
据 Hackaday 报道,从导航到时钟同步,卫星导航系统对现代生活至关重要,却出人意料地脆弱——从简单干扰到复杂的欺骗攻击都可能得手。包括 GPS 在内的大多数 GNSS 系统没有任何验证手段,攻击者只要以更高功率播发虚假信号就能劫持接收机,而 GNSS 信号到达地面时极其微弱,这对中等装备水平的攻击者来说并不难。
欧洲的伽利略系统正在改变这一局面。其「信号认证系统」(SAS)的思路是:地面站预先选择信号扩频码,用定期更换的密钥加密后发布;需要验证信号的接收机可提前下载并存储这些加密码。伽利略卫星在 E6-C 导频信号上播发,接收机记录信号;卫星发送完消息块后,再通过独立信号播发解密密钥,接收机解密恢复扩频码,并与录得的信号做相关运算求得伪距。
这套系统相当复杂但确实有效:本月初在挪威安多亚举行的年度 Jammertest GNSS 测试活动中,各机构用一周时间检验自家 GNSS 系统对抗干扰、延迟转发和欺骗的韧性。欧空局利用五颗伽利略卫星,在欺骗条件下仍为接收机获得了稳定且通过认证的定位——这是伽利略首次公开演示民用认证定位。
报道指出,该方法原则上可扩展到其他 GNSS 系统,而且动机充分:就在不久前,理论上存在多年的 GPS 弱点已被大规模实战利用。
本文来源:https://hackaday.com/2026-09-27/defeating-satellite-spoofing-with-galileos-encryption/
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According to Hackaday, from navigation to clock synchronization, satellite navigation systems are vital to modern life, yet surprisingly fragile—vulnerable to everything from simple jamming to sophisticated spoofing attacks. Most GNSS systems, including GPS, have no authentication mechanisms; attackers can hijack receivers simply by broadcasting fake signals at higher power, and since GNSS signals arriving at ground level are extremely weak, this is not difficult for an attacker with moderate equipment.
Europe's Galileo system is changing this situation. The idea behind its "Signal Authentication System" (SAS) is: ground stations pre-select signal spreading codes, encrypt them with regularly rotating keys, and publish them; receivers that need to verify signals can download and store these encrypted codes in advance. Galileo satellites broadcast on the E6-C pilot signal, and receivers record the signal; after the satellite finishes sending a message block, it broadcasts the decryption key over a separate signal. The receiver decrypts to recover the spreading code and performs a correlation operation with the recorded signal to obtain the pseudorange.
The system is quite complex but genuinely effective: at the annual Jammertest GNSS testing event held in Andøya, Norway earlier this month, organizations spent a week testing the resilience of their GNSS systems against jamming, delayed-relay, and spoofing. Using five Galileo satellites, ESA still obtained stable and authenticated positioning for receivers under spoofing conditions—the first public demonstration of civilian authenticated positioning by Galileo.
The report notes that the method could in principle be extended to other GNSS systems, and the motivation is strong: not long ago, GPS weaknesses that had existed in theory for years were exploited on a large scale in real-world combat.
