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电动汽车展望 ——中国新能 源汽车: 市场、 政策与消费者

E-mobility and beyond -
New energy vehicles in
China: Market, policy and
consumers

预致汽车咨询有限公司和
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新能源汽车市场

中国新能源汽车（以下简称“NEV”）在 2014 和 2015 这两年的发展令人惊叹。

2014 年，中国生产了近 85,000 辆插电式混合动力汽车和电动汽车，比 2013 年增长了 265%。2015 年，这一产量达到 34 万辆，同比增长 300%。2016 年，产量进一步增长至 51 万辆，同比增长 51.7%。¹

中国在 NEV 市场的全球排名从 2013 年的第四位上升到 2014 年的第二位，仅次于美国。2015 年，中国以 340,471 辆跃升至第一，远高于美国市场规模的 123,000 辆。² 2016 年，中国的 NEV 数量是全球其他地区的两倍以上。

值得注意的是，这种增长，特别是 2015 年的跨越式发展，并不是市场自然需求所造成的，而是政策和补贴在其中发挥了重要作用。

2017 年 1 月，NEV 销售额同比减少了 50%，这警示 NEV 市场在补贴消失时可能会出现震荡。³



“胡萝卜”政策

中国将 NEV 定义为插电式混合动力汽车和电动汽车（包括蓄电池电动汽车和燃料电池电动汽车）。普通全混合动力汽车不属于 NEV，目前在许多国家不符合领取补贴的资格。

中华人民共和国国务院（国务院）2012 年 4 月 18 日发布了节能与新能源汽车计划，明确到 2015 年电动和插电式混合动力汽车数量达到 50 万辆；到 2020 年，这个数量计划上升到 500 万辆。

中国新能源汽车的发展正式开始于 2009 年，当时中国启动了“十城千辆”示范项目。2009 年，中央政府选出十个城市进行示范。2010 年末，该示范城市名单扩大到 25 个城市，示范 NEV 的数量目标是到 2012 年底达到 3 万辆。⁴

这个被叫做 NEV 第一阶段的三年示范项目未能达到预期效果，大多数城市没有兴趣花费当地资金去补贴其他地方生产的 NEV，2012 年下半年在中央政府的大力推动下才勉强完成了三万辆的目标。

鉴于第一阶段实施困难，中央政府没有立即推出第二阶段示范项目，直到 2013 年 9 月，88 个城市被选中，承诺到 2015 年底购买近 33 万辆 NEV。

1. 2016 年新能源汽车增速超过 50%，中华人民共和国工业和信息化部，2017 年 1 月 13 日，<http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146312/n1146904/n1648362/n1648363/c5462628/content.html>

2. 2015 年新能源汽车高速增长，中华人民共和国工业和信息化部，2016 年 1 月 15 日，<http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146312/n1146904/n1648362/n1648363/c4600465/content.html>

3. 基于 AutoForesight 研究

4. 苗圩：撸起袖子一起加油干 促进新能源汽车产业健康发展，中华人民共和国工业和信息化部，2017 年 1 月 17 日 <http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146347/n1147601/n1147604/c5466635/content.html>

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在 88 个城市中，超过一半的城市发布了补贴个人消费者的地方政策，主要是与中央政府的补贴金额相匹配。结果提供给电动汽车的补贴达到近人民币 11 万元 / 辆，提供给插电式混合动力汽车的补贴约人民币 6.5 万元 / 辆。⁵

在直接补贴之外，中央政府决定从 2014 年 9 月起取消 NEV 车型 10% 的车辆购置税，这使得补贴总额几乎占大部分 NEV 零售价格的 40-45%。

此外，北京、上海、深圳和杭州等实施车辆牌照控制政策的大城市还向 NEV 提供免费车牌，其价值分别约达人民币 5 万至 9 万元（根据购车者所在的城市而定）。如果将这个价值计算在内，总补贴比率可达到 NEV 零售价格的 60-65%。

尽管充电设施还远未普及，但有了巨额补贴，以及更重要的免费车牌，个人消费者很快便被吸引过来，插电式混合动力汽车的个人需求自 2014 年以来一直旺盛，占插电式混合动力汽车销售总额近 75%，而个人对电动汽车的需求则没那么强劲，只占电动汽车销量的不到 30%。

但即使中央政府给予了如此之多的补贴，与第一阶段相似，地方城市仍不热衷于使用地方城市的预算去购买非本地的 NEV 车。同样类似于第一阶段，2015 年下半年，地方城市才忙于完成它们承诺的目标，仅 2015 年第四季度的销量就占当年总销量 37.9 万辆的 50% 以上。



“胡萝卜”政策的问题

美国和日本也对 NEV 提供补贴，但是他们将补贴与零售价格的比例控制在 10% 到 25% 之间，⁶ 中国 40% -65% 的补贴率就相对高得多，这导致一些代工厂商（OEM 厂商）对 NEV 的零售定价较不合理。总的来说，中国的 NEV 零售价格一般比美国或日本市场的主流 NEV 价格高 30-50%。

由于补贴过多，结果导致沿海地区的补贴欺诈行为频发。中华人民共和国工业和信息化部（工信部）和中华人民共和国财政部（财政部）于 2016 年初开始进行联合调查，对涉嫌骗补的十多家公司进行了处罚。这也解释了为什么在 2014 年和 2015 年突然涌现出那么多租赁公司，在 2015 年购买了大量的电动汽车。这些“租赁公司”（有些是由汽车制造商成立的）将电动汽车卖给了自己的租赁公司或关联第三方，在获得补贴后，他们拆卸了电动汽车，并收回电池用于下一轮电动汽车的“制造”。

5. 基于 AutoForesight 研究

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鉴于此类案件太多，政府意识到不能靠补贴来促使新能源车行业成熟，所以政府决定在 2020 年底前逐步取消补贴。以 2016 年的补贴金额为基础，2017-2018 年的补贴为 2016 年的 80%，2019-2020 年的补贴则为 2016 年的 60%。此外，中央政府决定不再进行第三阶段的示范项目。⁷

由于目前的 NEV 销售主要是由政策刺激实现的，削减补贴之后，OEM 厂商将面临更大的压力去降低价格。到 2020 年底，OEM 厂商只能依靠自己的力量：那些将电动汽车定价太高的厂商将会失去市场，而那些在未来 5 年内可以降低成本的厂商届时将迅速占据市场份额。

然而，大多数 OEM 厂商没有快速做出回应去降低价格和成本，相反，他们似乎宁愿尽可能多地享受目前 NEV 定价策略中的好处。为什么 OEM 厂商的言行不一致呢？答案就是：因为“胡萝卜”太多，而“大棒”不足。



“大棒”政策

目前主要的“大棒”是乘用车燃料消耗量限值，或企业平均燃料消耗值（Corporate Average Fuel Economy, CAFE）。到 2020 年底，OEM 厂商生产的传统汽车平均燃料消耗将为 5 升 / 100 公里，而节能型车辆燃料消耗量为 4.5 升 / 100 公里。⁸

为了达到这个目标，行业需要保证在 2020 年使 NEV 产量达到乘用车总产量的 7% 左右，或在总销售 2600 万辆中占约 200 万辆。⁹ 按照目前的定价结构和较低的补贴，2020 年，消费者不太可能愿意购买这么多 NEV。

2013 年 5 月 1 日，中国颁布了《乘用车企业平均燃料消耗量核算办法》。其中规定了如果企业不能达标将如何受到惩罚。违规厂商生产的每辆车最高将被罚款人民币 12000 元，即如果一家汽车制造商生产了 100 万辆车辆，罚款便可超过人民币 100 亿元。显然，这个惩罚似乎过于严苛，可能不现实。

此后，这个办法经过了四次更新和修改，将信用交易系统引入汽车行业，惩罚也逐步减轻。到目前为止，仍然没有关于这个政策执行的明确指引。

至少现在看起来，这个“大棒”政策还不够强硬。整个行业仍然有这样一种心态，即太多的公司不能达标，因此政府不能惩罚所有的人。

7. 关于 2016-2020 年新能源汽车推广应用财政支持政策的通知，中华人民共和国工业和信息化部，2015 年 4 月 22 日，<http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/n3054355/n3057585/n3057590/c3617158/content.html>

8. 节能与新能源汽车产业发展规划（2012-2020 年）印发，中华人民共和国工业和信息化部，2012 年 7 月 9 日，<http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1146557/n1146619/c3072778/content.html>

9. 基于 AutoForesight 研究

» 结论

消费者总是很实际的，他们愿意为新技术和环保目的支付合理的价钱。但他们可能不会在没有补贴的情况下以高价购买任何 NEV。

另一方面，补贴不能成为汽车制造商长期将 NEV 产品价格保持在较高水平的借口，依靠政府补贴和政府大型采购是非常短期的战术，不能作为一个战略。

这里的关键是，在给出太多的“胡萝卜”之后，政府可能会转向使用“大棒”，迫使 OEM 厂商遵守市场规则。虽然没有人知道这个“大棒”会有多大，但它仍然会给 OEM 厂商带来压力，从而更快地降低成本。如果价格到 2020 年可以降低到相同规模的传统汽车的 30-50%，那就不需要担心 NEV 的销售，达到汽车总产量 7% 的目标是可以实现的。


否则到 2020 年，维持 2016 年的销量都将十分困难。

中华人民共和国国家发展和改革委员会（国家发改委）和工信部最近在 NEV 发展方面的举措表明，每个 OEM 厂商的 NEV 信用额度分别为总生产 / 进口的 8%（2018）、10%（2019）和 12%（2020 年）。这给所有的 OEM 厂商施加了更大的压力去思考他们的 NEV 本地化策略。

由于这一规定仍在讨论中 – 而且预计不会有什么重大的变化 – 我们建议 OEM 厂商应认真考虑制定一个满足这些要求的策略。工信部已发布一个修订后的公式，以计算 NEV 所需的信用额度。但目前的 NEV 信用交易管理和控制状况尚不清楚。为了抵消负数 NEV 信用余额，制造商只能从其他制造商那里购买正数 NEV 信用额度。但是，信用额度的市场价格又会如何呢？对于尚未准备在中国进行 NEV 生产的所有 OEM 厂商来说，这留下了诸多的不确定性。

毕马威根据现行法规进行模拟的结果表明，外资 OEM 厂商不会达到 2018 年的目标，2019 年也可能达不到目标。要在快速变化和不确定环境中保持竞争力，保持灵活和敏捷的 NEV 战略更为重要。

最后，尽管政府大力推动 NEV，但消费者是否会接受仍然是个问题，因为 NEV 用户的主要关注点仍然是（1）NEV 缺乏有竞争力的定价和（2）没有充足的充电基础设施可为客户提供方便。





The NEV market

Both 2014 and 2015 were very successful years for new energy vehicle (NEV) development in China. In 2014, China produced nearly 85,000 plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) and electric vehicles (EVs), 265 percent higher than in 2013. In 2015, the production volume hit 340,000, rocketing by 300 percent. In 2016, the volume grew further to 510,000, a 51.7 percent growth.¹

At the same time, China's global ranking in the NEV market improved from fourth in 2013 to second in 2014, after the US. The high volume of 340,471 in China in 2015 – far higher than the US market size of 123,000 – helped China jump to first place. In 2016, China's NEV volume was more than double the rest of the whole world.²

This type of growth, especially the leap forward in 2015, was not the result of a demand-driven market – instead, policies and subsidies played a major role.

However, in January 2017, NEV sales decreased by 50 percent year-on-year, an alarming signal that the NEV market may become shaky as the subsidies fade.³



The policy 'carrots'

NEVs in China are defined as PHEVs and EVs (including battery EVs and fuel cell EVs). Normal full hybrids are not regarded as NEVs, and are no longer eligible for subsidies in many countries.

The State Council released the *Energy Conservation and New Energy Vehicles Plan* on 18 April 2012, which stated the target for the number of electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles in operation by 2015 would reach 500,000 units, and by 2020, the plan is to increase the volume to 5 million.

China's NEV development formally began in 2009, when China started the 'Ten Cities, Thousand Vehicles' pilot project. In 2009, the central government selected 10 cities which would provide NEV subsidies to

1. 'The growth rate of NEVs was over 50% in 2016', Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), 13 January 2017, <http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146312/n1146904/n1648362/n1648363/c5462628/content.html>

2. 'NEVs grew at a high speed in 2015', Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), 15 January 2016, <http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146312/n1146904/n1648362/n1648363/c4600465/content.html>

3. AutoForesight research

promote NEV sales. This was expanded to cover 25 cities in late 2010, and the target volume of NEV pilots was 30,000 units by the end of 2012.⁴

This three-year pilot project, called Stage 1 NEV pilot, was not considered successful. Most of the cities were not interested in spending their local funds to subsidise NEVs made elsewhere. Through enormous effort, the 30,000 unit target was eventually met, mostly due to the push by the central government in the second half of 2012.

Due to the difficulties with this process, the central government did not launch the Stage 2 pilot project until September 2013. At that time, 88 cities were selected, with the aim of purchasing nearly 330,000 units by the end of 2015.

More than half of the 88 cities issued local policies to subsidise individual consumers, mostly by matching the central government subsidy amount. Subsidies to EVs were nearly RMB 110,000/unit, and PHEVs about RMB 65,000/unit.⁵

On top of the direct subsidy, the central government decided to waive the 10 percent vehicle purchase tax for NEV models from September 2014, making the total subsidy value almost 40-45 percent of the retail price of most NEVs.

In addition, large cities with car licence plate control policies, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hangzhou, all gave free licence plates to NEVs, valued at about RMB 50,000-90,000 depending on the city. If this value is included, the total subsidy ratio would hit 60-65 percent of NEV retail prices.

With this large subsidy amount, and more importantly, a free licence plate, individual consumers were quickly motivated to buy these vehicles – despite the fact that charging facilities were far from ready. Individual demand for PHEVs boomed from 2014, accounting for nearly 75 percent of total PHEV and EV sales, although individual demand for EVs was more moderate, accounting for less than 30 percent of PHEV and EV car sales.

However, even with such big central government subsidies, similar to during Stage 1, local cities were not keen to purchase foreign NEVs using local city budgets. As happened in Stage 1, in the second half of 2015, local cities were busy trying to reach their promised targets, though reluctantly. The sales for Q4 2015 alone accounted for more than 50 percent of the year's 379,000 units.

4. 'Miao Wei: Roll up your sleeves and work harder to promote the healthy development of the NEV industry', MIIT, 17 January 2017, <http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146347/n1147601/n1147604/c5466635/content.html>

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Policy 'carrot' problems

The US and Japan also subsidise NEVs, but they control the ratio of subsidies against retail prices between 10 percent and 25 percent.⁶ China's subsidy ratio of 40-65 percent is much higher, resulting in some unreasonable NEV retail pricing by certain original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). China's NEV retail prices are generally 30-50 percent higher than the mainstream NEV prices in the US or Japan market.

Due to the high subsidies, there was a lot of subsidy fraud in coastal regions. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and Ministry of Finance jointly started investigations in early 2016, and penalised more than 10 companies accused of fraudulent behaviour. This explains why many rental companies emerged in 2014 and 2015, purchasing large numbers of EVs in 2015. These 'rental companies' were sometimes established by car manufacturers, who sold EVs to their own rental companies or a related third party. After getting the subsidies, they disassembled the EVs and took back the batteries for the next round of 'manufacturing' of new EVs.

Due to the number of fraud cases, the government realised that the NEV industry could not develop into a mature industry while it had government subsidies, so it decided to phase out the subsidies by the end of 2020. The 2017-2018 subsidies are 80 percent of those in 2016, while subsidies in 2019-2020 are only 60 percent of those in 2016. In addition, the central government decided there will be no Stage 3 pilot projects.⁷

Since the present NEV sales were mostly achieved through policy stimulus, after the reduction, OEMs will have even more pressure to reduce their prices. OEMs will need to be able to run independently by the end of 2020. Those whose EVs are priced too high will lose market share, while those who can reduce costs in the next five years will stand to gain market share.

Unfortunately, most OEMs are not responding quickly enough to lower prices and costs. Why have OEMs been slow to act? This could be because there have been too many carrots, but not enough sticks.

6. AutoForesight research

7. 'Circular on Financial Support Policies for NEVs' Popularisation and Application in 2016-2020', MIIT, 22 April 2015, <http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/n3054355/n3057585/n3057590/c3617158/content.html>



The policy 'stick'

The main stick so far is the fuel efficiency limits of passenger cars, or Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE). By the end of 2020, the average fuel consumption of traditional cars from OEMs will likely be 5L/100km, while that of energy-saving vehicles should be 4.5L/100km.⁸

To hit this target, the industry needs to ensure that around 7 percent of total passenger cars produced in 2020 are NEVs, or around 2 million units of a total of 26 million cars.⁹ With the current pricing structure and lower subsidies, it is less likely that consumers will be willing to buy this many NEVs in 2020.

On 1 May 2013, China issued *Passenger Vehicle OEM Average Fuel Consumption Accounting Method*. This defines how to deal with OEMs if they fail to meet the standards. The OEMs will be fined up to RMB 12,000 for each vehicle they produce – in other words, if a car manufacturer produces 1 million vehicles, the fine could easily be RMB 10 billion. This punishment seems too strict, and unrealistic.

There have since been four updates and modifications, which introduce the credit trading system into the auto industry, and the penalties have been reduced over time. At the moment, no one really knows how this policy should be enforced.

It seems that currently, the stick is not big enough. The industry still seems to have the mentality that the government cannot punish everybody, as many companies cannot meet the standards.

8. 'Energy Saving and NEV Industry Development Plan (2012-2020)', MIIT, 9 July 2012, <http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1146557/n1146619/c3072778/content.html>

9. AutoForesight research

» Conclusion

Consumers tend to be practical and are generally willing to pay a fair cost for new technology, and for environmental protection purposes. However, they will probably not purchase NEVs at a high price when there is no subsidy at all.

On the other hand, subsidies cannot become car manufacturers' excuse to keep the NEV product price high for too long. Relying on government subsidies and fleet purchases from the government are very short-term tactics, rather than a strategy.

The key here is, after giving out too many carrots, the government may shift to sticks and force OEMs to follow market rules. Though nobody knows how severe the penalties will be, it will still put pressure on OEMs to reduce costs more quickly. If the price can be lowered to 30-50 percent of the same size traditional car by 2020, there will be no need to worry about NEV sales, as it will be possible to meet the target of 7 percent of total car sales. Otherwise, it will be difficult to maintain even the 2016 volume.

The recent move by the National Development and Reform Commission and MIIT on NEV development suggests that the NEV credit scheme for each OEM should be at 8 percent (2018), 10 percent (2019) and 12 percent (2020) of total production/import. That puts even more pressure on all OEMs to think about their localisation strategy for NEVs.

As this regulation is still under discussion – and it looks like no major changes are expected – OEMs should think about a strategy to meet these requirements. The MIIT has issued a revised formula to calculate the NEV credits required, however, it is still unclear how NEV credit points trading will be managed and controlled. To offset the negative NEV balance, manufacturers can only purchase positive NEV credits from other manufacturers. However, what will be the market price for the credit points? This leaves a lot of uncertainty for all OEMs which are not yet fully prepared for NEV production in China.

KPMG analysis of the current regulation indicates that many OEMs may miss the target for 2018 – this will likely also be true for 2019. The need for a flexible and agile NEV strategy is even more important to maintain competitiveness in a fast-changing and uncertain environment.

Finally, the question still remains whether consumers will buy NEVs despite the strong push for them, as NEV users' major concerns still remain – the lack of competitive pricing for NEVs and the shortage of conveniently placed charging infrastructure.

» 联系方式

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