
本月我们收到了两款不同寻常的小巧设备用于评测:PlugMate 和 PlugClaw,它们均由 TrustKernel 制造,这是一家安全公司,比起消费电子产品,它更因其他品牌手机中的可信执行技术而为人熟知。每一款都是一台大小如同 U 盘、完全独立运行的微型电脑(拥有独立的处理器、内存和加密存储),运行着一款名为 PlugOS 的私有加固版 Android 系统。将它插入你的手机、平板电脑或电脑后,这些主机设备便会为其提供屏幕、键盘和网络连接。你的任何数据都不会越界。
最容易理解的说法是:它是一台小型电脑(更准确地说,是一部小型手机的硬件),会借用你的屏幕、鼠标、键盘和其他外设与你互动。IT 人员难免会把它比作虚拟机,这个类比并不差,只不过这里没有任何东西是虚拟的。它是真实、独立的芯片;它只是像虚拟机共享资源那样,共享主机的显示和连接管线。拔掉它,TrustKernel 表示不会留下任何痕迹。
PlugMate(促销价 US$199,建议零售价 US$299)被定位为更严肃的那一款:一个用于保护你的私人应用、数据和身份的硬件保险库。PlugClaw(促销价 US$149,建议零售价 US$239 起)基于同样的基础平台,只是在上面加装了一个 AI 智能体(OpenClaw 在 Ubuntu 虚拟机中与 PlugOS 并行运行),它可以替你操作应用、回复消息并执行工作流。同样的外壳、同样的尺寸,不同的定位,更低的价格。这立刻让人产生疑问:为什么 AI 那款反而更便宜?我们稍后会回到这个问题。
如果你刚刚入手了一台,关键操作是:在设置任何内容之前先运行系统更新。在我们的设备上,最新的 OTA 更新顺利完成,也没有影响我们的测试文件,但更新会替换系统映像,TrustKernel 警告称 beta 版本“可能导致数据丢失”,而且在这个平台上任何重置都会轮换加密密钥,也就是说数据一旦丢失就真的找不回来了。因此,请把它当作一部全新手机来对待,而不是一个文件夹:先把它插好,跳过设置向导,前往 PlugOS 设置 → 系统更新,让它自行完成,然后再开始把你的生活装进设备。如果你要更新一台已经在使用的设备,请先备份:PlugOS 有一个“Local Backup”功能,可将备份写入主机设备,不过它要求先在主机的 PlugOS 客户端中设置存储位置(对话框明确指向 PC 客户端的设置),论坛用户也仍在请求更完整的备份路径。在测试恢复之前,请把 U 盘上的任何内容都视为重要数据。
FW 1.1.8 更新界面(左图);本地备份需要在 PC 客户端中设置主机端存储位置(右图)
包装盒正面规格标签
两者都装在同一个通用的蓝色"PlugOS — USB-C Extended Computing Device"包装盒中,盒上带有"Made for iPhone | iPad"徽章,以及用于区分两款产品的贴纸:我们的是一台红色 PlugClaw(6GB/128GB)和一台黑色 PlugMate(128GB)。有趣的是,两个标签都标注为 Model PS01,这与 TrustKernel 声称的 PlugClaw 基于 PlugMate 打造的说法相符。
PlugClaw 内容
PlugMate 内容
PlugClaw 包装盒内含:设备本体、一个可将设备折叠贴合在手机背部的 U 形 USB-C 转接头、两个网状保护套、设置指南以及产品密钥/保修卡。该转接头值得称道:它做工扎实,在我们的手机上即便套着厚手机壳也能稳定连接,提前解决了"插头太粗塞不进手机壳开孔"的经典难题。PlugMate 的包装大致相同,用条纹手机壳替换了网状保护套——原来这么设计是有原因的(它是散热片,下文详述)。包装盒上还印有一条值得反复强调的警告:务必先在 PlugOS 中正常关机,再拔出设备。这是一台基于 eMMC 的计算机,而非 U 盘,TrustKernel 警告热插拔可能损坏文件系统。
适配器穿过后壳,在手机背面折叠平整
棒状、硬币状和套件,套在一起并排放置
长50毫米,宽19毫米,厚8毫米,标称重量14.3克:我们的厨房秤测得两个棒状产品裸机重量均为15-16克,与官方规格相差无几。无论如何,这些东西都比大多数人手头常见的USB闪存盘还要小巧。
放在秤上的PlugClaw。内部,根据TrustKernel的规格表,搭载联发科Helio G80八核芯片(两颗Cortex-A75,六颗A55),4GB内存(我们的PlugClaw为6GB版本;6GB/256GB的PlugMate仅存在于纸面规格,且长期缺货)以及128GB全加密eMMC存储。一个USB-C公头接口包办一切:供电、数据传输、身份认证和显示输出。设备没有电池,没有调制解调器,没有SIM卡槽;这背后意味着什么,下文再述。
这里值得提一笔:TrustKernel 自己的支持论坛将处理器标注为 Helio G70,而规格页面和一项独立拆解(在电路板上发现了 MT6769V SoC)则指向 G80。我们直接测了自己的样机:PlugOS 内的 CPU-Z 报告显示为 2 GHz 的 Helio G80,因此规格表胜出。其底层运行的是 Android 14;它的实际新旧程度值得在下方单独说明。这类细节对性能影响不大,但对原则而言很重要:在安全设备上,你希望文件与实物完全一致,论坛上的一个拼写错误虽然无伤大雅,但精确就是精确。
两者的设置流程相同:先在主机上安装 PlugOS 客户端(Android 8+、iPhone 15 及以上机型的 iOS 16.6+、Apple Silicon 的 macOS 14.5+、x86 的 Windows 8+,或在 Ubuntu/Debian/Fedora/RHEL x64 上运行的新版 Linux beta 客户端),然后将设备插入,扫描产品密钥二维码,设置 PIN 码,最后等待即可。
在手机上直接配对,还有一个低调但讨喜的细节:Android 客户端无需账号、无需注册、无需邮箱:插入、配对、即可使用。2026 年,一个不想知道你是谁的应用几乎是一则宣言,而且它恰好与“零数据收集”的宣传完美契合。从启动到插上线即可使用的桌面:PlugMate(Android 主机)耗时 24 秒,PlugClaw(Windows,固件 1.1.8)耗时 20 秒。重置后的首次启动较慢(我们的是 58 秒,需要生成密钥并运行首次初始化),但后续冷启动始终很快。作为参考,PCMag 报道称他们的设备启动时间长达数分钟;要么是他们运气不好,要么是一年的固件更新确实带来了实质改善。我们押注后者。
TrustKernel 声称支持 Android、iOS、Windows、macOS 和 Linux 的即插即用。我们拿着一整套设备来测试:一台 Windows 电脑、一台 Fedora 笔记本、一部 Android 手机和一台 MacBook Pro:
- **Android 手机** | PlugOS Android 应用 | **可用** — 手机上可完整使用会话,U 型转接头可穿过手机壳
- **Windows 电脑** | PlugOS PC 客户端 | **可用** — 会话的屏幕录制功能默认被阻止,直到你关闭 PlugOS 的录制保护(这是用户可切换的设置,并非硬性锁定)
- **Fedora Linux** | PlugOS 客户端 1.5.7 Beta(Flatpak)| **可用** — 官方安装程序支持 Fedora;完整设置界面可用
- **Intel MacBook Pro(2017)** | macOS 客户端 | **拒绝** — 客户端要求 Apple Silicon 芯片 + macOS 14.5;我们的 Intel 机器无法安装该应用
我们尝试的所有主机均正常运行,且出现的故障均符合预期。有趣的发现来自 Windows:客户端运行正常,但屏幕录制结果中完全缺失了 PlugOS 窗口;该录屏保护位于主机侧,实际上只是 PlugOS 设置中的一个开关选项。将其禁用后,会话即可正常录制。Fedora beta 客户端也表现可靠:官方安装程序正确处理了 dnf,放置了一条规范的 udev 规则,最终效果与 Windows 客户端一致。
本文来源:https://www.cnx-software.com/2026/10/12/plugmate-and-plugclaw-review-thumb-sized-android-based-private-computers-with-optional-ubuntu-openclaw-support/
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The easiest way to picture it: it’s a little computer (or more accurately, the hardware of a small phone) that borrows your screen, mouse, keyboard, and other peripherals to interact with you. IT folks will be tempted to compare it to a virtual machine, and the analogy isn’t bad, except that nothing here is virtual. It’s real, separate silicon; it just shares your host’s display and plumbing the way a VM shares resources. Unplug it, and TrustKernel says it leaves nothing behind.
The PlugMate (US$199 on sale, US$299 RRP) is pitched as the serious one: a hardware vault for your private apps, data and identity. The PlugClaw (US$149 on sale, from US$239 RRP) is the same basic platform with an AI agent bolted on top (OpenClaw running in an Ubuntu VM alongside PlugOS) that can operate apps, answer messages, and run workflows for you. Same shell, same size, different pitch, lower price. Which immediately raises the question: why does the AI one cost less? We’ll come back to that.
Here’s the bit that matters if you’ve just bought one: run the system update before you set anything up. On our unit, the latest OTA went through cleanly and left our test files alone, but updates replace the system image, TrustKernel warns beta builds “may cause data loss,” and any reset on this platform rotates the encryption keys, meaning gone really means gone. So treat it like a fresh phone, not a folder: plug it in, skip the setup tour, go to PlugOS Settings → System Update, let it do its thing, and only then start installing your life on it. And if you’re updating a device you’re already using, back up first: PlugOS has a “Local Backup” that writes to the host device, though it insists on a storage location being set in the host’s PlugOS client first (the dialog literally points at the PC client’s settings), and forum users are still asking for a fuller backup path. Treat anything on the stick as precious until you’ve tested a restore.
FW 1.1.8 update screen (left); Local Backup asks for a host-side location (right) where you set it, in the PC client
Both arrived in the same generic blue “PlugOS — USB-C Extended Computing Device” box with a “Made for iPhone | iPad” badge and a sticker telling the two units apart: ours are a red PlugClaw (6 GB/128 GB) and a black PlugMate (128 GB). Interestingly, both labels say Model PS01, which tallies with TrustKernel’s claim that PlugClaw is built on PlugMate’s foundation.
PlugClaw content PlugMate content
In the PlugClaw box: the stick itself, a U-shaped USB-C adapter that folds the device flat against the back of your phone, two mesh protective sleeves, a setup guide, and the product-key/warranty cards. The adapter earns a mention: it’s a sturdy little thing, and on our phone it connected happily through a chunky case, solving the classic “fat plug won’t fit the case’s port cutout” problem before it starts. PlugMate’s pack is much the same, swapping the mesh sleeves for a ribbed case, which exists, as it turns out, for a reason (it’s a heatsink, more on that below). The box also carries a warning worth repeating: always shut the unit down from inside PlugOS before yanking it out. It’s an eMMC-based computer, not a flash drive, and TrustKernel warns that hot-unplugging can corrupt the file system.
Adapter through a case Folds flat behind the phone
Sticks, coins, and kit Sleeved, side by side
Fifty millimetres long, nineteen wide, eight thick, and a claimed 14.3 grams: our kitchen scale says 15–16 grams bare, for both sticks, which is within sneezing distance of spec. Either way, these things are smaller than most USB drives you’ve got lying around.
PlugClaw on the scale Inside, per TrustKernel’s spec sheet, sits a MediaTek Helio G80 octa-core chip (two Cortex-A75, six A55), 4 GB of RAM (6 GB in our PlugClaw; a 6 GB/256 GB PlugMate exists on paper but is permanently out of stock) and 128 GB of fully encrypted eMMC storage. One USB-C male connector does everything: power, data, authentication, display out. There’s no battery, no modem, no SIM slot; more on what that means later.
Worth a footnote here: TrustKernel’s own support forum has the processor listed as a Helio G70, while the spec pages and an independent teardown (which found an MT6769V SoC on the board) point to the G80. We asked our unit directly: CPU-Z inside PlugOS reports a Helio G80 at 2 GHz, so the spec sheet wins that argument. It’s running Android 14 underneath; how fresh that really is gets an entry of its own below. It’s the sort of detail that matters less for performance than for the principle: on a security device, you’d like the paperwork to be exact, and a forum typo is a small thing, but exact is exact.
Setup is the same on both: install the PlugOS client on your host (Android 8+, iOS 16.6+ on iPhone 15 and up, macOS 14.5+ on Apple Silicon, Windows 8+ on x86, or the new Linux beta client on Ubuntu/Debian/Fedora/RHEL x64), plug the stick in, scan the product-key QR code, set a PIN, wait.
Mate direct on a phone And a quietly lovely detail: the Android client asks for no account, no registration, no e-mail: plug, pair, go. In 2026 an app that doesn’t want to know who you are is practically a manifesto, and it happens to match the “zero data collection” pitch nicely. Boot time, plug-in to usable desktop: 24 seconds on the PlugMate (Android host), 20 seconds on the PlugClaw (Windows, firmware 1.1.8). First boot after a reset is slower (58 seconds on ours, generating keys and running first-run init), but warm boots are consistently quick. For context, PCMag reported multi-minute boots on their unit; either they were unlucky, or a year of firmware updates has genuinely paid off. Our money’s on the latter.
TrustKernel claims plug-and-play across Android, iOS, Windows, macOS and Linux. We threw our menagerie at it: a Windows machine, a Fedora box, an Android phone and a MacBook Pro: HostClientResult Android phonePlugOS Android appWorks — full session on the handset, U-adapter fits through a case Windows PCPlugOS PC clientWorks — screen capture of the session is blocked until you switch off PlugOS's capture protection (a user toggle, not a hard lock) Fedora LinuxPlugOS client 1.5.7 Beta (Flatpak)Works — official installer handles Fedora; full Settings UI present Intel MacBook Pro (2017)macOS clientRefused — the client requires Apple Silicon + macOS 14.5; our Intel machine wouldn't accept the app
Every host we could try worked, and the failures were predictable ones. The interesting discovery was on Windows: the client ran fine, but screen recordings came back with the PlugOS window missing entirely; the capture protection is host-side, and it turns out it’s just a toggle in PlugOS settings. Disable it and the session records normally. The Fedora beta client earned its keep too: the official installer handles dnf properly, drops a sane udev rule, and the result behaves like the Windows client.
Stick on a laptop The beta client on Fedora
Worth knowing: TrustKernel says iPhone 15 and up only; Lightning won’t work even through adapters, and it’s reported running happily on iPads and iPhones (we had no iOS device to verify with). macOS support is Apple-Silicon-only per the download page, and our Intel MacBook confirmed it the hard way: the client won’t install at all. We don’t have an iPhone or an Apple-Silicon Mac in the lab to check the iOS/macOS side (readers feeling generous: the review bench happily accepts donations, ideally with ports). Windows on Arm isn’t supported yet. And the Linux client is still beta: early builds lacked file transfer, backup, and clipboard sync, though one forum user reports it running happily under Qubes OS, which feels very on-brand for this product.
Living with it is unremarkable in the good way: it’s a phone. Apps open at phone speed, scrolling is phone scrolling, and YouTube ran at 1080p without a stutter in our testing. Nothing about the daily experience reminds you that the computer doing the work is plugged into a USB-C port, which is quietly the whole point.
Boot it, and you get a phone-shaped Android 14 desktop, portrait on phones, a portrait window on PCs. The usual suite is here: settings, file manager, browser (a privacy-focused one called Veil), the open-source HeliBoard keyboard (nice choice), a Play Store-capable app store, and PlugOS Settings, which is where the product earns its keep:
Virtual Peripherals is the party trick. Apps inside PlugOS never see real hardware; they get a virtual view you control. GPS can be set to host mode or anywhere you drop a pin; we parked ours in Alaska, and Google Maps dutifully agreed we were freezing to death in Anchorage. Worth noting: it only spoofs the GPS coordinates. Your traffic still rides the host’s network, so IP-based geolocation still outs you, as TrustKernel’s support staff confirmed on their forum, suggesting a VPN inside PlugOS for the full effect.
The same panel lets you simulate a SIM card (IMSI, IMEI, ICCID, carrier, even a phone number) plus Wi-Fi MAC/BSSID, camera (black frames), microphone (silence), and sensors. To apps inside PlugOS, you look like a phone that isn’t yours. Let’s be precise about what that is and isn’t: there’s no modem and no eSIM here. You can’t make calls or get a number that receives texts; you’re faking the identifiers apps read, not real telephony.
Google Maps in PlugOS, parked in Alaska (left); The simulated-SIM editor (right)
The firewall is a proper system-level one: per-app allow/block lists in blacklist mode, plus Net Logs and a DNS/NTP toggle. It’s off by default, which matters if you bought this for the privacy defaults. We verified the controls; one forum user did report flaky checkbox behaviour, so watch it rather than trust it blindly.
GMS is optional. Google Mobile Services are off by default; flick the switch, and the Play Store appears for whatever needs it. On Play Integrity, our unit passes BASIC and DEVICE but fails STRONG; a forum screenshot showed STRONG passing on a different firmware, so your mileage may vary by release, and STRONG-requiring apps (Krungthai NEXT again) are the ones that refuse.

Duress PIN and self-destruct. PlugOS Security gives you two related weapons: a duress code (a second unlock you can enter under pressure that silently wipes the device) and a configurable brute-force limit: pick 5 to 15 wrong attempts and the unit auto-resets on the nth failure. TrustKernel’s docs say the wipe rotates the encryption key and can present a fake “hardware malfunction” screen as a decoy. We verified both features exist in the settings (the reset-on-Nth-attempt menu is right there, options 5 through 15); deliberately setting our own unit off is a test we’re saving for last, since a device full of your data is a one-way trip.
Containment, verified. This is the core promise: apps inside PlugOS can’t see the host’s data, IMEI, or identifiers, and the host can’t see inside PlugOS. TrustKernel’s whitepaper claims all peripherals are virtualised, and the USB link is an encrypted, access-controlled channel. Our checks back the mechanism: About phone inside PlugOS reports a PlugOS-assigned IMEI rather than the host’s, the device identifies itself as PlugOS hardware rather than the phone it is plugged into, and on the network side apps see a private 10.x NAT address, which PlugOS’s own settings call an “internal network address, inaccessible from the external network”. Inbound, nothing can knock. Outbound is where the catch is: traffic still exits via the host’s real public IP, so IP-based geolocation and the host network’s visibility of your traffic are unaffected; “can’t be knocked on” is not “can’t be watched”. Independent testing went further than we dared: dumping the stick’s partitions with mtkclient and reflashing a modified boot image: the userdata partition wouldn’t read (encrypted), the modified boot wouldn’t boot, and the unit then disabled itself entirely, product key invalidated, dead. Someone bricked their own device trying to crack it; call that an endorsement, depending on your sense of humour.
Let’s not pretend: a Helio G80 is a midrange chip from 2020, and no amount of aluminium makes it a Snapdragon. Geekbench 7 inside PlugOS on our PlugMate returned 306 single-core, 782 multi-core. In practice, everyday apps open promptly, scrolling is smooth enough, and YouTube played 1080p flawlessly; the short version is “phone apps, phone speed”. It browses, messages, streams, and runs bank apps fine; it is not a device you buy to feel speed.
Fair question, because software has been quietly copying the idea. Xiaomi’s Second Space (there since MIUI, still in HyperOS) gives you a whole second profile (own apps, accounts, files, separate unlock finger), free, on the phone you already own. Google’s Private Space in Android 15 does a similar trick at AOSP level, complete with the option to hide that the space exists at all. Samsung’s Secure Folder has offered Knox-backed separation for years, and even humble app cloners give you a second WhatsApp.
Here’s the difference, and it runs deeper than a feature list: all of those are second drawers in the same house. They run on the same kernel, the same modem, the same SIM, the same hardware identifiers, so an app inside Xiaomi’s Second Space still sees your real IMEI, your real sensors, your real everything. They can’t fake a location, they can’t firewall an app off the network, they can’t be duress-wiped, and they most definitely can’t be unplugged and carried to your mate’s iPad. PlugOS is more like a separate house that happens to share your driveway; different land title, different letterbox.
Same logic for the other usual suggestions. GrapheneOS hardens your phone beautifully, but it is your phone. Tails on a USB stick borrows the whole computer to boot: great for PCs, useless on a phone, and you’re trusting the host’s hardware and bootloader. A second phone costs more, needs charging, and can’t lend an iPhone an Android. No other hardware product currently does what these two do; the last similar category was Intel’s Compute Stick, and it was neither secure nor long-term for this world. If all you need is hiding Tinder from your flatmate, your Xiaomi or Pixel already does it for free. PlugMate and PlugClaw earn their price when the requirement is physical separation that travels.
Same stick, same PlugOS, plus an Ubuntu VM running OpenClaw, TrustKernel’s agent framework, with an “Android-Use” layer that lets the agent operate apps the way a person would: tapping, typing, navigating. The marketing line is “ChatGPT talks, PlugClaw acts.”
First, a wrinkle that deserves its own paragraph: remember the lovely “no account, no registration” client? That courtesy ends at the AI’s front door. PlugClaw wants activation: a one-time code sent to your phone number or email (the phone field helpfully defaults to +86), plus a ticked User Agreement and Privacy Policy, before the agent will do anything at all. Perfectly ordinary for a service that dispenses credits, mildly ironic on a stick sold on privacy. Worth flagging without being a dealbreaker: if you bought the Claw precisely to avoid handing anyone your digits, BYOK with a self-managed model is the cleaner path.
OTP activation, +86 default main UI, login-gated
The claim, in practice: it works, and it really does operate the phone-OS side of the stick. In our tests it told a joke, generated a logo, translated text into Thai, produced a five-second video clip of a puppy, and (asked to review itself) used its android_use hooks to interrogate its own hardware and write up the results (specs correct, battery level invented: “24%, surviving on charm and optimism”; there is no battery).
Set loose on a real chore (“install a Play Integrity checker from a trusted source and report the result”) it found the right GitHub repo, realised it was source-only, pivoted to a mirror site, met a Cloudflare wall, and kept throwing itself at the door until we intervened. You have to admire the persistence, though it’s a reliable way to burn credits. On pure on-device control, it fared better: asked to use the calculator, it opened the app and tapped through the sum step by step: slowly, but correctly and visibly.
The agent’s first answer Translating into Thai Tool calls + logo Asking it for a video A 5-second puppy clip
Model choice is broad: the picker lists three free models (Qwen and MiniMax variants) plus a paid ladder from 0.2× to 47× the base credit rate, with names like GPT-6-Astra and a Claude Sonnet that the vendor lists as “Caude-sonnet” (a typo shipped in their own UI). Availability varies by region (the setup list doesn’t include Thailand, so we activated under the USA), and a separate GUI model (Qwen3-VL) is what actually drives the screen-tapping. Video generation is a single option: ByteDance’s Seedance-2.0. You can also bring your own API key, and (the bit the marketing undersells) PlugClaw exposes a local API gateway at 127.0.0.1, so the stick doubles as a portable LLM endpoint for other tools.
the paid model ladder the GUI model picker video model: Seedance only local API gateway on 127.0.0.1
Pricing is pay-as-you-go in “credits”: 100 per US dollar, sold in $5–150 packs via Stripe, valid for a year, no refunds. You get 1,500 credits (about $15) free at activation. Ours went 1500 → 1429: a few credits for text and image chores, about 66 for the video and self-review. Media generation is where the meter spins; chat is cheap. There are no subscriptions, which is a welcome change from the usual AI mugging.
The privacy pitch is “Confidential AI”: TrustKernel claims cloud inference runs inside hardware-protected confidential VMs neither they nor the provider can see into, while admitting upfront that frontier models do see your request content. Your workspace stays encrypted on the stick.
You can also text the stick on WhatsApp or Telegram and have the agent work remotely, and there’s a skills marketplace plus third-party ClawHub and MCP support, though the marketplace is in its early days: most community skills show single-digit install counts and lean heavily towards Chinese services (Qzone, ZAKER, Baidu trends). The way we’d put it: PlugClaw is a PlugMate with a junior employee living inside it (tireless, occasionally charming, prone to running face-first into Cloudflare), and the employee works for tokens.
The skills marketplace More of the marketplace
After weeks of research (the reading honestly started before the sticks arrived; we were keen) and our own testing, the genuine fits:
And who it’s not for: anyone wanting a phone replacement (no modem), a desktop replacement (portrait phone UI), a gaming device (it’s a Helio G80 in a 14 gram body, be reasonable), or plausible deniability against nation-state forensics (see above).
They share the same PS01 platform, the same PlugOS, the same security toolbox. The PlugClaw adds the AI stack and undercuts the PlugMate by US$50. TrustKernel says the hardware is “streamlined” to hit that price, though on paper our units are near-identical (we benchmarked the Mate only; the Claw’s extra 2 GB showed no disadvantage in daily use). Availability nudges the decision further: the PlugMate’s only paper advantage (a 6 GB/256 GB config) is permanently out of stock (TrustKernel blames storage-chip supply, no restock timeline), so the Mate you can actually buy is the 4 GB/128 GB one. And the Claw dips lower still: a 4 GB/64 GB SKU drops the entry price beneath the US$149 we quoted, which is plenty if the stick’s job is apps and agents rather than hoarding files. If you want the vault and don’t care about AI, PlugMate makes sense only if you truly value its positioning; for most people, PlugClaw is the better buy. Between you and I, same isolation, plus an eager little helper that does your chores, for less money. And after testing: the agent does earn its keep; on-device it genuinely operates apps, slowly but correctly, as long as your chores stay inside the stick and away from Cloudflare.
Both are clever, genuinely unusual devices that mostly deliver the thing they promise: a real, encrypted, second Android that lives on a keyring and borrows whatever screen you feed it. The isolation is real, the privacy toolbox is thoughtfully designed, the duress and tamper behaviors are above anything else at this price. You do pay in other currencies, though: closed source, unaudited, Chinese jurisdiction, host-keyed PIN, a phone UI on desktops, and heat you’ll feel. At US$199 for PlugMate and US$149 for PlugClaw on sale, PlugClaw is the easy recommendation of the two, assuming you have chores it can actually do. We’d like to thank TrustKernel (PlugOS) for providing both review units; the opinions, measurements, and gripes above are our own. You can purchase either on the PlugOS website, and CNX Software readers get a 5% discount with the coupon code CNX.
MBMena Bassily “MB” has over 20 years of experience in IT and a passion for technology, Linux, tinkering, and DIY. Based in Chiang Mai, he writes Linux drivers, custom kernels, and reviews the obscure tech most people haven’t heard of.