IT之家 10 月 17 日消息,Anthropic 公司昨日(10 月 16 日)发布博文,宣布其内部研究用 Claude 模型用不到 30 分钟,追溯出五条美国国家标准与工艺研究院(NIST)标准椭圆曲线的“种子”(seed)来源,为一桩延续约 26 年的密码学悬案给出了可复现的答案。
IT之家注:这里的种子(seed),可以理解为“生成椭圆曲线参数时使用的一段起始数据”,生成规则像一台固定程序的机器,种子就是投入机器的原料。同样的原料,按照同样的规则处理,就能得到同样的结果。公开种子后,其他人可以复算,检查曲线参数是否确实按公布的步骤生成。
谜题源于 2000 年纳入美国数字签名标准的一组椭圆曲线。相关种子由美国国家安全局(NSA)给出,却未说明生成过程,长期引发是否暗藏后门的猜测。这些曲线用于椭圆曲线数字签名算法(ECDSA),协助验证数字信息的真实性。
据 Anthropic 介绍,Claude 转而排查上世纪 90 年代常见的软件工具,发现这些种子实际来自 C 语言库中的伪随机数生成器 lrand48,初始化输入则是 Unix 时间戳。
模型借助识别位模式、恢复生成器状态并反向推算,将相关生成时间追溯至 1997 年至 1998 年。其中,P-256 的标准种子对应一次运行中的第 1,842 个候选值。团队已公开复现代码。
结果表明,P-192、P-224、P-256、P-384 和 P-521 的种子,均可由 1997 年至 1998 年的 Unix 时间戳初始化生成。其中,P-256 对应 1997 年 8 月 16 日,经过 1,842 轮候选生成得到标准中的种子。
Anthropic 强调,这不是破解 ECDSA,也没有发现新的攻击方式,结果降低了参数被刻意植入后门的疑虑,使用者无需因而采取措施。不过,研究尚未解释全部细节,涵盖 B-163 种子的来源、部分曲线基点的生成方式,以及为何跳过某些可用候选曲线。
本文来源:https://www.ithome.com/1/014/191.htm
若有版权问题,请来信告知:13951431913#139.com 或在右方提交评论。
IT House October 17th news, Anthropic released a blog post yesterday (October 16th), announcing that its internal research with Claude model in less than 30 minutes, traced out five National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standard elliptic curve of the "seed" (seed) source, for a 26-year extension of the cryptography case to provide a reproducible answer.

IT House Note: The seed here can be understood as "a piece of starting data used when generating elliptic curve parameters", generating rules like a fixed program machine, and the seed is the raw material input into the machine. The same raw materials, treated according to the same rules, can get the same results. After the seed is published, others can re-calculate and check whether the curve parameters are indeed generated according to the published steps.

The puzzle stems from a set of elliptic curves that were incorporated into the US digital signature standard in 2000. The seeds were given by the US National Security Agency (NSA), but the generation process was not explained, which has long sparked speculation about whether the backdoor is hidden. These curves are used in the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) to help verify the authenticity of digital information.

According to Anthropic, Claude turned to troubleshooting software tools common in the 1990s and found that the seeds actually came from the pseudo-random number generator lrand48 in the C language library, and the initialization input was a Unix timestamp.

The model traces the generation back to 1997 to 1998 by recognizing the bit pattern, restoring the generator state, and reversing the calculation. Among them, the standard seed of P-256 corresponds to the 1,842nd candidate value in one run. The team has made the code publicly available.

The results show that the seeds of P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 can all be generated by Unix timestamp initialization from 1997 to 1998. Among them, P-256 corresponds to August 16, 1997, after 1,842 rounds of candidate generation, the seeds in the standard were obtained.

Anthropic emphasizes that this is not a cracking of the ECDSA, and no new attack methods have been discovered, which reduces the suspicion that the parameters are deliberately implanted in the back door, so that users do not need to take action. However, the study has not yet explained all the details, including the source of the B-163 seeds, how some of the curve basis points were generated, and why some of the available candidate curves were skipped.
This article is from: https://www.ithome.com/1/014/191.htm For copyright issues, please write to: 13951431913#139.com or submit a review on the right.