, the Renminbi is widely accepted and used in Hong Kong, Macau, Laos, Myanmar, and other border areas as a medium of exchange and a store of value even though it is not legal tender in these places. In Hong Kong, Renminbi bank deposits have risen rapidly from virtually nothing to almost 10 percent of total bank deposits in all currencies（see Chart 10）. This demonstrates that it is possible for a non-local currency to gain wide general acceptance even without full convertibility.

Chart 10 Renminbi-Denominated Bank Deposits in Hong Kong

Almost all Chinese international trade, including both exports and imports of goods and services, has been denominated and settled in US dollars since China began its economic reform and opened to the rest of the world in 1978. Chinese exporters and importers in selected regions have been permitted to settle their trade in Renminbi since 2009 on a voluntary basis, by mutual agreement between the exporter and the importer in each case.The practice will be extended to the whole nation in 2011. Approximately 30 percent of Chinese trade is conducted with East Asian economies.If the Renminbi is to be used as the settlement currency by Chinese exporters and importers with their trading partners in East Asia, the Chinese demand for US dollars for international transactions purposes would be greatly reduced, and the People's Bank of China, China's central bank, would no longer need to hold as much foreign exchange reserves as it does now. For comparison, approximately half of Japanese international trade is denominated and settled in Yen.

Chinese imports from East Asia except Japan amount to US$ 300 billion a year. If these imports alone can be settled in Renminbi, the requirement of foreign exchange reserves for transactions purposes can be reduced. Similarly, Chinese exports to East Asia except Japan amount to more than US$300 billion a year. To the extent that the importers in these East Asian economies can obtain Renminbi（for example, from their exporters）, they may also be able and willing to pay for their imports from China in Renminbi. If this happens, the US dollar assets held in the foreign exchange reserves of their central banks for transactions purposes can also be reduced.

The proportion of Chinese trade settled in Renminbi has grown from 2.5 percent in 2010 to 7 percent as at the end of 2011 Q1. This proportion is expected to increase further in the future.Thus far, trade settlement in Renminbi is predominantly for Chinese imports, accounting for approximately 90 percent. In order for Renminbi settlement to be more widely used by Chinese exporters, overseas importers must be able to have access to Renminbi themselves. This will take some time but as exporters to China in these economies are paid in Renminbi, their Renminbi balances will in principle be available for the importers. The use of the Renminbi as a trade settlement currency may also be facilitated by an offshore forward market for Renminbi established by or under the authority of the People's Bank of China with participation restricted to bona fide exporters and importers to and from China.

Moreover, if other East Asian economies, such as Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand also begin to use either their own currencies or the Renminbi as their settlement currency for trade amongst themselves, it would further reduce the demand for US dollars for international transactions purposes and hence the proportion of the foreign exchange reserves that the central banks of these economies hold in terms of US dollar-denominated assets.

In May 2011, the Ministers of Finance of China, Japan and South Korea, meeting on the sidelines of the Asian Development Bank annual meeting in Hanoi, issued a statement to the effect that they would study the use of their own currencies in trade settlement with one another. Trade settlement in the own currencies of the trading partner-countries is straightforward if the bilateral trade is basically balanced. A problem arises only when there are persistent bilateral surpluses or deficits.The central bank of the surplus country will wind up holding the currency of the deficit country. What can be done to reassure the surplus country that it will not lose out by holding the currency of the deficit country for more than a short period?

A commitment by the central bank of a country through mutual agreements to redeem its currency held by other central banks in terms of other hard currencies（e.g., US dollar or Euro）, gold, or its inflation-indexed bonds will go a long way to reassure the central banks of surplus countries that they will not lose out in terms of purchasing power, which is ultimately what really matters. If trade settlement in own currencies turns out to be a widespread and durable arrangement, it may supplant the use of the US dollar as the principal international trade settlement currency eventually.

Even if the Renminbi is not fully convertible in the sense of a total absence of inbound as well as outbound capital controls, it may nevertheless be maintained as part of foreign exchange reserves by the central banks and monetary authorities of other countries and regions as long as there is a credible commitment through mutual agreements by the People's Bank of China to convert any Renminbi presented by a foreign central bank into US dollars or Euros or any other so-called “hard” currencies, or even gold at a pre-agreed parity.Foreign central banks can hold the Renminbi for potential transactions purposes with China or other economies willing to accept the Renminbi.The People's Bank of China already has bilateral currency swap agreements in place with the central banks or monetary authorities of Argentina, Belarus, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Mongolia and more such agreements are expected to come.

Whether the Renminbi will become a major international reserve currency eventually remains to be seen.There are both pros and cons for a country's currency to be used by other countries as an international reserve currency. The Japanese Yen is fully convertible but the Japanese Government has not promoted its use by other countries as a major international reserve currency. At the present time,Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea have all been considering investing part of their foreign exchange reserves in Yuan-denominated securities to diversify its portfolio, even though the Yuan（Renminbi）is not yet fully convertible.

Implications for China Development Bank

What implications does the Twelfth Five-Year Plan have for China Development Bank? Under the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the Chinese economy is supposed to undergo a transformation of its mode of development from “Export-Oriented to Domestic Demand-Oriented” and from “Input-Driven to Innovation- or Technical Progress-Driven.”

What are the possible sources of sustainable growth of domestic demand? They include, in addition to household consumption and public infrastructural investment（e.g., high-speed railroads, intra-urban mass transit systems and power plants）: （1）accelerated urbanization;（2）owner-occupied residential housing;（3）investment in the conservation of energy, clean and renewable energy, and environmental protection and preservation; and（4）education and health care and the application of high technology in these sectors.

Long-term financing of infrastructural projects is China Development Bank's forte, so there should be many opportunities under the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. Urbanization will require infrastructure—roads, railroads, airports, power plants, water works, communication and optical fiber networks, mass-transit systems as well as residential housing.Reduction of energy consumption and reduction of carbon emission require new investment in power plants—gas-fired, hydroelectric power, nuclear power—clean coal, and other alternative forms of energy.

Under the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 36 million new affordable residential housing units are to be built. China Development Bank can help make these units more widely affordable by establishing a home loan unit that issues long-term fixed-rate bonds to financial institutions and pension funds and other long-term investors, and with the proceeds purchases qualified long-term fixed-rate mortgage loans from originating lenders, who should be required to retain a residual interest, say, between 5 and 10 percent, in the mortgage loans originated by them（so as to discourage moral hazard）.

In order to promote innovation, China Development Bank can finance the completion of a national optical-fiber network that links the entire country, with free or low-cost access to the internet everywhere. This will greatly accelerate the transmission of information and knowledge and equalize the opportunities between the more developed coastal areas and the less developed interior and the Western regions. With access to the internet, a student in Qinghai, one of the poorest provinces in China, will have access to the same information as a student in Shanghai, the richest municipality; and small enterprises can compete with large enterprises on a more equal footing on the World Wide Web.

In addition, China Development Bank can through its investment unit invest in venture capital around the world. The basic idea is to try to finance the future Apple, Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook and Twitter at a very early, start-up stage. The probability of success of venture capital investment is low, approximately one in every ten ventures.But the payoff can be huge if one is able to invest in the right start-up early. Moreover, it is almost impossible for a Chinese enterprise to try to buy,say,10 percent of Apple or Microsoft（too expensive, local political opposition）after it has become successful, but it would have been quite possible at the start-up stage. However, it is difficult to predict, a priori, which venture will be successful.China Development Bank should therefore invest widely and early—sow many seeds early and harvest a few large trees years later.

China Development Bank can also play a leading role in financing the development of commercial-scale pilot plants for new technologies, for example, the coal-to-oil conversion technology, the shale-gas fracking technology, or the nuclear fusion technology, or new materials, for example, plastics that can be as strong as steel. Once proven, the unit cost of subsequent plants can be considerably lowered. These new technologies can provide credible substitutes to conventional forms of energy and materials and hence restrains their price increases over time. The only effective long-term hedge for commodity-price-led inflation is the development of credible substitutes.

China Development Bank can provide long-term US dollar-denominated or other foreign currency-denominated loans to Chinese direct investors with good credit investing overseas, funded through the issuance of foreign-currency-denominated bonds by China Development Bank both within China and outside China. China Development Bank can also borrow US dollars or other foreign currency directly from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange（SAFE）of the People's Bank of China（PBC）, at close to the rates offered by U.S. Treasury or other government bonds of similar maturities. By being able to borrow long-term in the currencies of the investee-countries, the outbound Chinese direct investors can also effectively hedge the long-term exchange rate risk. China Development Bank is also uniquely suited to the provision of infrastructural loans. As Chinese enterprises go overseas to acquire natural resources, they will need to develop the infrastructure of the investee-countries so that the natural resources can be exploited and exported.This is where China Development Bank can also play a major role.

With the internationalization of the Renminbi, meaning the increasing availability and use of the Renminbi outside China, China Development Bank can also take advantage of the opportunity to further internationalize its operations. China Development Bank can provide long-term financing for inbound foreign direct investment. For example, it can provide long-term Yuan-denominated loans to foreign direct investors with good credit（e.g., Intel and Microsoft）for their projects in China, thus allowing the foreign direct investors to essentially match their assets and liabilities in terms of currency and maturity. With such a loan, a foreign direct investor can effectively hedge the long-term exchange rate risk.However, in order to discourage moral hazard, the foreign direct investor（actually the ultimate parent thereof）should be required to provide a direct loan guarantee to China Development Bank of an amount equivalent to the loan in terms of US dollars or another hard currency. If the project fails commercially and the outstanding loan cannot be fully offset by the remaining assets, the parent will have to make up the difference.

The increasingly widespread use of Renminbi for Chinese international trade settlement implies that a great deal of the Renminbi balances used by Chinese importers to pay their foreign suppliers will remain outside of China at least for a while until they begin to be used by foreign importers of Chinese goods and services to pay their Chinese suppliers. Chinese commercial banks operating abroad will play a major role in the intermediation of these Renminbi balances. However, recycling of such Renminbi balances back into China in the form of loans or bond proceeds on any significant scale is likely to create difficulties for the Chinese financial sector because of the large interest-rate differential between on-shore and off-shore Renminbi funds at the present time.

However, China Development Bank can engage in a form of “recycling” that does not affect the Chinese domestic financial sector.China Development Bank can issue Renminbi-denominated bonds, to be purchased in Renminbi, outside of China, for example, in Hong Kong（but perhaps also elsewhere as Chinese international trade settlement in Renminbi grows）. Currently, with China Development Bank's quasi-sovereign credit rating, it can probably borrow offshore at no more than 2 percent per annum, probably less, compared to 4 percent per annum or more within China. With the Renminbi proceeds, it can purchase US dollars or other foreign exchange from the People's Bank of China, to be used to support China Development Bank operations overseas.It can also use the proceeds to lend to overseas borrowers with a legitimate need for Renminbi, e.g., to pay for imports from China or to make direct investment in China. In so doing, China Development Bank actually helps to reduce the foreign exchange reserves held by the People's Bank of China as well as the cost of sterilization operations that the People's Bank of China otherwise has to conduct in order to prevent the Yuan from appreciating too much or too fast.

Finally, China Development Bank, as a Chinese policy bank with a global reach, can also operate an offshore interbank market in forward Renminbi on behalf of the People's Bank of China as a public service. The commercial banks that participate in the interbank market can in turn sell forward Renminbi and US dollars to bona fide exporters and importers of goods and services in the Chinese market（but not to pure currency speculators）.

Concluding Remarks

China Development Bank should maintain its unique status as the leading policy bank of China and its unique ability to finance projects that ordinary commercial banks are either unwilling or unable to finance（either too large, or too risky, or too long a time horizon）. In order to meet the demands for long-term, fixed-rate financing, banks cannot rely on the relatively volatile short-term and variable-rate bank deposits for funding. China Development Bank has the unique advantage that it is able to raise, through the capital markets, long-term fixed-rate funds at a lower cost than commercial banks, given its sovereign or quasi-sovereign credit rating. It should capitalize on this advantage.

It should therefore remain wholly state-owned and not be privatized either in whole or in part. By remaining wholly state-owned, it will continue to enjoy sovereign or quasi-sovereign credit rating and will not be subject to pressure from private shareholders to maximize profits, especially short-term profits. The disastrous experience of the partially privatized and publicly listed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States should be a lesson.Policy banks should never be privatized. Once privatized, whether in whole or in part, pursuit of profit will become the most important consideration of the management to the exclusion of the policy goals; and it will either lose its sovereign or quasi-sovereign credit rating, so that its cost of funds will rise, or, if it is allowed to keep its quasi-sovereign rating, it will induce moral hazard on the part of the management, private shareholders and all the market participants, because of the perception that it will never be allowed to fail.

[1] An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Twelfth Meeting of the International Advisory Council of China Development Bank, Beijing, May 19，2011.

Chapter 16 The Future Financial Landscape：China Development Bank

Hans W. Reich

China Development Bank（CDB）was established on March 17, 1994 under the jurisdiction of the State Council. It is mandated with improving the standard of living of the Chinese population and enhancing the country's competitiveness.

To achieve these goals, the bank has two main responsibilities: provide financing for the construction of the country's infrastructure including social infrastructure and strengthen the international co-operation of China's real economy through appropriate financing.

When CDB was founded, the centrally state controlled but global-trade oriented Chinese economy had already been growing for 15 years，driven by the successful implementation of the socialist yet market-oriented economy the governing principles of which have survived to this very day.

In a talk with CDB's International Advisory Council, a Chinese prime minister once described the approach as follows: “As much socialism as necessary and as much market economy as possible.” While the concept is dirigist, it is not rigid. Instead, government intervention in the country's economic development was always a function of the constantly changing relationship between the social status of the population and economic growth that leaves room for a continuous improvement of people's living conditions.

In addition,China opened up greatly to foreign investments. Foreign export-oriented companies realise that, over the long-term, access to the huge Chinese market cannot only be secured by trade but also by production in China—if they are willing to form joint-ventures with Chinese companies, the prerequisite for any foreign investment. Capital, manufacturing, product and marketing know-how flow into China; in return, the country offers lower production costs and, longer term, a gigantic market.

Looking at the financial sector, one might think that its development could and should have mirrored that of the real economy. Yet a number of reasons stood in the way. For one, the government had—and still has—substantial reservations against foreigners dominating the financial sector, and for cause. First of all, there is the official exchange rate policy of a non-convertible Renminbi. Furthermore,China does not want to become dependent on foreign banks. As a result, minority interests of below 25 percent are allowed, but only if the foreign partner ensures a transfer of know-how.

The main reason, however, likely resides in the Chinese government's awareness that the Chinese banking system is in a deplorable state. Acting as so-called policy banks, Chinese banks have traditionally provided liquidity to state-owned companies seeking to meet plan targets and have thus largely been vicarious agents in a cameralistic financial system rather than intermediaries between investors and borrowers.

They also did not heed transformation risk. Banks refinanced via deposits and, if these were insufficient, via the central bank. The nonexistence of risk management systems added to the problem and led banks to pile up losses and defaulted receivables.

Filtering these out of the web of state-owned companies and state-owned banks that spanned all of China was a Herculean challenge that required powerful government intervention. Restructuring banks and implementing modern operational and risk management systems also took time. Time the Chinese government did not have if it wanted to deliver on its ambitious targets of building the country's infrastructure, improving the social infrastructure, enhancing the economic infrastructure by promoting and financing SMEs, promoting housing, helping Chinese companies make their way abroad and ensuring commodity supply to China.

Against this backdrop and in acknowledgement of the above, the Chinese government established China Development Bank. It was designed to be a well-managed financial institution anchored in the economy and acting as an acknowledged financial market participant. It was to have access to cheap funding and be under government ownership and supervision while being run in accordance with best bank practices by the best talents available. Such an institution could also serve as a benchmark for a financial sector in restructuring mode.

The bank's responsibilities included driving the development of a Chinese capital market and supporting the state-owned companies in building transparent financial reporting that allowed for credit appraisals as well as risk and project controls that ensured that funds were used according to their purpose.

The bank got off to a very jolty start. While it always generated profits after its founding year and while bank assets increased to about US$70 billion until 1998, one-third of the originated loans proved unrecoverable.

In this situation, Chen Yuan assumed leadership of CDB. Chen Yuan already had a successful track record as a former Vice Governor of the People's Bank of China: he had been instrumental in turning that organization into a modern central bank and making it the largest of its kind in a matter of ten years. Chen Yuan immediately initiated an organizational and strategic realignment of the bank. This included building an exemplary risk management, refocusing the business strategy, using and thus promoting the development of a Chinese capital market as well as internationalizing the bank and communicating globally in order to understand the best practices of other development finance institutions.

This strategy soon proved successful. Total assets increased more than tenfold to almost US$800 billion by 2010. Profitability kept up with growth, the NPL ratio fell to 0.7 percent. The bank turned into a capital market innovator, for instance when issuing the first asset-backed security. Even when financing development, the bank complies with the rules of solid risk management.As a step towards commercialization of China Development Bank from a purely government-run institution, CDB officially became a commercial bank in December 2008, and capital was increased substantially to about US$ 55 billion.

The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 prevented the bank's privatisation not only because the markets did not allow for a successful sale of shares but also because the crisis' contagious effect on the real economy led officials to again appreciate the importance of having a development finance bank.

Against this backdrop, CDB's future business model is again up for discussion. The author believes that there are three principal options:

Option 1: Policy and commercial banking combined.These functions cannot be performed by the same bank or entity. Business policies, targets and management mindsets are so different from each other that they would lead to suboptimal results in both cases. In addition, investors will not be able to distinguish which funding is benefiting from government support and which is not. Still, China's economy and society remain in need of a strong and efficient policy bank. In the authorities' drive towards transforming CDB into a full-fledged commercial bank, they must also decide how to organize policy banking in the future and how to organize the transfer of policy bank-related assets and funding.

Option 2: Another possible option would be a full-blown universal bank offering investment, corporate and retail banking as well as markets, securities and equities including transaction services, asset management and insurance. This combination allows for a steady and balanced income stream from fees and interest. As such a broad scale of activities is quite difficult to manage, however, officials should remember one basic rule—The attempt to achieve good results everywhere typically leads to widespread underperformance. For this reason, CDB should at least stay away from insurance services. Partly, because they conflict with banking activities and insurance specialists will achieve much better results, but also because the new bank should develop a unique selling proposition to differentiate itself from the competition. In that sense the existing know-how in project financing could be one of the new entity's strength.

Option 3: A public sector financing institution. This sector could be CDB's forte. Yet the change in the regulatory environment and the rising risk potential of sovereigns will not create a profitable business environment.

In addition, most multilateral development banks,all of which benefit from low funding costs are looking for new mandates and invading that sector already. In a low margin business such as the public sector,cheap funding is vital. A business model built on compensating for disadvantages in that area through high transformation and mismatch risks on the funding side of the business cannot be considered sustainable.

Once the business model has been determined, there is the question of where it should be implemented, i.e. the question of the bank's regional footprint.

Clearly, this very much depends on the analysis of where the Chinese economy is going. It is evident that the Chinese economy is very much driven by exports. This trend will continue, even if local consumption is increasing. The driving force behind this export success is foreign direct investments. Going forward, Chinese corporations will invest heavily abroad in order to explore new and safeguard existing markets and secure access to raw materials as well as high standard technology.

Any Chinese bank seeking to provide its clients globally with all the products they need and facilitate their access to the world's capital markets must have a global footprint. This sounds simple. But the bank must also comply with all regulatory requirements of the host countries which require a large-and expensive-administrative infrastructure. Decision makers will therefore have to determine whether to offer all services everywhere. Let us take a practical example. Retail banking is important to diversify bank funding, but it should not be introduced into mature markets where entrance costs will be much too high. It should, however, be considered for emerging and developing countries. The best way to expand the business abroad is by prudent acquisitions. I would discourage building a business from scratch in a headquarter-driven process.

In conclusion, the best option should be alternative 2, i.e. a full-service bank operated on a global basis based on the existing expertise in project financing. This also tallies with the development of the Chinese economy, where CDB has its roots. If managed well, this model would ensure a good and strongly diversified income stream, asset risk portfolio and funding as well as a broad access to the financial markets.

The organization structure of this type of bank must also be addressed.

As a basic principle,the organization should be structured from the client up. Decision-making should take place as closely to the client as possible. In consequence, leadership and responsibility should be spread globally. Regions must have individual budgets, P&Ls and balance sheets. The bank will only be successful outside of China if the local genius can be mobilized and if people are given enough freedom to be creative and serve clients in a motivated and efficient manner. Accountability, sustainability and continuity in dealing with clients are the keys to sustained success.

Corporate functions and IT on the other hand should be centralized to achieve economies of scale.

To put it in a nutshell:China undoubtedly needs strong banks with a broad range of well diversified financial services available across the globe. This corresponds to the needs of the Chinese economy, which will turn ever more global going forward. After a short implementation period, such a model would create a competitive advantage over other Chinese banks.

At the same time,China also undoubtedly needs a policy bank that compensates market deficiencies and initiates structural reforms. Among others, it will have to support the SME sector, the urbanization efforts, the need for environmental protection, energy saving, social and other infrastructure on behalf of the government.

Irrespective of the final decision on the future of China Development Bank,the institution benefits from a very strong foundation. It is financially sound, it can rely on experienced, well educated and motivated employees, and its organizational structure can serve as a benchmark in the Chinese financial sector.

These achievements are due to Chen Yuan's success as the bank's Governor. He has rendered outstanding services to his country.

Chapter 17 Reforming the Global Financial Architecture

The Late Sir Andrew Crockett[1]

Introduction

“Architecture” may seem a rather pretentious word to describe the ad hoc set of arrangements that make up the current international financial system. Even a reformed financial system will surely lack the clarity of structure and design that are the hallmarks of good architecture. But a financial system should nevertheless conform to certain broad principles, which can be readily understood and widely accepted. It is these principles that I want to talk about today.

To my knowledge, there is no generally-agreed definition of what is meant by the term “global financial architecture.” I will take it to encompass three things:first the basic economic model by which international financial relations are conducted; second, the network of institutional arrangements that are put in place to manage these relations; and third, how decision-making power in the system is distributed among individual countries. I hope that what I mean by each of these aspects will become clearer as I go along. My central theme is that all three aspects of the international financial architecture have been profoundly affected by the way in which the world economy has evolved over the past few decades, and by certain trends that have come to a head in the current crisis.

The first major trend of the post war era has been the growing ascendancy of the free market philosophy. This has led to a focus on open and global financial markets as the principal driving mechanism for the international allocation of resources. Not only is this a somewhat different model of international financial relations from that envisaged at Bretton Woods, it has called for new institutional mechanisms to manage it. Now, however, the current financial crisis has placed in question the validity of some aspects of this new model.

The second major trend has been the growing weight in the world economy of newly emergent economies. This has rendered outdated the distribution of power in the global institutions created after the Second World War. The fact that the crisis had its origins in the major financial centers has intensified the calls by emerging markets for more say in how international financial relations are managed.

These trends, and the questions now being raised about the financial architecture, have major implications for Asian economies. Asian countries have been both the beneficiaries and occasionally the victims of financial globalization. They have been the countries that have seen their shares of world output and trade grow the fastest.Asia therefore has a key interest in a more robust framework of international finance, and in a more equitable sharing of decision-making authority. But it has hitherto played a relatively minor role in the design and management of the international monetary system.

In my remarks today, I will begin by considering the changing economic model of international financial relations; and how institutional structures have been adapted to reflect the changes that have taken place. I will then say something about how the experience of the past two years has altered perceptions of the working of the system, and how reforms are taking account of the lessons learned. Lastly, I will discuss how the relative roles of different countries need to change to reflect new realities of the global balance of economic power.

The Changing Model of International Financial Relations

The basic model of international economic relations has evolved enormously from the system set up in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the words of Padoa-Schioppa and Saccomanni, the international monetary system has gone from being “government-led” to “market-led.”[2]

The Bretton Woods system, established in 1944, assigned a key role to governmental decision-making. And it did so in a framework of largely separate and independent national financial systems. Consider four central features of an international financial system: the exchange rate regime; the balance of payments adjustment process; international liquidity creation, and payments arrangements. Under Bretton Woods, all have a substantial measure of government management.Exchange rates were fixed and could be changed only by intergovernmental agreement in specified circumstances of “fundamental disequilibrium.” Otherwise, governments were expected to defend them by exchange market intervention. Balance of payments adjustment was pursued through the deliberate use of domestic demand management to secure a stable current account. International liquidity depended on the fixed dollar price of gold, and the mechanism for liquidity creation was hotly debated in international fora. And capital account payments were in most countries subject to restriction through exchange controls.

Over time, however, this government-led system was undermined by forces of economic liberalization, particularly in capital markets. Capital controls proved difficult to enforce, and were eventually rejected on philosophic grounds also. The fixed exchange rate system among the major countries broke down in 1971, and was replaced by a floating regime, in which market forces played the major role. International liquidity became essentially demand-determined, as aggregate reserve balances were increasingly based on national decisions. And the adjustment process was largely market-driven, with major governments eschewing current account targets and allowing exchange rate movements, rather than domestic demand policies, to perform the function of equilibrating demand and supply for foreign exchange. In sum, where previously governmental decisions had dominated the management of the international monetary system, by the latter decades of the 20th century market forces largely guided cross border flows of real and financial resources.

To be sure, not all countries moved to the same extent or at the same pace. Many emerging markets still today manage their exchange rates and maintain some capital controls. But by the beginning of the current century, it was possible to say that the basic architecture of the international financial system was based on market forces, which in turn operated through open and global capital markets. Nation states generally accepted a responsibility to pursue prudent domestic monetary and fiscal policies, but this was assumed to be consistent with allowing market forces to determine exchange rates and international financial flows.

Institutional Implications of the New Model

A major consequence of the liberalizing trend was an enormous expansion in cross border capital flows. The separation that had existed between national capital markets in the earlier post war years was almost completely eroded, and a single global capital market developed. Concomitantly with this process, financial market players were growing in size and geographical spread. They were developing new financial instruments that facilitated the management of risk and taking of positions in a wide range of markets. As markets became more “complete” it became harder for government policies to escape their discipline. If anything, however, this was regarded as a further benefit of a market-driven international financial system.

The growth of global financial markets signaled significant changes in the basic model within which international economic relations were managed. The relative importance of governmental decisions about exchange rates, liquidity creation and so on, declined relative to regulatory decisions about how financial institutions and markets were supervised.

Within national economies, increased importance was attached to central banks, whose monetary policies directly affected financial market conditions, and to those agencies responsible for the regulation and supervision of institutions and markets. To begin with, and with the benefit of hindsight, surprisingly, the preservation of financial stability was not a major focus of regulators' attention. Many financial systems had been heavily regulated for decades, with controls on permitted fields of activity, market entry, prices of services, and interest rate levels. These controls resulted in financial repression, but effectively insulated financial systems from instability. Basically, the cushion of rents was so large that failures were highly unlikely.

With the flowering of liberalization, however, the model of an administratively regulated financial system came into question both nationally and internationally. The basic assumption of the liberal economic model was that market forces are largely beneficent, and so the thrust of regulation should be to facilitate their operation. In such a model, the dangers of financial instability might be greater, but it was thought that these dangers could be controlled by a combination of the enlightened self interest of market players, the self-equilibrating properties of markets, and risk-based, “light touch” supervision by the regulatory authorities.

The international dimension of a lightly regulated market based financial system was the need to ensure a level playing field for global financial institutions, through comparable regulation in individual national markets. But which body, in the “architecture” of the system, should be charged with promoting the necessary global cooperation?

The IMF was not well-suited to this task for several reasons. One was the fact that the expertise of the Fund had been built up in the macroeconomic area, and the Fund staff had relatively less experience in financial matters. Another was the fact that the Fund was an intergovernmental agency, largely dominated by finance ministries, whereas much of the authority in the financial arena was wielded by other agencies such as central banks and financial regulators.

As a result, and little remarked by observers at the time, important areas of responsibility for the management of the international financial system passed into the hands of bodies other than the IMF. A number of these were found in Basel, where central bankers had been meeting since the 1930s. With the increased prominence of monetary policy as the principal tool of macroeconomic policy, and the growing independence of central banks, the monthly（later bi-monthly）meetings of central bank Governors in Basel became a significant element in the structure by which international economic relations were managed.

Other significant developments in the institutional architecture were the creation in 1975 of what later became the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the growth in the authority of the International organization of Securities Commissions（the securities regulators, IOSCO）and the establishment of a network of central bank committees to monitor market trends and developments. Lastly, in 1999, the Financial Stability Forum was established to bring together in a single body the key institutions concerned with issues of national and international financial stability.

Three aspects of this new institutional architecture are worth noting. First, it developed largely ad hoc, and outside the framework of formal treaty obligations. This gave it flexibility in operation but robbed it of legitimacy. Second, it was largely unplanned, in the sense that each committee was established to meet a particular need with little attempt at coordination or overall design. And third, it developed within a philosophical framework that regarded market forces as largely stabilizing.

The Impact of the Crisis

What does the current crisis tell us about the desirability and effectiveness of a market-based, global financial system, and the architecture that has developed to manage it? There are many lessons, but perhaps the most obvious one is that unfettered market forces have not prevented a synchronized global meltdown in financial markets, with devastating consequences for real economic activity and employment. We have learned that market failures are more widespread and problematic than we previously believed. A lightly regulated financial system does not necessarily tend to a stable equilibrium.

Reforms to the previous regulatory philosophy are therefore called for. The questions now faced are what these reforms should be and how they can be brought about. Will they be a modification at the margin of the basic open market approach? Or will they involve much more far-reaching restraints on market forces, and perhaps a move back from globalization? As these issues are being resolved, there is also the question of what institutional structure will be most effective in managing a reformed financial system.

One view is that globalization has been proved wanting in the present crisis, and that what is required is a much greater dose of governmental involvement in key economic areas. This could include more managed exchange rates, stricter controls over movements of capital, and tighter licensing of financial products. It could also involve more governmental control of the shape of national financial systems, perhaps through breaking up financial conglomerates and/or limiting the activities of foreign firms. Those who favor this approach recognize that it involves a retreat from globally integrated financial markets but feel that the costs of this are less than advertised, and worth paying to obtain the benefits of greater stability in national financial systems.

There are undoubtedly superficial attractions to more direct government involvement in key financial markets and prices, and more local control over national financial markets. It could help avoid some of the consequences of unfettered market over-reactions. It could prevent governmental policy objectives from being frustrated by market developments. Emerging markets in Asia, for example, feel vindicated in their policy of managing exchange rates, accumulating large foreign exchange reserves and maintaining capital controls. Those that have limited foreign involvement in their financial sectors believe this has helped protect them from a drying up of lending.

More restrictions over financial institutions could also limit some of the costly cross-border contagion we have seen. Regulators such as the FSA in London are seeking to guard against imported instability by introducing measures to require global institutions to manage their local balance sheets according to national prudential standards. There are calls for financial innovation to be managed so as to avoid the use of “weapons of mass financial destruction”.

Seductive as some of these arguments are, I believe that, if pushed too far, they carry significant potential costs for the world economy. Accepting them unquestioningly could begin a trend that might lead to the fragmentation of capital markets, and a retreat from globalization. It should not be forgotten that globally integrated capital markets have brought great benefits. The aim of the reforms that are now urgently needed should therefore be to preserve these benefits while addressing the specific defects that have resulted in such damaging instability. The new financial architecture should therefore be based on a greater recognition that market failures can occur, that market forces therefore need to be better controlled, and that new institutional mechanisms are needed to manage these processes. How can this be achieved?

Concerning macroeconomic variables, it is clear that market forces can cause capital flows and asset prices to overshoot. But this does not mean that governmental decisions would be better. As a general matter, the reverse is almost certainly true. But we probably need a conceptual framework that enables us to decide when it is legitimate to override market signals in the interest of systemic stability. Take the case of asset bubbles. For a long time, it was assumed that asset bubbles were impossible to identify in advance, and that the best policy was to mop up the consequences after they had burst. Now, there is greater interest in seeing whether credit financed bubbles can be addressed as they are emerging, and how monetary or regulatory policies can be used to control them. Research is beginning to have some success in identifying early warning signals of unsustainable financial imbalances.

In attempting to make counteracting financial imbalances operational, however, international cooperation will be key. It will be very important to have a coordinated view of what is possible and desirable in this area. Divergent approaches could well lead to inconsistent monetary policies and to undesirable exchange rate movements. The aim should be the correction of potential sources of instability rather than trying to suppress their consequences.

Moving from macroeconomic concerns to financial regulation, it should be possible to devise market-friendly tools to preserve stability, rather than administrative-type restrictions on what financial institutions are allowed to do and where they are allowed to operate. The crisis has demonstrated that banks need to hold larger capital buffers to internalize the costs of potential public support, and that the range of institutions subject to supervision should be widened. It has also shown the need to address procyclicality in the financial system and to take a much wider view of the macroprudential aspects of systemic stability. There is thus a strong basis for an internationally coordinated set of guidelines for managing financial systems. Devising and implementing these guidelines presents a demanding, but achievable, research and policy agenda for the international community.

There would be significant drawbacks if individual countries pursued separate approaches to strengthening their financial systems. The benefits of a global capital market depend on reasonably consistent national regulations to provide a level playing field for competition. Without this, there are risks of regulatory arbitrage. Experience seems to suggest that in the presence of regulatory arbitrage national regulators will seek to erect barriers to cross-border activities, in order to preserve their capacity to control risks in their domestic financial system. This may be understandable, but undermines the benefits that flow from a global capital market.

In my view, an efficient international financial architecture should involve a truly global framework of supervision and regulation, together with international agreement on the management of crises and the resolution of failing institutions. Only in this way would regulators be able to assure public opinion in their respective countries that they were protected against the risks of financial instability, while preserving the benefits of an open international financial system.

Three principles are of key importance. First, regulation should be based on a common framework of rules across national jurisdictions. This is the easiest（though still not easy）element to achieve. Banking and other financial regulators should agree on minimum prudential standards for the institutions under their control, and for a common coverage of regulated institutions and markets. This requires building on the current Basel capital standards, with modifications to strengthen guidelines that have been shown to be inadequate.

Second, and harder, there need to be understandings about supervisory implementation, i.e., about how regulations established by common agreement are interpreted and enforced. This is difficult because national supervisors have a statutory responsibility for the institutions incorporated within their jurisdiction, and do not always feel able to rely on the prudential supervision of foreign supervisors over foreign-based institutions. The key here is to find mechanisms, perhaps through colleges of supervisors, which provide reassurance to national supervisors that they can rely on the judgments of foreign peers.

The third element is a mechanism that permits the orderly winding down of a failing institution. This is undoubtedly the hardest, as it goes to the heart of national legal systems and touches on the fiscal responsibilities of national governments. For moral hazard reasons, no institution should be perceived as too big to fail, so mechanisms are needed that will allow failure without imposing unacceptable costs on either national taxpayers or partner countries.

There are four key prerequisites of an acceptable failure regime:（i）imposing losses on stakeholders that are predictable and consistent with avoidance of moral hazard;（ii）avoiding unnecessary damage to “innocent bystanders”, especially when that would provoke a loss of confidence in otherwise sound financial institutions;（iii）minimizing taxpayer costs; and（iv）sharing equitably across affected countries any residual fiscal burden.

This is a demanding set of requirements. I fully understand that they are easier to set out than to implement. But unless we are able to build a more cooperative international structure of supervision and crisis management, we are at risk of squandering the gains of many decades of growing financial globalization. No region would be at more risk of losing from this than Asia. For this reason, Asian countries need to have clear ideas about how the architecture of finance should be reformed, and to be prepared to use their enhanced role in the global decision making process to this end.

The Distribution of Decision Making Power

I come, lastly, to how power and influence should be exerted by participant countries in the international financial system. This has been a dominating theme in discussions about the reform of the IMF.

The reason for the debate is obvious. Since the early 1970s, there have been rapid changes in the relative economic weight of different countries, which have rendered obsolete the preexisting power structure in international finance. This is particularly apparent in the quota shares of the IMF and World Bank. Changing economic weights have affected many regions, but they are most clearly evident for Asia. Asian countries have developed rapidly over the past three decades or so. Excluding Japan, their share of world output has risen from 7.8 percent in 1975 to 14.6 percent today. Even this understates the growth in the importance of these nations in international financial relations. Asia's share of world exports has risen from 8 percent to 23 percent over the same period, and its share of global foreign exchange reserves from 21 percent to 49 percent.

It is clear that Asia merits greater representation in the key international decision making bodies. But to be effective in increasing Asia's voice, Asian countries need to be clear on their objectives. A first question is to identify the bodies that are likely to be most influential in shaping the global financial architecture. A second is to develop a strategy for achieving more “clout” in these bodies. A third is to work out what it is Asian countries want, in a substantive sense, in the model of international financial relations. And a fourth is to utilize their growing voice collectively to achieve these goals. Let me end my remarks by commenting briefly on each of these.

Concerning the bodies that will wield the most influence in the financial system of the future, it would be a mistake, in my view, to focus only on the IMF and World Bank. These are certainly important institutions, and the IMF will probably play a major role as the forum for discussing macroeconomic imbalances. But also of importance will be the G20 and the various sub-groups formed under its aegis. In this connection, the Financial Stability Board（FSB）assumes particular prominence. It seems likely that the FSB will be the forum that develops the regulatory structure of a reformed financial system, and makes recommendations about international harmonization of regulatory standards. Also of key importance will be the various committees established under the umbrella of the BIS, which will also participate in the FSB. These include, in particular, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Committee on the Global Financial System, and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems.

The good news is that the Asian members of the G20 are now also members of all these bodies. But this still leaves open the second question, that of how to develop a voice in the Committees commensurate with the growing importance of Asian economies. This is not a question of voting power, since there is no voting structure in the committees. Rather, influence depends on the perceived value of the intellectual contribution to the discussion. So it will be important for Asian countries to be represented by respected technical experts, with the latitude to participate in discussions without being bound too restrictively to a “party line.” Formal statements prepared by capitals are unlikely to be well received.

Third, and most importantly, Asian countries need to decide exactly what shape of international financial system best suits their needs for the medium and long-term future. In my view,Asia will be an increasingly active participant in cross-border financial relations and would benefit from an architecture that facilitates global integration of capital markets and banking systems. If this is true, Asia would benefit from a supervisory structure in which more decisions were harmonized at the global level. This of course runs counter to instincts to preserve domestic freedom of action in regulatory matters. It will be necessary for Asian countries to decide where their long term balance of interest lies, and pursue that holistically, rather than react to particular issues on an individual basis.

Lastly, Asian countries need to decide how to concert their voice to best effect in groupings where there will inevitably be disparate interests. Given that the G20 and FSB are ad hoc groupings and do not have the legitimacy of universality and a treaty basis, I believe it would be useful for Asian members of these bodies to “reach out” to non-member countries in the region, both to keep these countries informed of developments and to solicit their input to key decisions. This would enhance the legitimacy of the Asian voice.

Conclusion

Allow me to sum up. The “architecture” of the future global financial system seems likely to continue to be based on a market-driven model, but one in which market regulation will play a more substantial role than hitherto. The institutional structure for managing such a system will probably be fragmented, with various international regulatory bodies playing a role alongside the established international financial institutions. And Asian countries have the opportunity to have a larger voice in the management of the system.

If I am right in this, the architecture of the new arrangement will not be tidy. But it will be based on a number of key principles, which it is important to keep in mind as specific arrangements are developed. These include: a recognition that open markets are the basic organizing framework for international financial relations; a willingness to intervene to counter market failures where there is a collective judgment that such failures have occurred; a network of institutions to give effect to the principles just outlined; and a distribution of authority within these institutions that allows all participant countries to feel their views are adequately taken into account.

It will be a challenge to put these principles into effect. But the prize is worth it, in terms of a stable and cooperative international financial system that exploits the undoubted advantages that global capital markets can offer.

[1] Sir Andrew Crockett presented this paper at the Conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Santa Barbara, October 18-20,2009.

[2] Padoa-Schioppa, T. and F. Saccomanni: “Managing a Market-led Global Financial System” in P.B. Kenen（ed）“Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years after Bretton Woods”, Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, pp 235-68.

Concluding Observations

The achievements of China Development Bank（CDB） could not have been possible without the transformation of the Chinese economy and financial system into a world leader in trade and investments that took more than 500 million people out of poverty. These essays all show that visionary leadership combined with sound financial management and responsiveness to expanding market opportunities are key to institutional success.

But China's journey in the 21st century is a continuing one, fraught with new challenges and opportunities. Even as the world emerges from its deepest recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Chinese economy is transitioning into a phase of slower growth within a context of slower growth in the advanced economies.

The world is beginning to address a different set of problems from those of the last three decades of Great Moderation and rising prosperity. Post-crisis, the world must confront the opportunities brought by new technology, the rebalancing of power and trade between advanced and emerging markets, and the social inequities and environmental problems. Almost all economies need to address the questions of job creation, dealing with the income and wealth gaps, and investing in people and infrastructure for the future.

Emerging markets will need to confront the challenges of escaping from the middle-income trap, through improved governance and strategic deployment of scarce resources. The emerging markets can no longer depend on exports as a major engine of growth and may have to develop domestic consumption to drive growth and employment. At the same time, they face excess capacity in many “smokestack” industries; they need to create jobs for the rising number of young labor force moving into crowded cities, and they need to address the environmental issues, welfare and inequities abound.

In many countries, industrial policy has been revived, such as the Korean Green Economy plan, and the new role of development or policy-based finance seriously re-considered. For example, the BRIC countries are considering the establishment of a BRICS development fund or bank. All these stem from the successful lessons of development institutions like CDB in fostering development with an international perspective, whilst acting effectively at the local level.

To sum up, the leadership and vision of Mr. Chen Yuan has set a beacon and standard for development finance which has created very valuable lessons and rich experience in undertaking reforms and financial innovation for emerging markets. We present these essays in his honor and hope that they contribute to the continuing debate on how development finance can strengthen global development and stability.

The Contributors

C. Fred Bergsten

C. Fred Bergsten, Senior Fellow and Director Emeritus, was the founding director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics （formerly the Institute for International Economics） from 1981 through 2012. He is a member of the President's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations, a member of the Advisory Committee to the Export-Import Bank, and co-chairman of the Private Sector Advisory Group to the United States-India Trade Policy Forum, comprising the trade ministers of those two countries. Dr. Bergsten's previous positions included: Assistant Secretary for International Affairs of the U.S. Treasury; Chairman of the Eminent Persons Group of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation （APEC）; Chairman of the Competitiveness Policy Council created by the Congress. He chaired the “Shadow G8,” comprising top economic and foreign policy experts from the G8 countries, which advised those governments on their annual summits during 2000-2005. He has authored, co-authored, edited and co-edited numerous books on international economic issues.

Sir Andrew Crockett, 1943-2012

The late Sir Andrew Crockett was General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements （BIS） from January 1，1994 until March 31，2003. He was Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum from April 1999 until March 31，2003. From 1972 to 1989 he was a staff member of the International Monetary Fund, and from 1989 to 1993, an Executive Director of the Bank of England. In the latter capacity, he was a member of the Monetary Committee of the European Union, Alternate Governor of the International Monetary Fund for the United Kingdom, and a member （subsequently Chairman） of Working Party 3 of the OECD. He was a member of the Group of Thirty, the Board of Trustees of the International Accounting Standards Board, the International Advisory Council of the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the China Development Bank.The BIS inaugurated a biennial Andrew Crockett Memorial Lecture in his honor, the first of which was delivered by Professor Raghuram Rajan, Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago and more recently, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India.

Jacob A.Frenkel

Dr. Jacob A.Frenkel is Chairman of J.P. Morgan Chase International, a member of the Executive Committee of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and the J.P. Morgan International Council. He also serves as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Group of Thirty （G30）, which is a private, nonprofit Consultative Group on International Economic and Monetary Affairs. Previously, he also served as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and as Governor of the IMF and Alternate Governor of the World Bank for Israel. He also served as the Governor of the Bank of Israel. He is the author of numerous books and articles in the fields of international economics and macroeconomics.

Toyoo Gyohten

Dr.Toyoo Gyohten has been the President of the Institute for International Monetary Affairs （IIMA） which is a research institute founded by the Bank of Tokyo （currently The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.） since December 1995. He served for many years in the Japanese Ministry of Finance until he retired as Vice-Minister for International Affairs in 1989, and worked for the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank. He chaired the Working Party III of OECD, Paris from 1988-1990. He was a visiting professor at the Harvard University Business School, Princeton University. He was Chairman of the Bank of Tokyo from 1992-1996. He chaired the Institute of International Finance, Inc. from 1994-1997. He had served as Special Advisor to Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in 1998, and Special Advisor to the Cabinet, including being the Special Envoy of the Prime Minister from 1998-2010. In September 2009, he was appointed as a Special Advisor to the Minister of Finance. Dr. Gyohten co-authored the book “Changing Fortunes” with Mr. Paul Volcker.

Hu Huaibang

Dr.Hu Huaibang joined China Development Bank in April 2013 as Chairman and Executive Director of the Board of Directors. Prior to this, he served as Chairman of the Bank of Communications since 2008; Chairman of the Supervisory Board of China Investment Corporation from September 2007 to September 2008; Director-General of the Supervisory Boards Office and the Commissioner of Disciplinary Inspection of the China Banking Regulatory Commission from July 2003 to September 2007. He also held various positions at the People's Bank of China （PBC） from June 2000 to July 2003， including Vice-President of the PBC Chengdu Branch, President of PBC Xi'an Branch and Provincial Administrator of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange in Shaanxi. Mr. Hu received his doctorate in Economics from Shaanxi Institute of Finance and Economics in 1999.

Paul Keating

The Honorable Mr. Paul Keating was elected to the House of Representatives as the Member for Blaxland in 1969. He was Federal Minister in 1975 and held the portfolio of Minister for Northern Australia in the Whitlam Cabinet. Mr. Keating became Prime Minister of Australia in December 1991 and led the ALP to a historic fifth term of Government in March 1993. Mr. Keating focused Australia's external policy towards the Asian region. He took an active role in the establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation （APEC） forum, and initiated a commitment to a regional free trade agenda at its annual leaders' meeting. He also developed strong bilateral links with Australia's neighbors, especially Indonesia. On April 15,2003, Mr. Keating was awarded a Doctorate of Laws LLD Honoris Causa from the University of New South Wales. Mr. Keating's book, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific, published in March 2000, examines Australia's foreign policy objectives and achievements during his term as Prime Minister.

Jacques Kemp

Mr. Jacques Kemp was the Chief Executive Officer of ING Asia/Pacific Ltd. He had held various positions as Global Head of e-Business at ING Group, General Manager and subsequently Chairman of ING Bank International. He began his career in ING Group in 1974 in the risk management area. He was one of the key executives in building ING's prime position in Latin America in the 1980s before moving on to the Head Office of ING Group. He has served as a Non-Executive Director of KB Financial Group, Inc.（formerly, Kookmin Bank） and Director of ING Vysya Bank Ltd. Mr. Kemp received an MBA from the University of Chicago.

Henry A. Kissinger

Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger is Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm. He is also a member of the International Council of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; a Counselor to and Trustee of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; an Honorary Governor of the Foreign Policy Association; and an Honorary Member of the International Olympic Committee. Among his other appointments, Dr. Kissinger is a member of China Development Bank's International Advisory Council, member of the Board of Directors of ContiGroup Companies, Inc. and an Advisor to the Board of Directors of American Express Company.Between 1968 to 1977, Dr. Kissinger served as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under President Richard Nixon, and continued as Secretary of State under Nixon's successor Gerald Ford. Among the awards Dr. Kissinger has received have been the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973; the Presidential Medal of Freedom （the nation's highest civilian award） in 1977; and the Medal of Liberty （awarded to ten foreign-born American leaders） in 1986. Dr. Kissinger is the author of numerous books, the latest being “On China”. He was formerly Professor at Harvard University and is an authority on foreign policy, international affairs and diplomatic history.

Lawrence J. Lau

Professor Lawrence J. Lau is currently Ralph and Claire Landau Professor of Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Chairman, CIC International （Hong Kong） Co., Limited. He joined the faculty of the Department of Economics at Stanford University in 1966, becoming Professor of Economics in 1976 and the first Kwoh-Ting Li Professor of Economic Development at Stanford University in 1992. From 1992 to 1996, he served as a Co-Director of the Asia-Pacific Research Centre at Stanford University, and from 1997 to 1999, as the Director of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. Professor Lau specializes in economic development, economic growth, and the economies of East Asia, being also an authority on China. From July 2004 to 2010, Professor Lau was Vice-Chancellor of The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He was a non-official member of the Executive Council of Hong Kong SAR Government from 2009 to 2012. He became President of China Investment Corporation International in 2012. He has authored or edited five books and published more than one hundred and sixty articles and notes in professional journals.

Ng Kee Choe

Mr. Ng Kee Choe is currently Chairman of the CapitaLand Group in Singapore. He was previously Chairman of Singapore Power Limited and served as a Senior Advisor to the Chief Executive Officer of DBS Group Holdings Ltd. since July 1, 2003. He joined DBS in 1970 and served in a number of positions in DBS, including being Vice Chairman of the DBS Group till 2003. He is currently Chairman of NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Limited and President Commissioner of Pt Bank Danamon Indonesia. He holds directorships in SATS Ltd., Singapore Exchange Limited, Fullerton Financial Holdings Pte Ltd. and CapitaLand Limited. He serves as a Governor of the Singapore International Foundation. He was a Member of the Temasek Advisory Panel of Temasek Holdings （Private） Limited and is a member of China Development Bank's International Advisory Council.

Sir William Purves

Sir William Purves, CBE, DSO, GBM was the Chief Executive of the HSBC Group from 1986 and its Group Chairman from 1986 to 1993. He joined the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in 1954 （now part of the HSBC Group） and retired in 1998 after 44 years of service. He has served in a number of other senior advisory positions in a number of countries: Chairman of The British Bank of the Middle East; Chairman of Midland Bank Plc.; Vice Chairman of ALSTOM SA; Director of Scottish Medicine Ltd., Interpacific Holdings Ltd., Worldwide Shipping and Investment Company Ltd., Reuters Founders Share Company Ltd., and Trident Safeguards Ltd. He is a member of Hong Kong Chief Executive's International Advisory Council and a member of China Development Bank's International Advisory Council. He was appointed a Commander of the Order of the British Empire in 1990 and was knighted in 1993. Sir Purves received a commission in the King's Own Scottish Borderers in 1951 and was awarded a Distinguished Service Order for his actions with UN forces in Korea.

Hans W. Reich

Mr. Hans Werner Reich has been the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and Chairman of Public Sector Group of Citigroup Global Markets Deutschland AG & Co.KGaA since September 1, 2008. Mr. Reich served in a number of positions: Chairman and Member of the Supervisory Board at Aareal Bank AG; Chairman and Member of the Board of Managing Directors of KfW （Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau）; Deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board at IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG; Vice Chairman of DEPFA BANK PLC and its Non-Executive Director; and Managing Director of Allied Capital Germany Fund, L.P. He is also a Member of the Supervisory Board of ALSTROM GmbH; the Deutsche Energie-Agentur GmbH; the HUK-COBURG Haftpflicht-Unter-stützungs-Kasse kraftfahrender Beamter Deutschlands AG; the HUK-COBURG-Holding AG; the RAG AG and Thyssen Krupp Steel Europe AG （Thyssen Krupp Steel AG）; the Economic Advisory Group at Fraport AG; the Supervisory Board at IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG and Hermes Kreditversicherungs AG; and the Supervisory Board at Deutsche Post AG and Deutsche Telekom AG.

Israel Sendrovic

Mr. Israel Sendrovic served for 33 years at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York （FRBNY）, 19 of those years as its Chief Information Officer and 15 years as a member of its Management Committee. While at the FRBNY, he developed and ran Fedwire, the world's premier funds transfer system. Mr. Sendrovic also provided oversight to the successful design, development, deployment and operation of the private sector-owned Continuous Linked Settlement Bank System （CLS）. He acted as the senior adviser and trusted intermediary on the project working with the primary vendor （IBM）, CLS, regulators, central banks, and shareholders. He represented FRBNY on the Bank for International Settlements Group of Computer Experts for 20 years and chaired its Working Party on Security Issues for nine years. In that capacity, Mr. Sendrovic headed the G10 task force that produced the study on Security of Electronic Money. He also advised central banks and international organizations on payment systems and technology issues.

Andrew Sheng

Andrew Sheng is currently President of Fung Global Institute, Hong Kong. He was formerly the Chairman of the Securities and Futures Commission, Hong Kong from 1998-2005. He is on the Board of Directors of Khazanah Nasional Berhad, Malaysia, and sits on the International Advisory Council of the China Development Bank, the China Investment Corporation, and Securities and Exchange Board of India. He is also Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing; Pro-Chancellor of the Universiti Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia; Adjunct Professor and Third Holder of the Tun Ismail Ali Chair at the Faculty of Economics & Administration, University of Malaya.

A central banker by training, he was Assistant Governor and Chief Economist of Bank Negara Malaysia. Between 1989 and 1993, he served at the World Bank and from 1993 to 1998, he was the Deputy Chief Executive at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. He has written widely on financial and monetary affairs, including “From Asian to Global Financial Crisis” （2009）, Cambridge University Press and co-edited “Capital Market Reform in Asia” published in 2012.

Uli Sigg

Dr.Uli Sigg, a business journalist by training, is currently Deputy Chairman of the Ringier Board of Directors, a position he has held since 2003, having served as Chairman from 1999 until 2003. He has served as Switzerland's Ambassador to China and North Korea, also serving as founding Chairman of the Swiss-Chinese Chamber of Commerce. His profound knowledge of Asia significantly facilitated Ringier's first steps into Vietnam and China. Sharing Michael Ringier's avid interest in contemporary art, he is one of the most eminent collectors of works by Chinese artists.

Paul A. Volcker

Mr. Paul Volcker has worked in the United States Federal Government for almost 30 years, culminating in two terms as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 1979-1987. Mr. Volcker retired as Chairman of Wolfensohn & Co. upon the merger of that firm with Bankers Trust. From 2000-2005 Mr. Volcker served as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the International Accounting Standards Committee. In 2003, he headed a private Commission on the Public Service recommending a sweeping overhaul of the organization and personnel practices of the United States Federal Government. In 2004, he chaired the Independent Inquiry into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program. In 2007, he chaired a panel of experts to review the operations of the Department of Institutional Integrity. In 2008, he was the head of the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board. Mr. Volcker is associated with the Japan Society, the Institute of International Economics, the American Assembly, and the American Council on Germany. He is also Honorary Chairman of the Trilateral Commission and Chairman of the Trustees of the Group of 30. He is currently associated with reform of the U.S. financial system in the aftermath of the global financial crisis through his Volcker Rule proposal.

Sir David Wright

Sir David Wright, GCMG （Order of St Michael and St George） LVO （Royal Victorian Order）, is a former British diplomat. He was appointed Ambassador to South Korea in 1990 and four years later returned to London as Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. From 1996 to 1999 he was appointed Ambassador to Japan, subsequent to which, he became the Chief Executive of British Trade International, which promotes British exports and inward investment. He retired in 2002. After retiring from HM Diplomatic Service, he joined Barclays Capital, the investment banking arm of the Barclays Group, as Vice Chairman where he is responsible for banking client relations in Asia-Pacific and Barclays' links with the U.K. government and other public entities. He is also Vice-President of the China-Britain Business Council, a member of the International Advisory Council of China Development Bank, a member of the International Advisory Board of All Nippon Airways, and a Governor of the Royal Shakespeare Company. He is the current Chair at the Korean British Business Council.